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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the motive ideas and assumptions that have informed industrial 
policy in Uganda since 1945. I deploy a historical perspective in order to understand the 
process of industrial policy and hope to capture the practices of industrial policy so as to 
explain the failure to pursue a successful industrialisation process in the country. The 
objective is to explain the nature of Uganda’s industrial policy practices, historically, with 
the view to deepening our understanding its impact on the industrialisation process. The 
study contends that industrial policy and industrialisation are often products of 
numerous historical, social, economic and political considerations. The major finding of 
this thesis is that the lack of a coherent industrial policy was a major contributing factor 
in the explanation of Uganda’s stunted industrialisation process. 
 
Secondly, the study analyses industrial policy practices in light of the imposition of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) on the country. Apart from the specific 
policies and institutional framework under SAPs, the study endeavours to explain their 
impact on industrial sector and it is  focused on three themes: i) effects of liberalisation 
and privatisation on industry, ii) the sources of finance for industry and iii) the 
technology policy and its implications for industrial policy. The study as well addresses 
the public-private sector interactions which are seen as an expression of embryonic 
embedded autonomy. 
 
The study contends that for industrial policy to be effective at the national level and 
enhance competitiveness of industry there should be a selective, sectoral focus approach 
rather than a general regulation of the entire economy. Given the variant sectoral 
characteristics and features, the understanding of specific sectoral needs is critical to 
avoid a generalised industrial policy practices. The focus on sectors brings out similarities 
and differences which may inform state policy towards each of them. To illustrate the 
differences and similarities between sectors and the need for differentiated industrial 
policy options, we take the cases of the textile and fish processing industry sub-sectors. 
 
In conclusion, the thesis contends that to advocate for industrial policy in the current 
global context constitutes a movement away from traditional interventionism and goes 
beyond the market versus the state dichotomy and recommends their close interactions 
to realise sustained industrialisation. In this case, the interaction between institutions, 
technology and market reforms as the basis of a coherent industrial policy. From a policy 
perspective, this study attempts to provide an analysis that may lead to improved 
industrial policy-making within Uganda’s broad political economy. 
 ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................................... I 
ABBREVIATIONS.........................................................................................................................VI 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND SOURCES.............................................................................VIII 
DEDICATION ...............................................................................................................................IX 
DECLARATION............................................................................................................................. X 
CHAPTER ONE .............................................................................................................................. 1 
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM ............................................................. 1 
1.0 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................1 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM ..................................................................................1 
1.2 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF UGANDA’S INDUSTRIAL POLICIES ..................................................4 
1.3 CURRENT CONTEXT: BASIC NATIONAL ECONOMY OF UGANDA .....................................................6 
1.3.1 Geography and Basic Economic Data...................................................................................7 
1.3.2 The Structure of Manufacturing.............................................................................................8 
1.3.3 The Industries Selected for Illustration of Industrial Policy Practice..................................11 
1.3.4 Overview of the Clothing and Textiles Industry...................................................................11 
1.3.5 Overview of the Fish Processing Industry ...........................................................................12 
1.4 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM ....................................................................................13 
1.5 PURPOSE STATEMENT...................................................................................................................14 
1.6 STUDY AIMS AND OBJECTIVES .....................................................................................................15 
1.7 RESEARCH QUESTIONS .................................................................................................................16 
1.8 THE RATIONALE/SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY ............................................................................16 
1.9 METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION METHOD......................................................................17 
1.9.1 Research Design ..................................................................................................................18 
1.9.2 Data Collection Techniques.................................................................................................19 
1.9.3 Sampling ..............................................................................................................................19 
1.9.4 Limitations ...........................................................................................................................20 
1.9.5 Structure and Scope of the Thesis ........................................................................................20 
CHAPTER TWO............................................................................................................................ 24 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................... 24 
2.0 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................24 
2.1 INDUSTRY AND INDUSTRIALISATION.............................................................................................25 
2.2 DEVELOPMENTAL SCHOOL (1945-1970S).....................................................................................26 
2.2.1 Developmentalism................................................................................................................27 
2.2.2 Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI)...........................................................................29 
2.2.3 A Critique of Import Substitution.........................................................................................34 
2.2.4 Dependency Critique of Developmentalism.........................................................................37 
2.2.5 The Socialist Model and Industrialisation ...........................................................................41 
2.2.6 The Failure of Developmentalism and the Rise of Neo-Classical Theory............................45 
2.2.7 Export-Oriented Industrialisation (EOI) .............................................................................46 
2.2.8 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) .........................................................................................50 
2.2.9 Export Processing Zones (EPZ)...........................................................................................53 
2.3 EXPERIENCES OF INDUSTRIALISATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA ................................................55 
2.4 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................61 
CHAPTER THREE ....................................................................................................................... 64 
3. ANALYTICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK........................................................... 64 
3.0 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................64 
3.0.1 Structuralist Approach.........................................................................................................64 
3.0.2 Neo-liberal Approach ..........................................................................................................67 
3.1 INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (IPE) APPROACH ..............................................................68 
3.1.1 Institutions ...........................................................................................................................70 
3.1.2 States and Markets ...............................................................................................................73 
 iii
3.1.3 Developmental state.............................................................................................................74 
3.1.4 Bureaucracy.........................................................................................................................75 
3.1.5 Embedded Autonomy............................................................................................................77 
3.1.6 State Autonomy ....................................................................................................................78 
3.1.7 Intermediate Institutions ......................................................................................................79 
3.1.8 The Market ...........................................................................................................................79 
3.1.9 Late Industrialisation...........................................................................................................81 
3.1.10 Technological Learning .....................................................................................................82 
3.1.11 Value Chains and Upgrading.............................................................................................84 
3.1.12 National Innovation System ...............................................................................................86 
3.2 DIMENSIONS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY ...........................................................................................90 
3.2.1 Theoretical Arguments for Industrial Policy .......................................................................91 
3.2.2 Theoretical Arguments against Industrial Policy ................................................................96 
3.3 STATES AND MARKETS: COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES.....................................102 
3.4 CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................108 
CHAPTER FOUR .........................................................................................................................109 
4. INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF UGANDA’S INDUSTRIALISATION ..................109 
4.0 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................109 
4.1 “LATE” COLONIAL INDUSTRIALISATION - 1945 – 1962 ..............................................................110 
4.1.1 The Colonial Bureaucracy .................................................................................................112 
4.1.2 Coordination agencies and institutions for control over resource flow.............................114 
4.1.3 Control over Financial Resources .....................................................................................119 
4.1.4 Intermediate Institutions ....................................................................................................121 
4.1.5 Technical Education and Entrepreneurship ......................................................................123 
4.2 IMMEDIATE POST-COLONIAL INDUSTRIAL POLICIES, (1962-71).................................................125 
4.2.1 Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI).........................................................................126 
4.2.2 Africanisation / Ugandanisation Policy.............................................................................128 
4.2.3 Financing Industrialisation and FDI .................................................................................130 
4.2.4 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) .......................................................................................132 
4.2.5 Nationalisation...................................................................................................................134 
4.2.6 Limitations of ISI policy.....................................................................................................135 
4.3 THE “ECONOMIC WAR” POLICY AND DE-INDUSTRIALISATION (1972-80) ..................................138 
4.4 CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................144 
CHAPTER FIVE...........................................................................................................................146 
5. INDUSTRIAL POLICIES UNDER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES (SAPS) 
1981-2006.........................................................................................................................................146 
5.0 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................146 
5.1 SAPS AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES, PHASE ONE – THE OBOTE II PERIOD (1981-85) ....................147 
5.1.1 Rehabilitation Efforts under SAPs .....................................................................................148 
5.1.2 The Expropriated Properties Act, (1983)...........................................................................150 
5.1.3 Liberalisation and its Effect on Industry, 1981-85.............................................................150 
5.1.4 Sources of Finance for Industry.........................................................................................152 
5.2 SAPS AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES, PHASE TWO – 1987-2006......................................................153 
5.2.1 Liberalisation and the Industrial Sector ............................................................................155 
5.2.2 Privatisation of the Public Industrial Sector......................................................................160 
5.2.3 Financing Industrialisation and Investment ......................................................................166 
5.2.4 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Industrial Sector ....................................................173 
5.2.5 Export Processing Zones (EPZs) .......................................................................................179 
5.2.6 Financing Industry with Foreign Aid and Loans ...............................................................180 
5.2.7 Politics and Patronage in Financing of Industry...............................................................182 
5.2.8 Conclusion .........................................................................................................................184 
CHAPTER SIX..............................................................................................................................187 
6. INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND AGENCIES IN SUPPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
SECTOR ........................................................................................................................................187 
6.0 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................187 
6.1 BRIEF BACKGROUND TO THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS..............................................................188 
 iv 
6.2 THE REFORM OF THE BUREAUCRACY .........................................................................................189 
6.3 SPECIALISED AGENCIES IN SUPPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR .............................................197 
6.4 INDUSTRIAL POLICY INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................200 
6.5 INSTITUTIONS FOR TECHNOLOGY POLICY (UIRI & UNCST) .....................................................202 
6.5.1 Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) .....................................204 
6.5.2 Uganda Industrial Research Institute (UIRI).....................................................................207 
6.6 INDUSTRIALISTS AND THE UGANDA MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION (UMA)...........................210 
6.7 CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................220 
CHAPTER SEVEN...................................................................................................................... 222 
7. THE TEXTILE AND CLOTHING INDUSTRY ................................................................... 222 
7.0 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................222 
7.1 THE STRUCTURE OF UGANDA’S TEXTILE INDUSTRY ..................................................................223 
7.2 THE HISTORICAL LEGACY: COLONIAL AND INDEPENDENCE PERIOD, 1950-80 ...........................226 
7.3 THE TEXTILE IMPORT SUBSTITUTION UNDER COLONIALISM: 1950-62........................................227 
7.4 TEXTILE ISI FROM 1962 TO THE 1972 “ECONOMIC WAR” ..........................................................229 
7.5 THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY UNDER SAPS........................................................................................232 
7.6 MARKET REFORMS AND THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY .......................................................................236 
7.7 SECOND-HAND CLOTHING AND TEXTILE INDUSTRY ..................................................................242 
7.8 PRIVATISATION AND CONSTRAINTS ON THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY ................................................247 
7.9 THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY AND EXPORT ORIENTATION .................................................................252 
7.10 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................260 
CHAPTER EIGHT ...................................................................................................................... 263 
8. THE FISH PROCESSING INDUSTRY.................................................................................. 263 
8.0 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................263 
8.1 THE STRUCTURE OF THE FISHING INDUSTRY ..............................................................................264 
8.1.1 The Evolution of the Fish Processing Industry ..................................................................267 
8.1.2 The Natural Resource Base of Fish Processing.................................................................269 
8.2 EXPORT ORIENTATION OF THE FISH PROCESSING INDUSTRY ......................................................275 
8.3 COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES FOR EXPORT MARKETS IN THE FISH INDUSTRY................................285 
8.4 THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERACTIONS IN THE FISH INDUSTRY ....................................................289 
8.5 DEPENDENCE ON EXPORTS MARKETS ........................................................................................292 
8.6 CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................296 
CHAPTER NINE ........................................................................................................................ 298 
9. CONCLUSION: SUMMARY, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH .. 298 
9.0 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................298 
9.1 SUMMARY AND CENTRAL ARGUMENTS......................................................................................298 
9.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION....................................................................................................303 
9.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS ................................................................................................................304 
9.4 POTENTIAL AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .............................................................................306 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................ 323 
 
 v 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE 1 :  LOCATION OF AREAS OF RESEARCH ON UGANDA MAP....................................XI 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 1.1:  GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) AT CONSTANT (1997/1998) PRICES: ..........8 
TABLE 1.2: INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, ANNUAL GROUP SUMMARY.................9 
TABLE 1.3:  SELECTED MAJOR INDUSTRIAL GROUPS AND THEIR CONSTITUENT FIRMS
................................................................................................................................................................10 
TABLE 1.4:  SELECTED LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS ..........................................................11 
TABLE 4.1: SELECTED INVESTMENTS FROM THE 1950S (BEFORE INDEPENDENCE) ......136 
TABLE 4.2: SELECTED INVESTMENTS FROM THE 1960S (AFTER INDEPENDENCE) .........137 
TABLE 5.1: UGANDA: PUBLIC ENTERPRISES SUBSIDIES FROM GOVERNMENT...............162 
TABLE 5.2: INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF UDB PORTFOLIO, 1980-1997...........................172 
TABLE 6.1:  CIVIL SERVICE SIZE AFTER REFORMS .................................................................192 
TABLE 6.2: STI SECTOR FUNDING FOR FY 2005/2006 ...............................................................206 
TABLE 7.1: THE MAJOR MANUFACTURERS OF CLOTHING & TEXTILES............................224 
TABLE 7.2: SHARE OF COTTON TO GDP AND NATIONAL EXPORTS 1998-2005..................225 
TABLE 7.3: SOME IMPORTED RAW MATERIALS USED BY THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY......235 
TABLE 7.4: PRODUCTION IN, TRENDS AND EARNINGS SINCE LIBERALISATION ............239 
TABLE 7.5: UGANDA TEXTILE AND GARMENT TRADE BY VALUE (1995-1999). ...............246 
TABLE 7.6: INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT CAPITAL ALLOWANCES ..............253 
TABLE 8.1: LIST OF ESTABLISHED FISH PROCESSING PLANTS IN UGANDA.....................265 
TABLE 8.2: EXPORT OF FISH AND FISH PRODUCTS FROM UGANDA 1991-2006 ................266 
TABLE 8:3: FISHERIES PRODUCTION ESTIMATES FOR UGANDA 1999-2003.......................269 
TABLE 8.4: LEVELS OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE FISH PROCESSING FIRMS..........................280 
TABLE 8.5: ESTIMATES OF THE ECONOMIC LOSSES DURING THE BAN 1998-2000 ..........293 
TABLE 8.6:  ACQUACULTURE PRODUCTION BETWEEN 2000 AND 2003 IN UGANDA ......294 
 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: DEFINITIONS OF KEY CONCEPTS........................................................................308 
APPENDIX 2: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS...................................................................................312 
APPENDIX 3: TECHNOLOGY POLICY...........................................................................................313 
APPENDIX 4: PERD – PRIVATISATION INTERVIEW OUTLINE................................................314 
APPENDIX 5: UGANDA INVESTMENT AUTHORITY (UIA) POLICY .......................................315 
APPENDIX 6: INDUSTRIALISTS IN UGANDA – INTERVIEW OUTLINE..................................316 
APPENDIX 7: UGANDA MANUFACURERS ASSOCIATION (UMA)..........................................317 
APPENDIX 8: TEXTILE INDUSTRY POLICY ................................................................................318 
APPENDIX 9: COTTON DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION........................................................319 
APPENDIX 10: FISHERIES POLICY IN UGANDA INTERVIEW OUTLINE................................320 
APPENDIX 11: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR THE FISH FIRMS ...............................................321 
APPENDIX 12: NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES .......................................................................322 
 vi 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ACC           African Chamber of Commerce 
ADB          Africa Development Bank 
AGOA    African Growth and Opportunity Act 
ATM       African Textile Mills 
BCGA    British Cotton Growing Association 
CDC   Commonwealth Development Corporation 
CDO  Cotton Development Organisation 
CFTU Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
CMB   Coffee Marketing Board 
CMC   Common Man’s Charter 
DFCU Development Finance Company of Uganda 
DFF   Development Finance Fund 
DLF   Development Loan Fund 
EAC  East African Community 
EACM East African Common Market 
EAIRO East African Industrial Research Organisation 
ECGS   Export Credit Guarantee Scheme 
EDP    Enterprise Development Programme 
EOI   Export Oriented Industrialisation 
EPZs Export Processing Zones 
ERP  Economic Recovery Programme 
ERS  Export Refinance Scheme 
EU    European Union 
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment 
FEZs Free Economic Zones 
FTZs Free Trade Zones 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GMOs Genetically Modified Organisms 
ICB     International Commercial Bank 
IDA    International Development Association 
IDC   Industrial Development Corporation 
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development 
ILO   International Labour Organisation 
IMC   Indian Merchants Chamber 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IPE  Institutional Political Economy 
ISI  Import Substitution Industrialisation 
ITCRF Investment Term Credit Refinance Fund 
JBIC  Japan Bank for International Co-operation 
LDCs Less Developed Countries 
LMB  Lint Marketing Board 
MCP Master Craftsman Programme 
MFEZ Multi-Facility Economic Zone 
MNCs Multinational Corporations 
MoFPED Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
MP Member of Parliament 
MPS Ministry of Public Service 
MTAC Management Training and Advisory Centre 
MTTI Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Industry 
NARO National Agricultural Research Organisation 
NICs Newly Industrialising Countries 
NIS National Innovation System 
NRA National Resistance Army 
NRM National Resistance Movement 
 vii
NSSF National Social Security Fund 
NTB National Textiles Board 
NTC National Tobacco Corporation 
NTC National Trading Corporation 
NYTIL Nyanza Textiles Industries Limited 
OGL Open General Licence 
PERD Public Enterprise Reform and Divestiture 
PMB Produce Marketing Board 
PSF Private Sector Foundation 
PSRRC Public Service Review and Reorganisation Commission 
PU Privatisation Unit 
R&D Research and Development 
SAPs Structural Adjustment Programmes 
TEMAU Textile Manufacturers Association of Uganda 
TICAF Tororo Industrial Chemical Fertilisers 
TRIMs Trade-Related Investment Measures 
TUFMAC The Uganda Fish Marketing Corporation 
TUMPECO Uganda Metal Products and Enamelling Company 
UAFU Uganda African Farmers Union 
UCB Uganda Commercial Bank 
UCC Uganda Cement Corpration 
UCC Uganda Chamber of Commerce 
UCI  Uganda Cement Industries 
UCSB Uganda Credit & Savings Bank 
UDB  Uganda Development Bank 
UDC Uganda Development Corporation 
UEB Uganda Electricity Board 
UEPB Uganda Export Promotion Board  
UEPC Uganda Export Promotion Council 
UFPEA Uganda Fish Processors and Exporters Assocaition 
UGCEA Uganda Ginners and Cotton Exporters Association 
UGIETA Uganda Importers, Exporters and Traders Association 
UGIL United Garments Industries Limited 
UGU Uganda Growers Union 
UIA Uganda Investment Authority 
ULATI Uganda Leather Tanning Industry 
UMA Uganda Manufacturers Association 
UMACIS UMA onsultancy and Information Services 
UNBS Uganda National Bureau of Standards 
UNBS Uganda National Bureau of Statistics 
UNCCI Uganda National Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
UNCST The Uganda National Council for Science and Technology 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
UOPSA Uganda Oil Seeds Processors Association 
URA Uganda Revenue Authority 
USC Uganda Steel Corporation 
USSIA Uganda Small Scale Industries Association 
VAT Value Added Tax 
WB World Bank 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
 viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND SOURCES 
 
In the course of this study, I have benefited from support, encouragement and 
facilitation from many individuals and institutions. It is with great appreciation that I 
humbly acknowledge the assistance that I received from them. 
 
I particularly wish to thank my late supervisor, Prof. Guy Mhone for his intellectual 
guidance and personal humility. Prof. Mhone was one of the most patient teachers I have 
encountered in my academic life. Apart from intellectual clarity, he taught by example as 
he integrated me in research projects that he was involved in. I appreciate his 
commitment to academia. May your soul rest in peace. Secondly, Prof. Patrick Bond who 
agreed to supervise me upon the death of Prof.Mhone. I am very grateful for the 
thorough and helpful suggestions he contributed to this thesis. Thanks to Prof. Sheila 
Meintjes and Prof. Tom Lodge of Department of Political Studies, who guided me in 
proposal writing. Thanks to Prof. ROK Ajulu at University of the Witwatersrand 
Department of International Relations for helpful comments. My greatest gratitude goes 
to Dr. Cecile Badenhorst and Prof. Anne McLenan at the Graduate School of Public and 
Development Management (P&DM), who guided me in the revision of this thesis.  
 
 
My special thanks go to Makerere University, Kampala and its Staff Development 
Programme for sponsoring both tuition and fieldwork expenses for this thesis. My 
particular regards go to its former Chairman Prof. John-Mary Ssebuwufu and Dr Bwana 
Charles, the then Ag. Head of Department of Political Science and Public 
Administration. At University of the Witwatersrand, I am grateful for the provision of an 
amiable academic atmosphere without which the completion of this project would have 
been very difficult. My special thanks to the Office of Residence, particularly Rob 
Sharman, who sorted out my accommodation problems. Thanks to the library staff who 
always preserved for me research materials or ordered them through Inter-Library Loan 
facility. 
 
My greatest appreciation goes to sourcing of data that I have used in this study. Thanks 
to all staff at the National Archives, Entebbe and in particular Mr. Ongom at their 
Kampala branch, at the Ministry of Public Service. Thanks to the Makerere University 
library staff, especially of the Africana section who always traced for me the old 
newspapers of the 1950s. Access to Parliamentary library was very useful Thanks to all 
officials at the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Planning and Economic 
Development, Uganda Manufacturers Association, (UMA), Privatisation Unit, Uganda 
Investment Authority (UIA). There are particular individuals in these establishments 
whom I conducted interviews with and appreciate the time they offered. These include: 
Micheal Opagi,(Privatisation Unit), Dr. Maggie Kigozi (UIA), Musajjakawa, (UIA), Keith 
Muhakanisi, (Ministry of Planning and Economic Development), Mr Jorg Wiegratz, 
Industrial Competitiveness Consultant, (MTTI), Wassaw Hashim, (AGOA Country 
Response Office), Kashiwada Yuichi (Phenix Logistics Uganda, Ltd), Mrs. Katiti Ovia, 
(UFPEA), Mubiru Richard (Southern Range Ltd),  and general exceptions of those who 
who availed materials and offered interviews but requested that the sources may not be 
revealed.       
 
Finally, friendships and comradeships: Particularly, Kenny Hlela, Chris Malikane,  
Nthabiseng Motsemme, Okot Benge, Ernest Ogwang and above all Mehari Kefela, the 
Eritrean IT expert who helped with word processing.  
 ix
Dedication 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Mr Lawrence Okuku Okumu (R.I.P) and Mrs 
Nafula Okuku who always stressed to me the importance of education and knowledge in 
life. Special dedication goes to my son, Che Justus Kwang’a who has been an inspiration 
and is an expression of hope that there is a future in the quest for knowledge which he 
shall likely pursue.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
Declaration 
 
 
I Juma Anthony Okuku, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own 
work and has never been submitted for any award in any other university. 
 
 
December, 2006                               Signature………………………………………..         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xi
Figure 1:  Location of Areas of Research on Uganda Map 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Industrial policy has often been informed by particular ideas and assumptions about what 
government should or should not do and the extent of state intervention to promote 
industrialisation. Industrial policy presupposes clearly defined objectives and an 
organised system under particular institutional arrangements with a shared vision for 
industrial transformation. Industrialisation never proceeds independently of the concrete 
institutional and historical context. Uganda’s industrialisation process has not been 
informed by a coherent industrial policy. In addition to understanding what informs the 
industrial policy, the aim of this study is to investigate the factors and actual constraints 
to the industrialisation process of Uganda.  
 
This chapter presents the overall introduction to the study:  First, the background to the 
problem is stated. Second, the overall problem of industrial policy is presented within the 
context (both historical and current) of Uganda’s industrialisation process. Third, the 
research problem is precisely stated. Fourth, the purpose of the study is stated. Fifth, the 
research aims and objectives are spelled out. Sixth, key research questions are stated. 
Seventh, the rationale or the significance of the study is presented. Eighth, research 
methodology is presented.  Finally, the organisation of the thesis is outlined.  
 
1.1 Background to the Research Problem 
 
This study focuses on the problems and possibilities of industrial policy in Uganda. The 
industrial strategy pursued by post-colonial regimes in Uganda up to 1990s with the 
onset of privatisation, was conceived after the Second World War by the British colonial 
state. The first development plan by the colonial state, the Worthington Development 
Plan for Uganda (1946), did not spell out an industrial policy.1 An approximation to 
industrial policy can be seen in the establishment of Uganda Development Corporation 
                                                 
1 Uganda Protectorate (1946), Worthington Plan: The Development Plan for Uganda, London. This was a ten 
(10)-year development plan that was heavily influenced by the Labour government in United Kingdom 
(UK). The Plan laid out concrete proposals aimed at institutional and structural changes in the colonial 
economy. It emphasised the public sector and did not include serious considerations for the private sector. 
The Plan proposed the construction of a power station, state participation in industrial development and 
initiation of co-operatives. This informed the establishment of Uganda Development Corporation (UDC) 
as the first public sector undertaking to spearhead Uganda’s industrial development. 
 2 
(UDC) in 1952 which aimed at spearheading the industrialisation process by the state in 
partnership with private companies and individuals. Prominent among the private 
companies and individuals were actors such as Madhvani Group and Mehta Group, who 
were also owners of the two sugar estates in existence then. Basically, UDC was a 
product of the colonial development project. It acted as the mediator of the colonial and 
post-independence industrial policies. 
 
The First Five-Year Development Plan, (1961/2–1965/6), followed in the footsteps of 
Worthington Plan, (1946) and the World Bank Mission Report, (1961). The newly elected 
Prime Minister, A M Obote, consented to their recommendations.2  Both documents 
advocated for the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI). The Development Plan 
would continue the production of cement, beer, saw mills and sugar refineries. The stress 
was on semi-processing of primary products, prominently Cotton (textiles) and Coffee 
and did not recommend value addition and advanced manufacturing in the country. Up 
until President Milton Obote’s 1 May Day Nakivubo Pronouncements of 1970 that 
nationalised most significant Asian and British Industries, ISI was the major industrial 
strategy being pursued.3 
 
The “economic war” declared by President Idi Amin in 1972, which expropriated Asian 
properties, resulted in the generalised economic disarray and political instability.4 The 
“economic war” distorted the ISI as the entrepreneurs who had been the major link in 
mainly import dependent economy in terms of machinery and were mainly Asians were 
expelled. The industrial sector and the areas that complemented industry, particularly 
agriculture, mining, trade and commerce as well as education was disrupted by the 
unplanned take-over of Asian enterprises.  Underlying this whole process was that there 
was no coherent and well articulated industrial policy.  
                                                 
2 Uganda Government (1961), The First Five-Year Development Plan, the Worthington Plan 1946 and the World 
Bank Report on Uganda (1961). As President Milton Obote put it in the forward to the World Bank 
report, “In 1960 the World Bank carried out an economic survey mission and the report entitled “The 
Economic Development of Uganda” was published in 1961. The World Bank mission made practical 
recommendations supported by analysis as a basis for the programme of development of Uganda covering 
the period 1961/62 to 1965/66. My Government broadly accepts the recommendations in the report and 
has produced a development plan closely modelled on them” It is interesting to note that the World Bank 
took an implicitly pro-ISI stance at this early stage of Uganda’s development. 
3 The Nakivubo Pronouncements refers to the declaration of partial (60%) nationalisation of industries, 
banks and several commercial enterprises by the Obote, regime on May Day 1970. Barya, J.John (1986) The 
Impact of Foreign Capital on the Performance of the Uganda Development Corporation (UDC) – A Legal and Socio-
Economic Analysis, LLM, Warwick University and Onyach-Olaa, Martin (1989), Industrialisation Policies and 
Strategies of Uganda: 1962-1989, MA (Economics), University of  Manchester, United Kingdom.  
4 “Economic War” referred to the declaration by Idi Amin to expel Asians from Ugandan economy based 
on the perception that they were involved in illegal repatriation of capital from the country.  
 3 
By 1980, the formal economy had all but collapsed. The first Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs), lasting from (1981-84) stressed the rehabilitation of ISI industries 
related to coffee and cotton processing within the broad framework of macro-economic 
stability. The Second SAPs under the National Resistance Movement (NRM), regime 
from 1987 to the present, has had far-reaching impact on the economy. This phase 
emphasised macro-economic stability, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), privatisation of 
government parastals and the return of the expropriated Asian properties in the context 
of market reforms and full exposure to international “competition”.5 Thus, SAPs were 
perceived as a remedial strategy but still characterised by an incoherent industrial policy. 
 
The problem at the level of industrialisation, however, still remains. Although there has 
been a revival of some industries and establishment of new ones, manufacturing remains 
negligible as compared to agriculture with over 80% contribution to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). The industrial policy framework remains ill-defined and incoherent, 
although one is in the process of being crafted.6 The conception of technological transfer 
remains old-fashioned, that is, through FDI. There is little conception of a broad 
technological capacity building effort within a dynamic national innovation system to 
enhance the country’s industrial competitiveness. The Uganda National Council for 
Science and Technology (UNCST) which is responsible for technology policy 
formulation remains under-funded and under-staffed with little linkage to the industrial 
sector. Here in lies the policy problem, the effects of which the study aims to explain. 
 
The Ugandan policy-makers seem not to have thought through the consequences of the 
unbridled market reforms being pursued by the state under SAPs for the future of 
manufacturing capability and competitiveness of Uganda firms. The failure of 
industrialisation in Uganda in the last 50 years, however, must be seen in broad, complex, 
historical, political and economic processes confronting the country.  
 
                                                 
5 Barya, J.John (1995), Industrialisation and Technological Acquisition in Uganda: An Analysis of the Policy, Legal and 
Institutional Framework with Three Case Studies, Research Report Submitted to the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC), Ontario, Canada, February. 
6 Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry (2007), National Industrial Policy: A Strategy for Uganda’s 
Transformation, Competitiveness and Prosperity,  Kampala,  August. This follows various versions of industrial 
strategy  policy  statements since 1994. 
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1.2 The Historical Context of Uganda’s Industrial Policies 
 
The establishment of an industrial sector in Uganda was influenced by two major factors: 
establishment of Asians as entrepreneurs, particularly after World War II and, secondly, 
the then ruling Labour Party ideology of state control. During the colonial period and the 
period of Kenya-Uganda railway construction, Uganda experienced the first influx of 
Asians. After the completion of the railway about 6,000 Asians decided to remain in 
Uganda. By 1953, Asians held 97.5% of trade in the main city of Kampala. Almost the 
entire sugar production and cotton processing and ginning were in their hands. By 1963, 
there were over 82,000 Asians, equivalent to just about 1% of the total Uganda 
population.7 These owned various commercial units and industries. Asians therefore 
became the first industrialist (entrepreneurial) class of Uganda. 
 
During the same period, the colonial authorities of the 1940s and early 1950s preferred 
public corporations on the grounds of political ideology and organisational reasons 
influenced by the Keynesian revolution.8 Britain, under the Labour Party government of 
1945-51 was undertaking a remarkable expansion of the public enterprise sector of the 
economy. The Labour Party with socialist-leaning political ideology was for the state to 
control the key sectors rather than have it left to the private sector. At the organisational 
level, public corporations were chosen and not the government departments in the 
promotion of industry because they were in a better position to give a combination of 
public ownership, public accountability and business management for public ends. This 
resulted in the formation of UDC in 1952, with funds from cotton and coffee proceeds, 
and was given the mandate to spearhead investment in the industrial sector.9 
 
By the time of independence in 1962, given the structure of the accumulation process 
that discriminated against Africans, the main groups that could accumulate and invest 
were the Asian entrepreneurs and the colonial state owned and controlled UDC. By 
1962, therefore, an indigenous Ugandan industrialist (entrepreneurial) class in Uganda 
                                                 
7 Government of Uganda (1964), Background to the Budget, Entebbe, p.25 
8 Middleton, Roger (1987), “The Rise and Fall of the Managed Economy” Middleton, Refresh 5 (Autumn 
1987), p.5. According to Middleton, Keynesian revolution refers to the economic theorising by John 
Maynard Keynes, (1883-1946), a British economist whose ideas are particularly remembered for advocating 
interventionist government policy. Keynesianism was informed by the view that governments know how 
to control the economy and secure full employment. The essential message of the Keynesian revolution 
was that capitalist economies were not self-stabilising by virtue of some automatic market mechanism – 
hence some form of government intervention would be needed to stimulate demand and help the 
economy get back full employment.   
9  Mamdani, Mahmood (1976), Politics and Class Formation in Uganda, New York, London: Monthly Review 
Press. 
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barely existed. During the first decade of independence in 1960s, government’s macro-
economic policy framework was that of a mixed economy where the private sector was 
allowed to operate side by side with government, with certain sectors, which were 
considered strategic reserved for the state. In the context of the absence of an indigenous 
entrepreneurial class, the state intensified the drive towards the industrialisation of the 
economy through UDC by investing substantially in agro-allied and processing 
industries, mining, agricultural enterprises and manufacturing.  
 
The industrialisation strategy adopted was that of a market-based, state-led ISI. The 
objectives of ISI were to help raise the standards of living of the people, to provide 
employment opportunities, to supply consumer goods and to add value to the natural 
resources through processing. Emphasis was put on the production of low-skill import 
substitutes. There was also a gradual move towards the Ugandanisation of the economy.  
 
The “Move to the Left” in late 1960s and the consequent “Nakivubo Pronouncement” 
in May 1970 were attempts to fulfil partially the objective of Ugandanisation.10 This 
action, as that of “economic war” in 1972, was informed by the ideology of economic 
nationalism. To underline, briefly, the difference between the “Move to the Left” and the 
“economic war”, it can be noted that two differ significantly. While Ugandanisation in 
the context of the “Move to the Left” was an exercise in state building or transformation 
and was intended as a step by step control over the economy, the 1972 “economic war” 
represented state destruction as it was unplanned and destroyed the entrepreneurial class 
in the economy. 
 
The second independence decade of the 1970s witnessed the expropriation of the non-
Ugandan business followed by an adhoc allocation of business to Ugandans who had no 
entrepreneurial culture.  By 1979, the manufacturing sector had all but collapsed. Despite 
the fact that there were 50 factories in the medium and large-scale sector operating in 
1971, by 1981 at the launch of SAPs, 15 of these had completely closed down and the 
capacity utilisation of the remainder was only around 25%. In the small industries sector, 
870 establishments were operating in 1971. By 1981, only 418 could be identified and of 
                                                 
10 Nabudere, Dan, (1980), Imperialism and Revolution in Uganda, London and Dar es Salaam: Onyx, Tanzania 
Publishing House and Jorgensen Jan, (1981), Uganda: A Modern History, London: Croom Helm. 
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these 162 had closed down and 256 were operating only intermittently, the rest had 
vanished.11 
 
In the 1980s, attempts were made to revitalise the manufacturing sector in three ways: 
rehabilitation, liberalisation and return of the expropriated properties to the former Asian 
owners. During this period there were moves by government to rehabilitate and to 
liberalise the economy. The Expropriated Bill (1982), which was enacted by parliament in 
1983, sought to return the expropriated properties to their original Asian owners. Some 
economic recovery was registered due to the rehabilitation and the attempted 
privatisation measures. Despite these efforts, by the early 1990s, the contribution of the 
manufacturing sector to total GDP had not yet achieved the 12% level of the 1960s.12 
 
Finally, the macro-economic framework of the 1980s was continued in the 1990s by 
opening up the economy fully and gearing it for regional and international competition. 
The early 1990s saw the setting up of several institutions to aid the process of industrial 
transformation. These included: the enactment of the Investment Code and the creation 
of the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA), liberalisation of foreign exchange market, 
Privatisation Unit (PU), Land Act and Uganda Export Promotion Board (UEPB) and 
Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), among others, moves which aimed at preparing the 
economy for competitive regional and world markets. It should be noted that the missing 
link in all these efforts was the lack of a concrete articulation of the notion of industrial 
policy, which would act as a guiding programme for the acquisition of technology and 
the enhancement of the industrial competitiveness of Uganda’s industrial sector. Below 
we give Uganda’s basic economic data. 
 
1.3 Current Context: Basic National Economy of Uganda 
  
This section gives basic data on Uganda’s national economy. The first part outlines the 
geography and general economic data of the country. The second part outlines the 
contribution of the manufacturing sector to the national economy through the index of 
industrial production, labour market indicators and the major industrial groups in the 
country. 
 
  
                                                 
11 Onyach-Olaa, Martin (1992), “Industry in Uganda: Current State, Problems and Prospects”, a paper 
presented at the National Economic Workshop, Entebbe, 27th-28th November,  pp 3-4. 
12 Ibid, p.4. 
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1.3.1 Geography and Basic Economic Data 
 
Uganda is a land locked country situated in East Africa at 1.00 degrees N and 32 degrees 
East with a total area of 235,887 sq km of which 193,504 are land and 42,383 inland 
waters. It has borders with Kenya to the East (933 km), Tanzania to the South (396 km), 
and Rwanda to the South West (169 km), The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to 
the West (765 km) and Sudan to its North (435 km). (See figure 1). 
 
Uganda is endowed with fertile soils, regular rainfall and mineral deposits of copper, 
cobalt and newly discovered oil. The agricultural sector controlled by mainly small 
farmers (peasants) is the most important sector for the country’s economy employing 
about 80% of the work force. Its main exports are coffee, fish and fish products, tea, 
gold, cotton, flowers and other horticultural products.  
 
Uganda’s economy has increasingly become monetised as evidenced by the share in 
GDP of the non-monetary sector which declined from 76% in 1990 to about 36% in 
2001, signalling a return to market transactions. The GDP growth (at factor cost) was 
5.4% during the fiscal year 2003/04 compared to 4.5% recorded in 2002/03. The real 
GDP growth increased in 2004/05 to 6.4% but again declined in 2005/06 to 5.1%.  The 
decline is attributed to fall in agricultural output due to prolonged drought conditions 
and effect on industry sector due to energy crisis. 
 
The principal countries that Uganda exports to, remain in Africa. During the 2005, 
Kenya supplied the largest imports to Uganda. The other main trading partners were 
South Africa, Egypt and Swaziland. Imports to Uganda consist mainly of investment 
capital equipment, vehicles, petroleum, medical supplies and cereals. The principal 
countries from which Uganda imports are Kenya, India, UAE, South Africa,  Japan, US.  
Below we have the contribution to GDP percentage contribution by sector. 
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Table 1.1:  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Constant (1997/1998) Prices:  
 
Percentage Contribution by Sector, 2001/02 – 2005/06 
 
Sector                                      2001/02       2002/03     2003/04    2004/05    2005/06 
 
Agriculture 36.5% 35.7% 34.1% 32.5% 31.0% 
Mining & Quarrying   0.7%   0.7%    0.7%   0.8%    0.7% 
Manufacturing   8.7%   8.6%    8.5%   8.9%    8.3% 
Electricity & Water   1.3%   1.3%    1.3%   1.3%    1.2% 
Construction   6.6%   7.0%    7.5%   7.8%    8.4% 
Wholesale, Retail Trade & 
Hotels 
12.7%  12.8%   12.9%  13.0%   13.5% 
Transport & Communication   4.9%   5.5%   6.3%   7.2%  8.2% 
Community Services 13.2% 12.9% 13.0% 12.8% 13.0% 
Rent & Owner – occupied 
Dwellings 
   6.9%   6.9%   6.9%   6.8%   6.7% 
All net taxes on Products & 
Imports 
   8.5%   8.7%   8.7%   8.9%   9.0% 
Total GDP at Market 
Prices 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Source: Statistical abstracts, UBOS, 2006. 
 
From the above table agriculture remains the major contributor to gross domestic 
product as the country remains an agricultural economy. Manufacturing contributes less 
than 10 % of the GDP. The other major contributor is the trading and service sector. 
 
 
1.3.2 The Structure of Manufacturing 
 
Contributing 8.5% of Real GDP, 5% of total advertised employment and over 20% of 
export earnings, manufacturing sector still remains relatively small. The growth of formal 
manufacturing has come under severe strains, mainly from an ongoing power crisis, but 
also other constraints like bad roads, lack of favourable long term financing and has 
shown negative growth between 2004/05 and 2005/06 by 3.5%.13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Statistical Abstract, UBOS, 2006. 
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Table 1.2: Index of Industrial Production, Annual Group Summary 
 
2001-2005 (Base 1997/98=100) 
 
 
Source: Abstracts UBOS, 2006. 
 
From the above table, it can be noted that the manufacturing sector is based largely on 
the processing of agricultural commodities, such as cotton, coffee, sugarcane and food 
crops. There are a number of large-scale industries producing beverages, tobacco, wood 
and paper products, construction materials and chemicals. The small-scale manufacturing 
is dominated by the clothing industry, but also includes maize processing units, furniture-
making and general workshops. The growth rates of various sectors are represented in 
the table. The growth of formal manufacturing, however, has seen strains, owing mainly 
to the current power crisis, but also from other constraints such as bad transport 
networks, lack of long-term financing services that resulted in negative growth between 
2004/05 and 2005/06 by 3.5%.14 
 
There exists a substantial emerging industrial class in Uganda. This class is dominated by 
the old Ugandan Asian industrialists namely the Mehta , Madhavani group of companies 
and Karmali (Mukwano).  
 
The Madhvani Group is estimated to employ between 7,000 and 10,000 workers and the 
contribution of around 8% of total tax revenue collection in Uganda at present down 
from approximately 10% in corporate and excise taxes in 1970 before the Asian 
expulsion in 1972. 
 
                                                 
14 Statistical Abstract, Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), 2006. 
Group No. of 
Establishments 
Weight 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Foods & Beverages 48 39.3 131.9 135.3 136.4 141.6 123.8 
Drinks & Tobacco 12 18.6 119 122.5 137.3 153.9 179.2 
Textiles, Clothing & 
Footwear 
7 4.6 166.3 168.4 207.4 267.1 249.0 
Paper and Printing 13 6.2 183.8 156.7 192 189.4 182.8 
Chemical Products 22 8.2 138.2 132 150.7 149.1 183.1 
Bricks and Cement 11 5.6 148.6 167.9 158.5 207.7 200.1 
Metal Products 19 10.5 204.9 202.2 178.6 226.8 302.2 
Miscellaneous  17 7 103.7 152 151.6 188.8 179.6 
Total 149 100 141.4 145.5 151.2 169.2 175.3 
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The Mehta Group of Companies employs approximately 7000 workers and a 
contribution of about US $ 7 million in taxes. 
The Mukwano Group of Companies is one of the largest conglomerates in Uganda. It 
employs more than 10,000 workers and contributes about US $ 20 million in taxes 
annually. Below are selected major industrial groups in Uganda’s economy. 
 
Table 1.3:  Selected Major industrial groups and their constituent firms  
 
A) Madhvani Group of Companies B) Mehta Group of Companies 
1. Kakira Sugar Works (1985) Ltd 1. Sugar Corporation Ltd 
2. Steel Corporation of East Africa Ltd 2. UGMA Engineering Corporation 
3. East African Glass Works (1995) Ltd 3. Cable Corporation 
4. Associated Match Company (1985) Ltd 4. Agro-Chemical & Food Company Ltd 
5. Madhvani Soap Industries Ltd  
C) Mukwano Group of Companies D) Alam Abid Group of Companies 
1. Mukwano Industries Uganda Ltd 1. Casements (A) (1965) Ltd 
2. A.K. Oils and Fats Ltd 2. Steel Rolling Mills Ltd 
3. Mukwano Personal Care Products Ltd 3. Roofclad (1986) Ltd 
4. A.K. Plastics (U) Limited 4. Oxygas Ltd 
5. Mukwano Sweets & Confectionaries Ltd 5. Crocodile Tools Co. Ltd – Formerly 
Chillington Tool Co. 
E) Mulwana Group of Companies F) Spear Group of Companies 
1. Nice House of Plastics Ltd 1. GM Tumpeco Ltd 
2. Uganda Batteries Ltd 2. Wava Beverages Ltd 
3. Jessa Milk Processing (1994) Ltd 3. Wava Holdings 
G) Sembule Group of Companies 4. Wava Engineering 
1. Sembule  Steel Mills Ltd 5. Spear Motors 
2. Sembule Electronics Ltd   
3. Shelter Ltd  
4. ATC Sembule (Computers)   
  
Source: From My Fieldwork, 2006. 
 
Apart from sugarcane, milk and oil seeds, which are produced in the country, most of the 
raw materials and component parts of the firms above are all imported. They function 
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mainly as assembling plants with very minimal backward and forward linkages.  In the 
table below we outline the basic labour market indicators. 
Table 1.4:  Selected Labour Market Indicators  
 
Indicators Male Female Total 
Uganda labour force (Number ‘000) 4,634.2 5,138.4 9.773 
Labour force in Non-Agriculture informal 
sector (Number ‘000) 
1,418 1,142 2,560 
Working poor (Number ‘000) 1,629 1,876 3,505 
Labour force Participation Rate (%)     80.3      79.9    80.1 
Employment to population Ratio (%)     78.2      76.6    77.4 
National Unemployment Rate (%)       2.6        4.2      3.5 
Urban Unemployment Rate (%)       7.6      17.0    12.2 
Youth Unemployment Rate (%)       7.5        8.8      6.3 
Share of youth to Total     51      62    58 
Underemployment Rate (%)     18.9      15.1    16.9 
 
Source: Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS), 2002/03. 
 
The Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) 2002/03 showed that Uganda’s labour 
force stood at 9.8 million persons, of which 2.6 were in non-agriculture informal sector. 
Of the 9.8 million persons in the labour force, 3.5 million persons were the working 
poor. The unemployment rate was 3.5 percent, while the underemployment rate is 17 
percent.15 
 
1.3.3 The Industries Selected for Illustration of Industrial Policy Practice 
 
The details of contributions by the sub-sectors selected for illustration of the practice of 
industrial policy, namely i) clothing and textiles sector and ii) fish processing are outlined 
in their respective  chapters.  What follows are brief overviews. 
 
 
1.3.4 Overview of the Clothing and Textiles Industry 
 
The clothing and textile industry, in its current modernised form, is important because 
processes remain very labour intensive, skill requirements are generally low and exporting 
textiles is still one of the best options to enter the world market and create employment 
in a country like Uganda. 
 
                                                 
15 Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), (2006), p.13. 
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Uganda has a strong history of textile manufacturing dating back to the 1950s. Uganda’s 
textile industry consists of 29 ginneries with a total capacity of 1,100 bales a day. Actual 
production is, however, only 500 per day. There are also eight textile mills in the country, 
yet none are major exporters. Ugandan textile firms employ an average of 275 workers. 
Recent investment guides outline opportunities in the manufacturing of textile products 
such as lint, fabrics and mixed fabrics and fibre yarns. Uganda cotton farmers do not use 
pesticides, creating opportunities for the processing of organic cotton products. A 
substantial faction of the agricultural population is involved in cotton growing especially 
in the Eastern and Northern parts of the country. 
 
1.3.5 Overview of the Fish Processing Industry 
 
The fish processing and export business has become a major contributor to the national 
economy. Fisheries products have become Uganda’s main commodity export, only next 
to coffee. Five of the East African great lakes lie within Uganda’s territory. Lake Victoria, 
the world’s second largest lake, has a surface are of 68,000 square Km and is shared 
between Tanzania 51%, Uganda 43% and Kenya 6%. The lakes can enable sustained fish 
processing and export.  
 
The industry provides livelihood to a substantial part of the population. By 2005, more 
than 350,000 people were directly employed by the fisheries industry in Uganda and over 
1.2 million were indirectly employed.16  Fishing operations are conducted by local fisher 
people. Industrial fishing that uses more sophisticated mechanised techniques is not 
allowed as it would lead to the depletion of fish stocks more rapidly thus endangering 
local livelihoods. 
 
The fish processing industry consists of 17 operating firms which employ between 150 
and 400 workers on average. With the decline in the traditional exports of coffee, tea, 
tobacco and cotton, there has been their replacement by non-traditional exports, one of 
which is fish. By 2001 non-traditional exports had overtaken traditional exports. The best 
export performance has been observed in Uganda’s fish sub-sector followed by 
horticulture. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Nakaweesa, Dorothy (2006) “Uganda Fish Exports Earn US $ 143 million in 2005)”, The Monitor, 4th 
January. 
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1.4 Statement of the Research Problem 
 
 
Significant industrialisation has not been achieved in Uganda, as in most of sub-Saharan 
Africa, because of the failure to institute coherent industrial policies which are cognisant 
of the complex historical, political, economic and social context of the country. The basic 
research problem to be confronted is, to understand the failure to institute coherent 
industrial policies as the major explanation for Uganda’s stunted industrialisation. 
Although a measure of success was achieved by this strategy and manufacturing sector 
accounted for, on average 12% per annum of the total GDP in the 1960s and Uganda 
was able to export some of its manufactured products such as textile and sugar within 
the East Africa region,17 the less than optimum performance of ISI was mainly due to the 
non-selectivity, lack of a strategy that would be based on experience and the concrete 
contextual analysis of the various components of the economy. The wholesale ISI 
policies hardly paid attention to the process of reaching national and international 
competitiveness by local firms, as they remained cripplingly static and the political 
instability the 1970s accentuated the process. 
 
Secondly, there exists a knowledge gap in the studies on Uganda’s industrial policies and 
industrialisation, apart from a 1967 study,18 Barya (1986)19 and Onyach-Olaa (1989)20 the 
rest are general, limited and superficial to understanding Uganda’s industrial policies.  
The general studies include: Campbell (1975)21, Mamdani (1976)22, Naburere (1980)23 and 
Jorgensen (1981)24. The studies offer inadequate understanding of the importance of a 
coherent industrial policy to guide industrialisation. They are concerned with general 
political economy and tend to ignore the micro-economic mechanisms in support of the 
industrial sector.  
                                                 
17 Onyach-Olaa, Martin (1992), “Industry in Uganda: Current State, Problems and Prospects”, a paper 
presented at the National Economic Policy Workshop, Entebbe, 27th –28th November, p.3. 
18 Stoutjesdijk, E. J., (1967), Uganda’s Manufacturing Sector: A Contribution to Analysis of Industrialisation in East 
Africa, Kampala and Nairobi: East African Publishing House. 
19 Barya, J, John (1986), The Impact of Foreign Capital on the Performance of the Uganda Development Corporation 
(UDC) – A Legal and Social Economic Analysis, Master of Laws, Warwick University. 
20 Onyach-Olaa, Martin (1989), Industrialisation Policies and Strategies of Uganda: 1962-1989, MA 
(Economics), University of Manchester, UK. 
21 Campbell, Horace (1975), The Political Struggles of Africans to Enter the Market Place in Uganda, 1900-
1970, MA Thesis (Political Science), Makerere University. 
22 Mamdani, Mahmood (1976), Politics and Class Formation in Uganda, New York: Monthly Review Press.  
23 Nabudere, Dan (1980), Imperialism and Revolution in Uganda, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing 
House. 
24 Jorgesen, Jelmert, Jan (1981), Uganda a Modern History, London: Croom Helm. 
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Studies specific to the industrial sector suffer from a number of weakenesses. First, Barya 
(1986) is a legalistic study of UDC with dependency theoretical perspective. The central 
thesis of the study is that UDC was merely an instrument of foreign capital in 
collaboration with the local state. This is a rather narrow conception of the importance 
of institutions in the process of industrialisation in developing countries like Uganda. The 
major problem with public institutions has been their lack of coherence and failure to act 
as agents of transformation by building managerial and technological capacities and 
enhance industrial competitiveness.   
 
Second, Onyach-Olaa’s (1989) study is a general statement on industrialization policies 
and strategies in post-colonial Uganda. The specifics of industrial policy are not analysed. 
The discussion of choice of technology is narrowly focused on resource and capital 
saving strategy.25 The studies do not analyse the broad consequences of the unbridled 
market reforms for future of manufacturing capability of Uganda’s industries, particularly 
their competitiveness. 
 
This study, therefore, is an attempt to fill that knowledge gap as the above studies do 
little to advance knowledge on the industrialisation process in Uganda. This is perhaps 
the first major study that is focused primarily on Uganda’s industrial policies in the 
context of recent market reforms. The application of industrial policy framework is likely 
to aid in accomplishing this task as a guide to both the policy makers and firm owners in 
their planning and implementation of dynamic industrial policies.  
 
 
1.5 Purpose Statement 
  
The purpose of this research is to investigate why and how the failure to formulate a 
coherent industrial policy may explain the failed industrialisation process in Uganda.  
This limited the proper conceptualisation of the industrialisation process and tended to 
undermine the possible development of an entrepreneurial state. Such a state would have 
provided supportive infrastructural investment and targeted incentives necessary for 
stimulating technological learning, the accumulation of technological capacity in firms 
thus enhancing their competitiveness.  
 
                                                 
25 Onyach-Olaa, Martin (1989), Op. Cit p.138. 
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The current industrial policy environment is such that, for the bureaucrats and the 
entrepreneurs, rather than lay emphasis on the development of technological innovation, 
acquisition of technology and learning, have tended to use their strong political 
connections to maximise short-term accumulation interests. Clearly, there is need to re-
think past industrial policies and institute new ones. To do this, the socio-political bases 
of industrialisation must be clearly defined.  
 
1.6 Study Aims and Objectives 
 
General Objective 
 
The central objective of this study is to undertake a systematic investigation into what 
informs the nature of industrial policy and the industrialisation process in Uganda, 
focusing on the interaction between institutions, technology and the market reforms.  
The aim is to explain the problematic of Uganda’s industrialisation process with the view 
to suggesting priority areas for future industrial policy 
 
Specific Aim and Objectives 
 
More specifically, the aim and objectives of this study are to: 
1. Examine, through an analysis of historical data and recent industrial policy 
practices, their determinants and their implications for a comprehensive 
formulation of coherent industrial policy. 
 
2. To investigate the nature of institutions concerned with industrial 
development, their organisational efficacy, networking, coherence and their 
capacity to support and promote an effective industrialisation process. 
 
3. To study the specific cases of the development of technological capabilities, 
managerial capacity of individual firms in selected sectors for industrial 
development and competitiveness in the context of state policy and market 
reforms. 
 
4. To identify additional institutional and policy reforms required as compliments 
to industrial policy in order to improve overall performance of the economy in 
general and the industrial sector in particular. 
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5. To build a theoretical and empirical case for the importance of a coherent 
industrial policy and an effective national innovation system to develop 
technological capabilities, managerial capacity and competitiveness in late 
industrialising economies. 
 
6. Suggest priority areas for future industrial-policy relevant research. 
 
 
1.7 Research Questions 
 
i) What explains the lack of a coherent industrial policy in Uganda’s industrialisation 
experience?  
 
ii) What institutional mechanisms may be crafted to ensure coherent industrial policies? 
 
iii) What should be the new industrial policy direction for sustained industrial 
development in Uganda? 
 
1.8 The Rationale/Significance of the Study 
 
The study of the industrialisation process remains critical for development theorists and 
practitioners interested in the structural transformation of African economies in general 
and Ugandan one in particular. Industrialisation is essential to long-term development. 
Every country that has achieved sustained growth has also seen a structural 
transformation of its economy away from primary production toward industry. Industrial 
development is necessary to raise incomes and employment, to diversify exports and to 
extend markets. In nearly all economies, particularly those of East Asia, for instance, 
manufacturing has been the critical medium of structural transformation from a low-
productivity, low-income economy into one that is dynamic and diversified. 
Industrialisation, therefore, stands out as the solution to poverty and unemployment in 
countries like Uganda in the long term. 
 
More importantly, there is need to re-think the past industrial policies in Uganda. There 
is, however, uncritical acceptance of the standard SAPs by Uganda’s current policy-
makers. Therefore, in the absence of clearly spelled out measures to enhance Uganda’s 
capacity to move up the technological ladder through learning and innovation, the study 
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of industrial policy and the industrialisation process could provide a vision for the 
Ugandan economy to do more than export unprocessed primary commodities, such as 
coffee, cotton and tea. 
 
A United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) study argued that 
it is not possible to rely on market forces alone to move economies through the various 
stages of industrialisation and export orientation.26  This is because there are a number of 
market failures, problems of coordination, imperfect and asymmetric information, 
economies of scale, missing markets and imperfect competition in most developing 
economies. Since these factors impose themselves on the pace and direction of the 
industrialisation process, the question of how best to manage this process gains in 
importance. Industrial policy, in this instance, becomes crucial. 
 
The study is intended to contribute to knowledge, both theoretically and in the area of 
public policy debates on industrial development. The growing importance of the need to 
rationalise industrial processes merits serious attention from the academic community. 
The study recognises the point that industrial policy and industrialisation are often 
products of numerous historical, social, economic and political considerations. Industrial 
policy in itself, however, may not be a panacea to the industrial development problems in 
Uganda but it is rather a major guide to the industrialisation process. 
 
Below I outline the methodology used in the collection of data.  Data collection methods 
are often informed, first, by the philosophical disposition of the researcher and second, 
by the information needed from the research. 
 
1.9 Methodology and Data Collection Method 
 
 
This section of the chapter describes the research methodology used in data collection 
for this study. Research has been described as a systematic and organised effort to 
investigate a specific problem that needs a solution. Thus, a research process is based on 
logical relationships between subjects of investigation and not just beliefs.27 I carried out 
                                                 
26 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), (1996), UNCTAD Secretariat 
Report to the Conference on East Asian Development: Lessons for a New Global Environment, Geneva, 
Switzerland p.16. 
27 This section relies mainly on the following texts: 1) Neumann, W. (2000), Social Research Methods: 
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 4th edition and Gary King, Keohane. R and 
Verba S. (1994), Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton, New Jersey: 
University of Princeton. 
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the research for this study in cities of Kampala, Jinja, Entebbe and Mbale in Uganda 
where the firms in the illustrative cases studies (textile industry and fish processing) are 
located.  
 
 
 
1.9.1 Research Design 
 
The research conducted was policy-oriented as it was concerned and paid particular 
attention to the actions of government to leverage the selected industrial sub-sectors 
upwards. The focus of the research was with selected key informants in the state 
bureaucracy, owners and managers of the selected firms. This is because the research is 
intended to provide Ugandan policy-makers in government, and indeed the industrial 
sector as a whole, the information and options needed to understand and find solutions 
to shortcomings in the specified industrial sectors. (See appendix: 2). 
 
The choice of an appropriate research design is a crucial building block of the research 
process. It determines the actual construct of the research and leads to a framework 
within which the data is collected and analysed. This research was designed in two broad 
ways: first, there was a broad qualitative review of industrial policy practices and what 
informs their past and the motive forces behind the policies. Second, the research was 
based on case studies where key informants, based on well-specified questions were 
probed. It is based on a relatively flexible structure: neither pre-determined nor loose.  
 
Qualitative research methods have been used for data collection and analysis in this 
research, based on particular techniques. Though this is a primarily qualitative study, it 
was supplemented with quantitative data in form of statistical tables which enhance 
clarity and thus inform policy implementation and decisions. 
 
First, the evidence is derived from primary raw data acquired through interviews with key 
informants, both in the bureaucracy and the industrial sector. I apply the case study 
method, which enables one to examine in detail how various policy measures affect the 
performance of the specified industrial sub-sectors. This is because framing a case study 
around particular questions may lead to more focused and relevant description of the 
policy process. 
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Second, more data is derived from published literature which includes: dissertations, 
published and unpublished materials, government and its other agencies reports and 
newspaper reports. This is because to understand the complexity of the current problems 
in the selected sub-sectors, it is important to understand what happened in the past and 
how it impacts on what is taking place at the present in order to come up with new 
policy directions for the future. 
 
1.9.2 Data Collection Techniques 
 
This study adopts a multi-logical approach based on a mixture of techniques. Principally, 
it relies on the multiple case study method emphasising the use of primary data, semi-
structured interviews and key informants’ approaches. First, the interviews were 
conducted with key informants, in-depth, face-to-face, based on well-structured, 
interview schedules. The key informants were mainly government policy-makers, owners 
and managers of the selected firms in the sub-sector case studies of the textile and fish 
processing industries. The semi-structured interviews were preferred as we 
predetermined the issues to be covered, the informants to be interviewed and the 
sequence of the questions to be asked. This method leads to systematic collection of data 
with relative accuracy. The specific questions are outlined in the interview schedules 
attached (See appendices 3-11).  
 
Second, secondary sources consisted of literature on government intervention 
historically, industrialisation, policy formulation, evolution of Uganda’s policy 
framework, government policy documents, studies and reports on institutions connected 
with industrialisation, among other sources were referred to.  
 
1.9.3 Sampling 
 
The first action in primary data collection was the sampling of the firms in a particular 
selected sub-sector. The main objective of sampling is to collect primary data on 
mechanisms and indicators of policy practices through the study of specific cases in 
order to deepen our understanding of industrial policy making. Given the minute size of 
Uganda’s industrial sector, the major firms in the selected sub-sectors were systematically 
sampled. Uganda at the time of fieldwork (2004-2005) had four (4) major textiles 
manufacturing firms. Thus, in the textile sub-sector, 4 major firms were selected. Second, 
in the fish-processing sub-sector, 3 out 17 firms were systematically selected. Detailed 
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interviews were conducted with key informants in both sub-sectors on issues of 
ownership, sources of finance, sources of technology, size in terms of sales, size in terms 
of employment and export status. Important, in both sectors, was the role of their 
respective business associations.  
 
The disproportionate number of firms chosen was due to one major factor which was 
the acceptability to be interviewed by firm owners. The selection of more that one 
industrial sector was for illustrative purposes and to stress the need for a differentiated 
industrial policy as there are specific sectoral needs and characteristics.  
 
1.9.4 Limitations 
 
The biggest limitation was the unwillingness for some selected key informants to avail 
themselves for interviews due to mainly unfulfilled appointments, particularly by policy -
makers. The second limitation was the unwillingness to allow access to documents such 
as reports on various aspects of the economy. Even when a key informant availed 
himself, the impression was given that the research was being interruptive of their duties. 
There was a tendency to evade “sensitive” questions. However, the depth of interview 
data allowed for cross-referencing and validity checks. 
 
At the sub-sector, firm level, there was as well unwillingness for firms to respond 
unambiguously to questions regarding the workings of the firms, particularly their 
financial, investment plans, wage policy, financial support from government and other 
related matters as these were regarded as trade “secrets”. However, with the help of 
personal networking, most of these limitations were overcome, particularly the limitation 
of documents such as reports. Despite these limitations, the data collected was rich and 
valuable.  Below is an outline of the structure and scope of the thesis. 
 
1.9.5 Structure and Scope of the Thesis  
 
This thesis is divided into three parts with nine chapters. Part one is composed of three 
chapters, one, two and three. Chapter one is the introduction. It spells out the objectives, 
background problem statement, context, rationale and significance of the study, 
definition of key concepts and dimensions of industrial policy. The final part of the 
chapter outlines the methodological issues and data collection methods that were applied 
in the study. 
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Chapter two presents the literature review and examines the different views that inform 
industrial policies and the industrialisation in Third World development from a political 
economy perspective. There is a review of specific industrial policies embedded in ISI 
and socialist industrialisation model in the Third World. The failure of developmentalism 
and the rise of neo-classical discourse and assumptions are discussed. The chapter 
confronts the neo-classical conception and categorisation of the policies following the 
EOI strategy as non-interventionist. This conception of EOI as non-interventionist is 
found to be problematic. Finally, a brief comparative historical experience of 
industrialisation in sub-Saharan Africa is made to give the study a broad regional 
perspective. Part two consists of three chapters: four, five and six. It forms both the 
historical/ institutional background and empirical examination of industrial policies 
practiced in Uganda since 1945.  
 
Chapter three constitutes the analytical framework. This chapter has four main 
objectives. First, it is a reflection on recent theoretical debate on the efficacy of 
institutions and whether they matter in the development process. The central argument 
here is that there is need to move away from the traditional notion of institutions as 
constraints and see them as devises which enable the achievement of economic goals. 
Secondly, the chapter attempts to highlight the institutional complexity of the 
relationship between states and markets. I contend that to understand the workings of 
the market economy, there is need to study a wide range of institutions, prominent 
among them is the state, which affect and are affected by the market. An effort is made 
to analytically unravel these relationships in the study of industrial policy. Thirdly, we 
examine the notions of “late” industrialisation, technological learning and national 
innovation system as elements of institutional political economy. In “late” 
industrialisation, states play a critical role in taming domestic and international market 
forces. Fourth, the theoretical debate for and against industrial policy practice is 
presented. Finally, an assessment of the relative importance of states and markets in the 
European “early” industrialisation, the experience of East Asian “late” industrialisation 
and their institutional underpinnings are highlighted. This analytical framework 
emphasises the fundamentally political nature of the market and applies the political 
economy logic to the analysis of the market, and not just to the analysis of the state. The 
contention is that markets are, in the end, political constructs in the sense that they are 
defined by a range of formal and informal institutions. 
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Chapter Four covers the institutional foundations of Uganda’s industrial policies in a 
periodised manner from 1945 to 1980 at the on-set of SAPs. First, it considers industrial 
policies in the “late” colonial period (1945-62). Second, it outlines the institutions that 
were crafted by colonial policy-makers to support the industrialisation process. Third, it 
examines the industrial policies during the immediate post-colonial period (1962-1972). 
Fourth, it discusses the “economic war” policy of 1972 and its impact on Uganda’s 
industrialisation processes. Efforts are made to link these processes and their 
implications for the adoption of SAPs in the early 1980s. 
 
Chapter five covers industrial policies under the SAPs period, 1981-2006 and is divided 
into two phases. The first section discusses industrial policies of phase 1: SAPs under 
Obote II regime, 1981-85. Reference is made to the efforts at the rehabilitation of 
industry and complementary sectors, liberalisation of the economy, return of the 
expropriated Asian properties and the critical issue of sources of finance for industry. 
The second section examines industrial policies under SAPs phase II: from 1987-2006. I 
discuss the practice of industrial policies in the context SAPs that stress liberalisation and 
privatisation. The critical issue of financing industry and the intensification of politics 
and patronage in financing industry is examined.  
 
Chapter six examines the institutional reforms, particularly the reform of the 
bureaucracy, and the creation agencies in support of the industrial sector and 
implementation of aspects of SAPs. First, the various bureaucratic reforms, particularly 
in the traditional civil service, and the reorganisation of Ministries, are examined. Second, 
I make an overview on intermediate institutions – business associations which are critical 
in the implementation of industrial policies and they are an expression of embryonic 
embedded autonomy. Finally, we discuss the question of technology policy. This is 
examined based on the premise that the success of the overall strategy of industrialisation 
of any country, to a large extent, depends on the nature of the institutions that enable the 
adoption, innovation and acquisition of technological knowledge. 
 
Part three is as well organised under three chapters: seven, eight and nine. It is composed 
of case studies of two industrial sectors (textiles and fish processing) to illustrate the 
practice of industrial policies both before and after SAPs, and the conclusion. Chapter 
Seven discusses the clothing and the textile industry sector. Through a sketch of its 
development history, we examine the legacy of the state interventionist ISI policy 
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through the 1950s and 1960s. The second part covers the impact of expropriation of the 
Asian entrepreneurs in 1972 on the textile industry. The third part looks at the impact of 
the adoption of SAPs since 1981, on the textile industry. Efforts are made to assess the 
viability of the textile industry in Uganda under the current global economic trends 
without a national textile policy.     
 
Chapter eight discusses the fish processing industry. The industry has risen in importance 
and is now the second major foreign exchange earner next to coffee in Uganda. The 
chapter addresses four issues. The first section looks at the structure and the evolution 
fish processing industry from being state-controlled to FDI-dominated. The second 
section assesses the implication of the industrialisation process based on a fragile natural 
resource base which can easily suffer from the “tragedy of the commons” (lakes). The 
third section evaluates the stress on export orientation as an industrial policy in a sector 
dominated by FDI with little connection to the national economy. The fourth section 
looks at the competitive strategies, dependence on export markets and their impact on 
local fisher people. Finally, we discuss the public-private interactions in the fish 
processing industry and its contribution to value chain upgrading and the 
implementation of industrial policy.  
 
Chapter nine presents the conclusion. This chapter is concerned with three issues. 
First, it offers a brief summary of the central arguments of the thesis. Secondly, it 
sums up the major finding on industrial policy practices and their limitations. These 
have implications for the contribution to the industrial policy debate; draw beneficial 
lessons of the past and the problems associated with errors that may have been made 
along the way in the context of the practice of industrial policy in the current global 
context. Finally, the chapter identifies potential future areas of research and industrial 
policy innovation. 
  
CHAPTER TWO 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter constitutes a broad literature review and a critical analysis of the different 
paradigms that have informed industrial policies in the post-World War II Third World 
development. The review of the literature is important in the sense that it helps one to 
understand the various dimensions of the research problem. First, it identifies the 
research that has been carried out on the subject. Second, it exposes the contributions 
and the limitations that the policy measures taken in the industrialisation process 
confronted. This would partly explain why particular industrial policies may have not 
been so successful. Finally, it enables one to focus on the solutions to the knowledge gap 
in the Third World industrialisation process hence transcending the previous limitations. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the various schools of thought that have 
informed the study of development in general and industrial policy and industrialisation 
processes, in particular. These can broadly be put into three categories: i) developmental 
school, (1945-75), ii) neo-classical school, (since 1975) and iii) the institutional approach 
which is discussed in next chapter 3. For each category and period the study analyses the 
motive ideas and assumptions behind the industrial policies and industrialisation process. 
The study attempts to show that in an effort to industrialise, Third World states have had 
to engage in different forms of developmentalism. 
  
The first part of this chapter looks at the basic concept of industrialisation and what is 
meant by industry. The second part reviews developmentalism by analysing the 
experience of the application of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI). The third 
part looks at the socialist industrialisation model adopted by several Third World 
countries and offers explanations why it was a dismal failure in most cases. The fourth 
part deals with the Export Oriented Industrialisation (EOI) policy advocated by the neo-
classical theory as practiced through the institutional mechanism of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and the notion of value chain and 
upgrading. Finally, a brief review of industrial policy practices of sub-Saharan African 
countries after independence is outlined. 
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2.1 Industry and Industrialisation 
 
Industry is usually taken to mean a broad class of similar products, embracing numerous 
plants and firms. Thus, iron and steel is customarily spoken of as an industry. In a more 
localised definition, industry is seen as an economic activity generally regarded as a 
separate activity from agriculture, trade (wholesale and retail), and services (transport and 
telecommunication, hotels and restaurants, community service.1 In the Ugandan context, 
industry includes the following sub-activities: mining and quarrying, manufacturing (both 
formal and informal), utilities (electricity and water sectors) and construction. 
 
Industrialisation is a more complicated process. Industrialisation has been at the centre of 
transformation of societies into modern economic entities. Modern industrialisation can 
be located in the 19th century with the centre being England. The basic definition is that 
it is a process of social and economic change whereby a human society is transformed 
from a pre-industrial to an industrial state. It means a replacement of human labour by 
machinery to manufacture goods. In this way it induces a shift from home (craft) to 
factory based-production and initiates transition of an economy from agrarian to one 
based on industry.  Thus, there have to occur changes both in technology and 
products.  
 
In a more rational sense it is a process whereby a share of industry in general and 
manufacturing in particular in total economic activities increases. According to Sutcliffe, 
a country is regarded as industrialised when a certain minimum percentage (say 25%) of 
its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) arises in the industrial sector.2 This has to be 
reflected in the share of employment.  
 
To be considered developed a country must have a certain level of industrialisation. 
Industrialisation, however, has never been automatic. Historical evidences suggest that 
the process of industrialisation has been influenced deliberately by external interventions 
                                                 
1 This is the definition used in the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) Statistical Abstract 2006 for 
purposes of computing GDP of the country and value addition of economic activity in the fiscal year 
2005/06. 
2 Sutcliffe, R. B (1971), Industry and Underdevelopment, London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 
pp 16-18. 
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such as government policies.3  During the first industrial revolution, the British 
government intervened by restricting the movement of skilled craftsmen to abroad to 
minimise the flight of technological capability. Similarly in the 18th and 19th century, 
United states and Germany intervened vigorously. Since then industrialisation has taken 
place under different circumstances. 
 
Alice Amsden notes that the nature and the role played by technical knowledge, separates 
industrial revolutions in England, Germany and the United States on one hand, from the 
industrialisation that occurred in twentieth-century agrarian societies. Industrialisation 
occurred in England on the basis of invention. To catch up, USA and Germany 
industrialised on the basis of innovation. Japan and other East Asian countries have 
industrialised on the basis of learning through importing technology from abroad and 
assimilating, adapting and improving on it.4  This is the process referred to as late 
industrialisation – where the central tendency among leading firms is learning rather than 
invention or innovation of significantly novel technology.5 
 
For the Third World aspiring to industrialise, it is important to take note of the changed 
global circumstances for effective process of industrialisation, particularly through 
absorption of rapidly changing technology. To be noted are the differences in the 
character of the institutions on which late industrialisation is based and managed. The 
drive to industrialise in Third World countries, one can argue, is due to the psychological 
desire to catch-up, that is, to bridge the gap with the developed countries as speedily as 
possible. According to some, industrialisation in the Third world has passed through 
various phases of developmentalism which we review below. 
 
2.2 Developmental School (1945-1970s) 
 
The study of industrialisation in the Third World was undertaken within a 
developmentalist framework consisting of modernisation and dependency theories. The 
developmentalist model is a post-World War Two phenomenon and dominated 
development theorising from around 1945 to early 1970s. Developmentalism consists of 
                                                 
3 From the classical observation by Fredrich List, (1885), Alexander Gerschenkron, (1962), Landes David 
(1969) and more recently Amsden Alice, (1989 and Wade Robert (1990), state interventionist policies have 
always been the drivers of the industrialisation process. 
4 Amsden, Alice (1989), Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp3-7. 
5 Ibid, p.4. The discussion of the notion of late industrialisation is done in the next chapter. 
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three sets of strands namely modernisation, structuralism and dependency, each with its 
own policy prescriptions for the industrialisation of the Third World. 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Developmentalism 
 
Developmentalism applied insights or theories to explain the logic of social action in the 
south. Developmentalism is linked to liberal ideology and the idea of progress. The 
central thrust of modernisation theory is evolutionary. Its claim is that to develop, Less 
developed Countries (LDC), would pass through a series of stages mirroring the history 
of Western countries.6 The theory viewed social reality through a series of binary 
opposites, a particular dualism: – modern versus traditional, industrial versus pre-
industrial. It believed that in the transition from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ forms of social 
organisation, already completed in the industrialised West, the complex interactions 
between social change and economic development, mediated by politics, could be traced 
with some precision, using ‘structural-functional analysis’ and the topology of social 
structure derived from Weber by Talcott Parsons.7   
 
Developmentalism in the 1950s focused narrowly on how the economies of former 
colonies might be transformed and made more productive as decolonisation approached. 
The focus here is to examine its perception of how development could be brought 
about. Its goal was growth and the agent of development was the state and the means of 
development was the macroeconomic policy instruments, basically, a conscious 
commitment to state intervention. This could be achieved in several ways: first, modern 
values being diffused through education and technology transfer to the ‘elites’ of the 
periphery. This would entail ‘big push’ industrialisation, pro-capital and pro-big large-
scale manufacturing based on capital-intensive technology imports. Second, state 
intervention that provided a basis for ISI as a market-oriented, state-led development 
process informed by the distrust of unfettered markets. 
 
                                                 
6 Rostow, W.W (1960), The Stages of Economic Growth:Non-Communist Manifesto, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). In Rostow’s schema, development is a five state process from traditional to modern 
society. Using the metaphor of an aeroplane, Rostow’s stages are as follows: 1) Stationery (traditional 
society), 2) Pre-conditions for take-off, 3) Take-off, 4) Drive to maturity and 5) Mass consumption society 
(modern society). 
7  Quoted in Leys, Colin (1996), The Rise and Fall of Development Theory, (London: James Currey Ltd), p.9. 
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In its ‘classic’ form, economic developmentalism posited a modern sector acting as a pole 
of development from which the industrial revolution would eventually diffuse out to the 
rest of the Third World society.8 LDCs were thought unlikely to generate sufficient 
capital internally hence foreign capital needed to be mobilised. For the developmentalists, 
shortage of capital necessitated a policy of “unbalanced growth” - concentrating 
investment where it realised the greatest return and hence the most rapid accumulation 
of capital.  
 
Developmentalism emphasises the positive aspects of foreign capital as well as foreign 
trade. Characteristics such as new resource inflows, employment generation, access to 
technology and entry to foreign markets have been emphasised as ways that foreign 
capital promotes development.9  Thus, following the First World countries, Third World 
countries embarked on a programme of “Big Push”, rapid, catch-up industrialisation.10 
The premises of the notion of big push were pro-capital and pro-big, large-scale 
manufacturing and mega-projects which were favoured over small scale ones in the belief 
that the highest return and productivity gains were to be found in the capitalist ‘growth 
poles’ of secondary industry. This was informed by the assumption that progress would 
evolve through diffusion or trickling down of capital and technology. These premises 
were then linked to capital-intensive technology imports from the West in complete 
disregard of factor endowments in labour abundant developing countries. 
 
The pro-big capital and pro-urban biases had continuously formed the cornerstone of 
successive western originated development theories: Rostow’s stages theory,11 Albert 
Hirschman’s unbalanced growth theory,12 Arthur Lewis’s dual economy theory,13 and 
                                                 
8 Smith, Tony (1985), “Requiem or New Agenda for Third World Studies”, World Politics, Vol. 37, No.4, 
(July), p.550. 
9 Stallings, Barbara (1990), “The Role of Foreign Capital in Economic Development” in Gereffi, G., and 
Wyman, Donald, (eds.), Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialisation in Latin America and East Asia, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, p.57. 
10 The urge to “leapfrog” development, which means a quantum leap from one stage to another without 
experiencing the intermediate steps between the two. The experience of East Asian industrialisation could 
be given as an example of leapfrogging.  
11 Rostow, W.W (1960), The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Take-off 
into sustained growth principle was based on the simple Harrod-Domar identity that in order for the 
growth rate of income to be higher than that of the population (so that per capita income growth is 
positive) a minimum threshold of the investment to GNP ratio is required given the prevailing capital – 
output ratio. 
12 Hirschman, Albert (1958) The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
“unbalanced growth” identified the lack of decision-making ability in the private and public sectors as the 
main bottleneck to development. The prescription for breaking through this bottleneck was to create a 
sequence of temporary excess capacity of social overhead facilities whereby creating a vacuum and an  
attractive physical environment would encourage the build-up of directly productive activities. 
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trickle down theory of various theorists. All these economists called for pro-urban, big-
scale and capital-intensive industrialisation strategies as a prescription for economic 
development of the Third World countries. These prescriptions were accommodated by 
the first generation of post-independence leadership elites in the South, who aspired to 
achieve rapid economic development of their countries. As a result, they were reflected 
in the capital-intensive ISI strategies of many developing countries. 
 
The diffusionist assumption behind the transfer of technology and capital to LDCs as a 
development mechanisms had a number of limitations. First, the diffusionist approach 
fails to recognise that its alleged solutions – the intensification of market relations – are 
at the origin of all the difficulties that LDCs face.14 Second, by introducing state-of-art 
technology – ensuring that the most up-to-date production technologies were transferred 
to the Third World without concurrent institutions of creative and innovative adoption 
in the domestic economy could not, by itself, secure sustained industrialisation process. 
Third, the perception that the causes of underdevelopment were domestic, internal to the 
developing nations themselves, were rather narrow. It ignored the impact of the link 
between international forces and local actors in the development process. Fourth, the 
idea of engineering solutions to development obstacles to economic diffusion through 
the use of force or by building of consensus, so that institutions are ultimately created 
that can make the process of change self-sustaining, was rather mechanical. This is 
because modernist developmentalism is silent about the social character of the 
development process.  As a result, its policy prescriptions were essentially statist and 
mercantilist rather than entrepreneurial and capitalist. In the final analysis, the central 
problem of modernist developmentalism is that it was unilinear and ethnocentric in its 
conception of change in the Third World.  These criticisms are carried further as we 
review the experience of the import substitution strategy. 
 
2.2.2 Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) 
 
The review of the literature on ISI is heavily dependent on Latin American and East Asia 
experiences. It is these societies that first embarked on the process of industrialisation in 
                                                                                                                                            
Alternatively, the process could start by a build-up of directly productive activities ahead of demand, which 
in turn would generate a need for complementary social overhead projects. This meant concentrating 
investment where it realised the greatest return and hence the most rapid accumulation of capital. 
13 Lewis, Arthur (1954), “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour”, Manchester School, 
May.  The naïve two-sector model, continued to assign to substance agriculture an essentially passive role 
as a potential source of “unlimited labour” and “agricultural surplus” for the modern sector. 
14 Smith, Tony (1985), “Requiem or New Agenda”, Op Cit. p.551. 
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the Third World. The review notes the differences between the applications of the ISI 
strategy in these economies. While Latin American and sub-African economies 
implemented “across-the-board” import substitution and protectionism with little 
horizon on export markets, the East Asian industrialists did not see import substitution 
and export orientation as mutually exclusive. They combined both strategies. The 
differences in the industrialisation process between these regions are partly explained by 
these differing practices. 
 
The second thrust of developmentalism to industrialise was state intervention through 
ISI as a market-oriented, state-led development strategy. Post World War Two ISI was 
informed by a particular variant of structuralism based on the Latin American 
industrialisation experience.15  The central idea associated with structuralism in the 1950s 
and 1960s was the belief that market failure is a perverse feature of the underdeveloped 
economy with the corollary that the state has an important role to play in correcting it.16  
All countries intending to industrialise, globally, relied on ISI.  In this section, we review 
what constitutes ISI policy. Secondly, we point the rationale for its practice. Thirdly, we 
reflect on the various policy instruments for its operation. Finally, we point out the 
limitations of ISI. 
 
Albert Hirschman argues that ISI is an industrialisation practice that starts predominantly 
with the manufacture of finished consumer goods that were previously imported and a 
moves on more or less rapidly and successfully, to the ‘higher stages’ of manufacture, 
that is, to intermediate goods and machinery, through backward linkages effects.17 In 
general, import substitution refers to “a set of ideas about why mass poverty has 
prevailed and continues to prevail in many countries while other countries have grown 
rich and about a general approach to the elimination of poverty.”18   
 
In practice, especially in sub – Saharan Africa, ISI was based on the belief that controls 
on imports coupled with unselective support of any industrial investment, would be 
enough to bring about a sensible kind of industrialisation. There were three major 
                                                 
15 Prebisch, Raul (1950), The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems, New York: 
United Nations. Usually referred to as “Prebisch Manifesto”. 
16 Onis, Zaya, (1991), “Review Article: The Logic of the Developmental State”, Comparative Politics, Vol.24, 
No.1 October, p109. 
17 Hirschman, Albert (1971), “The Political Economy of Import Substituting Industrialisation in Latin 
America, in Albert O. Hirschman, (1971), A Bias For Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America, New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, p.91.     
18 Bruton, Henry (1998), “A Reconsideration of Import Substitution”, Journal of Economic Literature, 
Vol.XXXVI (June), p.904. 
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reasons for pursuing ISI. It was perceived that ISI would bring about: i) more rapid 
transfer of technological innovation in industry than in agriculture – thus raising 
economy wide productivity levels. ii) greater absorption of labour in an era of rapid 
population and urban growth and iii) the movement of factors of production into 
industry and away from exports, a process that would reduce the latter as a share of 
national output and improve the terms of trade.19  
 
In practice, therefore, ISI is a trade pattern under which imports are actually being 
replaced by domestic products. Import substitution as such is not an incentive system 
first; it is a choice of products and a choice of production processes and organisational 
technologies for which incentives subsequently had to be designed.20  ISI belongs to a 
school of thought that conceptualises development as a “catch-up” process. To catch up, 
Third World countries embarked on two variants of industrialisation: import substitution 
and import reproduction. Lynn Mytelka draws the contrast of the two practices in 
industrialisation process.21 
 
According to Lynn Mytelka, import substitution is constituted by identification of the 
purposes embodied in imported products; determine their relevance to the local 
environment and designing a product that conforms most closely to domestically 
available inputs, material and non-material. Within the context of import substitution 
strategy, there is no automatic assumption that given product categories are homogenous 
either in the characteristics of the product – its quality, size, colour, material inputs and 
design – or in the processes through which it is produced. The reduction of imports as a 
share of domestic consumption thus occurs without requiring that the locally made 
product be identical to the formerly imported one. On the other hand, import 
reproduction strategies take the ‘product’ as their point of departure rather than 
‘purpose’. Import reproduction strategies; thus, ignores the extent to which products 
incorporate concepts of functionality, cost, quality and aesthetics that correspond to the 
producer’s principal market sale.22  
 
In a process of import substitution, ‘production’ is not the sole end; rather it becomes 
part of a more complex process of technological learning that encompasses product 
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specification and design, process choice and change in social organisation of production. 
Given this characterisation, to what extent can it be said that the ISI developmentalism 
as practiced in the 1950s to the 1970s in most of the Third World states was import 
substitution or import reproduction? 
ISI was practised within a particular institutional context and applied various policy 
instruments in its operation. There were three salient features of this industrialisation: the 
“political regime” and the nature of the state and the relation of local capital to the state, 
the financial basis of this industrialisation and the “trade regime” that prevailed.23 The 
resort to ISI was prompted by a number of factors. According to Raul Prebisch in the 
context of Latin America, the stimulation of development from abroad by constant 
increase in exports of primary products had come to an end.24 Thus, these countries no 
longer had an alternative between vigorous growth along those lines and internal 
expansion through industrialisation. Therefore, the “structure” of the economies of the 
developing countries had to be changed in fundamental ways if they were to compete on 
equal terms in the World markets, and a market mechanism could not bring about this 
sort of structural change.25  This was influenced by Keynesian ideas that a perfectly 
functioning market may not ensure full utilisation of resources. The appropriate strategy 
was deliberate development policy based on state intervention and replacement of 
imports from the rich North with domestic production. Large-scale comprehensive 
planning, rather than the market, was assumed to be the appropriate instrument.26  
 
The major policy instrument for ISI that has come under scrutiny is the policy of 
protection of local firms based on infant industry argument.27 Therefore, to industrialise, 
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given the existence of already industrialised and highly productive economies (North), 
the countries of the South must protect their economies from imports from the North 
and concentrate on putting in place new activities that will produce an array of 
manufactured products currently imported.28 Apart from the infant industry argument, 
protectionism was justified on the basis of experience of the now advanced countries29. 
Prebisch’s support for industrialisation did not imply the wholesale protectionism of 
inefficient and uncompetitive industries. In his view, the imperative of post-war trade 
and industrialisation policy required a judicious combination of import substitution and 
export promotion rather than blanket protectionism. A policy of autarky is as absurd as 
free trade.30 
 
The second policy instrument was that of state participation in the economy. Apart from 
the rejection of market solutions, state participation was justified on the historical 
experience of the now developed countries.  In the historical period in which they began 
their industrialisation processes, the countries that are now developed applied policies of 
active state participation in combination with free functioning of the market and 
formulated theories, which gave technical backing to these policies.31 As a result, in the 
1950s up to the 1970s, Third World countries opted for an approach involving deliberate 
industrialisation with state participation in support of the private sector.32 Behind this 
approach was the nationalist quest for greater control of the economy in the absence of 
national industrial capitalist classes and to ensure accumulation in light of the reticence of 
foreign capital.33 
 
The third policy measure was to induce capital formation. Sources for financing 
industrialisation have important political implications. The financing of ISI had to come 
from domestic savings augmented with foreign savings. The policy objective was to 
accelerate the rate of investment. Domestic savings were considered the primary 
constraint and the earliest arguments for foreign investment and aid rested on the 
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assumption that the savings of the poor countries had to be supplemented by foreign 
savings if acceptable growth rates were to be achieved. Foreign investment as a source of 
capital and technology was emphasised.   In addition, capital goods had to be imported 
to facilitate the process of industrialisation. This produced balance of payments pressures 
and to counter these pressures, a variety of tariffs, import licences and exchange controls 
were instituted.34 In summary, the thinking that produced ISI was: get the investment 
rate up, import capital, with its in-built technology and soon the end of 
underdevelopment would be at hand.35 
 
Briefly, although ISI has been perceived as a failure in bringing about development, it 
scored a number of achievements. Basically, the 1950s up to early 1970s were boom 
years. There was substantial public sector development in many African countries, often 
with direct involvement of foreign firms and the World Bank, which raised the share of 
manufacturing in the national products of various countries. Imports rose faster although 
technology transfers had mixed results. To note, the import substitution achieved from 
the 1950s onwards was more of a result of deliberate, state-led economic policies.36  This 
boom period had some contradictory outcomes, though. The excess profits of the first 
ISI industrialists set up resistances against further industrialisation.37 Second, the main 
effect of these boom decades was to undermine the argument that developing countries 
could not export. Finally, in Africa’s case, investments by foreign firms and the World 
Bank later became sources of difficulties of many kinds – balance of payment problem, 
budget deficits and productivity growth, in particular.38 
 
2.2.3 A Critique of Import Substitution 
 
The major critique of ISI is that as practiced it lacked dynamism and had little focus at 
graduation as exporters. As far as the research problem is concerned, ISI lacked 
coherence and was not selective and targeted on what may be considered as critical 
sectors that would enhance the productivity and competitiveness of particular 
economies.  
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Critics of ISI have attributed its failure to the practice and application of particular policy 
instruments, prominent of which is protectionism based on infant industry argument.39 
Frederick List, the foremost proponent of the theory of infant industry protection did 
not recommend “across-the-board” protection of the whole manufacturing sector. 
According to him protection has to be temporary, selective and targeted and not 
excessive. The “across-the-board” import substitution practiced in LDCs was a 
misapplication of infant industry argument that List advanced and it was a reaction to 
import restrictions as a result of balance-of-payments problems and not because of a 
clear industrial and trade policies. As a result, there was a tendency to favour non-
essential, luxury industries with ready markets provided by the elite. To List, state 
intervention in the economy at the appropriate time and in appropriate amount was 
indispensable precondition for successful development.40  
 
The second concern is whether what failed was import substitution or import 
reproduction. The bulk of the new industries were in the consumer goods sector and 
undertaken in accordance with known processes and on the basis of imported inputs and 
machines. ISI was wholly a matter of imitation and importation of tried and tested 
processes. ISI brought in complex technology, but without the sustained technological 
experimentation and concomitant training in innovations that are characteristics of the 
pioneer industrial countries.41 This imitation led to import reproduction rather than 
import substitution, which should have entailed a more complex process of technological 
learning and upgrading accompanied with change in social organisation of production.42  
 
Most of the smaller African states, for instance, did not actively pursue an import 
substitution strategy. An array of import substitution measures did appear in (Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Nigeria) in the 1960s – but they were mainly ad hoc 
measures. As Roger Riddell argues, import substitution did not fail in Africa; rather it was 
never really tried.43  The principle reason for the failure of import substitution, therefore, 
was that as practiced, it created an environment that discouraged learning.44 
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The supposed “failure” of ISI to graduate into exporters must be put in context.  ISI 
consisted of three phases, thus: i) the first phase involved the relatively easy substitution 
of simple domestically produced consumer goods for previously imported items, ii) the 
second and the more difficult type involved the production of intermediate goods and 
consumer durables, a shift from “horizontal” to “vertical” ISI – so dominated to 
describe an integrated line of production of fewer final goods and their inputs and iii) the 
production of capital goods would follow.45 This is not what occurred in most Third 
World countries. 
 
First, according to Albert Hirschman, the industrialists who first appear in non-industrial 
countries may not be all that much in favour of dynamic industrial development as they 
are satisfied with excess profits in the first phase of ISI and set up resistance against 
further industrialisation.46 Second, most of the new industries set up were exclusively to 
substitute imports, without any export horizon on the part of either the industrialists 
themselves or the government so as to transcend the “easy” substitution phase. Third, 
lacking in self-assertion, the industrial interests failed to vigorously press for enabling 
institutional arrangements – exports, subsidies, preferential exchange rates, or more 
radically, an exchange rate that is undervalued rather than overvalued, to support them in 
the export drive. Fourth, export drive is very demanding and the new industrialists lacked 
the capacity to initiate it. To initiate an export drive, an industrialist must frequently make 
special investments in research, design and packaging; he must assemble a specialised 
sales force, delegate considerable authority, among other measures.47  
 
One of the fundamental causes of the “failure” of import substitution that is hardly 
stressed in the literature is the negligence of the agricultural sector. Under ISI as 
practiced in most LDCs, it did not seem generally appreciated that a sluggish agricultural 
sector would most inevitably penalise the growth of non-agricultural sectors.48 The 
expansion of domestic markets could only come about as a result of the mobilisation of 
dormant resources in all sectors of society, particularly those in agriculture, by means of 
necessary reforms and technological innovations as well as purposive protective 
measures on the part of the state. Agro-industrial linkages are critical in terms of supply 
of labour from agriculture to industry, supply of raw materials, provision of surplus 
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capital for investment in industry and the agricultural sector acting as a market for 
industrial goods. Historical experience teaches that it is futile to attempt to achieve 
successful industrialisation in the absence of a prosperous agriculture.49 
 
The failure of ISI developmentalism can best be appreciated if put in context. The failure 
of ISI may be attributed to the form it took. It was imitative and more of import 
reproduction rather than import substitution. It came to suffer from what was referred to 
as import substitution syndrome.50 That syndrome consisted of reliance on central 
planning effort, a set of nominal tariffs that generally showed little economic rationale, 
quotas, exchange controls, overvalued exchange rates that contributed to unemployment 
and under-utilisation of capital in capital scarce economies, penalised exporting and had a 
difficult wage setting situation. Agriculture was as well neglected.  
 
ISI approach requires implementation of a wide variety of policies and interventions at 
multiple levels from establishing and enforcing industrial, technological and sectoral 
targeting, the promotion of local content, the acquisition and upgrading of technology, 
the creation of basic knowledge infrastructure and general infrastructure. This is 
exceedingly complicated and is best done within the framework of social, political and 
cultural institutions, which affect and shape the effectiveness of any strategy.51 Much of 
the measures were not carried out in the practice of ISI, as there was no systematic 
application in most LDCs. As Jagdish Bhagwati observes, the failure of ISI regime might 
come not so much from the excessive degree of import protection, but from “chaotic 
pattern” that such protection is allocated within the various import substitution 
industries.52 It is within this context of a failed industrialisation process that dependence 
theory critiqued modernist developmentalism and aspects of ISI.     
 
2.2.4 Dependency Critique of Developmentalism 
 
The dependency theory critique of the nature of industrialisation based on ISI was that 
the capitalist penetration it endangered intensified dependence, particularly technological 
dependence. Second, it shifted the emphasis away from internal to external factors, 
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emphasising the Centre – Periphery dichotomy. Third, it stressed the outflow of surplus 
facilitated by the Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and the local capitalist and ruling 
classes – the compradors. Fourth, it advocated for de-linking from the international 
system and pursuing self-reliance through socialism. Thus, according to dependency 
theory, the solution to development dilemma cannot lie in the greater reliance on market 
forces but in more radical promotion of national or regional industrial policies, which 
include greater control of foreign enterprise, greater scrutiny over imports of technology, 
reform of the tax and incentive system and the redistribution of income.53    
 
The dependency critique of the stagism of developmentalism focused on its universalism. 
Dependency argued that the states of development could be defined by any nation and 
not by a universal economic law imposed by outsiders. In addition, developmentalism 
focused entirely on the internal conditions of the countries, leaving external factors 
behind and ignoring the heavy colonial heritage of LDCs.54 
 
Second, the dependency critique of ISI was based on the failure of ISI strategy to solve 
the problems and it had instead aggravated them. In addition, there was a proliferation of 
MNCs in industrialisation to produce for the internal markets. The protectionist tariffs of 
ISI strategy or rather import reproduction and the search for cheaper labour costs 
increased foreign industrial investment. The major observation by dependency theory 
was that the nature of dependence was no longer that of industrial dependence but a 
technological dependency. The problems of balance of payments that ISI attempted to 
resolve were dramatically aggravated due to the technological dependence on the centres. 
Rather than importing consumer goods, ISI involved importing capital goods – 
machinery, new technologies, patents and licences which were very expensive. The 
technology transferred did not adapt to the uniqueness of every region. By early 1960s 
after a decade of ISI, balance of payment deficits, trade deficits, increased marginalisation 
of the population and inflation continued to affect the regimes.55   
 
Gunder Frank’s theory of the development of underdevelopment is, from an economic 
viewpoint, an internal critique of ISI.56 Far from reducing dependence on foreign 
imports, ISI strategies exacerbated it. The greater the industrial development, the more 
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imports cost as a share of the value of outputs. But of concern for the dependency 
theorists was who the beneficiaries were. Among the winners of ISI developmentalism 
were the MNCs and the financial institutions that often enjoyed more governmental 
protections and incentives than did local “infant industry”. 
Third, there emerged dependency critique of the role of the “national” capitalist class. In 
the literature on industrialisation it is often stressed that an industrial bourgeoisie should 
be the leading class.57 For the Third World with a minimal development of an industrial 
class, the focus was the international capital, MNCs and the state. As a result, ISI was 
based on international capital and state entrepreneurship. 
 
In dependency theory, there emerged two contending strands of views on industrial 
capitalist class. One that concentrated on the external relations and the other that 
focused on the local side of dependent development.58 To the “old” school of 
dependency, national industrial groups, which had been formed during the previous 
period, became associated to MNCs and that was becoming a transnational bourgeoisie 
associated with MNCs hence eroding the process of national development.59 To this 
school, the “national” bourgeoisie did not represent a progressive or reliable ally to 
dismantle the structures of the world capitalist system that reproduces 
“underdevelopment” in the periphery.60 To the “old” wave of dependency theory, the 
national bourgeoisie was simply seen as compradors – agents of foreign domination. 
 
The “new” wave of dependency writing inspired by Fernando Henrique Cardoso focused 
on the relationship between the state, foreign and local firms.61  This is what Peter Evans 
refers to as the triple alliance. 62  The strategy of dependent development – essentially the 
phase of ISI in which MNCs came to play an expanded role, resulted from a particular 
transnational class coalition, with the MNCs as most powerful. The power of the MNCs 
within the triple alliances stemmed from the flexibility inherent in transnational 
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organisation, the weight they had in the national economy, particularly in the most 
dynamic sectors. The economic problems attributed to dependence on foreign firms are 
numerous: the introduction of inappropriate products, patterns of consumption, 
technologies and production processes, undesirable trade behaviour, particularly – 
transfer pricing.63   
 
Thus, LDCs remained dependent, in fact, intensified their dependence in the ISI period. 
But as Stephan Haggard notes, the preoccupation with dependence deflects attention 
from the central theoretical question: under what conditions will the state supplant 
foreign investments in strategic sectors, support local capital in doing so, or tighten its 
regulatory grip? 64 Colin Leys provides part of the solution as to how to study and 
theorise the conditions under which other peripheral countries have and others have not 
experienced significant measures of growth.65 In particular, the focus should be on the 
process of domestic capital accumulation, which has formed the basis for the 
constitution of one particular class. The argument is that what produces 
underdevelopment is not the “transfer of surplus” appropriated from the periphery, a 
transfer is an effect of structures at the periphery which militate against the productive 
investment of the surplus at the periphery.66 
 
In the current global context, attaining enabling conditions for accumulation of capital 
remains difficult. One solution would be to reinvent the local bourgeoisie. But as Peter 
Evans observes in the case of Brazil, reinventing the local bourgeoisie is problematic. In 
Brazil, the economic constraints created by the regime’s commitment to abide by the 
“normal” rules of internationalised oligopolistic competition made it difficult for the 
state to promote the interests of local capital. 67 
 
Dependency critique was that developmentalism had a tendency to ignore how domestic 
political forces constrain economic policy and shape state responses to the external 
environment, downplay the critical role of the state in development. States in the Third 
World are not merely comprador states. Developing countries have witnessed state 
intervention because governments had to perform more functions in order to trigger 
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industrial growth. Down-playing the critical role of the state in development by 
dependency theory was a result of its failure to study and understand class relations in the 
periphery concretely and the genuine gains in economic strength that have become 
apparent recently in several Third world countries with the help of state intervention. 
Alice Amsden notes that some developing countries, due to their size, manufacturing, 
know-how and human capabilities have managed to beat the system.68 Finally, 
dependency theory did not question the justification for developmentalism and accepted 
the superiority of industrial progress, technology and methods of production. Perhaps 
the most controversial proposition by dependency theorists was the suggested solution: 
socialist industrialisation alternative as the new form of social and economic organisation 
for LDCs.  
  
2.2.5 The Socialist Model and Industrialisation 
 
Several Third World countries were attracted to what was thought to be a “socialist” 
model of industrialisation that would transform their economies from dependent 
capitalism to dynamic self-sustaining economies. The attempt at socialist industrialisation 
in LDCs was based on one of the policy alternative advanced by dependency theory – 
de-linking. Several less developed countries saw the need to de-link as far as possible 
from the international economy and pursue self-reliance, while nationalising the 
economy to stem the likely outflow of capital this would incur. Here, we briefly review 
the origins of the socialist model, its component parts, assumptions, practices and 
limitations of socialist industrialisation in LDCs. 
 
The socialist experiments in the Third World were informed by several experiences and 
convictions. Socialist development experiments in LDCs are viewed as a logical outcome 
of the failures of dependent capitalism and as nationalist reactions to imperialism and 
underdevelopment.69 Domestically, the ruling classes, particularly the “national” 
bourgeoisie were regarded as puppets of foreign interests.70 The solution to this failure 
was to institute socialist industrialisation. Drawing from the experience of Soviet Union, 
Paul Baran argued for socialist industrialisation, though not at the expense of agriculture, 
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both of which were prominent parts of Soviet industrialisation.71 Industrialisation was 
seen not merely as the establishment of conventionally defined industries but as a 
comprehensive process of both social and technical change throughout the whole 
economy. Industrialisation was seen as providing the most effective means of dissolving 
the ties of dependence and defending LDCs against hostile international pressures – 
military, political and economic.72 Samir Amin advocated for a self-reliant economy – one 
in which there is complete circuit of capital internally since it produces its own capital 
goods.73 
 
Second, the socialist model of development entailed five major elements: nationalisation 
of industry, socialisation of agriculture, abolition or limitation of markets, state control of 
the distribution of goods and services and establishment of a comprehensive planning 
system.74 In most cases in the Third World, the system of ownership of means of 
production was such that the government and the bureaucracy controlled all aspects of 
the economic organisation or partially by allowing collective ownership through co-
operatives with minimum private ownership. The key feature of decision-making in a 
socialist economy is through central plan. Typically, a central planning agency sets out 
production targets for goods and services over a period of a few years and how these 
goods and services will be distributed through allocation. A key feature of centrally 
planned economic system is that the price mechanism has a limited role. The central 
planning body makes the vital economic decisions and then implements them in form of 
output targets for enterprises, which are owned by the state. Overall, central planners 
allocate state-owned resources towards particular areas of production. 
 
For most of LDCs, drawing on the experience of Soviet Union, state-owned resources 
came to be directed at establishment of heavy industry and the production of capital 
goods using highly mechanised capital-intensive techniques of production. The adoption 
and practice of socialist industrialisation in the Third World was problematic in a number 
of ways. 
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First, the context of the Third World was inadequate for socialist industrialisation. This is 
because “socialism is not only a developmental process, but a societal state arising out of 
prior developments. It presupposes a secure material – industrial base”, which were in 
short supply in Third World countries.75 
 
Second, state ownership of means of production and centrally planned industrialisation 
in the Third World was difficult given the inadequacy in bureaucratic capacity. Planned 
growth demands effective institutional structures, particularly of information gathering. 
The collection, processing and transmission of information through a hierarchical 
structure were very costly and unsound. Increasingly, state intervention came to lead to 
the growth of an unproductive bureaucracy. 
 
Third, the socialist economic system that was established was unable to develop and 
implement new technologies and methods of production. The nature of the transfer of 
technology did not differ much from that of the non-socialist Third World economies. 
Much of the technology imported remained unchanged and outdated with no vigorous 
catch-up processes.76 
 
Fourth, the structure of production inherited from colonialism was heavily oriented to 
export of cash crops and minerals (raw materials) and could not easily be re-oriented 
towards local needs and industry. These were fragile economies that depended on 
international trade. They had to develop under adverse internal and external conditions. 
They faced many of the external constraints as their non-socialist counterparts: distorted 
political economies, weak base of available resources, dependence on a few commodities 
and balance of payments deficits. They as well needed raw materials, wider markets for 
finished products or import of advanced technology.77 Attempts at autarkic policy 
favouring economic diversification would have to contend with local markets being 
insufficiently large, particularly in small countries, to justify investment in certain lines of 
production where economies of scale may be crucial. There was therefore no possibility 
of escaping dependence on generating export earnings.78 They had to trade, borrow and 
deal with the material culture of capitalism.79 
                                                 
75 Leftwich, Adrian (1992), Op Cit, p. 39. 
76 Oyzerman, Theodore, (2003), “Marxist Concept of Socialism and Real Socialism”, Social Sciences, Vol.34, 
No.1, p.38. 
77 White, Gordon., et al (eds), (1983), Op Cit,  p. 15-18. 
78 Colburn and Rahmato (1992), Op Cit, p. 165. 
79 Fagen, R., et al (eds), (1986) Op Cit, p. 14. 
 44 
 
Despite the difficulties of constructing socialism in the context of the Third World 
conditions, some advances were made in terms of industrialisation in most “socialist” 
countries. Several countries experienced quantitative as opposed to qualitative rapid 
industrialisation with largely little innovation in industrial processes resulting in the 
inability to implement new technologies and methods of production.80 In Tanzania, for 
instance, there was substantial growth in industry from a very low base but it was largely 
of the classic ISI variety, or rather of import reproduction with limited technological 
innovation.81 At the same time as in the case of other “socialist” Third World countries, 
the Tanzanian state was beset by unfavourable economic conditions and failed to alter 
the fundamental causes of dependence and poverty. 
 
Perhaps, the most successful case of socialist industrialisation has been that of China.82 
After the 1949 revolution, China embarked on a conscious process of industrialisation. 
There were particular favourable policies towards private capital. The basic guidelines of 
policy were “utilisation, restriction and gradual transformation” of the private sector. 
Industrialists and merchants were defined as the “national bourgeoisie”, an ally against 
imperialism contrary to their conception as “compradors” by the dependency theory. But 
this was only for a short period.83 By the 1960s, the industrial sector had gradually been 
incorporated into the new system of planned production and distribution.84 The record 
of 1960s and 1970s suggests the growing incapacity of state institutions to direct the 
economy in socially productive ways through the traditional mechanisms of political 
mobilisation and bureaucratic control. This changed in the 1980s as the reform policy 
emphasised selectivity. 
 
The Chinese experience on the state’s role in industrialisation process brings out a 
number of lessons.85  First, the need to resist any simple, ahistorical generalisations about 
the economic impact of state intervention and support the case that different forms and 
degrees of state involvement are appropriate at different stages of the industrialisation 
process, with traditional directive methods having relevance and effectiveness in initial 
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periods of basic construction of structural change. Second, all stages, not merely in more 
‘mature’ phases of industrialisation, state involvement need to be selective in scope of 
involvement, whether in terms of types of economic decisions or of different economic 
sectors. More flexible forms of involvement should be adopted, notably between 
directive and guidance methods. Third, there is need to strike a balance between state 
agencies and productive units. Finally, questions of economic management and reform in 
state socialist context are deeply political and not susceptible to merely technical 
solutions. 
 
Overall, most Third World “socialist” states faced several constraints, both historical and 
institutional in their efforts at industrialisation. Perhaps the most critical was the 
generalised nature of state intervention whereby the most important and concentrated 
centres of production were nationalised as were houses of capital, commerce and foreign 
trade. The state became landlord, industrialist, banker and merchant, all at the same time, 
which could only lead to compounded inefficiency.86 
 
In general, the ideology of developmentalism and the idea of the interventionist state is 
inseparable. From the 1950s to 1970s, development analysts and policy-makers, implicitly 
or explicitly, viewed the state as the primary mechanism of overcoming certain major 
constraints inherent in the domestic and international context of the “new nations”. 
Where nation states were weak or non-existent, they had to be “built”.87 With the 
persistence of dependence and generalised economic crises in the 1970s, both in the 
“socialist” and non-socialist Third World countries, there emerged a critique of the 
variant developmentalism from the neo-classical theory, particularly of state 
interventionism. 
 
2.2.6 The Failure of Developmentalism and the Rise of Neo-Classical Theory 
 
Both structuralism and dependency theories and their “socialist” variants through various 
policy decisions, particularly unselective state intervention, produced inefficient 
programmes of industrialisation such that by the 1970s economic crisis had set-in most 
of the Third World. This discredited interventionist policies resulted into a return to 
market theory. The new policies went back to neo-classical economic theory that claimed 
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that the only way to restore growth and economic stability was to remove most of the 
state’s power to control prices and allocate economic resources and transfer decisions to 
competitive markets.  
 
Central to neo-classical theory is the notion of comparative advantage that, if it exists, 
will lead to efficient reallocation of international resources, largely due to specialisation 
and the division of labour. According to neo-classical theory, the market is at its best an 
automatic mechanism, which ensures an efficient and pro-developmental allocation of 
resources as opposed to the contention that the market left unguided will in many cases, 
fail to produce that benevolent output.88  
 
As far as industrialisation is concerned, neo-classical theory puts stress on export-
oriented industrialisation (EOI). EOI is defined as a set of trade and industrial policies, 
which do not discriminate between production for domestic market and exports, or 
between the purchases of domestic goods and foreign goods.89 Here we examine the 
institutional mechanism through which EOI has been practiced including: foreign direct 
investment (FDI), export processing zones (EPZ) value chains and upgrading as policy 
instruments that would bring about growth and development in LDCs. This seeks to 
answer one key question: who are the key movers in EOI? : EPZs, export subsidies, 
FDI, credit to upgrade exports? 
 
2.2.7 Export-Oriented Industrialisation (EOI) 
 
Neo-classical economics makes a basic distinction between “inward-looking” and 
“outward-looking” regimes of trade and finance, roughly equivalent to “import 
substituting” and “export promoting”. The two sides of the distinction are treated as 
mutually exclusive and are the point of the liberal prescriptions.90 To the neo-classical 
school, ISI was a failure mainly because it was inward-looking. The verdict of the failure 
of ISI gained force when an alternative phenomena emerged which showed all signs of 
success. Countries that switched emphasis during the 1960s to EOI, particularly in East 
Asia, achieved the most remarkable rates of economic growth.91 Given the startling 
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success of East Asian countries, EOI proponents hold this alternative as the “pathway” 
that should be followed by all countries wishing to industrialise.92 
 
Under EOI, market forces supposedly determine the type of production that will take 
place, producing within a country’s comparative advantage and consequently at lower 
domestic resource costs per unit of foreign exchange than ISI. For a successful EOI, the 
role of the state is essentially to stay out of the way and not grant favourable incentives 
(or discriminatory disincentives) to any particular sector of the economy.93  The policy 
prescription of EOI strategy is based on a number of assumptions. First, that export 
penetration will enable firms to overcome the constraints on sales imposed by absolute 
size and dynamism of the domestic market. Second, that exporting, by exposing firms to 
foreign competition, technology and marketing, can lead to productivity gains that would 
not be obtainable from sales in the domestic market. Third, that exports allow access to 
imports that can be purchased with the foreign exchange they generate. Fourth, that if an 
export-oriented strategy attracted FDI that would not have come to the economy under 
an import substitution regime, there will be further benefits that go beyond the monetary 
value of increases in exports.94 
 
The neo-classical explanation and policy prescriptions are based on the claim that East 
Asian success was due to the adoption of the “right” policies, by liberalising imports, 
adopting “realistic” exchange rates and providing incentives for exports, reliance on 
market forces and integration into the World economy that yielded results superior to the 
protection and dissociation from the World economy.95 According to Krueger96 the 
essence of an export promotion strategy is to “systematically promoting exports” in 
addition to a liberalised trade and payment regimes. The mere absence of an import-
substitution bias would not provide such a systematic push. Two questions remain 
though: 1) whether successful EOI was due to such policy prescriptions and 2) whether 
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EOI can provide a successful strategy for all countries as many of the proponents 
suggest. 
 
The conception that categorises the policy of states following the EOI strategy as non-
interventionist is particularly problematic and the association of export-orientated 
strategies with free-market policies is, likewise unfounded.97 An examination of the 
historical, social and political contexts of these countries suggests that these contexts 
were major determinants of the success of such a strategy. As was the case of South 
Korea, a very conscious and directed set of economic policies including uniform 
exchange rates, tax exemptions for exporters, reduced prices for inputs and access to 
credit for investment were implemented.98  Second, a significant proportion of the 
increased LDCs’ exports came to be carried out by foreign subsidies or by local 
producers which were sub-contracted by foreign manufacturers or trading house.99 
 
The Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs), development was a result of a set of 
international circumstances, particularly relatively favourable access to international 
markets and international finance.100 This was in the context of a buoyant transnational 
banking market that developed over the 1960s and 1970s, specialising in borrowing and 
lending of currencies outside the country of issue, commonly known as the “Euro-
dollar” market. The access to this private capital market allowed countries, which 
obtained large volumes of credit to avoid the influence of IMF conditionality on 
economic policy.101 In the 1970s the poorest countries were unable to follow the strategy, 
as they were subjected to the IMF/World Bank stringent conditions as sources of 
finance. Thus, the key to the introduction of an export-led strategy among the NICs was 
the availability of capital from Japan and USA coupled with creation and access to 
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markets for manufacturing in Japan and the NICs, especially during the Korean and 
Vietnam wars.102   
 
To the neo-classical school, the state should remain “neutral” and not intervene in the 
economy. Yet, one of the key conditions for the development of successful export-
oriented industrialisation strategy in East Asia was a strong institutional state linked to 
the business community with a certain level of embeddedness and able to adopt and fully 
implement the necessary policy reforms.103 The state control over industrial development 
is held to have been extensive and decisive in bringing about economic growth in East 
Asia. The NICs were not the liberal, market-oriented economies they appeared to be.104 
 
There is a tendency to present import substitution and export-orientation as mutually 
exclusive. Yet, ISI must be seen as a precondition for successful export-led growth. 
Successful exporters were countries in which import substitution was relatively successful 
in building up an industrial structure, which was not merely limited to local production105. 
The exporting states, as a primary prerequisite to effective involvement in exports, were 
to bring institutional changes to enable more industries to export. To do this the states 
evolved an autonomous state strategy whose objective was to upgrade domestic firms by 
selective restrictions of FDI and the use of technology imports with foreign participation 
largely limited to targeted sectors, with complex industrial policies that encouraged 
upgrading.106 
 
The prescription of EOI to Third World countries in the current global conditions is less 
than optimal. This is because the policy confronts several limitations both theoretical and 
contextual. The international conditions under which the East Asian NICs prospered no 
longer obtain. Second, the protectionism in advanced countries discriminates most 
severely against LDC manufactures. Third, most of the Third World government lack 
political autonomy, which is a major factor in their ability to undertake many of the 
policies required in order redirect the economy.107 
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In summary, it could be argued that ISI is a pre-condition for successful export-led 
growth under particular political conditions. Whereas the development debate has 
conceptualised ISI and EOI as an either or proposition, in reality export-oriented policies 
are not necessarily in direct competition with import-substitution policies. Both can be 
performed simultaneously and often are. The dichotomy between export-orientation and 
import-substitution is not a necessary dichotomy. Not only is the putative success of 
EOI a misrepresentation of the actual experience of the Asian countries, it distorts the 
perception of what is possible and desirable for other developing countries around the 
world.108 As Nen Liang observes, the NICs actually pursued an infant industry based 
export-oriented, “protected export promotion” strategy, not the commonly perceived 
static comparative advantage – based “export promotion” strategy, their protectionist 
policies are not mere exceptions, but integral elements of their export-oriented 
strategy.109  Below we examine the institutional mechanisms employed to advance the 
EOI strategy thus: FDI, EPZ and upgrading the value chain. 
 
2.2.8 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 
FDI is one of the presumed institutional mechanisms linking export-orientation to 
growth as it is based on the transfer of state of the art technology normally required to 
compete successfully in the world market for manufactures.110 It is based on the 
assumption in neo-classical economics that of the FDI “spillovers”. The spillovers 
concept suggests that after a certain threshold is reached in terms of the level of inflow 
of FDI to a host country, a number of benefits in form of technology transfer, 
production linkages, the training of human resources and local entrepreneurial 
development, among others “spillover” into the host economy.111 Thus, FDI brings to 
the recipient country not only capital and foreign exchange but also managerial ability, 
technical personnel, technological knowledge, administrative organisation and 
innovations in products and production techniques.112 It is on the basis of these 
presumed benefits that FDI has been prescribed to all Third World countries as a vehicle 
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for industrialisation. A close look at successful exporters suggests that such benefits are 
not automatic. 
 
Most countries that succeeded in exports had particular institutions nationally which 
enabled them to implement such policies.  First, the composition of foreign capital is 
more important than volume since they lead to different dynamics. Barbara Stallings, 
while contrasting East Asian and Latin American experiences, notes that the dominant 
source of foreign capital was FDI in the later.113  As implied by the term itself – investors 
maintained direct control over their assets. This control meant that foreign capitalists 
acquired a great deal of economic and even political power vis-à-vis the state and local 
capital, thus limiting the growth of domestic capitalist capacities in Latin America.   
 
Given that the purpose of foreign capital is to further the interests of those who provide 
it, development of the host country is a fortuitous side effect at best which will only 
come about if the host government maintains enough autonomy and control to 
guarantee that the benefits are shared between providers and recipients of foreign 
capital.114 This was not the case for most Third World states. Instead, the issue involved 
in foreign investment as seen from the perspective of government officials in such states, 
is simply to extract the greatest personal share from whatever wealth or income that 
might be generated by the private actors.115 
 
The positive effects of FDI are not automatic for host countries and depend on the 
instituted policies and other factors such as historical and structural distinctions within 
states. Stephan Haggard argues that variations in the role of foreign capital among 
countries pursuing similar strategies must be explained by the political and economic 
threats foreign firms pose, the level of development by local firms when MNCs enter 
and the political links between the private sector and the government.116  What 
differentiates the East Asian states from other LDCs is that they instituted domestic 
policies that enabled them to benefit from FDI. In Taiwan, for instance, domestic 
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producers in selected sectors were protected not only from imports competition but also 
from foreign firms operating in the domestic market. 117 
 
To benefit from FDI, the government must ensure that dynamic interaction with FDI 
becomes part of the national development strategy. The centrepiece in the interest in 
FDI is acquisition of technology. The adoption of foreign- invented technology has 
proved to be a condition for industrial development. Again the transfer of technology 
cannot happen passively without the active participation of government. Beneficial 
spillover effects and enhancement of industrial development are dependent upon 
governmental strategies.118 How much of the aggregate benefits of FDI spread 
throughout the economy – depends on “linkage” effects of FDI or local sourcing by 
foreign firms. The central problem for the recipient country, therefore, is how to devise 
policies that will encourage a greater flow of foreign resources and at the same time 
ensure that it makes the maximum contribution to the achievement of development 
objectives.119 
 
To capture the spillovers, the successful exporters have adopted the “target winners” 
strategy as opposed to “picking winners” strategy of ISI.120 In practice, the government 
targets lead MNCs whose corporate strategies are more attuned to their developmental 
circumstances and industrial aspirations, in order to locate nodules of their international 
systems of integrated production into the economy. The idea is to implement national 
policies that will convince, cajole or incentivise the MNCs into improving and upgrading 
those capabilities to sustain more technologically sophisticated industrial activities 
producing more benefits for the domestic companies and employees in the process. 
 
While FDI is desirable for the late industrialising countries, the benefits can only be 
realised within a particular institutional context. The view that FDI shall lead to 
technology “spillover” automatically may be mistaken. One of the reasons for the failure   
of several countries to benefit from FDI is that they did not construct institutions for the 
transfer of technology and creation of alternative sources of financing industrialisation. 
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Below we examine the promise of Export Processing Zones (EPZ) for the 
industrialisation of Third World Countries.  
 
2.2.9 Export Processing Zones (EPZ) 
 
EPZ is part of the “big push” strategy into export markets. It has been prescribed by the 
neo-classical theorists to Third World states as the best way to attract FDI, manufacture 
and export cost-competitive products to the more prosperous markets of the developed 
world. EPZs are industrial estates where land, utilities, transport facilities and even 
buildings are provided by the government, at subsidised rates. Labour is frequently 
organised under government supervision and subjected to more stringent rules than 
those governing the work as a whole. The zones offer additional incentives, such as 
complete tax holidays, unlimited profit repatriation and duty free entry of goods destined 
for exports.121  
 
According to neo-classical theory, EPZs provide exceptional opportunities to improve 
free market activities and to exploit comparative economic advantage.122 The firms in 
EPZs have to export all their production in return for enjoying duty-free and tax free 
imported inputs, good infrastructure facilities and simplified administrative procedures 
for trade and remittances.123  It is suggested that EPZs produce benefits for the host 
country by attracting FDI, generating employment, increasing exports, and promoting 
economic linkages via technology transfer and use of local materials, hence bring about 
industrialisation.124 The concern here is to examine the extent to which EPZs can be a 
mechanism for the industrialisation of LDCs. 
 
The adoption of export-led growth strategies by developing countries is directly 
responsible for the considerable expansion of EPZs in recent years. Beginning with the 
establishment of the first EPZ (the Shannon Free Zone) in Ireland 1959, by the end of 
the 1960s, there were a dozen or so such zones, mostly in Asia (Taiwan, South Korea, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and India) and in Latin America (Mexico, Columbia and 
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Dominican Republic). Subsequently, the concept spread and such zones multiplied both 
in the developing and in the developed countries.125   
 
In general, the EPZs were important in the early period of the export-oriented strategy in 
the larger NICs, but their importance should not be exaggerated. Hopes pinned on such 
zones by developing countries as vehicles of industrialisation, are frequently excessive. As 
Stephan Haggard notes, in both Taiwan and Korea, the export take-off began before the 
construction of EPZs. In Taiwan, for instance, EPZs contributed 16% of exports 
between 1976 and 1980. 126  
 
Second, in terms of development, the objective of EPZs is to facilitate industrialisation 
particularly by attracting FDI, in terms of technological capacities and acquisition of skills 
for national workforce. This is because EPZs reflect the inevitable technological and 
organisational - (management, marketing) limitations of indigenous enterprise at the 
outset of industrialisation.127 The transfer of technology through EPZs, however, has 
been less than optimal. The type and the forms of operation within EPZs seem to 
constitute an obstacle to the existence of significant technological transfer, activities 
largely correspond to stages of component assembly and sub-assemblies that are part of a 
global production process and value chain, the technically advanced elements which 
remain unavailable to local sub-constructors.128 In effect, technology is not transferred as 
the principle behind the EPZs encourages the development of assembly plants requiring 
low-skilled labour and producing goods with low value added. 
 
Third, countries establishing EPZs expect them to stimulate economic development 
through accelerating industrial growth and by providing employment. Other than the 
direct creation of employment in EPZs, the amplitude of effects induced in the rest of 
the economy depends on numerous factors such as the inward investment strategy 
adopted by the country concerned and its initial level of development.129 Even then, 
given the objective of relying on low skilled labour for competitiveness, the quality of 
jobs created is rather low. 
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The experience of economies where EPZs were established is that they did not lead to 
implanting of an industrialisation process. Neither were EPZs a bed of roses. In the 
practice of the EPZs, the labour force has been instead subject to repression. Through a 
combination of coercion and legislation, wages and working conditions have been kept 
artificially different from the rest of the economy: below average wages, long working 
hours, substantial dependence on low-skilled, female workers in order to maintain 
competitiveness.130  As was the case in Korea, there was new legislation that extended 
special protection against labour disruption to foreign investors and firms in export 
processing firms. These varied new restraints on workers as seen in very slow real wage 
gains for workers during the early 1970s.131   
 
The other limitation of EPZs prescription as a policy is the tendency to downplay the 
centrality of the state in their effective operation. In a study of Free Economic Zones 
(FEZ) in China, which are an equivalent to EPZs, while the large flow of foreign 
investment supports the market model of neo-classical economics, which attributes 
investment growth to government deregulation, this government regulation is selective 
and partial, reflecting the state policy to shape and isolate FEZs into special economic 
environments for foreign investment. 132 
 
In general, the expansion of EPZs has been mainly of benefit to a few emerging 
countries, located principally in Asia. The historical example of emerging Asian countries 
shows that the creation of free zones can in no way be considered to have been the 
central thrust of an industrialisation policy, but at best as a component of such a policy 
whose success depended on a number of objective conditions.133  Below we briefly 
review recent experiences of industrialisation in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
2.3 Experiences of Industrialisation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
The literature on industrialisation in sub-Saharan Africa has tended to focus on three 
issues: First, the failure of industrialisation in general, particularly the import substitution 
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variety. Second, the on-going process of de-industrialisation under SAPs) and its policy 
prescriptions aimed at total liberalisation of the market, and third the literature that 
builds the case for industrial policy.  
 
There is substantial literature on the failure of sub-Saharan Africa’s industrialisation.134 
Inspite of the channelling of substantial resources to promote and establish 
manufacturing in sub-Saharan Africa, the manufacturing bases of most countries remain 
small.135 The supposed failure of industrialisation is attributed to the policy of ISI 
adopted after independence. Lynn Mytelka attributes this failure to the views of the 
policy-makers on the industrialisation process.136 African policy-makers equated 
industrialisation to mass production. Moreover, mass production of import-reproduction 
kind that went hand in hand with what has become known as “industrialisation by 
invitation” – efforts to induce capital engineering, management and marketing skills to 
flow from North to South.137 Basically, African states adopted ISI in its static form. In a 
process of import substitution, production is not the sole end. Rather it becomes part of 
a more complex process of technological learning that encompasses product 
specification and design, process choice and change and the social organisation of 
production. Second, ISI came to be seen as a permanent, general and non-selective 
strategy, an end in itself, and not as a tactic in the industrialisation process. Yet, in the 
successful NICs, for instance, ISI was seen as temporary and intimately linked to EOI. 
 
At another level, the failure to industrialise has been attributed to lack of technology 
policies.138 It is argued that these policies remained largely implicit rather than explicit and 
that the current institutions for managing them are inadequate to the task. While these 
arguments often offer some explanation, they leave out the possible socio-political causes 
of the failure of state intervention through ISI to bring about industrialisation. The 
failure of ISI must be seen in the broader context of the failure of the governing elite to 
reconstruct the post-colonial state as well as its failure to understand the institutional and 
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political processes underlying effective state intervention. The African states, for 
instance, are seen as too incompetent to try any form of intervention.139 In a situation 
where holding positions of power within the state apparatus is seen as an opportunity to 
acquire wealth,140 where development is not a priority and the political 
instrumentalisation of disorder reigns, the Afro-pessimist view is that any form of state 
intervention to promote development is likely to end up in dismal failure.141 However, 
there are always possibilities. Instead of reforming the whole state system, there is a 
possibility of developing “islands” of bureaucratic competence within particular 
institutions with the mandate of promoting industrialisation. 
 
The pervasive use of parastatals (public enterprises) as agents of industrialisation was a 
dismal failure. The public sector under an unreconstructed state was assigned a dominant 
role in ISI strategy in much of sub-Saharan Africa and most of them ended in failure.  
David Himbara notes in the case of Kenya, that the state agencies created for this 
purpose failed to achieve their dual objectives of becoming architects of the private 
sector of African capitalism or consolidating themselves as viable instruments of state 
capitalism.142  The main shortcomings were that the parastatal organisations possessed 
neither the technical skills nor the financial resources necessary to accomplish the goals. 
One point that the literature on public enterprises in Africa does not bring out is that 
their failure was not simply because they were public enterprises. Public enterprises were 
at the centre of industrialisation in the successful East Asian NICs, for instance. The 
underlying difference can be found in the institutional basis of the policy. The set of 
institutional and political arrangements in much of sub-Saharan countries were not 
compatible with approximate mix of state intervention and market orientation in the 
economy as was the case in the East Asian NICs. 
 
                                                 
139 There is a whole range of literature on state failure in sub-Saharan Africa which include: Evans, Peter 
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The second set of literature on African experience focuses on de-industrialisation under 
Structural Adjustment Policies and its prescriptions.143 The common thread in this 
literature is that it challenges the neo-liberal assumptions underlying the industrialisation 
strategies for Africa. To reverse the current de-industrialisation process, there is need for 
more than just free markets. Howard Stein contends that the explanation for African 
industrial malaise is underdetermined in the sense that it misses fundamental structural 
causes.144 Overall, the World Bank/IMF prescriptions will likely de-industrialise the 
existing manufacturing base in many African countries without encouraging any 
replacement. It is argued that while there are problems with the structure of industry in 
Africa, hoping that the market will solve the difficulties is no substitute for developing an 
industrial policy.145 
 
The denial of a central role of the state by The World Bank and IMF by restricting it to 
dealing with law and order issues, yet the state has been so crucial in the process of late 
industrialisation, has accelerated the de-industrialisation process in Africa. African 
economies find themselves denied the use of the state. In the absence of indigenous 
capital, waiting for arrival of foreign investors has only led to stagnation and de-
industrialisation.146  Deborah Brautigam observes that in the case of Taiwan, the 
industrialisation support policies involved an extensive government role, while structural 
adjustment programmes in Africa are predicted on reducing the role of the state.147 The 
hostility to the African state by SAPs precludes the state’s crucial involvement to resolve 
market failures, which result in de-industrialisation. 
 
Sanjaya Lall’s concern with SAPs prescriptions for industry is with what it leaves out. 
While there should be no need for debate about the need for reform of African industry, 
SAPs prescriptions leave out the crucial element of skills and technical capabilities.148  
The chances of failure of SAPs in this context are greater. Lall suggests that given the 
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need to remedy market deficiencies to achieve sustainable industrial development, the 
first step in adjustment should be to improve the states intervention capabilities.149 This 
is because both the “market-friendly” model, in World Bank mold, and the industrial 
policy model, require an exceptionally capable bureaucratic apparatus in order to work. 150 
 
Given the historical analysis of the African industrial performance and the experiences of 
industrial processes in other developing countries outside Africa, SAPs for industry is 
rejected.151  What is needed is to be sensitive to both price and market signals, while not 
shunning the explicit promotion of manufacturing and the furthering of inter-linkages 
with other sub-sectors of the economy. Sachikonye adduces evidence in the Zimbabwean 
case on how SAPs had undermined several manufacturing sub-sectors before they had 
been prepared for international competition. 152 
 
A theoretical and empirical question remains though: is there a possibility of developing a 
viable industrial policy under SAPs? SAPs presuppose that economies should move in 
the direction of a liberalised market where the forces of supply and demand are the basis 
of allocation of resources in the economy. On the other hand, industrial policy implies 
state intervention in the process of resource allocation. But as Lall observes, there is 
scope for industrial policy left but under the new rules, it remains a grey area. Four ways 
are suggested through which African governments may overcome the restrictions on 
state intervention that come with liberalisation. First, much may depend on the skills of 
the government concerned in designing measures that are permitted or camouflaging 
ones that are not. Second, it is necessary to build strong government capabilities to deal 
with trade disputes in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), by developing the legal and 
economic expertise to deal with disputes that may lead to losing competitive advantage. 
Third, the management of the liberalisation processes, which offers one potential avenue 
for the exercise of industrial policy over the medium term. Finally, he suggests the 
application of technological capability approach, which suggests the need for gradualism 
in the liberalisation process. It proposes the removal of high, sustained and 
indiscriminate protection and other barriers to competition. The introduction of 
competition has to be subject to the time and resource needs of learning. 153    
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To most African governments, this may be a Herculean task. Ironically, the case for 
infant industry is accepted by some World Bank studies. These are some of the loopholes 
in the system that should be exploited by African governments. Though limited, there 
remains scope for a selective industrial policy exercise in the African situation. The 
World Development Report conceded some ground on the need to have effective states 
in the development process.154  The report’s basic argument is that governments are now 
believed to be important and the priority is to make them work better rather than 
downsize them though it remains dogmatic on the issues of liberalisation. The 
enhancement of state capacity is now recognised as fundamental in the development 
process. 
 
The third set of literature on African industrialisation is one that builds the case for 
industrial policy.155 Sanjaya Lall raises the central question of the need for African 
industrialisation.156 It is argued that instead of asking whether Africa should industrialise, 
it would be sensible to ask that: given the need for industrialisation, what sorts of 
industries should be set up, at what pace and most important, what action should be 
taken to ensure that they are operated efficiently? Roger Riddell raises a case for what he 
refers to as a “benign interventionist” policy, which would be sensitive to both price and 
market signals, while not shunning either the explicit promotion of manufacturing.157  On 
the basis of historical analysis of African industrial performance and the experience of 
the industrial process in other developing countries outside Africa, Riddell rejects the 
underlying assumption of SAPs that forces of supply and demand, the market-
determined price regime should determine and set pace for change in the structure of 
industrialisation in the economy. To Lall the problem with past intervention was non-
selectivity and lack of strategy rather than the selection and strategy based on experience, 
                                                 
154 World Bank (1997), The World Development Report: The State in a Changing World, New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
155 These include: Riddell, Roger (1993), “The Future of Manufacturing sector in Sub-Saharan Africa” in 
Callaghy, T.M., and Ravenhill, John (eds), Hemmed In: Responses to Africa’s Economic Decline, New York: 
Columbia University Press, Pack, Howard (1993), “Productivity and Industrial Development in Sub-
Saharan Africa”, in World Development, Vol.21, No.1, Lall, Sanjaya (1992), “Structural Problems of African 
Industry” in Stewart, Frances., Lall, Sanjaya., and Wangwe, Samuel (eds) Alternative Strategies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, London: Macmillan, Lall, Sanjaya, and Stewart, Frances (1996), “Trade and Industrial Policy in 
Africa” in Ndulu, Benno, and Van De Walle, (eds) Agenda for Africa’s Economic Renewal, Oxford: Transaction 
Publishers, Lall s., and Wangwe, Samuel (1998), Industrial Policy and Industrialisation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa” Journal of African Economies, Vol.7 Supplement 1, Owusu Francis, and Samatar, Abdi, Ismail (1997), 
“Industrial Strategy and the African State: The Botswana Experience” Canadian Journal of African Studies, 
Vol.31 No.2,  and Mkandawire, Thandika and Soludo, Charles (1999), Our Continent, Our Future: African 
Perspectives on Structural Adjustment, Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc., among others. 
156 Lall, Sanjaya (1992), Op Cit, p.106. 
157 Riddell, Riddell (1993), Op Cit, p.239. 
 61 
analysis and economic evaluation.158 Wholesale ISI hardly paid attention to the need to 
reach international competitiveness. On the whole, the importance of socio-political 
bases for successful industrial policy is hardly considered. Proponents of industrial policy 
must take these issues into serious consideration.   
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to examine the broad literature on developmentalism and associated 
industrial policies in the Post-World War II Third World Economies. Prior to the review, 
we defined what constitutes an industry and industrialisation and noted that both 
concepts are context specific both local and global. The literature was discussed under six 
related themes. First, modernist developmentalism posited a modern sector acting as a 
pole of development from which the industrial revolution would eventually diffuse out to 
the rest of the Third World societies. We have observed that the diffusionist assumptions 
on the transfer of technology through “big push”, pro-capital, pro-big, large scale 
manufacturing without concurrent institutions for creative and innovative adoption 
within the domestic economy, could not, by themselves, secure sustainable 
industrialisation process. 
 
Second, the dominant thrust of the efforts to industrialise in LDCs was based on state 
intervention through ISI as a market oriented, state-led development strategy. While this  
strategy achieved relative success in a number of Third world economices by raising the 
share of manufacturing in their national products, it had several shortcomings in its 
practice. First, according to Fredrick List, there was need for infant industry protection 
which had to be temporary, selective and targted and not excessive. The “across-the-
board” import substitution as practiced in the 1950s to the 1970s was a misapplication of 
the infant industry argument on which it was based. Second, ISI in practice was imitative 
which led to import reproduction that took the “product” as their point of departure 
rather than the purpose. Third, apart from the form of the ISI that was practiced being 
unselective and imitative import reproduction type, there was little effort to graduate 
from being infants to mature industry. 
 
The third theme of the review examined the notion of socialist industrialisation as several 
LDCs adopted this model. This mode of industrialisation was seen by policy-makers as 
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providing the most effective means of dissolving the ties of dependence and defending 
LDCs against hostile international pressure – military, political and economic. It was 
noted that the adoption and the practice of socialist industrialisation in much of the 
Third World was less than optimum. We argue that “socialist industrialisation” failed 
mainly due to the fact that socialism is not only a developmental process, but a societal 
stage arising out of prior developments. It presupposes a secure material-industrial base, 
which were in short-supply in Third World countries. 
 
Fourth, it is noted that the failure of ISI developmentalism and the “socialist” variants of 
industrialisation resulted in the emergence of the dominance of neo-classical discourse 
with its claim that the only way to restore growth and economic stability was to remove 
the state’s power to control prices and allocate economic resources and transfer decisions 
to competitive markets. Neo-classical discourse, as far as industrial policy is concerned, 
puts stress on EOI practiced through the institutional mechanism of FDI, EPZ and 
value chain upgrading. The literature suggests a number of caveats on EOI. First, the 
conception that categories the policies of states pursuing EOI strategy as non-
interventionist, is particularly problematic. Secondly, the association of export oriented 
strategies with free-market policies is likewise unfounded as the state was critical in the 
success of EOI, for instance, in East Asia. Third, the literature suggests that we should 
transcend the tendency to present ISI and export-orientation as mutually exclusive. ISI is 
a precondition for successful export-led growth under particular political conditions. 
 
The literature brings out the reality that the experience of industrialisation efforts in most 
of sub-Saharan Africa was largely dismal as far as implanting industrialisation process is 
concerned. It was noted that inspite of the channelling of substantial resources to 
promote industrialisation in sub-Saharan Africa, the results have been dismal with very 
low levels of manufacturing. There are several reasons for the failure: 1) ISI was adopted 
in a static form. In the process of import substitution, production is not an end in iself as 
was practiced in much of sub-Saharan Africa. 2) Technology policies remained largely 
implicit rather than explicit and the institutions for managing them were inadequate to 
the task.  3) The set of institutional and political arrangements in much of sub-Saharan 
African countries were not appropriate for dynamic industrialisation. 
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In the final analysis, while industrialisation has been problematic in Africa and other 
Third World countries, the solution is not to abandon the idea of industrialisation but to 
rethink past industrial policies.  
 
The above literature review has been at a broader level. The themes that have been 
reviewed shall be applied in chapter four which discusses Uganda’s institutional 
foundations in the practice of industrial policy. What follows in the next chapter is the 
analytical and theoretical framework of the study. 
 CHAPTER THREE 
 
3. ANALYTICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
Over the past 50 years scholars in the field of economics, development and social 
sciences, in general, have been debating the efficacy of institutions in development 
applying several approaches. The first objective of this chapter is to set up the analytical 
framework and theoretical assumptions in the study of industrialisation.  The second 
objective is to suggest a framework within which we can develop and offer alternative 
explanations for the failure to pursue successful industrialisation in Uganda type of 
economies. 
 
Prominent among the approaches to the study of industrialisation are modernisation and 
dependency theories. This chapter shall not repeat the theoretical discussion of the 
modernisation and dependency theories which were examined in chapter two. A detailed 
discussion in this chapter shall be focused on three approaches, namely: 1) structuralism 
2) neo-liberalism and 3) institutional political economy. 
 
 
3.0.1 Structuralist Approach 
 
Structuralism as an approach emerged out of Latin American intellectual movement 
spear-headed by Raul Prebisch,1 based on the notion that undeveloped economies were 
characterised by pervasive market failures. Prebisch introduced the notion of an 
industrial, hegemonic Centre and an agrarian, dependent Periphery as a framework for 
understanding the international division of labour. He hypothesised that the two 
elements were related by a process of unequal exchange based on structures, blockages 
and imbalances, hence the name “structuralism”. Assuming a greater rate of 
technological innovation in industrial countries, he argued that there were different 
responses to the behaviour of the business cycle by primary exporters and by 
manufacturers resulting in secular effects.2  For development to occur in the Third 
                                                 
1 Prebisch, Raul (1950), The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems, New York: United 
Nations. 
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World, there was need for the removal of the blockages and imbalances vis-à-vis the 
Centre and embark on industrialisation. 
  
To the structuralists, the presence of widespread and pervasive market failures implied 
that state intervention was critical for the success of the development project.3 
Structuralism had two major assumptions. First, for the early structuralists, 
industrialisation was seen as the single most objective in the development programme, 
since historically the process was associated with rapid economic growth and high per 
capita incomes. Second, industrialisation seemed to offer a partial solution to 
employment requirements.4  
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, structuralism became popular with both theorists and 
policymakers and made three major contributions to development theory and policy. 
First, it drew attention to the significance of capital accumulation, externalities in the 
process and the importance of manufacturing in economic growth. According to 
structuralism, industrialisation would ensure more rapid transfer of technology and 
absorption of labour. Second, it illuminated the dangers of a strategy that involved 
indiscriminate integration into the free international division of labour, particularly for a 
country in the early stages of development.5 Third, the state-led ISI strategy as advanced 
by structuralism, achieved relative success in a number of Third World economies by 
raising the share of manufacturing in their national products.6 
 
The application of the structuralist schema in most of the Third World economies came 
to suffer from two major weaknesses: 1) indiscriminate protectionism and 2) a naïve 
conception of the state as well as the political processes underlying effective state 
intervention.7 This resulted in several negative outcomes.  
 
First, due to indiscriminate protectionism, ISI contributed to inflation because of 
monopolistic elements in the domestic market for industrial goods. There was the 
protection of manufacturing sector as a whole, where as the “infant-industry” argument 
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suggested the need to disaggregate the manufacturing sector and to provide protection to 
a few sectors at a time.   
 
Second, the ISI protectionist policy did not have a “sunset clause” – a given time horizon 
on protection. Domestic as well as foreign firms in sheltered industries often became 
highly efficient at rent-seeking, hiding behind tariff walls, or other forms of protection 
which allowed grossly inefficient industries to arise. ISI distorted price signals and 
punished exporters when the policy was pursued through single, overvalued exchange 
rate or a multiple rate favouring importers of industrial equipment and inputs.8   Finally, 
ISI was seen as an end in itself by most policy makers and entrepreneurs. Yet, successful 
exporting nations in East Asia went through ISI first, as part of a sequence leading to 
export substitution. 
 
The second major weakness of structuralism was the naïve conception of the state. 
Structuralism subscribed to an idealistic and benevolent conception of the state. First, 
given its preoccupation with market failure, structuralism believed that government 
action to correct market failure would necessarily and automatically result in superior 
economic performance and welfare. Second, structuralism neglected the possibility that 
in absence of the required institutional and political bases, state intervention would prove 
to be counterproductive, with pervasive “government failure” emerging as a natural 
substitute for the pervasive market failure that state intervention was designed to correct 
in the first place.9 
 
These are the weaknesses that the neo-liberals exploited and challenged resulting in the 
demise of structuralism as the dominant paradigm in the 1960s and 1970s. First, the neo-
liberals re-defined the nature of state and the politics of accumulation. Second, they 
demonstrated the highly inefficient nature of industrialisation in many Third World 
countries based on heavy and indiscriminate protectionism.10 This resulted in the 
ascendance of the neo-liberal approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Love, Joseph, (2005), Op Cit, pp 104-06. 
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3.0.2 Neo-liberal Approach 
 
Neo-liberalism refers to the doctrine that economic life should be as untrammelled by 
constitutional, legal and administrative constraints as it is possible to achieve, consistent 
with the maintance of a stable society and market place.11  David Harvey has recently 
given its wide-ranging definition that:  
 
“Neo-liberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human beings can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by 
strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to 
create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. …State 
interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, 
according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to 
second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will 
inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their 
own benefit” 12 
 
To note, briefly, neo-liberal conception of development arose on the basis of the failure 
of structuralist theories. Structuralism in many countries resulted in irrational policy 
decisions, combined with “monopoly rents” and produced inefficient industrialisation 
programmes resulting in economic crisis by the late 1970s as state intervention was 
discredited and led to market theory and policy managed by the World Bank and IMF.   
 
Neo-liberalism made two major contributions: 1) reconceptualisation of the role of the 
state in development and 2) the practice of rent-seeking. Neo-liberalism viewed the state 
as a distinct, well-organised and powerful interest group of self-maximising politicians 
and bureaucrats whose primary objectives are to maximise their personal wealth and 
power.13 The state, therefore, could not be benevolent as the structuralists assumed. 
 
Second, neo-liberalism contended that state intervention led to rent-seeking. The 
extensive micro-level state intervention in form of heavy protectionism, subsidised loans, 
price ceiling on public enterprise products designed to encourage industrialisation and 
private sector development tended to foster the emergence of powerful interest groups 
which in turn undermined state power. The energies of these interest groups came to be 
focused on lobbying for state rents.14  
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The alternative, according to neo-liberalism, was the institution of free trade and free 
markets that would produce the best results and would remove the capacity of non-
accountable states to use political power to extract rents from society and make 
irresponsible economic decisions.15 Since the early 1980s, Third world countries have 
been conditioned to apply these policies, particularly that of taking both politics and the 
state out of the market through substantial liberalisation and privatisation. Accordingly, 
the only positive role of the state was the provision of secure property rights. These 
policies have been very difficult to implement. 
 
The first major weakness of neo-liberal theory is its view of the role of the state in 
development. Instead of having a differentiated view of the state, neo-liberalism simply 
demonised it.16 The state can play a positive role in the development process although 
this depends on its organisational efficacy. 
 
Second, while the neo-liberal political economy argues for taking the state out of the 
market, the introduction of market-oriented reforms in practice required a certain level 
of capability of the state. The hostility towards the state led to the failure of “rational 
policies” and a partial return to the state through the “good governance” agenda. 
 
What appears to be missing in both the structuralist and neo-liberal frameworks is Karl 
Polanyi’s important proposition that the market is an “instituted process”. Both the 
policy measures and institutions adopted in the market economy, has a crucial bearing on 
its future performance.17 It is this missing link that Institutional Political Economy (IPE) 
attempts to capture. 
 
 
3.1 Institutional Political Economy (IPE) Approach  
 
Institutional Political Economy (IPE) approach is that body of theory that defines the 
market, the state, institutions, politics and their mutual relationships as contradictory and 
problematic. Although this approach has deeper historical basis, the review here is based 
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on recent revisionist writings by several authors.18  It emphasises the fundamentally 
political nature of the market and applies the political economy logic to the analysis of 
the market, and not just to the analysis of the state.19 This approach's explanation of the 
development process goes beyond the methodological individualism of much of the 
current neo-liberal theory as it illuminates the various dimensions of development. 
 
The institutional political economy tradition takes institutions as a major factor in 
economic development as they act to alter capabilities, change incentives, and modify 
behaviour and attitudes of development actors.20 The IPE approach grounds assertions 
of institutional effects in the analysis of actions of specific groups and organisations. 
Given particular social, institutional legacies and initial conditions, different societies 
adapt differently to economic transformation. Thus the study of industrial policy and 
industrialisation could be enhanced by IPE. IPE is appropriate as industrialisation never 
proceeds independently of the concrete institutional and historical context. 
 
This section of the analytical framework covers five main areas. The first section is a 
reflection on recent theoretical debates on institutions and their varying impact on the 
development processes among countries. The argument in this section is that there is 
need to move away from the traditional view of institutions as constraints and focus 
attention on institutions as devises, which enable the achievement of economic goals and 
more importantly, see them as constitutive of the interests and worldviews of the 
economic actors.   
 
The second section looks at the states and markets. The state, as is the market, should be 
seen as a historically rooted institution, and not simply a collection of strategic 
individuals. To understand the workings of the market, we need to understand a wide 
range of institutions that affect and are affected by it. Several notions in relation to the 
state are discussed, among these: developmental state, bureaucracy, embedded autonomy 
and state autonomy.  
 
The third section looks at the notion of late industrialisation, technological learning and 
national innovation system. Technological capacity is critical in the industrialisation 
                                                 
18 Among these include: (Chang, Ha-Joon, 2002, Rodrik, Dani, 2000, Evans, Peter, 1995, Lall, Sanjaya, 
1990, Wade, Robert, 1990, Amsden, Alice, 1989 and Johnson, Chalmers, 1982).  
19 Chang, Ha-Joon, (2002a), “Breaking the Mould: An Institutional Political Economy Alternative to the 
Neo-liberal Theory of the Market and the State”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26, p.557. 
20 Lall, Sanjaya, (1990), Building Industrial Competitiveness in Developing Countries, (Paris: Development Centre 
Studies, OECD), p.11. 
 70 
processes. The fourth section is a theoretical discussion of the various dimensions of 
industrial policy. Finally, an assessment of the relative importance of the state and 
markets in European industrialisation and in the “late” industrialisation experiences is 
made and their institutional underpinning is highlighted. 
 
To study industrial policy and whether it makes a difference in the development 
processes of nations is to resurrect the debate on states and markets, that false 
dichotomy, in the development process. This has far-reaching implications for theoretical 
understanding of the development process and policy choices available to Third World 
countries. The study of industrial policy raises multiple theoretical and empirical issues. 
This theoretical framework is based on four themes that emerge in the literature: a) 
Institutions, b) The state versus the market debate, c) The notion of embedded 
autonomy and d) Late industrialisation and technological learning.  
 
3.1.1 Institutions 
 
Institutions have been defined in various ways. The neo-classicals as represented by 
Douglas North define institutions as “a framework within which human interaction takes 
place”. 21  According to them they are the rules of the game of a society, thus, the 
humanly devised constraints that structure human interactions. Institutions are 
composed of formal rules, (statute law, common law, regulations), informal constraints 
(conventions, norms of behaviour and self-imposed codes of conduct) and the 
enforcement characteristics of both.22 In IPE, on other hand, institutions are defined as 
“systematic patterns of shared expectations, taken-for-granted assumptions, accepted 
norms and routines of interaction that have robust effects on shaping the motivations 
and behaviour of sets of interconnected social ties”.23 Chang and Evans further note that 
in modern societies, institutions are usually embodied in authoritatively coordinated 
organisations with formal rules and capacity to impose coercive sanctions, such as the 
government or the firms.  
 
                                                 
21 North, Douglass (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic performance, Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, p.4. 
22 North, Douglass, (1995), “The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development”, in 
Harriss, J., Hunter, J., and Lewis Colin (eds) The Institutional Economics and Third World Development, London 
& New York: Routledge, p.23. 
23 Chang, Ha-Joon and Evans, Peter, (2001), “The Role of Institutions in Economic Change” A Paper 
prepared for the meeting of The Other Canon Group, Venice, Italy, January, 13-14, p.1. 
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Dani Rodrik notes that it is useful to think of institutions broadly as a set of humanly 
devised behavioural rules that govern and shape the interactions of human beings, in part 
by helping them to form expectations of what other people will do.24 Thus, institutions 
include both formal rules and informal norms, customs, conventions and standard 
operating practices which structure the relationships between individuals and social 
groups. Institutions are then conceived of as socially constructed, routine produced and 
behaviour regulating frameworks.25 In development, institutions – arrangements between 
units that go beyond arms-length relationships to define and specify ways, in which these 
units can co-operate or compete and can, resolve collective action problems. The state is 
certainly one such institution.26 
 
While organisations may be embodiments of institutions, a more adequate vision of how 
institutions shape economic behaviour and outcomes has to be developed. This calls for 
a move away from the traditional view of “institutions” as constraints and focus attention 
to institutions as devises, which enable the achievement of economic goals, and more 
importantly, see them as constitutive of the interests and worldviews of economic actors.27 
One must move away from the economistic model, which dominates the current 
discourse on institutions, and look at institutional change as dependent on interest-based 
cultural/ideological projects. Crafting and changing institutions requires changing the 
worldviews that inevitably underlie institutional frames. Ideological conception of 
institutions shape economic behaviour and outcomes. Institutions must not be seen only 
as constitutive or enabling but also as constraining, all at the same time, in a combined logic. 
 
By the order of things, institutions matter.28 This contention has been a result of the 
inadequacy of both the statist and neo-liberal approaches with the rise of institutionalist 
criticism of state reductionism and the market fundamentalism in the respective 
perspectives. Following the institutionalist criticisms, neo-liberal doctrine has recently 
come to admit the importance of institutional factors in understanding the role of the 
                                                 
24 Rodrik, Dani, (2000), “Institutions for High Quality Growth: What They are and How to Acquire 
Them” Studies in Comparative International Development, Fall, 2000, Vol.35, No.3, p.4. 
25 Lauridsen, S., Laurids (1995), “Introduction” in Institutions and Industrial Development Experiences, 
International Development Studies, Occasional Paper No. 16, p.1-2. 
26 Doner, Richard, (1992), “Limits of State Strength: Towards an Institutionalist View of Economic 
Development” World Politics, Vol.44 (April), p.401. 
27 Chang, Ha-Joon and Evans, Peter., (2000), Op Cit., p.5. 
28 Increasingly, the question that is being asked is that “which institutions matter? This can be partially 
answered that which institutions matter depends on the context. 
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state in development.29 This is reflected in the writings of Douglas North and The World 
Bank.30  But there should be no mistaken interpretation that these state-friendly noises 
from the World Bank are a prelude to abandoning its market fundamentalism. As in one 
of the above writings, the World Bank is still embedded in its technocratic conception of 
development – building institutions for markets.31 The notion of institutions is broader 
than that. Institutions are constituted and ultimately instituted not simply “built”. 
Institutions are important in the sense that any analysis and discussion of states should 
necessarily involve certain views about the structure of power and the relationship 
between social structures and human actions.   
 
The study of development is no longer seen as a process of capital accumulation, but 
rather as a process of organisational change.  Along with organisations, culture and 
norms are involved. The role of state power in shaping both organisational structures 
and culture is central. Essentially, turning the focus on institutions brings new 
considerations in development. Preferences depend on beliefs and expectations rooted in 
shared cultural understandings. Relationships among economic agents are based on 
loyalties and identifications not easily reduced to the pursuit of material ends. 
Technological change is shaped by incentives as well as shaping them.32  IPE argues that 
behaviour may be changed not only through changing institutions that define incentives 
for individuals, but also through ideological and institutional changes that influence 
individual motivations.33  
 
Peter Evans argues against what he refers to as “institutional monocropping” – the 
presumption that the most advanced countries have already discovered the one best 
institutional blueprint for development and that its applicability transcends national 
cultures and circumstances.34  Imposing new sets of formal rules without simultaneously 
reshaping the distribution of power that underlies prior institutional arrangements is a 
                                                 
29 Chang, Ha-Joon, (1997) “An Institutional Perspective on the Role of the State: Towards an Institutional 
Political Economy”, a paper presented at the International Conference on “Institutions and Economic 
Development – Towards a Comparative Perspective on State Reform”, November 12-14, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, p.3. 
30 North, Douglas  (1994), “Economic Performance Through Times”, American Economic Review, Vol.84, 
No.3, The World Bank, (1993), The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, The World Bank, 
(1997), World Development Report, and World Bank, (2002), World Development Report: Building 
Institutions for Markets, (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
31 The World Bank (2002), Building Institutions for Markets, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
32 Evans, Peter, (2002), “The Challenge of the “Institutional Turn”: New Interdisciplinary Opportunities in 
Development Theory”, paper submitted for volume on The Economic Sociology of Capitalist Institutions, June, 
pp.3-4. 
33 Chang, Ha-Joon, (2002a), Op Cit. p.555 
34 Evans, Peter, (2002a), “Beyond “Institutional Monocropping”: Institutions, Capabilities and Deliberative 
Development, mimeo, p.7. 
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dubious strategy from a political economy perspective. For Chang Ha-Joon, institutional 
monocropping constitutes, in Frederick List’s phrase, “kicking away the ladder”.35  He 
argues that the institutions currently imposed on the South are not in fact those that 
characterised the now developed countries during their ascension and that the imposition 
of these institutions will make development more difficult in the South, not easier.36  The 
crafting of institutions must take into consideration the local context. Institutions are not 
a natural phenomenon. They are constituted on the basis of particular “values” -
worldviews, moral codes and social norms, about development and by operating under 
these institutions, individuals inevitably internalise some of these values and they have 
themselves changed.37 The critical institutions in organisational change and in the 
industrialisation process include: the state, markets, bureaucracy and embedded 
autonomy.   
 
3.1.2 States and Markets 
 
The states and markets are central institutions in the development process. In IPE 
perspective, the state, as is the market, is seen as a historically rooted institution, not 
simply a collection of strategic individuals. The state and the market have not always 
existed. They have been socially created and constituted over time. The interaction of the 
state and society is constrained by institutional sets of relations. Economic outcomes are 
products of social and political institutions, not just responses to prevailing market 
conditions.38  
 
For states to be successful in fostering development, they need a considerable degree of 
internal cohesiveness, which is generally supplied by the presence of a robust, Weberian 
bureaucratic corps and inter-agency interactions.39  State effectiveness depends on a 
number of elements: the state acts as a corporate entity, internal coherence based on 
effective, rule following bureaucracy and appropriate power among state policy agencies. 
In order to be effective developmentally, the state must have the capacity to impose 
discipline on domestic firms. Internal cohesion and centralisation are presumed necessary 
                                                 
35 Chang, Ha Joon, (2002), Kicking Away the Ladder: Policies and Institutions for Development in Historical 
Perspective, London. 
36 Evans, Peter., (2000a), Op Cit, pp.8-9. 
37 Chang, Ha-Joon (2002a), Op Cit. p.554. 
38 Evans Peter, (1995), Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, p.18. 
39 Chibber Vivek, (2002), “Bureaucratic Rationality and the Developmental State”, American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 107, No.4, p.951. 
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if principle-agent and collective action problems within the state are to be overcome.40 In 
addition to the ability to discipline firms, planners need to also have the capacity to 
discipline other state agencies. This is because if the state is to be successful in its efforts 
to promote industrial transformation, a crucial precondition is that it has to have the 
internal cohesion necessary to carry it out.  To elaborate, we focus on two notions in 
relation to the state: developmental state and bureaucratic rationality. 
 
3.1.3 Developmental state  
 
There is extensive literature on the developmental state.41 The notion of developmental 
state has been variously conceptualised. Adrian Leftwich defines developmental states as 
“states whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the 
centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental 
objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions and direction of 
economic growth, or by organising it directly, or a varying combination of both.”42 A 
more embracing conceptualisation is given by Moon Chung-In and Rashemi Prasad that:  
Central to the developmental state are state structures characterised by executive 
dominance, bureaucratic unity and technical competence of bureaucrats, a large 
pool of policy instruments, selective and strategic use of resources and 
instruments and the political capability to insulate economic decision-making and 
implementation from contending political and social interests.43 
 
The logic of the developmental state rests on a combination of bureaucratic autonomy 
with an unusual degree of public-private co-operation. State intervention in the economy 
relies on organisational and institutional links between politically insulated state agencies 
and major private sector firms.44 Thus, developmental states are “organisational 
complexes in which expert and coherent bureaucratic agencies collaborate with the 
organised private sectors to spur national economic transformation.”45 
 
                                                 
40 Doner, Richard, (1992), “Limits of State Strength: Towards an Institutionalist View of Economic 
Development”, World Politics, Vol.44, (April)”, p.399. 
41 Among these are: Johnson, Chalmers, (1982), Wade, Robert, (1990), Amsden, Alice, (1989), Haggard, 
Stephan, (1990) and Woo-Cumings, (1999), The Developmental State, Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press and numerous articles.  
42 Leftwich, Adrian (1995), “Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State”, The 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol.31, No.3, February, p.401. 
43 Moon, Chung-In and Rashemi, Prasad, (1994), “Beyond the Developmental State: Networks, Politics 
and Institutions” Governance: International Journal of Policy and Administration”, Vol.7, No.4, p.360. 
44 Ziya,Onis, (1991), “The Logic of the Developmental State”, Comparative Politics, Vol.24, No.1, p.114. 
45 Doner, Richard, Ritchie, Bryan, and Slater, Dan, (2005), “Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of 
Developmental States: Northeast and South Asia in Comparative Perspectives, International Organisation 59, 
spring. P.327. 
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The developmental state undertakes a leading role in the creation of comparative 
advantage. It works with and often promotes the market. The market is employed as an 
instrument of industrial policy by exposing particular industries to international 
competitive pressures. Developmental states systematically manage the market as a 
means of long-term economic transformation. The top priority of action on economic 
development is operationalised in terms of growth, productivity and competitiveness. 
East Asian developmental states have been able to control and coordinate the private 
sector by creating and expanding resources and allocating them strategically. Expanded 
resources and their strategic use are done through innovative policy instruments, 
especially: credit, tax, wage policies and industrial associations.46 
 
With very close attention to the historical, institutional and political context, East Asian 
NICs constructed developmental states whose central mission was the long-term 
transformation of their economies. Underlying the political and institutional 
requirements for effective state intervention in form of strategic industrial policy are two 
features associated with the developmental state, namely, the unusual degree of 
bureaucratic autonomy and public-private cooperation.47 
 
3.1.4 Bureaucracy 
 
The bureaucratic state is a crucial background determinant for all legal and institutional 
underpinning of capitalism. Bureaucratically structured public organisations, using their 
own set of decision-making procedures are a necessary compliment to market-based 
institutional arrangements.48 In general, it has been noted that economic success requires 
a highly capable coherent economic bureaucracy, closely connected but still independent 
of the business community.49 Such a bureaucracy needs to be politically insulated from 
societal forces, competent and meritocratic. Insulation permits officials to formulate 
policy and to mediate the influence of foreign capital independently of powerful 
distributional coalitions.50 This enables officials to both push for new activities and 
                                                 
46 Moon and Rashemi, (1994), Op Cit. pp.362-63. 
47 Onis, Ziya, (1991), Op Cit. p.114. 
48 Rauch, James and Evans, Peter, (1999), “Bureaucracy and Growth: a Cross-National Analysis of the 
Effects of Weberian State Structures on Economic Growth”, American Sociological Review, Vol.64, October, 
pp. 29-30. 
49 Evans, Peter, (1998), “Transferable Lessons? Re-Examining the Institutional Prerequisites of the East 
Asian Economic Policies”, Journal of Development Studies, Vol.34, No.6, p.69.   
50 Doner, Richard, (1992), Op Cit. p 399. 
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discipline firms that may be recipients of state centred rents aimed to act as incentives for 
production. 
 
A competent, well-organised and meritocratic bureaucracy is important for effective 
policy. Any state embarking on economic transformation project has to undertake 
organisational reforms to create such a bureaucracy. A high quality bureaucracy is not 
necessarily one equipped with people with advanced training in economics or 
management. “What is most needed for successful policy is the ability of policy-makers 
to make a good judgement on main issues, and not specialist knowledge, which can be 
acquired by consulting experts and also by “learning-by-doing” on the job”.51 De-
emphasising the cultural dimensions of bureaucracy implies that constructing a new 
bureaucratic tradition may not be as difficult as some people argue it to be. Good 
bureaucracies can be relatively quickly built, if there is a political will and appropriate 
institutional reforms.52 The appreciation of the past experience and practice of the 
bureaucracy is necessary as the history of institutions matter. The building of a 
bureaucracy is path dependent but they can be built.53 For that matter, in the 
construction of a bureaucracy, one would have to “unlock” certain types of behaviour. 
 
Drawing on experiences from developing countries, James Rauch and Peter Evans 
observe that what seems to be more important than the political system or tradition is 
the existence of a “weberian” bureaucracy based on competitive recruitment and well-
defined career path that make politically motivated hiring and dismissal difficult if not 
impossible. 54  
 
In most Third World countries, there is entrepreneurial scarcity hence the need for 
bureaus organised as pilot agencies to act as nodal points to unleash entrepreneurial 
spirit. State entrepreneurship is important in the absence of a private sector. The 
entrepreneurial state defines growth, productivity and competitiveness of its economy. It 
                                                 
51 Chang, Ha-Joon, (2001), “Institutional Foundations for Effective Design and Implementation of 
Selective Trade and Industrial Policies in the Least Developed Countries: Theory and Evidence” , a  paper 
prepared for IDRC project on Economic Policy-Making and Implementation in Africa A Case Study of Strategic 
Trade and Selective Policies, mimeo, p.12. 
52 Chang, Ha-Joon, (1999), “Institutional Foundations for Effective Design and Implementation of 
Selective Trade and Industrial Policies: Theory and Evidence”, a paper prepared for the IDRC project on  
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53 Greener, Ian, (2002), “Theorising Path Dependency: How Does History Come to Matter in 
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explores opportunities and sets the direction for the private business to follow. It pays 
consistent and coordinated attention to problems and opportunities of particular 
industries based on long-term perspectives.55 The installation of coordinating agencies is, 
therefore, an important component of enhancing the state’s strategic capacity.56 
Effectiveness of the state, the bureaucracy, the market, and industrial policy mechanisms 
may best be realised through what is referred to as embedded autonomy.  
 
3.1.5 Embedded Autonomy 
 
The notion of embedded autonomy refers to “a concrete set of connections that link the 
state intimately and aggressively to particular social groups with whom the state shares a 
joint project of transformation”.57 These social ties bind the state to society and provide 
institutionalised channels for the continued negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and 
policies. This embeddedness is critical in the practice of industrial policy, which implies 
much denser and more intimate ties between bureaucrats and society, since bureaucrats 
must have access to information about industrial operations at a sectoral level.58 Eliciting 
entrepreneurship and facilitating the creation of new productive capacities requires a 
more complicated involvement in the affairs of the citizenry than simply eliciting their 
support. Such involvement with the private sector enables the state to have genuine 
capacity to formulate long-term goals, acquire information needed to effectively pursue 
those goals, in form of feedback, yet be sufficiently constrained by forces outside of the 
state so that its actions do not simply foster the interests of state elite.59  
 
Embeddedness is necessary for information and implementation, but without autonomy, 
embeddedness will degenerate into a super–cartel, aimed, like all cartels, at protecting its 
members from changes in the status quo.60 Charles Polidano notes that “the bureaucracy, 
no matter how cohesive, can do no more than provide the machinery for policy 
coordination and ensure that each Ministry of government is aware of what the others 
                                                 
55 Yu, Fu-Lai, (2001), “Towards a Theory of the Entrepreneurial State”, International Journal of Social 
Economics, Vol.28, No.9, pp 754-5.  
56 Chibber, Vivek, (2002), “Bureaucratic Rationality and the Developmental State”, American Journal of 
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57 Evans, Peter, (1995), Op Cit, p.59. 
58 Evans, Peter, (1998), Op Cit., p.68. 
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are doing. Apart from relations with civil society, particularly those involved in economic 
transformation project, there must be inter-agency interactions.”61 At the heart of these 
interactions is the notion of state autonomy and intermediate institutions.  
 
3.1.6 State Autonomy 
 
State autonomy – “the ability of states to act independently of the wishes of non-state 
actors and social groups as a component of state capacity”, is an essential element in 
successful state intervention.62 State autonomy is expressed through the exercise of state 
power. According to Michael Mann, state power takes two forms: despotic and 
infrastructural power.63 Despotic power entails a range of actions, which the elite is 
empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalised negotiation with civil groups. 
Infrastructural power on the other hand, refers to the capacity of the state actually to 
penetrate civil society and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the 
realm. This approximates to what Peter Evans calls embedded autonomy. These two are 
analytically autonomous dimensions of power. The developmental role of the powerful 
state, however, is not a constant. It has essentially fluctuated, sometimes promoting it, 
and sometime retarding it.64 
 
State autonomy can be an important element of state capacity and it is the reason why 
state intervention does not degenerate into perpetual subsidisation of inefficient rent-
seeking industries, but does not guarantee state effectiveness.65 As in the case of East 
Asia, state autonomy expressed itself through setting performance targets of industry, the 
readiness to withdraw support from unsuccessful firms, the diversion of resources from 
consumption to investment and the creation of efficient public corporations.66 This was 
possible because of the state connectedness, embeddedness, with the private sector 
actors. ‘Connectedness’ can magnify both the state’s capacity to make informed decisions 
and its logistical ability to carry them out. Autonomy enables the state to be selective 
about which groups to “connect” with and on occasion, to strike out on its own without 
                                                 
61 Polidano, Charles, (2001), “Don’t Discard State Autonomy: Revisiting the East Asian Experience of 
Development”, Political Studies, Vol. 49, p.520.  
62 Ibid, p.524. 
63 Mann, Michael, (1989),  “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results”, in 
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64 Ibid, p.135. 
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support from any group.67 This occurs through state interactions with intermediate 
institutions.  
 
3.1.7 Intermediate Institutions 
 
Intermediate institutions provide the interface between the bureaucracy and the firms in 
various sectors. Bureaucracies engaged in a dialogue with the private sector may get 
detailed feedback on policies. Without its embedding in dense network of public-private 
interface, it is argued, an autonomous state can easily degenerate into power unto itself. 
While without a high degree of autonomy through political insulation, an embedded state 
will be “captured” by powerful private sector interest groups.68 Given this kind of 
autonomy, a network of links to social groups with an interest in the state’s project of 
industrial transformation will magnify rather than reduce the capabilities of the state. In 
practice, connectedness would mean increased competences instead of capture.69  
 
The efficacy of embedded autonomy depends on the consistent practice of a 
combination of state corporate coherence and institutional arrangements that allow for 
continual negotiation between state and society about the economic objectives to be 
pursued and the means of pursuing them. States may not offer the sole or the best 
institutional responses to collective action dilemmas inherent in industrialisation. As 
Richard Doner observes, “business groups, producers’ associations and/or public-private 
consultative bodies may solve free rider and information problems”.70  Development 
requires the consent, indeed the active participation of diverse economic actors. State 
domination does not necessarily translate into national power. Apart from the state, the 
market is essential in the political economy perspectives. 
 
 
 
3.1.8 The Market 
 
The “market” is typically understood as “the price mechanism” and analysed through 
some definition of “competition”, by neo-classical theory.71  IPE, however, highlights the 
institutional complexity of the market. To disentangle this complexity, it is necessary to 
                                                 
67 Ibid, p.525 
68 Chang Ha-Joon, (2001), Op Cit, pp. 24-25. 
69 Evans, Peter. (1995), Op Cit., p.50 
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look at the economy more broadly as an instituted process.72 To understand the workings 
of the market, we need to understand a wide range of institutions that affect and are 
affected by it.73  The way a market economy is organised and the specific mix of 
competition and collaboration that emerges in response to the policy measures and 
institutions that it adopts, will have a crucial bearing on its future performance. Perhaps 
most controversial is the notion of “free market”. 
 
Defining the “free” market and therefore what counts as state intervention is 
problematic.74 No market is “free” as all markets have some state regulations about who 
should participate in which markets and on which terms. Markets are ultimately 
determined by the rights – obligation structure that underlies their relationships. Markets 
rely on other institutions. The capitalist system is made up of a range of institutions, 
including markets, as institutions of exchange, the firms as institutions of production and 
the state as the creator and regulator of the institutions governing their relationships as 
well as other informal institutions such as social convention.75 A market economy, 
therefore, is necessarily “embedded” in a set of non-market institutions. It relies on a 
wide range of non-market institutions that perform regulatory, stabilising and legitimising 
functions.76 Every well-functioning market economy is a mix of state and market, 
intervention and laissez faire. Bureaucracies and organisations do not necessarily stand in 
opposition to markets. Rather, they are crafted and instituted in an effort to underpin 
and to unleash market forces. The market is as such a product of other institutions. 
Markets are in the end political constructs in the sense that they are defined by a range of 
formal and informal institutions that embody certain rights and obligations, whose 
legitimacy is ultimately determined in the realm of politics.77  The practice of late 
industrialisation is an expression of this notion of markets. 
 
Late industrialisation, in Gerschenkronian sense, relies on more than the market. The 
state allocates resources to the industrialists. Resource allocation is driven not by the 
markets alone but by the institutions and forces that form and operate through markets, 
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plus the agents’ actions.78 Most important for this study, is the understanding of the 
financing of the industrialisation process which is discussed in details in chapter four and 
five. 
 
The financial structure can be used to test state efficacy because it is the overarching 
mechanism guiding the flow of savings and investment, delimiting the options of 
industrial policy, and managing flows to different industrial sectors.79 Financial systems 
go beyond markets and serve to transform savings into investment and allocate those 
funds among competing users.80 Since markets as institutions are essentially political, 
there are various types of financial systems, each of which has different consequences for 
the political ties between the banks, industry and finance. There are three types of 
financial systems: 1) a system based on capital markets with resources allocated by prices 
established in competitive markets, 2) a credit-based system with critical prices 
administered by government, and 3) a credit-based system dominated by financial 
institutions.81 The East Asian industrialisers opted for the second category - the credit-
based system with critical prices administered by the government. That system made 
possible industrial sectoral upward mobility. Under such structure, firms rely on bank 
credit – to the extent that the banks are the main suppliers – for raising finance beyond 
retained earnings.82 This is one of the factors that facilitated rapid industrialisation in East 
Asia. 
 
In general, the success or failure of policy has institutional basis. Successful cases of 
industrial policy have as one of their central points, sets of institutional and political 
arrangements compatible with an appropriate mix of state intervention and market 
orientation in the economy. This is vindicated by the experience of late industrialisers. 
 
3.1.9 Late Industrialisation  
 
The phenomenon of ‘late’ development should be understood as “a process in which 
states have played a strategic role in taming domestic and international market forces and 
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harnessing them to national ends”.83 This was given expression in the paradigm of “late” 
industrialisation and the practice of industrial policy. Late industrialisation can be defined 
as “a process of industrialisation whose central tendency among leading firms is learning 
rather than invention or innovation of significantly novel technology”.84  The general 
properties of an industrialisation based purely on learning appear to be quite distinct 
from those of an industrialisation based on pioneering technology.  Such a process 
requires a particular set of institutions. It is a new paradigm, in terms of the operation of 
the market mechanism and the role of the state. It is not merely an extension of 
advanced-country capitalism.85  
 
The mode of late industrialisation has been the borrowing of technology from more 
technically advanced societies, based on what may be called learning. As Alice Amsden 
observes, “borrowing requires creativity, just as innovation or invention requires learning 
from others”. 86   In common parlance is the idea that late industrialising countries need 
not re-invent the wheel. Unfortunately, some nations, particularly those in sub-Saharan 
Africa, have taken this idea of no need to re-invent the wheel too literally. While there 
may be no need for re-inventing the wheel, the process of acquiring technology from 
inventors or innovators is very engaging. At the centre of this process is technological 
learning.  
 
3.1.10 Technological Learning 
 
Technological learning refers to the mechanisms and processes by which technological 
progress is brought about. It is central to productivity growth and different types of 
product and process improvement.87 In contrast to economic ideas of learning-by-doing, 
technological learning is a dynamic, difficult and costly process.88 This implies that a late 
developer must leapfrog - make a quantum leap from one stage to another without 
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experiencing the intermediate steps between the two.89 This means developing industries, 
which are dynamic yet, do not accord with given comparative advantage.90 
 
The central tendency amongst successful late industrialisers has shifted from absorption 
of foreign technology through copying and self-teaching to the adoption of foreign 
technology through investing in foreign licences and technical assistance.91 Late 
industrialisation is a recipe for the deconstruction of the notion of comparative 
advantage and the creation of competitive advantage. 
 
Late industrialisation through learning demands considerable state intervention and 
direction of the national economy in order to transcend the constraints of lateness 
derived from the pre-existing structures of the world economy.92 Whether India, or 
Turkey, East Asia or Latin America, a general characteristic of late industrialisation is the 
existence of a developmental state - a state that mobilises and directs resources for 
developmental purposes. Because late industrialisers do not have the competitive weapon 
of new technology, their governments have had to play a far more interventionist role 
than in the past. Not only have they protected new and other industries from foreign 
competition, they have targeted strategic firms and industries for special incentives, 
including loans at concessionary interest rates, subsidised rents and restrictions on 
foreign investment.93    
 
At the heart of successful late industrialisation is a reciprocal principle of subsidy 
allocation. Big businesses in East Asia get extensive government support, for example in 
form of cheap credit for targeted industries and incentives to research and development 
(R&D). In exchange for subsidies, the government holds big business accountable for 
achieving concrete, monitorable performance standards with respect to, say exports and 
worker training. The reciprocity principle is the linchpin of industrial policy in Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan.94  
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The practice of industrial policy as expressed in the late industrialisation paradigm may 
not be enough to bring about industrialisation in backward countries. Conscious and 
systematic processes must be constituted for the adoption, diffusion and mastery of 
industrial technology. Technology may be defined as “the set of skills, knowledge and 
procedures for making, using and doing things in both market and non-market 
settings”.95 The concept of technology thus includes technical knowledge, (knowledge 
about machines and production processes) as well as institutional arrangements and 
skills, which are necessary to efficiently transform inputs into outputs.  Sharp and Pavitt 
argue that technology is not like ‘manna from heaven’, and not easily obtained and 
costlessly applied. On the contrary, it is often complex, multi-dimensional and specific to 
a particular firm, and a large part of it is tacit, uncodifiable knowledge that derives mainly 
from trial, error and learning.96   
 
3.1.11 Value Chains and Upgrading 
 
Value chain refers to “the productive activities that lead to and support the end use of a 
set of related products or services, including lead firms”.97 The concept of upgrading on 
the other hand refers to making better products, making them more efficiently, or move 
into more skilled activities.98 Due to recent changes in production systems, distribution 
channels and financial markets, and the spread of information technologies, enterprises 
are increasingly integrated in value chains that often operate across many different 
countries.  Value chain analysis focuses on the dynamics of inter-linkages within the 
productive sector, especially the way in which firms and countries are globally integrated. 
It is particularly useful for new producers – including poor producers and poor countries 
that are trying to enter global markets in a manner which would provide for sustainable 
income growth.99  
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For LDCs, the recognition of ways in which firms can be inserted into global value 
chains has impact on the formulation of the strategies for industrialisation.100 Firm 
upgrading involves insertion into local and global value chains in such a way as to 
maximise value creation and learning.101 The application of value chain and upgrading 
practices as a means of industrialisation presupposes the existence of an industrial base 
such that all that is needed is to upgrade and become competitive. The reality is that for 
most of the Third world the policy should be to establish industrial bases. Third world 
development problem should not be reduced to competitiveness. The real question is 
what kind of policies and institutions are most conducive for improving local 
competitiveness.102 This is because the local and national institutional environment, in 
which they are, profoundly influences firms and industries and how they function. Value 
chain analysis and upgrading may be more relevant in the emerging economies, NICs, 
which have shifted their development focus from simple export-oriented industrialisation 
to an emphasis on the on-going access to higher value activities in the global value chain. 
 
The notion of value chains and upgrading has critical implications for industrial policy 
and industrialisation in LDCs. The policy tools used for promoting industrial 
development and competitiveness in LDCs have changed substantially in the past 25 
years. ISI has given way to export promotion. Subsidies and protection aimed at 
promoting particular industries have largely given way to generic policies aimed at 
supporting competitiveness through human resource development, access to credit, 
business development services, along the value chain, among others. Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs) are being phased out, with implications for LDCs 
industrialisation.103 
 
The historical experiences of the NICs do not imply that industrial policy is irrelevant. 
The overall goal of much of industrial policy is still remains. Some of these policies 
remain relevant for LDCs in moving new firms through the various stages of acquiring 
manufacturing, design, marketing and branding capabilities until they are able to design 
and market products in their own names. The centrality of state support remains 
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necessary in the face of increasing competition. There is need for incentives and financial 
support to firms in the shift towards product design, branding and investment in 
research and development (R&D).104 
 
Industrial policy, in addition to its objective of industrial transformation of LDCs, ought 
to be informed by a critical understanding of value chain and upgrading, which enhance 
competitiveness. This is because understanding how these value chains operate is very 
important for LDCs firms and policy makers because the way value chains are structured 
has implications for newcomers.105 
 
 
3.1.12 National Innovation System 
 
The acquisition and development of technological capabilities can best be realised 
through a national innovation system, which refers to institutions and mechanisms 
supporting technical innovation and change. The innovation system encompasses the 
processes by which firms master, implement and designs manufacturing processes that 
are new to them. The system concept refers to a set of institutions whose interactions 
determine the innovative performance of national firms.106  The national innovation 
system is a very broad concept with features such as education and training institutions, 
science and technical institutes, user-producer interactive learning, knowledge 
accumulation, adapting foreign technology, promotion of strategic industry among 
others.107 To adapt and develop technological capabilities calls for a dynamic interaction 
of all the above institutions and processes. 
 
It has been argued that most developing countries are inept at using industrial 
technologies.108 Given this ineptitude, the rationale of developing a more complex 
innovation system is questioned. For example, Martin Fransman observes that it is 
increasingly being argued, particularly in the U.S.A and Europe that national technology 
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policy designed to give national firms a competitive edge based on superior technology 
has become obsolete in a globalised world.109 
 
Contrary to this notion of globalisation, national systems of innovation remain essential 
in the development process. As Richard Nelson and Rosenberg point out, at present 
national governments are committed to trying to define and protect or advance, what are 
regarded as specifically national technological capabilities in key areas.110 The nation-
state’s ability to adapt to internationalisation will continue to heighten rather than 
diminish national differences in state capacity and the associated advantages of national 
economic co-ordination.111 The acquisition of technological knowledge; knowledge of 
products, process and organisational technologies is the most important type of 
knowledge for economic growth. Scientific knowledge is important in that it lies behind 
the full understanding of technological knowledge and generation of new technological 
knowledge. Competence – how to run firms efficiently, how to invest, how to innovate is 
another type of knowledge required. Policy knowledge is also important. How to design 
and administer policies successfully often requires a good knowledge of economic and 
administrative principles.112  
 
Historically, for instance, countries intending to catch-up with the more advanced had to 
learn technology and construct national systems for technological acquisition to realise 
development. For late industrialising Germany, Friedrich List theorised the need for a 
national system and advocated not only protection of ‘infant’ industries but also a broad 
range of policies designed to accelerate, or make possible industrialisation and economic 
growth. He stressed the crucial importance of technological accumulation through a 
combination of technology imports with local activities and pro-active interventionist 
policies to foster strategic ‘infant’ industries.113 
 
In contemporary times, the technical sophistication of South Korea, Taiwan and other 
NICs, has led other nations that today have a weak manufacturing sector to wonder how 
they might emulate the performance of the successful NICs. As Nelson and Rosenberg 
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note, “there is clearly a new spirit of what might be called ‘techno-nationalism’ in the air, 
combining a strong belief that the technological capabilities of a nation's firms are a key 
source of their competitive prowess, with a belief that these capabilities are in a sense 
national and can be built by national action”.114 At the centre of South Korea’s, Kim 
Linsu115 and for Taiwan, Hou and Gee,116 technological capability was national system of 
industrial innovation. Kim Linsu argues that economic progress could be attributed to 
many factors but the most important of all may be technological capabilities, which is a 
combined outcome of various economic, social and technical inputs.117 Technological 
capability enables one to assimilate, use, adapt, change or create technology and to 
develop new products and processes in response to a changing economic environment. 
 
The national innovation system is, therefore, critical in the acquisition of technological 
capabilities. The important point, though, is that the development of technological 
capabilities is neither costless nor automatic. It is acquired through effort to apply 
existing information and to accumulate technological knowledge to evaluate and choose 
technology. This effort takes the form of investments in technological capability through 
skills training and research and development, which is the ability to make effective use of 
technological knowledge.118 For developing countries, industrial competitiveness depends 
on how well individual firms manage the process of technological and managerial 
development. Dahlman and Ross-Larson note that inventing products and processes is 
not at the centre of technological development needed for successful industrialisation.119 
However, the processes of technological skill acquisition face market and non-market 
obstacles. 
 
Sanjaya Lall observes that technology development faces a number of market failures and 
governments need to intervene to overcome them and promote deepening and 
diversification.120  This is because market forces do not always induce intensive 
technological changes that are warranted. The development of capabilities is an outcome 
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of complex interactions. The differences in technological capabilities of nations and the 
consequent core companies are a reflection of institutional differences in the mode of 
importing, improving, developing and diffusing new technologies, products and 
processes.121 
 
In spite of globalisation, the nation-state, national economies and national systems of 
innovation are still essential for the development process. Technology policy has to be 
guided by a strategic vision at the national level. The ultimate goal of development is to 
create a dynamically innovative economy, whose citizens can prosper whatever the state 
of the global economy.122 In this sense, the national innovation system must be seen as 
part and parcel of industrial policy. To achieve competitiveness there is need for the total 
organisation and articulation of the economy. Of critical importance is openness to 
foreign ideas and knowledge, and a capacity to absorb these and blend them with existing 
capabilities.123  The states, in general and industrial policy in particular, are critical in the 
process. 
 
The shift in theoretical debate is that from “why we need innovation policy” to “what 
kind of policy is needed” at the various phases of development of a country.124 The 
radical changes in the environment, globalisation and information technology revolution 
necessitate a shift towards an integrated policy process rather than a continuation of 
prevailing minor policy processes. It therefore, becomes increasingly important for 
governments and private firms in developing countries to be aware of technological 
developments of the cutting edge technologies and not just to be satisfied with finding 
niches and copying established technologies at the later stages of their development.125  
In general, globalisation increases the need for strong national innovation systems. As it 
poses new opportunities and challenges that local firms are ill-equipped to address on 
their own, public policy must continue to cajole and assist these firms by signalling 
opportunities, reducing risks and engaging in research and development.126 The process 
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of policy responses to challenges is increasingly complex due to the fact that the 
emerging forms of economic activities and competition indicates new roles for policy.127  
Constructing or changing institutions requires changing the worldviews that inevitably 
underlie their institutional frames. The combination of the above institutions and policies 
is critical for industrial transformation. What then is the relevancy of the institution of an 
industrial policy regime? 
 
3.2 Dimensions of Industrial Policy 
 
Industrial policy is a generic term for a spectrum of policies that are utilised for the 
purpose of promoting a country’s economic development. It encompasses a wide range 
of policies designed to affect production, consumption, investment and foreign trade in 
the way government considers desirable.128 The definition of industrial policy tends to be 
too broad and overloaded to be useful in practice. Chang Ha-Joon proposes to define it 
as “a policy aimed at particular industries and firms as their components to achieve the 
outcomes that are perceived by the state to be efficient for the economy as a whole”.129  
In practice of successful industrial policy, the focus has been on the narrow conception 
that takes targeting as the core of industrial policy.130 This is done through both formal 
and informal institutions. The central objective is to alter resource allocations towards 
particular sectors, firms or activities. 
 
Chalmers Johnson advances a more comprehensive definition of industrial policy. 
According to him, “industrial policy means the initiation and co-ordination of 
governmental activities, through targeting, to leverage upward the productivity and 
competitiveness of the whole economy and of particular industries in it…. Industrial 
policy is first of all an attitude and only then a matter of technique. Above all, it means 
the intrusion of goal-oriented, strategic thinking into public policy. There is no such a 
thing as a government not having an industrial policy”.131  
 
In general, industrial policy is a micro-economic policy implemented at the level of the 
firm or industry. While the target is usually particular firms or sub-sectors, several 
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instruments are employed ranging from direct subsidies to companies, loans and loan 
guarantees and tax incentives. Other policy instruments include: government 
procurements, preferential licensing, Research and Development (R&D) support, 
infrastructure development, worker assistance, trade promotion, control and 
regulation.132  
 
All governments intervene to shape their economies’ productive structures by default or 
design. Since, in modern times, industrial activity is the cornerstone of national economic 
development, all states practice a wide variety of industrial policies, albeit under different 
names and in different forms. In this sense all countries have an industrial policy; neither 
should industrial policy be reduced to targeting. 
 
There are arguments for and against the practice of industrial policy in developing 
countries with both theoretical and policy implications. On one hand, the proponents of 
industrial policy advance several arguments based mainly on the notion of complexity of 
the development process. On the other hand, the opponents advance contrary arguments 
and contend that all selective industrial policy is economically undesirable and harmful. 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical Arguments for Industrial Policy 
 
In this section, a detailed discussion of the various theoretical arguments in favour of 
industrial policy is presented. The basic argument is that there is room for state 
intervention where there is market failure – when a competitive market system does not 
yield the socially efficient outcomes. But what should be noted at the outset is that the 
conception, content and forms of industrial policy differ, reflecting the state of 
development of a given economy, its national and historical circumstances, international 
conditions and its political and economic situation, resulting in considerable differences 
from nation to nation and from era to era.133 The case for industrial policy can broadly be 
grouped around a number of themes: a) market failure, b) coordination task, c) 
informational externalities, d) need for technological upgrading through FDI and e) 
economies of scale. 
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Why industrial policy?  One of the central points of the proponents of industrial policy is 
the emphasis on the centrality of the state and related institutions in fostering the 
development process. It has been observed that historically, no country has entered into 
modern economic growth without the state’s targeted intervention or collaboration with 
large-scale private sector entities.134 One of the most critical functions of the state is to 
facilitate economic development and to enhance popular welfare. For the Third world 
countries where the task of economic transformation is enormous, there arises need for 
special policy practices that will facilitate the attainment of rapid industrialisation. The 
structures of developing countries are significantly different from those of industrialised 
countries, to such an extent that economic outcomes in response to similar events in 
each environment will systematically reflect such differences and approaches.135 Thus, a 
country’s economic position relative to more advanced nations directly influences the 
nature of state intervention in its development process. Empirically, the rise of East 
Asian economies where the state has implemented strong industrial policy measures and 
created industrial sectors that had not previously existed such as steel, shipbuilding, 
transportation, petrochemicals and semiconductors with great success, has aroused 
interest in industrial policy.136  
 
Secondly, market failure – which leads to slow development and workings of market 
institutions in less developed as opposed to richer economies, provides one of the basic 
rationales for expanding the scope of state intervention.137 This is because in the 
developing countries, it is not so much due to market failure that necessitates state 
intervention but more of the need to create markets, which may best be created by the 
state through structural reforms. Even in the absence of market failure, a less developed 
economy requires the government’s extra intervention to speed up industrial growth and 
structural transformation. It is, however, noted that not all market failures require state 
intervention.138 Intervention may be best justified where market failures significantly 
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retard industrial development and where market driven solutions fail or take too long to 
emerge. 
 
Industrial policy not only makes sense but can sometimes provide a better alternative 
both to the unregulated market and to other forms of state intervention, for example, 
central planning.139 Strategic industrial policy guided by a strong (pro-active) 
developmental state can be carefully employed to strengthen national firms and 
economies in this potentially hostile and destructive international environment.140  In a 
context where the economy is ever-changing and complex, state intervention leads to the 
creation of leverage points with which to influence the direction of the economy. The 
key sectors or industries are those with extensive linkages to the economy rather than 
few attachments to other industries. 
 
The coordination task of industrial policy is perhaps the most critical justification of its 
practice. Industrial policy can and should play an important role in resolving the 
coordination problems that cannot be easily dealt with by the market mechanism. 
Moreover, the market mechanism, which is seen as the invisible hand by Adam Smith, is 
particularly bad at resolving coordination problems that require large-scale changes like 
industrial crisis or restructuring.141 Chang, Ha-Joon notes that the deficiency of the 
unregulated market as a coordination device was already recognised by Karl Marx, who 
saw firms as islands of planned economy in the capitalist sea of anarchy. Therefore, 
investment coordination by the state is a way of avoiding over-investment and under-
investment due to the difficulty of making credible commitments concerning one’s 
investment decisions.142 To effectively execute this task, calls for clear policy-making in 
government, consultation among business, government and labour and create competent 
analytical systems capable of looking at the economy as a whole. Coordination, if 
correctly implemented, ensures articulation of multiple policy instruments with the entire 
                                                 
139 Chang, Ha-Joon, (1994), Op Cit, p.55. 
140 Elsner, W., and Groenewegen, J., (2000), Industrial Policies After 2000, London: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, p.474. 
141 Chang, Ha-Joon, (1994), The Political Economy of Industrial Policy, p.55. Adam Smith with his doctrine of 
“invisible hand” claims that the pursuit of individual interest leads to a socially optimal result. Thus, when 
each person attempts to maximise his/her own individual satisfaction, it is as if there is and “invisible 
hand” that arranges that society thereby achieves better outcomes than if each person had tried to act for 
public interest. Smith recognises that the invisible hand will fail whenever there is conflict of self-interest 
and where self-interest leads to socially undesirable outcomes, Farmer, J. David, (1996), Contemporary 
Conceptual Space: Reading Adam Smith, Journal of Management History, Vol.3, No.3, p.249.  
142 Chang, Ha-Joon, (1994), Op Cit. p.70. 
 94 
production system rather than a single industry or sector and many economic objectives, 
not just short-run efficiency.143    
 
To enhance competitiveness in industry, a certain level of technological mastery must be 
attained. State involvement is important. In developing countries, local industry cannot 
start from scratch without access to foreign technology. A certain level of domestic 
control is necessary as to leverage the local firms for acquiring foreign technology 
cheaply and pressurising foreign companies to make joint ventures with local 
entrepreneurs.144 Secondly, the acquisition and the creation of technology demands 
colossal resources to carry out Research and Development, (R&D). This cannot be left 
to the market forces alone as the requirements may be beyond individual firms or 
sectors. It requires an industrial strategy, which should be seen as a matter of managing 
technological change to achieve dynamically efficient industrialisation. 
“Technology…does not merely include the knowledge of physical processes that 
transform inputs into outputs (technical knowledge). It also includes the knowledge of 
procedural and organisational – that is, institutional arrangements for carrying out the 
transformations”.145  
 
Sustainable competition demands a shift by firms to modern sectors or more complex 
technologies. Yet, market prices, though important and effective signals for adjusting 
supply and demand in the short-run, are quite inadequate as guides for investment 
decisions about new technologies, choice of producers and scales of production. The 
combination of state prodding and subsidies may transform what could have been a 
risky, if not impossible, industry into an attractive proposition. Alexander Hamilton 
noted that “Capital is wayward and timid in lending itself to new undertakings, and the 
state ought to excite the confidence of capitalists, who are ever cautious and sagacious, 
by aiding them to overcome the obstacles that lie in the way of all experiments”.146   
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Closely related to the above argument is the notion that government is more willing to 
incur up-front losses than commercial participants. Sectors such as iron and steel, for 
instance, generate externalities whose benefits are desirable that they warrant government 
support.147 For developing countries, required investments are enormous in comparison 
to the savings or even national capital stock available. Although it may provide adequate 
signals for marginal changes, price mechanisms cannot guide “big” industrial decisions, 
nor can it be relied upon to induce the massive resource transfer necessary for 
industrialisation. Public interventions are required both to support investors via 
protection, subsidies, cheap credits and investment directly to break critical 
bottlenecks.148   
 
In addition to crafting an industrial policy, therefore, the state should necessarily be 
entrepreneurial in light of missing markets and institutions. The entrepreneurial 
orientation of the state comes from the recognition that some industries and some 
products are more important for the future growth of the economy than others and 
hence the need to concentrate scarce capital in strategic industries.149  
 
Industrial policy is deemed necessary in enhancing a country’s manufacturing 
capability.150  Macro-economic measures, though important, are not sufficient for the 
vigorous development of manufacturing. The state should intervene to promote 
industrial development if necessary through targeting.151 Targeting does not mean the 
promotion of technologies that are unlikely to develop on their own, it means, rather, 
helping them to achieve the necessary economies of scale and manufacturing efficiency 
without which they can never become internationally competitive.  
 
Contrary to the notion that globalisation renders state intervention irrelevant as critiqued 
by Martin Fransman,152 Linda Weiss observes that the nation-state’s ability to adapt to 
internationalisation will continue to heighten rather than diminish national differences in 
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state capacity and the associated advantages of national economic coordination.153 The 
state remains relevant both at the level of policy and the organisation of production. 
With intensified competition, it remains critical in the support for national firms or 
sectors and in enhancing the vitality of their value chains. 
 
Industrial policy must of necessity recognise and deal with these concerns. One 
important condition for the success of industrial policy is for it to be based on a coherent 
vision for the future of the industrial structure of the economy backed by an overall 
bureaucratic coherence. However, there are several contrary arguments on industrial 
policy.  
 
 
3.2.2 Theoretical Arguments against Industrial Policy 
 
 
The opponents of industrial policy advance contrary arguments. This section discusses 
the arguments against the practice of industrial policy. Among these include: i) the 
problem of picking winners within the two dimensions of lack of information and the 
encouragement of rent-seeking. ii) rejection of infant industry arguments, iii) the 
problems with targeting and iv) that industrial policy undermines the legitimacy of the 
state. These arguments are critically examined below. 
 
Firstly, the new consensus seems to be that all selective industrial policy is economically 
undesirable and harmful. The government’s role is simply to establish an economic 
environment in which market forces will realise the efficient allocation of resources. 
Consequently, there is no legitimate government role in ‘selectivity’ by altering the 
market driven allocation of resources between productive activities discriminatively 
among industries except as necessary to overcome market failures. The consensus points 
to the invisible hand of the market as the best allocating force to bring about systematic 
growth.154 
 
Secondly, it is argued that economic problems stem from too much, not too little 
government interference in the market and that the recommendations of industrial policy 
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place the government even further at odds with the free workings of the market.155  Slow 
progress in Less Developed Countries, (LDCs), has been attributed to the excessive 
economic intervention by their governments. Market failure is seen as mainly caused by 
excessive intervention rather than as providing a case for its further, even more pervasive 
extension.156 But as Peter Evans argues, in the contemporary world, withdrawal and 
involvement are not the alternatives.157 State involvement is a given. The appropriate 
question is not “how much” but “what kind”. The concern here is the question of state 
capacity to intervene appropriately. 
 
Thirdly, the consensus rejects the infant industry argument that since the structures of 
developing countries are less developed, there is need for nurturing industries and firms 
that can compete against their counter-parts in developed economies.158 It is argued, with 
substantial evidence, that most selective interventions in most countries have been 
ineffective, costly and corrupt.159 The failure of ISI can be attributed to misapplication of 
policies of protection. The problem with the opponents of ISI is that they treat infant 
industry protection as simply the use of tariff and non-tariff barriers to give domestic 
producers a chance to get established. This is misleading, however, because infant 
industry protection includes a whole array of other instruments – including subsidies 
through credit, tax concessions, privileged links to research institutes, targeted technical 
education, public procurement and the like. The case for infant industry protection is not 
a case for tariff and non-tariff barriers. It is a case for public support, of which trade 
protection is one kind, among many others. 
 
Contrary to the opponents of industrial policy practice, infant industry protection and 
proactive selective industrial policies more generally can be efficacious and should be 
regarded as a legitimate instrument of national development. Industries in developing 
countries, potentially competitive in world markets, save for catch-up costs associated 
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with late entry, might efficiently be protected in the early years of their development. 
Frederick List, the advocate of infant industry protection noted that it is a common 
clever device when anyone has attained the summit of greatness for him to kick away the 
ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing 
up after him. In this lies the secret of the cosmopolitan doctrine of Adam Smith.160 
Virtually all the now developed countries used public support for domestic industry, 
including trade protection, until their industries became strong enough to compete in 
conditions of more or less free trade. Not only did the now developed countries virtually 
rely on public support as they were developing, including trade protection, once at the 
stage of sufficient endogenous productivity growth to be able to compete without public 
support, also repudiated these same practices – not only for themselves but also for 
everyone else, and even disavowed their earlier use of them.161 
 
Fourthly, targeting constitutes an important part of industrial policy. Consequently, the 
critics of industrial policy have focused their attacks on the technical difficulty and 
political corruptibility of the targeting exercise, which they hardly lack supporting 
evidence and even turned targeting into a dirty word.162  There are two major problems 
associated with targeting: first, uncertainty and second, rent seeking.163  
 
It is true that there is a lot of uncertainty associated with selective intervention – 
uncertainty about where and how to intervene and about what results to expect.164 It is 
also true that the information problem arises because the state does not possess enough 
information to decide correctly on the future industrial structure of the economy.165 But 
it is also the case that the private sector as well suffers from the problem of imperfect 
information. It is the information externalities generated by ignorance in the private 
sector that creates a useful public role by the state.166 
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Fifthly, the proponents of rent-seeking theory have argued that under state promotion 
policies, instead of devoting their time and effort to managing production efficiently, 
managers will tend to concentrate their effort on lobbying state officials to establish and 
maintain policy created rents.167  The bribes as a result lower the return on investment 
and rent-seeking contracts cannot be enforced in court. Therefore, by this logic, any 
form of state intervention can only result in stifling of development in the process of its 
interactions with the entrepreneurs. For that matter government needs to maintain its 
autonomy from the private interests.  
 
But these arguments and assumptions do not take into consideration a number of 
factors: first, the state can elicit useful information from the private sector only when it is 
engaged in an on-going relationship with the private sector – a situation that has been 
termed by Peter Evans as “embedded autonomy”.168 Second, the arguments ignore the 
question of how states are configured, how their incumbents are recruited or how they 
are linked to other social groupings. Third, sight is often lost of the fact that 
governments need to learn how to promote industrial development. Finally, the notion 
of ‘imperfect markets are better than imperfect states’ seems to introduce an 
unwarranted pessimism if not defeatism into the debate on industrial policy.169  
 
According to this argument, therefore, industrial policy, should not be used because it 
undermines the legitimacy of the state.170 This is because by opening the door for special 
interests, industrial policy practice can erode the image of the state as a social guardian 
and therefore make people question its intentions. Secondly, it gives bureaucrats the 
power to allocate property rights and hence creates scope for bureaucratic corruption. In 
addition to its efficiency consequences (for example an industrial licence may go to an 
inefficient producer), corruption may have consequences for legitimacy of the political 
system and democratic control. But as Chang Ha-Joon argues, legitimacy is concerned 
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with the socio-economic system as a whole and as such legitimacy is not confined to 
industrial policy.171 
 
Arguably, the problem of rent seeking should not be seen in zero-sum terms. Many 
problems and costs associated with state-created rents identified by rent-seeking theory 
may be reduced through appropriate institutional arrangements.172 Rent seeking should 
not be regarded as endemic to state intervention per se, but rather resulting from specific 
political conditions. The solution, therefore, lies in more fundamental reforms of socio-
political formations. Dic Lo argues that the conceptualisation of the state as a collection 
of self-interested bureaucrats, and hence government failures as inevitably worse than 
market failures, is naïve.173 The defining moment for the success of state intervention is 
not simply to pick winners and perpetually protect them regardless of their performance 
but to look for parts of government where there is bureaucratic competence, where there 
is professional expertise with a certain amount of autonomy to formulate and implement 
policy. The right way of thinking about industrial policy, as Rodrik Dani argues, is, as a 
discovery process, – one where firms and government learn about underlying costs and 
opportunities and engage in strategic coordination.174 Political institutions and relations 
are better understood as products of historical evolution and social engineering rather 
than a utility maximisation choice and the analysis of them should be placed in their 
specific context. 
 
The opponents of industrial policy argue that it is less subject to democratic control 
because it is open to bureaucratic discretion, in contrast with other “even-handed” 
general policies. Against this view Chang Ha-Joon observes that “some degree of 
bureaucratic control is necessary for any society of reasonable sophistication, because 
many decisions have to be taken in response to rapidly changing situations and cannot, 
except at the cost of total stasis and chaos, be ‘left’ until a highly democratic decision-
making process has been completed.”175 It is not just only industrial policy that suffers 
from the problem of democratic control.  
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The opponents of industrial policy further argue that post-industrial economies are 
moving to service activities; hence favouring manufacturing is not only unnecessary but 
also harmful. It is argued that we need not and indeed should not, have policies that 
favour manufacturing, not to mention industrial policies geared to the needs of specific 
sector. This argument ignores the importance of linkages in the economy. The more 
advanced or modern the production process, the longer and more complicated the 
chains of linkages.176 
 
Effective industrialisation requires particular supporting institutions, which are in short 
supply in most developing countries. Although an effective industrial policy regime does 
require an appropriate set of supporting institutions, the difficulty of building them 
should not be exaggerated. Countries learn from their own past experience and from 
other countries and engage in institutional innovations. Institutional innovations do not 
necessarily take a long time. Learning from other countries with different institutions 
does not necessarily mean that a country has to exactly copy their institutions.177  
 
According to the opponents of industrial policy, the East Asian crisis of 1997-98 was 
attributed to the practice of industrial policy – that is, too much intervention resulting in 
cronyism. Using South Korea as a case, Chang, Park and Yoo contend that the crisis was 
not due to government intervention.178 They argue that the crisis resulted from 
uncoordinated and excessive investments in the private sector, financed by imprudent 
amounts of short-term foreign debt, which in turn had been made possible by rapid and 
ill-designed financial liberalisation and a serious weakening of industrial policy. It was the 
demise of industrial policy rather than its perpetuation, which drove the South Korean 
economy into crisis.  It was the dismantling of the traditional mechanisms of generating 
and coordinating long-term investment rather than the perpetuation of the traditional 
regime, which made South Korea’s corporate debt and foreign borrowing situations 
difficult. 
 
The main argument about the efficacy of industrial policy is not really between 
intervention and non-intervention, but about which form intervention is carried out and 
for which ends. While the proponents of industrial policy stress its necessity, the 
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opponents emphasise its insufficiency. In other words, industrial policy is both the 
solution and the problem. What is needed, however, is the exploration of intermediate 
factors that link the two extreme positions. Institutions and their practice through 
various mechanisms may be considered as crucial intermediate factors in bridging these 
extremes. These theoretical reflections can best be illuminated by the historical 
experience of the now developed and NICs as far as states and markets are concerned. 
 
3.3 States and Markets: Comparative Institutional Perspectives 
 
In institutional political economy perspectives, the classic interpretations of Weber,179 
Polanyi180 and Gerschenkron,181 of the development process have brought the relative 
importance of the state to the fore in the analysis of European industrialisation, 
puncturing the myth of the original industrial revolution as a purely private process. The 
statement that captures Weber’s stress on the centrality of bureaucracy is that “capitalism 
and bureaucracy have found each other and belong intimately together”.182  According to 
Collins Randall, the bureaucratic state is a crucial background determinant for all legal 
and institutional underpinning of capitalism, but there must be a separation of the 
administrator from treating the office and its incomes as private property.183  The major 
problem of the expansion of capitalism, Randall contends, is that of the development of 
the mind of capitalism. 
 
The Weberian perspective does not negate the positive effects of strengthening market 
institutions, but it does postulate that bureaucratically structured public organisations, 
using their own distinct set of decision-making procedures, are a necessary compliment 
of market-based institutional arrangements. For Weber, these public structures are not of 
an extraneous interest but, instead, are the key to all of the institutional structures of 
rational capitalism. To him, the operation of large-scale capitalist enterprise depended on 
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the availability of the kind of order that only a modern bureaucratic state could 
provide.184  
 
Karl Polanyi, as an institutional economic historian, observes that “there was nothing 
natural about laissez-faire, free markets could never have come into being merely by 
allowing things to take their course”.185  The ‘invisible-hand’ theory of social order is, 
indeed, a mere utopian ideal for market society.  Economic relations must always be seen 
as embedded in a matrix of social ties. Markets are not givens, they are social 
constructions.  
 
Karl Polanyi’s central observation is that: 
“The road to free markets was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in 
continuous, centrally organised and controlled interventionism. … The 
introduction of free markets far from doing away with the need for control, 
regulation and intervention, enormously increased their range. Administrators 
had to be constantly on the watch to ensure the free working of the system”.186  
 
Fred Block and Margaret Somers concur that the road to the free market was paved with 
continuous political manipulation whether the state was actively involved in removing 
old restrictive regulations or building new political administrative bodies to bolster the 
factors of production of the new market economy.187  The ‘natural’ self-regulating market 
was politically and socially constructed in its origins. According to Karl Polanyi:  
“Neither a national nor an international system can depend on the automatic 
regulants… the institutional fabric must maintain and control the economic 
scheme of things. To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate 
of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of amount and use 
of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society”.188   
 
Therefore, Polanyi provides a keen sense of the degree to which the creation and 
maintenance of markets depend on state action. The life of the market has been 
intertwined not just with other kinds of social ties, but with the firms and policies of the 
state. An effective state was not simply an adjunct to the market, but was an essential 
prerequisite of the formation of market relations.189 Linda Weiss and John Hobson, note 
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that the point is not just the Polanyian principle that market exchange depends on state 
power. It is that the markets require some form of central co-ordinating agency in order 
to effect change and adjustment to continuously changing conditions of competition.190 
 
Alexander Gerschenkron191 and Albert Hirschman192 can be broadly categorised as 
theorists of “late” development. Gerschenkron as a theorist of European 
industrialisation argues that in very important respects the development of a backward 
country, may, by virtue of its backwardness, tend to differ fundamentally from an 
advanced country.  Basically, his central thesis is that there is more than one path to 
development. Countries setting out to become industrialised are likely to forge their own 
policies, sequences and ideologies to that end. Conditions of backwardness make it 
imperative for countries developing late to institute an organised system in the 
development process.  As he puts it, “…the more backward a country, the more likely its 
industrialisation was to proceed under some direction, depending on the degree of 
backwardness, the seat of such direction could be found in investment banks, in 
investment banks acting under the aegis of the state, or in bureaucratic controls”.193 
 
The degree of state intervention required for promoting development increases in 
proportion to relative backwardness. It is these institutional arrangements that would 
bring about development in a backward country. Gerschenkron observes that “to break 
through the barriers of stagnation in a backward country, to ignite the imaginations of 
men, and to place their energies in the service of economic development, a stronger 
“medicine” is needed than the promise of better allocation of resources or even lower 
price of bread”.194 The peculiar conditions of late development necessitate vision, 
ideological commitment and different institutional arrangements. The market, as it were, 
is not enough. 
 
Albert Hirschman as well addressed the issue of economic development in backward 
countries. He argued against the theory of balanced growth, which he saw as a 
justification for centralised governmental direction.195 He as well rejected the notion that 
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the problem in the Third World was lack of capital, arguing that, “…savings and 
productive investment are as much a result as a cause of development”. Neither can 
market forces alone resolve this. He contends that development depends not so much on 
finding optimal combinations for resources and factors of production as on calling forth 
and enlisting for development purposes, resources and abilities that are hidden, scattered 
or badly utilised. 196  Particular institutional arrangements to mobilise these resources have 
to be put in place to transform backwardness. 
 
Albert Hirschman argued against the key role that is attributed to the generation of 
savings as the major basis of capitalism. It is totally wrong, he contends, to leave out of 
the account changes in much more strategic variables, such as corporate savings, 
technical innovation and entrepreneurial skills, not to speak of cultural and institutional 
factors.197 The condition of backwardness in the Third World is bound to make their 
development into a less spontaneous and more deliberate process than was the case in 
the countries where the process first occurred.  
 
The idea of induced decision-making and the creation of ‘multi-dimensional conspiracy’, 
which refers to creating sectoral dynamism for development, is of particular interest here. 
Among the institutions that may stimulate decision-making, the state is an obvious 
candidate. To play this role, the state must do more than provide a predictable 
environment or gather available capital together into larger lumps. The state is seen as a 
potential source of ‘disequilibrating’ incentives that make decisions harder to avoid and 
thereby induce private capital to become more entrepreneurial.198 
 
The focus on sectors creates ‘multi-dimensional conspiracy’.  Inducing decisions by the 
state focusing on sectors creates sectors and social groups that come to identify their 
future with the future of the sector. Having helped bring new entrepreneurial groups into 
a sector, the state can focus on nurturing them and promoting their further evolution.199  
The resulting dynamism in the economy within these sectors and beyond is what 
Hirschman refers to as ‘multi-dimensional conspiracy’. 
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The post World War 11 period was dominated by such theorising in development. As a 
result, most Third World states stressed the centrality of the role of the state in the 
development process. However, it was mainly the NICs of East Asia (South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore), which put into practice Gerschenkron's and Hirschman’s schemas of 
economic development. The crucial factor was the construction of developmental states 
by these late industrialising countries.  
 
The success of late industrialisation cannot be assumed. Such success has to be 
orchestrated through industrial policy. Theoretically, the recent relative rise of East Asian 
economies where the state has implemented strong policy measures with great success 
has aroused interest in industrial policy. From a broadly institutionalist perspective, 
several studies generated critical evidence of the East Asian development experience, 
which questioned the link between the idea of a free market and the outward-oriented 
model, postulated by the neo-liberals.200  Chalmers Johnson demonstrates the key role of 
institutions underlying rapid economic growth in Japan. Alice Amsden articulates the late 
industrialisation paradigm that underpins the technological mastery of the East Asian 
tigers. Robert Wade's central thesis is that the superior economic performance of East 
Asian economies is to a large extent the consequence of very high levels of investment, 
more investment in certain key industries than would have occurred in the absence of 
government intervention. Second, the exposure of many industries to international 
competition in foreign markets, though not in domestic markets. Within a particular 
institutional framework, therefore, the state made conscious, deliberate interventions and 
selection of industrial sectors to enhance their competitiveness, particularly in the export 
market.  Successful industrialising countries are those that addressed these concerns 
through a particular institutional framework. 
 
What is common to successful cases of late industrialisation is a good mix of competition 
and co-operation, which has been achieved through quite different sets of policy 
interventions and the institutions supporting these interventions.201  Therefore, the 
concerns of the neo-liberals with 'rent-seeking' and corruption aside, particular 
institutions, organised in a particular way, must be instituted in order to have a successful 
industrialisation process in a given context. 
                                                 
200 Mainly, Johnson, Chalmers, (1982), MITI and Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-
1975, Stanford: Stanford University Press, California, Amsden, Alice. (1989), Asia’s Next Giant and Wade, 
Robert, (1990), Governing the Market. 
201 Onis, Ziya, (1995), “The Limits of Neoliberalism: Toward a Reformulation of Development Theory”, 
Journal of Economic Issues, Vol.XXIX, No.1 (March), p. 97. 
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A central theoretical and empirical question then arises: why has industrial policy 
succeeded in East Asia and yet has largely been a litany of disasters in Africa and Latin 
America?  The success of policy is not derived from its definition as a good policy. The 
consistent pursuit of any policies, whether they are aimed at ‘getting prices right’ or 
implanting local industry, requires the enduring institutionalisation of a complex set of 
political machinery.202 The success or failure of policy therefore has an institutional basis. 
Successful cases of industrial policy had, as one of its central points, a set of institutional 
and political arrangements compatible with an appropriate mix of state intervention and 
market-orientation in the economy.203 
 
The pervasive failure of industrial policy in much of Africa and Latin America must be 
seen as a result of the failure to reconstruct the post-colonial state as well as failure to 
understand the institutional and political processes underlying effective state 
intervention. Ziya Onis observes that the state can play a positive role in the 
development process. The state’s ability to perform a positive role, however, is not 
guaranteed by definition but depends on its organisational characteristics including the 
quality of personnel, the degree of internal cohesion, and the degree of its autonomy or 
insulation from rent-seeking pressures. 204  
 
An effective industrial policy calls for intrusion of goal-oriented, strategic thinking into 
public economic policy. Needless to say, however, industrial policy is no panacea to 
problems of industrialisation. Like any other policy, or any other form of economic co-
ordination, it has its own costs and benefits. But for developing countries, it remains one 
of the most important policies for their transformation and enhancement of their 
industrial competitiveness. 
 
                                                 
202 Evans, Peter, (1992), “The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy and 
Structural Change”, in Stephen, Haggard and Robert, R.Kaufman, (eds), (1992), The Politics of Economic 
Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts and the State, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, p.141. 
203 Onis, Ziya, (1991), Op Cit, p.110. 
204 Onis, Ziya, (1995), Op Cit, p.115. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
The thrust of this chapter was to set up the analytical framework for the study. Thus the 
basis of this theoretical framework has been to integrate the theoretical themes that 
impinge on state intervention through industrial policy and set up a framework for 
interpreting research findings and policy conclusions.  
 
Institutional political economy perspective points towards the importance of multiple 
logics in the theorisation and practice of industrial policy, in this case, in terms of 
interactions between institutions, technology and markets.  The issue of industrial policy 
and interactions between institutions, technology and market reforms calls for a multi-
dimensional perspective and multiple logics. The problem of industrialisation and its 
resolution necessitates the support of both public and private order institutions. 
  
The possibility of institutions and their capabilities to bring about change are historically 
contingent. The differences in development trajectory are rooted, to a significant degree, 
in differences in national histories and cultures including the timing of a country's entry 
into the industrialisation process. The institutional political economy perspectives 
illuminate the differences and similarities in the given national institutions, laws, policies 
and processes. It is within this analytical framework that we examine what informed 
industrial policy and how the various institutional mechanisms have manifested 
themselves in the processes of Uganda’s industrialisation since the end of World War 
Two to the present. The basic objective of the chapter was to capture, analytically, the 
relationship between the state and the market penetration and the efficacy of industrial 
policy. This may provide the entry point to the analysis of industrial policy and the 
imagination that should guide the formulation of a robust industrial policy.  
 
As noted in the previous chapter, this study shall attempt to focus on institutional 
framework and the basis of industrial policies in Uganda. Thus, in the next chapter we 
examine Uganda’sinstitutional foundations for industrialisation prior to the adoption of 
SAPs in June 1981. 
 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4. INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF UGANDA’S INDUSTRIALISATION 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
This is the first data chapter of this study. It entails a detailed analysis of institutional 
foundations of Uganda’s industrialisation. It is primarily sourced from materials in the 
archives and secondary sources, both published and unpublished. The reliance on 
secondary sources as opposed to primary sources is due to the difficulty of locating the 
architects of Uganda’s industrial policies in the 1950s to 1970s for interviews. Yet the 
knowledge of the past institutional frameworks is so crucial in explaining the nature of 
the current industrial policies. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to situate Uganda’s industrialisation within its institutional 
history. This is because a significant problem of the study of institutions in Uganda is 
that there are relatively few data points. It is therefore particularly important to go back 
to history in order to salvage some historical materials and experiences. The problem of 
institutional incoherence in the practice of industrial policy which may be a major 
contributing factor in the explanation of Uganda’s stunted industrialisation process can 
best be understood historically. In this study it is noted that industrial policy and 
industrialisation are often products of numerous historical, social, economic and political 
considerations. There lies the importance of this chapter to the problem under study. 
 
This chapter examines Uganda’s institutional foundations for industrialisation since 
“late” colonial period, 1945-1980. The chapter is periodised into three phases: 1) 1945-
62, 2) 1963-1971, and 3) 1972-1980 with attendant institutions for implementing 
industrial policy.  The first section deals with the “late” colonial period, 1945-1962. 
Under this phase we examine several institutional elements: the colonial state and 
associated bureaucracy, the coordination agencies, the control over resources, peak 
business associations, technical education and entrepreneurship. An attempt is made to 
understand the influence of these institutional mechanisms to the nature of the 
industrialisation that occurred during this phase. 
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The second section examines the industrial policies during the immediate post-colonial 
government phase, 1963-1971. We probe the idea of initial conditions at the time of 
independence and the continuity of the industrial policies of the colonial period. We 
argue that the inherited institutions presented both possibilities and obstacles to the 
industrial transformation process in Uganda. 
 
The third section deals with the “economic war” policy period, 1972-1980. In this phase 
we examine the impact of the abrupt changes brought about by the “economic war” in 
Uganda’s political economy in general and industrial policies, in particular. The 
institutional framework for industrialisation which had been established in the colonial 
period, inherited, built-on with attempted modification through the “Move to The Left” 
during the immediate post-colonial period, was literally wiped out as policy-making was 
replaced by the rule by decree. This period is characterised by two elements: i) the 
expropriation of Asian properties and ii) the unplanned expansion of the public sector. 
We analyse how these two actions triggered a process of decline in economic growth 
resulting in de-industrialisation such that by 1979, with the end of the Idi Amin regime, 
most of the industrial sector had been decimated. 
 
Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of these institutional 
distortions for industrial policies under SAPs beginning in June 1981. The focus on 
institutions is informed by the view that policies do not operate in an institutional 
vacuum and therefore it is only logical that the success or failure of a particular process 
depends on the institutional arrangement within which they are constituted, enabled and 
constrained.  
  
4.1 “Late” Colonial Industrialisation - 1945 – 1962 
 
Uganda’s industrial policies in the “late” colonial period are underpinned by the 
definition of the colonial state. A colonial state is an alien administrative – coercive 
apparatus imposed by the metropolitan state over a more or less arbitrarily defined 
territory for the economic and strategic ends of the metropole.1 To realise this objective, 
the colonial state established institutions and mechanisms to expropriate surplus from 
domestic producers both for its maintenance and for the benefit of metropolitan 
                                                 
1 Jorgensen, Jelmert, Jan, (1981), Uganda: A Modern History, London: Croom Helm, p.134. 
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interests in industry, commerce, banking and shipping. The result was what Teddy Brett 
refers to as colonial non-industrialisation.2   
 
Basically, Uganda was to serve as a reservoir of cheap raw materials for British industry 
and consequently a market for its finished goods. Therefore, the institutions that were 
established were those that facilitated the extraction of surpluses from the agricultural 
producers. These included marketing boards, co-operatives, taxation and forced labour. 
The colonial economic planners did not take industrialisation seriously. The attempts by 
non-colonial capitalists such as Indians and Japanese to invest in Uganda were officially 
discouraged. When a proposal for a blanket factory in Uganda by the Japanese was 
suggested in 1935, the general issue of industrialisation arose and the Governor of 
Uganda (supported by the Governor of Tanganyika) opposed the proposal. The 
Governor of Uganda stated, “so far as Uganda is concerned, it can be definitely stated 
that it is of great importance to preserve the agricultural population and therefore I do 
not favour the idea of industrialisation”.3 Most of the colonial industrial policy was of 
processing of raw materials, mainly to reduce weight and protect quality and other bulky 
materials like cement, which could more cheaply be produced locally. Industrialisation in 
Uganda, therefore, was a post WW II phenomenon.  
 
The post-World War Two industrialisation was driven by a number of factors. First, was 
the need by the colonial state to accumulate surpluses in order to finance the 
reconstruction of the British shattered economy and maintain monopoly over the colony 
by capturing the market from other foreign investors and also to act as a dollar saving 
and earning exercise as some of the products were exported to earn dollars.4  Second, 
there existed substantial finances saved through the “Price Assistance Fund” extracted 
from cotton and coffee producers. Christopher Wrigley, the colonial economic historian 
conservatively estimated that by 1953, “voluntary” savings amounted to 82 million 
pounds.5 It was these resources that were applied to construct a hydroelectric dam at 
Owen Falls dam, Jinja, which was to provide low cost power for industrial and 
commercial activities in Uganda and Kenya and create a multiplier effect on the pace of 
                                                 
2 Brett, Edward,.A., (1973), Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 
London: Heinemann, pp. 266-282. 
3 Nabudere, Dan, (1980), Imperialism and Revolution in Uganda, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 
p.100. 
4 Mamdani, Mahmood, (1976), Politics and Class Formation in Uganda, New York: Monthly Review Press, 
p.202. 
5 Wrigley, Chris, (1959), Crops and Wealth in Uganda:  A Short Agrarian History, Kampala: East African 
Institute of Social Research (MISR). 
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industrialisation. The finances were as well used to kick-start ISI and fund the 
Africanisation programme in the 1950s. Industrialisation was undertaken largely with the 
country’s resources and thus not dependent on outside capital.6 
 
It has been observed that political power is directed to specific economic ends7, thus in 
this case the colonial state created institutions which, would act as a basis of 
industrialisation in Uganda. The concern here is the examination of the nature of these 
institutions and whether this explains the character of the industrialisation that took 
place. These include: the bureaucracy, coordination agencies, institutions for control 
resource flows, financial institutions and intermediate associations. In the absence of an 
indigenous capitalist class, the industrialisation process came to be state-led. 
 
4.1.1 The Colonial Bureaucracy 
 
The colonial administration crafted a fairly lean, efficient and highly motivated 
bureaucracy. Though conditioned by the colonial context, the recruitment and 
promotion were based on merit and performance. Honesty, integrity, patriotism, 
incorruptability and dedication were the underlying pillars, although in the interest of 
British colonial authority.8  The concern here, however, is a reflection on the worldviews 
that inevitably underlay institutional frames and what the bureaucracy did to promote or 
impede industrialisation. First, the colonial state, in league with expatriate firms, 
determined the overall orientation of the domestic economy through the control of 
economic policy.9  The colonial state institutions were set up to coordinate a limited 
industrialisation. Its responsibility for day-to-day decisions, however, gave rise to a 
measure of autonomy in its practice.  
 
As expected, economic growth was envisaged essentially in terms of the promotion of a 
narrow range of export staples while imports mainly took the form of consumer goods, 
which were taxed for revenue, rather than for the promotion of infant industry.10 What 
was critical for development was the attitude of colonial civil servants towards the 
                                                 
6 The Economist Intelligence Unit, (1957), Power in Uganda: A Study of Economic Growth Prospects for Uganda 
with Special Reference to the Potential Demand for Electricity, London, p.67.  
7 Mamdani, Mahmood, (1984), Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda, Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 
p.6. 
8 Langseth, Petter, and Mugaju, Justus (1996), Post-Conflict Uganda: Towards an Effective Civil Service, Kampala: 
Fountain Publishers, p.2. 
9 Jorgensen, Jelmert, Jan (1981), Op cit., p.135. 
10 Ehrlich, Cyril, (1973), “Building and Caretaking: Economic Policy and British Colonial Africa, 1890-
1960, Economic History Review, Vol.26, Issue 4, November. 
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colonised people as it crystallised in government action. The civil service recruitment and 
staffing was influenced strongly by racism and paternalism. There was emphasis on the 
separation between the races in the civil service, not only in terms of positions open on 
the basis of qualification of race, but also differential rates of pay, though this was 
abolished in 1954.11 Paternalism remained a major practice in the civil service. This may 
be noted in the colonial attitude towards the local civil servant thus:  the “local officer is 
young and inexperienced so he must therefore, be closely guided and controlled and his 
hand held for a long period”.12  
 
The civil servant was in most times a product of public school or Oxford and Cambridge 
(Oxbridge), who imposed a particular set of values. According to them, trade would 
harm Africans so it was not to be allowed. What is of concern is the stifling effects of 
their paternalism upon social and economic change in Uganda.13 This bureaucratic 
prejudice towards commerce had crippling effects upon the emergence and growth to 
maturity of an indigenous entrepreneurial class. By the 1950s in Uganda, the shortage of 
African traders began to worry government. Its bureaucratic solution was to establish a 
department whose officers were to teach book-keeping and other skills peripheral to 
business ability.14 This was in contrast to treatment of Asians. Mahmood Mamdani notes 
that the thrust of the colonial policy was to ‘keep the African out of the market place and 
in the agricultural economy – away from activities (commerce) which would give him the 
reason, the skill, the vision and the opportunity to organise the masses”. 15  The 
“support” for Asian manufacturers after World War Two, was, therefore, simply 
strategic.16  
 
Teddy Brett in a contradictory observation points out that “at no point was any official 
attempt made formally to forbid private attempts to establish manufacturing industries. 
Potential non-African entrepreneurs were made fully conscious of lack of support which 
                                                 
11 Apter, E, David, (1961), The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study of Bureaucratic Nationalism, Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, p.197. The differential pay was such that the Africans were paid 3/5 of 
the salary given to Europeans doing similar job, The Uganda Herald, January, 1952. This was abolished in 
1954. 
12 (Uganda Protectorate), 1960/1:3), Entebbe archives. 
13 Ehrlich, Cyril, (1954), “Some Social and Economic Implications of Paternalism in Uganda”, Journal of 
African History, VOL.IV. 
14 Ehrlich, Cyril, (1973), Op Cit., p.651. 
15 Mamdani, Mahmood., (1975), “Class Struggles in Uganda”, Review of African Political Economy, No.4, 
November p.31. 
16 Saul, John, (1976), “The Unsteady State: Uganda, Obote and Idi Amin”, Review of African Political Economy, 
No.5, p.25. 
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any attempts to break into the sector would likely receive. Second, the effects of policy 
made themselves felt in the failure to give any direct assistance to such assistance or to 
put financial pressures upon them which they could not hope to withstand”. 17 While not 
officially spelt out, the colonial state was not supportive of the establishment of 
manufacturing industries in the country.  
 
The colonial bureaucracy was limited in its mission as an institution to bring about 
change that would be enduring. Although state posts provided African bureaucrats with 
opportunities to accumulate capital to go into commerce when the Africanisation policy 
was launched, both during and after colonialism, there was limited institutionalisation of 
the idea of bureaucracy. A competent, well-organised and meritocratic bureaucracy is 
critical for effective policy implementation. Justus Mugaju observes that the inherited 
post-colonial civil service in Uganda was devoid of cultural attributes, shared values and 
historical traditions. It was an artificial institution, which did not have any social 
foundations.18 
 
4.1.2 Coordination agencies and institutions for control over resource flow 
 
Institutions that provide control over resource flows and organisational capacity, 
particularly entrepreneurial vision, which provides focal points around which private 
sector investment decisions can be co-ordinated, are critical in the industrialisation 
process. The most important institutions for the initiation and coordination of Uganda’s 
industrialisation was the Uganda Development Corporation (UDC), Co-operatives and 
Marketing Boards, which are discussed in detail below 
 
The experience of the industrialisation process is that countries setting out to 
industrialise at a disadvantage makes it imperative to institute an organised and co-
ordinated system in their development process.19  Such systems have the power and 
legitimacy to oversee activities across different agencies and resolve potential conflicts 
between them. Late colonial Uganda was not different. The colonial state (economic 
ministries), in general, the bureaucracy and Uganda Development Corporation (UDC) in 
                                                 
17Brett, Edward, A., (1973) Op Cit.,  p, 275. 
18 Mugaju, Justus, (1996), Op Cit, p.3. 
19 Gerschenkron, Alexander, (1962), Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
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1950s, in particular, oversaw the colonial industrialisation process.20 Unlike the successful 
late industrialisers of East Asia, Uganda did not have a single supra-agency to oversee the 
rest and coordinate the industrialisation process.21 The roles were combined. In Uganda’s 
case, UDC approximated to such an agency. It encouraged, promoted and assisted the 
establishment of new industries and the improvement and expansion of others.  
 
While the bureaucracy dealt with the general economic policy, UDC provided an 
entrepreneurial vision in terms of creation and state ownership of a number of 
enterprises. The construction of Owen Falls Dam to produce cheap electricity to run the 
industries was critical in the realisation of this vision. Together with the extension of 
roads, railways and telecommunication lines, the institutional context of industrialisation 
had been set up. Here we examine the extent to which these institutions, in practice, 
advanced Uganda’s industrialisation process. 
 
The impetus for industrialisation in Uganda came after the Second World War. A strong 
colonial official commitment to increased industrialisation was to emerge in the early 
fifties, especially the period under Sir Andrew Cohen’s Governorship. But in this case the 
attitudes of the earlier period continued to exert their influence. Industrialisation was not 
to be carried out by the indigenous entrepreneurs but by the colonial state. The Royal 
Commission Report noted that: “in the context where the direction and control of new 
capital investment can be conveniently vested in the state, as in the case of public utility, 
no particular difficulty need arise”.22 These attitudes produced UDC as an agent of 
Uganda’s industrialisation. UDC was essentially an instrument of colonial state-led 
development. It was at times used to supplant private enterprise. In 1957, for instance, 
UDC bought the NYTIL, from the government, which had earlier bought the newly 
established company from the Calico Printers Association.23     
 
                                                 
20 Several studies stress this point. Among them : Barya, JJ, (1986), The Impact of Foreign Capital on the 
Performance of the Uganda Development Corporation – A Legal and Socio-Economic Analysis, LLM dissertation, Law 
School, Warwick, UK,  Brett, E.A (1973), Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, Mamdani, M., 
(1976), Politics and Class Formation in Uganda, Nabudere, D., (1980), Imperialism and Revolution in Uganda and 
Jorgensen, J J, (1981), Uganda: A Modern History. 
21 Having an overarching single supra-agency, though necessary, is not a sufficient condition in the 
coordination of the industrialization. There are several mechanisms of coordination, not only through 
formal bureaucratic power concentration, but also through informal means to judge the concentration/ 
fragmentation of the economic bureaucracy. Depending on the manner of the exercise of state power, a 
single supra-agency could be subjected to abuse in terms of rent-seeking and patronage.    
22 H.M.S.O, (1955), The East African Royal Commission Report, 1953-55, London, p. 109, Entebbe archives. 
23 The Economist Intelligence Unit, (1963), Uganda: The Background to Investment, prepared for Government 
of Uganda, P.40, Entebbe archives. 
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Prior to the formation of UDC and its entry into ISI, there were some attempts at 
“industrialisation” by the colonial state. This took the form of compulsory cotton 
ginnery acquisition. This was informed by the policy of Africanisation of industry and 
commerce.24 As a result of the 1949 revolts, the policy of granting ginneries to Africans 
was extended.25 The co-operatives were declared legal, brought under state supervision 
through the 1946 Co-operatives Act and granted finances to expand their activities.26  
The policy unveiled was to help the controlled co-operative sector by acquiring 21 
ginneries and allocate them to African co-operatives over a period of ten years. The 
colonial state took a number of actions after the allocation of cotton ginneries to African 
co-operatives. First, it launched training programmes in gin fitting as part of the 
government’s wider scheme to encourage and equip Africans to take part in the ginning 
industry.27 Second, institutionally, financial support was provided through newly created 
bank, the Uganda Credit &Savings Bank (UCSB) and the African Loan Fund was 
established in 1954 to assist applicants who could not normally offer the type security 
`required for loans and from the Banks funds.28 Third, in a departure from the colonial 
government’s declared policy on acquisition of ginneries for African operators was 
receded to allow the North Mbale Union to build one.29  
 
The question remains whether the co-operatives were the appropriate institutional 
mechanism that would enhance Uganda’s entrepreneurship and bring about 
industrialisation. In the context of lack of capital, co-operatives can act as critical 
institutions for resource mobilisation. But in this case, the character of their introduction 
and the worldview underlying their operations could not create the necessary 
entrepreneurial spirit which could lead to sustained industrialisation. First, the acquisition 
of ginneries opened up the possibilities for a few handpicked co-operatives to enter into 
the cotton industry, where profits were virtually assured without much risk-taking or 
imaginative decision-making. Second, the co-operative sector was dependent on the 
                                                 
24 Africanisation (Ugandanisation) took two forms: 1) “providing opportunities and facilities to Ugandan 
Africans so as to enable them to take a bigger share of commerce and industry”, 2) “Africanising top 
executive posts” entailing “a systematic replacement of non-Africans and other non-citizens by Ugandan 
Africans in the senior executive posts”, Report of the Committee on Africanisation of Commerce and Industry in 
Uganda”  Uganda Government, 1968), p.1. 
25 Campbell, Horace (1975), The Political Struggles of Africans to Enter the Market Place in Uganda, 1900-1970, 
MA Thesis, Political Science, Makerere University, Kampala, p.180. 
26 Mamdani, Mahmood, (1975), Op Cit., p.40. 
27 The Uganda Herald, 19 July 1952, archives, Africana, Makerere University. 
28 Government of Uganda, (1975), Origins and Growth of Uganda Commercial Bank, 1950-75, Entebbe: Uganda 
Printers.  
29 Uganda Argus, 15 December, 1955, p.7, archives, Africana, Makerere University. 
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colonial state for financial support, auditing skills and experience and could not hold out 
much potential for challenging the foreign hegemony in the processing of cash crops. 
The ginneries were the dilapidated and ‘silent’ ones. Third, independent African 
businessmen could not qualify for assistance under the terms of the acquisition 
ordinance. Fourth, some of the emerging entrepreneurs simply used the co-operatives as 
stepping-stones to move into other business ventures and to national political arena.30 
Thus the creation of UDC promised a more entrepreneurial enhancement role.  
  
UDC’s contribution to Uganda’s industrialisation has been a subject of controversy. 
While it has been praised by John Katende, et al (eds.), it has been critiqued by John 
Barya.31 UDC was the agency set up in 1952 to accomplish the industrialisation process 
under the influence of the then dominant ideology of state-led development. The central 
objective of UDC, however, was to develop private enterprise. The colonial policy 
envisaged it to give private enterprise “a start” and/or to enter into partnerships with it.32  
This was after foreign investment failed to materialise and the colonial state stepped in to 
use the UDC as the vehicle of industrialisation.33 Together with local Asians who took 
the opportunity of new infrastructure investments such Uganda Electricity Board, (UEB) 
and who foresaw the coming Africanisation of trade and moved into manufacturing. 
Here we examine the extent to which UDC as an institutional mechanism, promoted 
industrialisation in Uganda. 
  
First, the industrial activity that arose in the 1950s led to the establishment of a number 
of factories, which led to expansion of the working class hence creating an internal 
market for the industrial goods and food stuff from the countryside. Second, the 
partnerships between mainly British corporations and UDC led to technological 
acquisition in terms of machinery and know-how that was imported into Uganda. Third, 
the colonial state encouraged the UDC to foster African entrepreneurship. The Small 
Industries Fund (SIF) was initiated with an allocation of 20,000.00 pounds, but the major 
problem was that the small African craftsmen did not even know about its existence.34 
Four, UDC had a certain amount of attraction for overseas investment because it 
                                                 
30 Campbell, Horace, (1975), Op Cit., pp. 180-202. 
31 Katende, John, et al (eds.) (1976), The Law of Business Associations in East and Central Africa, Nairobi: East 
African Literature Bureau and Barya, J.J (1986), The Impact of Foreign Capital on the performance of the Uganda 
Development Corporation. 
32 Nabudere, Dan, (1980), Imperialism and Revolution in Uganda, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 
pp97-108. 
33 Jorgensen, Jelmert, Jan, (1981), Op Cit, p.160. 
34 Campbell, Horace, (1975), Op Cit., p.208. 
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showed that the local people, the colonial state, were prepared to put their own money 
into development schemes.35  It also offered prospective investors a free research service. 
UDC search for foreign partners was helped by its clear freedom from government 
control and dedication to commercial principles.36 Investment expanded employment 
possibilities.   
 
While, in general, UDC was successful, like the co-operatives before it, it suffered from a 
number of shortcomings. First, UDC was not built as an agent of transformation of the 
Ugandan economy. It was part of the colonial strategy of neo-dependence through joint 
state and British ventures in ISI and British supplied; Uganda financed infrastructure 
development.37 These extraverted investments could not deepen Uganda’s industrial 
capacities. Second, while UDC was very successful in narrow economic terms, it was 
nevertheless a highly bureaucratised answer to the problem of transferring technology to 
an underdeveloped environment of Uganda, and one which did very little to stimulate 
indigenous entrepreneurship or to evolve truly autonomous solutions to the problem of 
raising the level of local economic activity.38 Third, the main beneficiaries of UDC 
operations were foreign investors because the direction of investments, the methods of 
production and types of technology were being determined by foreign capital interests 
who set up industries behind the tariff walls. Fourth, few of the UDC subsidiaries neither 
created new capacities nor were they undertaken with planned, backward linkages for the 
future development of their sources of raw materials.39  
 
At a regional level, the emergence of British firms committed to establishing 
manufacturing facilities inside the East African market, combined with the negative 
effects of policy in agricultural processing and marketing upon the emergence of 
indigenous entrepreneurship was likely to ensure that the industrialisation process would 
be heavily dependent upon the importation of expatriate capital and skills when it got 
underway.40 To build concrete institutional foundations for industrialisation called for 
more comprehensive institutionalisation of the industrial process. It needed a different 
conception of what constitutes industrialisation. 
                                                 
35 The Uganda Herald, 4 April, 1953, p.4., archives, Africana, Makerere University. 
36 Onyach-Olaa, Martin, (1989), Industrialisation Policies and Strategies of Uganda, 1962-89, MA Dissertation, 
Economics, University of Manchester, UK, p.70. 
37 Jorgensen, J.Jan, (1981), Op Cit., p.188. 
38 Brett, Edward, A. (1973), Op Cit., p.281. 
39 Barya, J.John, (1986), Op Cit., pp27-29. 
40 Brett, Edward, A., (1973), Op Cit., p.280. 
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4.1.3 Control over Financial Resources 
 
Control over financial resources is critical in ensuring the success of industrial policies by 
providing the state with the power to influence the private sector investment decisions, 
and more importantly, by giving it power to discipline the non-performers. Lack of 
finance and credit has been one of the explanations for retarded industrialisation in 
Uganda.41 The most common conception of the centrality of finance in development is 
that which emphasises the availability of credit to entrepreneurs. What is crucial is the 
understanding of the political economy of finance. The financial structure is the 
mechanism guiding the flow of savings and investment, determining the options of 
industrial policy and managing flows to different sectors.42  
 
The control over financial resources is perhaps the most critical institutional mechanism 
for ensuring the success of industrial policies by providing the state with the power to 
influence the private sector investment decisions, and more importantly, by giving it 
power to discipline the non-performers. The colonial state carried out such control 
through its banking and monetary sector. The political logic of colonial financial 
structure may offer us substantive explanation of nature of Uganda’s industrialisation 
process. The financial structure was as well reinforced by the attitudes towards Africans 
in the market-place. The Hilton Young Report of 1929 declared that Africans “may for 
generations, or conceivably for all time, lack the capacity to maintain all the activities of a 
complex civilisation”.43 If banking is considered complex, then colonial bank lending 
policies were informed by such attitudes.  Here, we examine how this control over 
financial resources was exercised and the implications this control had for the 
industrialisation process of the country. 
 
The control over the industrialisation process was done through the banking system. 
Banks have operated in Uganda since 1906 when the National Bank of India (National & 
Grindleys Bank), Standard Bank of South Africa, (1912), among others, were established. 
There were six expatriate commercial banks and Uganda was a member of the East 
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African Currency Board.44 As institutions, they operated in the interest of expatriate 
(British) and Indian capital. Their practices and regulations could not enable a process of 
entrepreneurship and industrialisation, particularly by Africans.45  
 
Through the banking system and several commercial programmes, the colonial state 
controlled the finances. These included: Uganda Credit and Savings Bank, Small 
Industries Development Fund, African Loans Fund (1954), the African Traders 
Development section of the ministry of commerce, African Business Promotions and the 
Co-operative Credit Scheme (1961), in addition to expatriate banks and insurances 
houses.46 What was done in practice, however, was against the promotion of the 
industrialisation of Uganda.  
 
Expatriate banks sought banking monopoly. A case in point is the National Bank of 
India that pressed the colonial state for formal recognition of its monopoly as official 
bankers of the state. The resulting agreement of 1913 remained in force until 1966.47  
The lending policies of the banks constrained the emergence of an African 
entrepreneurial class. Although there was expansion of banking services in the 1950s, the 
loaning policies acted as obstacles for potential African entrepreneurs. African traders 
and farmers faced problems in finding co-signers and in mortgaging crops or land. Thus, 
most of the African savings channelled into British or Indian banks were lent, as in the 
past, to Indian and European merchants and manufacturers, to multinational 
corporations, and to the state.48   
 
The Uganda Credit and Saving Bank, (UCSB), the forerunner of Uganda Commercial 
Bank (UCB), was created in 1950. The purpose of the bank was to mobilise deposits 
from the public and facilitate loans to Africans in furtherance of agricultural, commercial 
building and co-operative society activities.49  UCSB was not particularly useful to 
African entrepreneurs, the supposedly intended beneficiaries. It required land or a life 
insurance policy as collateral, such that only the wealthy mailo50 land owners or their 
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49 Government of Uganda, (1975), Origins and Growth of Uganda Commercial Bank 1950-75, p.9. 
50 Mailo land is a coinage by the Baganda in reference to the lands that were surveyed at the onset of 
colonialism because the surveys were calculated in terms of miles.  
 121 
educated children were eligible for loans.51 The policy of UCSB was to give cash to those 
who could provide the necessary collateral. The solution to the collateral condition 
would have been a broad land reform and titling of land in the whole country, whereby 
all land owners would possess land titles. To the present day, no national land survey and 
registration has occurred which would solve the constraint of collateral to borrowing 
funds for investment. 
 
The colonial banking systems operated as a pool of savings from rural areas and made 
them available to borrowers in urban areas.52 It was not intended to develop a local 
entrepreneurial class. According to Diana Hunt, although the number of applications for 
bank loans was high in 1950s and 1960s, half the loans went to agriculture, ‘by value’. 
Most loans went to co-operative unions for the construction of processing factories and 
to private individuals, particularly civil servants, for the construction and purchase of 
residential buildings.53  
 
At the regional level, the colonial currency system, particularly the East African Currency 
Board also served to channel resources from the colony to metropole. The Currency 
Board was mainly a mechanism of integrating a local currency system with the British 
one aimed at linking British and East African production and financial systems. Deposits 
received in East Africa, a large part was sent back to London for banking and application 
elsewhere.54 
 
Reflection on the political economy of finance during this period brings out the 
constraining character of the colonial financial structure on the country’s industrialisation 
process.  Gershenberg55 observes that commercial banking in Uganda, as most of Africa, 
can be criticised for not having made a greater contribution toward indigenous economic 
development. There was no systematic development banking system until after 
independence. 
 
4.1.4 Intermediate Institutions 
 
The existence of intermediate business/industrial associations that link the state 
apparatus with individual firms or sectors in ensuring the implementation of industrial 
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policies are critical for industrialisation. These are the institutions that provide the 
interface between the bureaucracies executing industrial policies and the firms that are at 
the receiving end of those policies. Bureaucracies engage in dialogue with the private 
sector and therefore they are able to get detailed feedback on their policies, albeit 
through different mechanisms depending on the country and thereby receive a constant 
feedback on their policies from those who were affected by them.56 It is at this level that 
principles are translated into concrete plans and enforced by industrial associations.  
 
Under colonialism, intermediate institutions existed in form of merchant associations and 
farmers associations. Being a colonial context, the dialogue between the colonial state 
and the associations was only partial. While the colonial relations with those representing 
the expatriate capital were mutual and that with the Asians ambivalent, that with Africans 
was essentially repressive. As a result most of the African associations created were 
geared towards the removal of colonialism and not for the implementation of industrial 
policies.   
 
There were several business associations representing different interests in the colonial 
economy. These included: The Uganda Chamber of Commerce (UCC), Indian 
Merchants Chamber (IMC), African Chamber of Commerce (ACC), Cotton Association, 
Uganda African Farmers Union (UAFU) and Uganda Growers Union (UGU). Here we 
examine the nature of the interaction between the colonial state and these business 
interests. UCC worked closely with colonial public bodies.57  The private sector 
enterprise wanted more than “inactive non-interference”.58  Sir Andrew Cohen, the 
‘enlightened’ colonialist, sought closer relations with business interest groups. Though 
the Indian Merchants Chamber had existed for long, Cohen was the first Governor to 
attend a gathering organised by the chamber.59 UCC which was dominated by Asian 
entrepreneurs was vehemently opposed both to the co-operative societies’ entry into 
crop processing as an initial programme of cultivating African entrepreneurship and the 
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colonial state’s entry into ISI through UDC.60 Thus the Chamber was opposed to the 
acquisition of ginnery policy that targeted Africans co-operatives. The Chamber argued 
that African participation in cotton processing was best fostered by private industry and 
the “nationalisation” would reduce African participation to a status of employee rather 
than owner.61 It acted more as a support system for colonialism than a business interest 
association. 
 
Like the Uganda Chamber of Commerce, the Indian Merchants Chamber was from the 
beginning concerned to influence the government economic policy.62 Often the 
merchants’ Chamber was used for political ends, such as representation on the 
Legislative Council (Legco) because they believed that the government was likely to pay 
more attention to them as representatives of a commercial organisation than as officers 
of ordinary Indian association. Thus it sought political representation as a way of 
advancing their commercial interests. This was logical in the sense that in general, 
political power responds to representative organised interests.  
 
Intermediary institutions were also breeding grounds for leadership in colonial 
bureaucracy. J.P Simpson, the Chairman of the Representative Members Organisation 
was originally associated with Uganda Company, became Chairman and General 
Manager of UDC, was a past president of the Uganda Chamber of Commerce.63  
 
4.1.5 Technical Education and Entrepreneurship 
 
Structural transformation of a dependent economy into an economy geared more to local 
resources and human needs requires engineers, technicians and agronomists as much as 
if not more than bureaucrats and clerks. In Uganda, emphasis on academic education 
undermined colonial rule but also tended to preserve structural dependence by creating 
an educated African bourgeoisie, which benefited from the maintenance of structural 
dependence.64  Thus the outstanding feature of the government sponsored large-scale 
                                                 
60 Jorgensen, Jelmert, Jan, (1981), Op Cit., p.189. 
61 Jorgensen, Jelmert, Jan, (1981), Op Cit., p.158. 
62Morris, H.S., (1968) The Indians in Uganda, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, pp.111-12. 
63Apter, David, (1961), Op Cit.,, p.165. 
64 Jorgensen, Jelmert, Jan, (1981), Op Cit., p. 165. 
 124 
industries was total reliance on imported entrepreneurial skills (managerial and technical) 
as well as components and some raw materials.65  
 
In contrast, Kenya spent most money on industrial rather than clerical training. Between 
1913 and 1924 technical schools were opened in Machakos, the Coast Province, Masai 
Reserve and at Kabete near Nairobi.66 The colonial education reforms did not depart 
much from this general tendency. On the education of Africans, reorganisation and 
expansion of teacher training, improvement of terms of service for teachers, expansion 
of secondary and primary education, were emphasised.67 There was no focus on technical 
education as much as it should have been done. 
 
One element, which is usually ignored when looking at the institutional context of 
industrialisation, is the quality of labour, its treatment and commitment. Peter Gutkind 
makes pertinent observations on the importance of work commitment in raising 
productivity. 68  To establish a new economic order, to increase productivity by means of 
a committed and stable labour force is probably less related to skills, education, 
incentives, traditional attachment and attitudes than it is to the perception that the 
African worker has his place in the social, economic and political order. The situation of 
the worker under late colonialism was influenced by the broader colonial situation that 
denied the African people a sense of belonging and humanity.   
 
Nevertheless, in the 1950s and 1960s there occurred modest industrialisation with the 
small manufacturing sector in Uganda that produced a significant range of mass 
consumption goods. The goods included: cotton and rayon pieces of goods, edible 
vegetable oil, soap, sugar, hoes, fishing nets, corrugated iron roofing, bicycle tyres and 
fertilizers. The sugar industry had spawned an engineering works and a small steel 
industry, which produced construction materials, spare parts and hoes for growers was 
established.69  Out of 264 manufacturing establishments reported in the 1963 annual 
surveys of industrial production, 102 manufacturing establishments, 39% started 
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production between 1955 – 1961, among them: Nyanza Textiles Industries Limited, 
(NYTIL) Tororo Industrial Chemical Fertilisers (TICAF) and the Copper Melting plant 
in Jinja.70 
 
Generally, by the end of colonialism, the character of the “middleclass” whether as 
entrepreneurs, bureaucrats or intellectuals were pathetic. They lacked the vision, expertise 
and experience required to transform the economy into one that was more integrated 
and less dependent. The question of what was to be done after colonialism centred 
almost exclusively on the Africanisation of state bureaucracy and trade rather than on 
transformation of the economic structures.71  As Teddy Brett concurs, “instead of 
developing a strong entrepreneurial base in marketing, processing and manufacturing and 
thereby providing the basis for an organic growth of an indigenous capitalist class, with a 
level of technology adapted to local circumstances, the colonial state ensured the 
dominance of imported capital and skills and hence continued dependence on the 
outside”. 72  
 
In essence, Uganda remained an agrarian economy. While there was modest 
industrialisation, the major sources of appropriation of surpluses extracted from the 
peasantry, were marketing boards and co-operatives. These institutional mechanisms 
continued to be the major internal sources of financing industry in the subsequent period 
during independence, the external sources being Aid and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI).  
 
4.2 Immediate Post-Colonial Industrial Policies, (1962-71) 
 
This period was presented with a number of possibilities and obstacles in industrial 
transformation process. Three salient features informed the industrialisation process.  i) 
enhanced state-led industrialisation, ii) Ugandanisation policy and, iii) Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). A particular legal framework and specific policy instruments 
buttressed these policies. The industrial policy and the industrialisation process during 
this period must be looked at within the broad social and political context of the country.  
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The policy immediately after independence had two major thrusts: on the one hand, the 
consolidation of the inherited institutional arrangements in addition to creating new 
ones, and on the other hand, opening the economy to foreign investors to provide new 
investments. This took the form of ISI dominated by public enterprises along side the 
private sector, both local and foreign. More broadly, the process was embedded in the 
ideology of developmentalism. 
 
4.2.1 Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) 
 
ISI – that industrialisation practice that starts predominantly with the manufacture of 
finished goods that were previously imported was the industrial strategy that was 
followed from the 1950s to 1980s in Uganda. ISI in Uganda was practised within a 
particular institutional context and applied various policy instruments in its operation. 
Three salient features informed ISI: the nature of the state and its relation to local capital, 
the financial basis of industrialisation and the trade regime that prevailed. ISI in Uganda 
is examined against the above features. 
 
Uganda inherited a particular state structure, institutions and development programmes 
from colonialism, which it simply built on, as they were very difficult to transform.  At 
the centre of the post-colonial state were a small elite political class and bureaucracy with 
a very limited vision of what it entailed to transform the economy. Both the political elite 
and the bureaucrats were responsible for the formulation and implementation of policy. 
The central problem was that the new “ruling” class had no economic base and the ‘elite’ 
bureaucracy was technically with little experience and lacked the important gradient of 
meritocracy. These two limitations had major implications for the development process. 
But perhaps the element that had more far reaching implications was the ruling class’s 
possession of relative autonomy with considerable room for manoeuvre. With this 
relative autonomy, the political class had the option creating public property under their 
control or engage in the accumulation process directly.73 The political class together with 
the bureaucracy opted for both control of state resources through the expansion of the 
public sector and the use of their bureaucratic position to engage in individual 
accumulation process through investment in small-scale concerns. As a result, the 
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political class and bureaucrats diverted the resources which would have been applied to 
the broader ISI project to mainly personal consumption.  
 
At the political level, the industrialisation policy of import substitution and the emphasis 
on public sector investments was informed by the above objectives of new political 
leadership as was in all newly independent Africa. In the context of the inherited state-led 
industrialisation process, it was thought that in order to develop, government had to take 
a leading position in the economy – public enterprises would generate surpluses, which 
government planners would then re-invest in high economic priority areas. This was 
thought to lead to more rapid economic development than would be the case if major 
investments and resource allocation decisions were left to the private investors.74 This 
explains the state focus on public investments through UDC. 
 
As had been under colonialism, UDC became the main mechanism for implementing the 
post-colonial state-led ISI industrialisation process as it had a successful past record as an 
initiator of projects both on its own and in co-operation with the private interests. UDC 
was organised along commercial lines with the government as the sole shareholder, with 
normal managerial operations left to the directors and executives.75 UDC’s collaboration 
with private actors such as Madhvani Group and Mehta Group created the mixed 
structure of private and public participation in the manufacturing sector and reflected the 
pragmatic approach, which the Uganda government had chosen towards industrial 
development.76 By the mid 1960s, UDC dominated the industrial scene and through 
subsidiaries and associated companies it had formed active partnerships with privately 
owned enterprises. At the beginning of 1968, there were 3600 registered commercial and 
industrial enterprises in Uganda. Approximately 10% were publicly owned, 13% were 
foreign owned and the rest were privately owned. But the most dominant ones were state 
owned and controlled. Among were: Uganda Cement Industry (UCI), Nyanza Textiles 
Industries Limited, The Uganda Metal Products and Enamelling Company 
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(TUMPECO), Tororo Industrial Chemicals and Fertilizers (TICAF), and several 
subsidiaries.77  
 
One significant change in the structure of industrial sector was the emphasis and a shift 
of ownership from private to public. In 1967, parliament enacted the Uganda 
Development Corporation Act, directing it to hold a 51% share in any new ventures it 
participated in. According to the Act, the government by itself could start industries 
where private investors were not forthcoming.78 Thus, when the post-independence 
period became disorganised politically, so were its initiatives disrupted leading to 
economic collapse and industrial decimation following the “economic war” in the 1970s. 
 
In 1960s ISI, apart from the public sector in the form of UDC, industrialisation was 
driven forward by the existence of the East African Common Market (EACM), the East 
African Community (EAC) and the entrepreneurial Asian class. The EACM/EAC 
facilitated the ease of exchange of inputs, technical assistance and marketing of the 
products while the entrepreneurial Asian community built up thriving industries in the 
private sector spread all over the country.79 Typically, ISI was characterised by 
quantitative restrictions, high tariffs on competing imports and broad based economic 
controls that subsidised the industrial sector.  
 
4.2.2 Africanisation / Ugandanisation Policy 
 
This is one of those policies that were inherited from colonialism. The reform of the 
public service was based on the proposals designed to accelerate the pace of 
Africanisation.80 The proposals included the introduction of a scheme to give special 
experience and accelerated promotion of suitable local officers and give compensation to 
expatriate officers affected, measure for intensified and improved training courses and 
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new training arrangements. Thus, there were energetic steps taken to speed up the 
localisation of the civil service in preparation for the country’s independence.81 
 
During independence, the central purpose of Africanisation was to reduce the 
dependency of Uganda’s economy on foreign personnel in the bureaucracy by recruiting 
Ugandan nationals and Ugandanising commerce. As a result the transition was highly 
politicised. It took on the form of broad developmentalist ideology and did not focus 
specifically on the industrial process. Building on what had been initiated in the 1950s, a 
commission for “Africanisation” was set up to look into the matter and make 
recommendations.82 In order to implement this policy, a division for Ugandanisation, 
Training and Recruitment was created in the Prime Minister’s Office and a permanent 
Secretary appointed by 1962.83 This was an opportunity to overhaul the colonial 
bureaucracy and build one that would contribute to the structural transformation of 
Uganda. The transition instead assumed a colonial character as the incoming political 
elite and bureaucracy were content with inheriting the colonial structures. 
 
The major focus of the Africanisation policy was on the economy. The stress was on the 
Africanisation of commerce as a way of promoting African entrepreneurship. Since 
industry was state-controlled through UDC, the focus was to promote African 
ownership of small-scale industries, marketing and processing through co-operatives- 
owned ginneries and coffee processors. Specific policy measures were taken. These 
included: 1) establishment of the Management Training and Advisory Centre, Kampala, 
2) Creation of the Small Industries Development Fund and 3) the Development Loans 
Fund (1965) at Uganda Commercial Bank.84  
 
The Advisory Centre trained a few small businessmen in bookkeeping, budgetary control 
and business organisation, beginning 1965. This did not entail acquisition of 
technological skills and more complex entrepreneurial knowledge, which are critical in 
the industrialisation process. Secondly, while the creation of a small-scale fund was noble, 
the funds were not focused on the small businessmen. The Ministers and senior civil 
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servants obtained loans to establish “small-scale industries”. Most of the funds for small 
industries went to Members of Parliament (MPs) to set up maize mills, milk 
pasteurisation plants, brick making factories and for saw mills. The mills operated at a 
loss because the “businessmen” employed incompetent relatives, such that by 1971 55% 
of the small industries had failed.85 The Development Loans Fund from UCB suffered 
the same fate. Created in 1965 at UCB to finance enterprises and agriculture, the fund 
came to be appropriated by leading politicians and bureaucrats at will. They failed to pay 
the loans and their interest mainly because they were given on political rather than on 
economic consideration.86 Most of the top African “businessmen” were bureaucrats who 
employed their relatives while they remained secure in their bureaucratic posts. 
 
In 1968, a committee on Africanisation chaired by a Member of Parliament, Francis 
Mugeni, was appointed.87 The resulting report made several recommendations. Two 
recommendations stand out as relevant to this study. First, it was recommended that 
foreign firms had to Africanise their top executive posts and place more Africans on 
boards of Directors. Second, it called upon the National Trading Corporation (NTC), 
which had been set up in 1966, to be more dynamic in its struggle with the entrenched 
Asian firms. There arises two problems with these recommendations. First, the 
occupation of executive posts by Africans in the foreign-owned firms would not in itself 
enhance their capacity to control the economy. Second, the struggle against Asians was 
misdirected, as they were not the real controllers of the economy. The NTC was not up 
to the task. The corporation was ineffective in so far as the bureaucracy was not 
interested in enforcing on-going innovation and technical change that might have been 
associated with indigenously centred industrialisation.88 
 
4.2.3 Financing Industrialisation and FDI 
 
To finance industrialisation the government used two broad approaches: On one hand, 
government mobilised local resources, particularly increased export of coffee and cotton, 
coupled with the creation of local financial institutions in form of banks, insurance 
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houses and building societies. 89  On the other hand, it encouraged private Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and Foreign Aid within a particular institutional framework and 
enabling incentives. 
 
By the time of independence in 1962, the financial institutions were basically British 
which dominated the economy. Three British banks: Barclays, Grindleys and Standard 
Chartered by 1965 continued to control over 80% of all commercial deposits in the 
country.  Thus, through the control of local savings, foreign banks had an iron grip over 
the future of direction of economic activity in the country: they channelled local savings 
to finance mainly foreign enterprises.90 To finance industrialisation, the state created 
several financial institutions to mobilise domestic savings and allocate them to 
indigenous firms and enterprises. 
 
It is within this context that the post-colonial regime created its own banks to mobilise 
and finance its development strategy. In 1963, the Co-operative Act was passed. 
Important in this case, the Act created the Co-operative Bank in 1963, the first 
indigenous commercial bank to carry out commercial as well as development banking 
business. Apart from being seen as vehicles of Africanisation policy, the bank allocated 
resources for processing to ginneries and coffee hurries before export. Secondly, in 1965, 
the government made its first equity investment in the banking sector by establishing 
Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) under the Act of Parliament No.22 of 1965 as the 
successor to the Uganda Credit and Savings Bank.91 In addition, the National Insurance 
Corporation (NIC) was established in addition to Postal Savings Bank. To oversee this 
financial structure, the Bank of Uganda, was established under the Bank of Uganda Act 
of 1966 as the central bank.92  
 
While the creation of these financial institutions was a step in the right direction, their 
impact on development in general and industrialisation in particular remained minimal. 
                                                 
89 Juma, A., Okuku, (2004), “Agrarian Basis of Uganda’s Industrialisation Process: The Contribution of the 
Cotton and Coffee sectors, a paper presented at the 2nd Institutional Framework for Industrialisation 
Workshop in Uganda, entitled: The Challenge of Agricultural Led Industrialisation in Uganda, 23-24, August, 
Centre for Basic Research, (CBR), Kampala. 
90 Mamdani, Mahmood., (1983), Op Cit., p.24 
91 Ddumba-Ssentamu, John, (1993), The Role of Commercial Banking in Deposit Mobilisation in Uganda, PhD 
Thesis, (Economics), Makerere University, Kampala, pp.26-27.  
92 Ibid, p.16. 
 132 
Gershenberg in his study of the role of commercial banking in Uganda’s economic 
development showed that UCB was not successful in acting as a spur to other 
commercial banks or in serving as a source of funds for small African retailers. 93  
 
Much of the financing of industrialisation was through the Development Finance. 
Company of Uganda (DFCU) in which Uganda Development Corporation, (UDC), the 
premier industrial agency in Uganda, had interests. DFCU was formed in 1964 as an 
associate in equal partnership with the British and German Development Corporation 
(Commonwealth Development Corporation, (CDC), UK and Industrial Development 
Corporation of West Germany) to promote medium-scale private enterprise. DFCU was 
basically a centre that provided information to foreign capital on local circumstances as 
well as a convenient co-ordinating link and source of finance for the investors. Most of 
the companies that sought to invest in UDC did so as joint ventures. 94 The other source 
of finance for industrialisation was envisaged to be FDI. 
 
4.2.4 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 
For the post-colonial government, the belief was that for rapid economic development to 
occur not only was foreign finances necessary but also private foreign investment and 
managerial know-how were critical. It was recognised that foreign participation was a 
necessity given the lack of indigenous capital and entrepreneurial skills.95  FDI was, 
therefore, identified as one of means for financing industrialisation in Uganda. This 
followed advise to the government from the World Bank to finance its development 
from raw materials exports and foreign state and private capital finance in form of FDI 
and aid.96  The government set out to implement this belief through a number of policy 
measures. The state had to create a conducive policy environment. The government 
enacted three major legal instruments: 1) The Industrial Charter, (1964) 2) The Foreign 
Investment (Protection) Act, (1964) and Foreign Investment (Regulation), 1965.  
 
The special encouragement to foreign investors was expressed in the Industrial Charter, 
the Foreign Investment (Protection) Act and the Industrial Licensing Act, 1969. The 
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Charter and Foreign Investment (Protection) Act, instilled confidence in the investors. 
They assured foreign investors security of their investments, remittance of profits and 
repatriation of profits and a reasonable tax regime. In line with the policy of 
Africanisation/Ugandanisation, an approved enterprise was required to train and employ 
as a high proportion of Ugandans as was reasonably possible at all levels. Second all 
approved enterprises had to use East African materials for their operations. Therefore, 
the Charter envisaged a contractual regime on specific matters such as tax and tariff 
concessions, introduction of Ugandans in enterprises, importation of raw materials and 
indigenisation of the manufacturing programme.97  In general, capital equipment and raw 
materials were import duty free, while the income tax regime provided generous 
allowances for the write-off of capital expenditure. These measures were aimed at the 
development of local entrepreneurial capacities. 
 
The Foreign Investment (Protection) Act was aimed mainly at providing certain 
guarantees to foreign investors. It provided two major guarantees to certificate holders of 
approved enterprises. 1) No Approved Enterprise should be compulsorily taken 
possession of or acquired except in accordance with the provisions of section 13 of the 
Uganda Constitution. 2), Certificate holders had the right to transfer out of Uganda any 
approved foreign currency and at the prevailing rate. What may be noted here, however, 
are two concerns. First, the right to the transfer of profits meant that there would be 
little expansion of industrial establishments in the country, since there would be limited 
reinvestment of some of the profits within the economy. Second, the incentives to 
private investors were practically always directed at the subsidisation of the use of capital, 
thus reducing the employment effects of new projects, which always relied on 
“expatriates”.98   
 
The existence of the Act did not stop the government from slowly moving towards the 
nationalisation of foreign investments in the subsequent years. Towards this end, the 
UDC, which was meant to start investments with big capital outlays and then sell them 
to private investors, was given a legal right to control 51% in some businesses it had 
started and this included such projects like Tororo Industrial Chemicals and Fertilisers 
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(TICAF), Uganda Cement Industries (UCI) and Nyanza Textiles Industries Limited 
(NYTIL).99 
 
Finally, the Industrial Licensing Act’s main purpose was to direct investment to those 
areas or sectors where government felt it would give the highest economic and social 
returns to the economy. Before any industrial licence was granted to any industrialist for 
manufacturing of a specified article/product, the “Industrial Licensing Board” was 
interested to know how many Ugandans the manufacturing establishment would be able 
to employ.100 The overall tendency, however, was that most foreign investors, who 
operated within the framework of domestic politics preferred partnership with UDC for 
political protection and national image.101  
 
In 1969, another policy instrument for enhancing the industrial sector was to be 
introduced. This was the reinforced public participation in production and recognition of 
the importance of local capital formation. The government had realised that it was 
critically desirable to check the high rate of capital inflow or importation and to increase 
the rate of domestic capital formation.102 This is what informed the enacting of the Trade 
Licensing Act, (1970), which made it illegal for non-citizens to participate in wholesale 
trade.103 Thus, the stress was on local capital formation and local savings as vital for 
future development of the economy.  It was within this institutional framework coupled 
with protectionism and the urge to expand into the East African common market, that 
Uganda’s industrial policy was practiced   
 
4.2.5 Nationalisation 
 
Nationalisation – the transfer of resources from the private sector to the public realm, 
was the general political action taken in most of the Third World countries to control the 
“commanding heights” of their economies. Nationalisation was often mistaken for a 
transition to socialism. Inspired by the Arusha Declaration in Tanzania, President Obote 
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launched The Common Man’s Charter (CMC).104 It was supposedly based on socialist 
principles with serious implications for economic development in Uganda in general, and 
industrialisation in particular. In line with the populist pronouncements in much of 
Africa, it stated that: 
 “…In our move to the left strategy, we affirm that the guiding economic 
principle will be that the means of production and distribution must be in the 
hands of the people as a whole. The fulfilment of this principle may involve 
nationalisation of enterprises privately owned” 105 
 
This was followed, on May Day 1970, in a policy statement that became known as 
“Nakivubo Pronouncement”, the government took a bold step to implement the above 
principle. Through nationalisation, the government would acquire a controlling share of 
60% of banks, insurance firms, oil companies and most large private companies and 
manufacturing establishments and also be excluded from external trade. In all, about 100 
firms were to be affected.106 These pronouncements, did not, and could not change the 
structure of industry in Uganda.  
 
By the time of the 1971 coup by Idi Amin, there was no clear and coherent industrial 
policy as such. Amin reversed the whole process by denationalising all the nationalised 
companies.  Under decree 18/1971, nationalisation was no longer necessary.  With the 
military coup, Uganda entered a new phase, not only of industrial policy change but also 
of economic and political policies. Within a year, however, Amin had turned against 
Asian property interests and later Western, especially British companies as the military 
regime launched the “Economic War” in 1972. The reality of the situation can be 
illustrated by the resulting de-industrialisation.  
 
4.2.6 Limitations of ISI policy 
 
There were several limitations of firms under UDC and FDI. The first limitation is that 
all the major companies under UDC were monopolies, yet a dynamic process of 
industrialisation demands competitiveness to spur innovation in industrial processes and 
products.   
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Second, ISI was heavily dependent on imported inputs, particularly technology and some 
raw materials. For instance, imports of producer materials rose from 27.4% in 1963 to 
36.3% in 1966 as a share of total imports.107 This went against one of the cardinal aims of 
ISI to save foreign exchange earnings. There was as well a limited consideration of 
efficiency and competitiveness in the regional export market.108  
 
Third, the form that industrialisation took was that of import reproduction rather than 
import substitution. Import reproduction is restricted to the manufacture of products 
without their qualitative enhancement and little learning. In the process of import 
substitution, production is not the sole end; rather it becomes part of a more complex 
process of technological learning that encompasses product specification and design, 
process choice and change in social organisation of production.109 This was not the case 
in Uganda. Instead, the industrialisation was of the import reproduction variety, which 
could not lead to the creation of a dynamic industrial structure based on technological 
deepening and innovation. As Mahmood Mamdani observes, most of the investments 
were last-stage assembly plants. Raw materials and quite often, semi-manufactured 
components were imported from the parent monopoly overseas. All firms initiated in the 
1950s and 1960s were linked to foreign monopolies or states.110 Tables of selected 
investments below illustrate this. 
Table 4.1:  Selected Investments from the 1950s (Before Independence) 
Name of Company Foreign Monopolies/States Involved 
1. Nyanza Textiles Bleachers’ Association (UK) 
Calico Printers’ Association 
2. Concrete Constructions (U) Ltd British Steel Reinforcements Ltd 
3. Universal Asbestos Manufacturing 
Co.(EA) Ltd. 
Universal Asbestos Manufacturing Co.Ltd 
(UK). 
4. East African Distillers Ltd Ducan, Gilby, Mathieson Ltd (UK) 
5.Uganda Meat Packers Ltd A. Baumann and Co.Ltd (UK) 
6. Kilembe Mines Ltd Colonial Development Corporation (UK) 
Frobisher Ltd (UK) 
Source: Mamdani, (1983:24) 
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The British colonial monopoly and virtue dependence by firms on British capital is 
reflected in their ownership and in all cases markets. The selected investments in the 
1960s below reflect a decisive link between Uganda and other Western monopolies. 
Independence did not bring about a transformation in the nature of the industrial sector. 
There was instead expanded dependence of the economy on foreign monopolies in 
general. 
Table 4.2: Selected Investments from the 1960s (After Independence) 
Name of Company Foreign Monopolies / States Involved 
1. Tororo Industrial Chemicals and 
Fertilizers (Ltd) 
International Ore and Fertilizers Corp. 
(UK) 
Falconbridge Nickel Mines (Canada) 
Imperial Chemical Industries (UK) 
2.Steel Corporation of EA Ltd Societa` in Accommandita Luigi Pomini 
(Italy) 
Societa` Per Azioni Fratelli Orsenigo (Italy) 
3.Uganda Garments Industries Ltd (UGIL) Marubeni-Ida Co.Ltd (Japan) 
Yamato Shirts Co.Ltd (Japan) 
4. Uganda Fishnet Manufacturing Ltd Nippon Rayon Co.Ltd (Japan) 
5. Development Finance Co.Ltd  of 
Uganda. 
Deutsche Gesellschaft (West Germany) 
6.Lira Spinning Mill Government of the Soviet Union 
Source: Mamdani (1983:24) 
 
The encouragement of foreign industrial investment, just as UDC which was the central 
agency of industrialisation, was non-selective. An effective industrial process demands a 
focused, selective and periodised establishment of industries. In a context of resource 
constraint, an effective industrial process calls for selectivity.  In the 1960s, for instance, 
apart from manufacturing plants, UDC controlled, through subsidiaries, a number of tea 
estates, cattle ranches, a chain of hotels, national parks and participated in hire-purchase, 
banking, mining and food processing.111 An effective industrial policy needed selectivity. 
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The policy-makers did not take into consideration the importance of an expanded 
domestic market – needed agrarian reform.112  In general it can be observed that 
Uganda’s industrial process simply took “baby-steps” which could not lead to dynamic 
and sustained industrialisation. It is within this context, that the governing elite launched 
what they called a “Move to the Left”, known as the Common Man’s Charter, in 1969 
and culminated in the Nakivubo Pronouncements of May 1970 which nationalised  60% 
of private industries and enterprises.  
 
4.3 The “Economic War” Policy and De-Industrialisation (1972-80)  
 
Industrial policy, after the reversal of the partial nationalisation pronouncements of May 
Day 1970, was informed by two major features: i) expropriation of Asian property and ii) 
The unplanned expanded participation of the public sector in the context of the general 
decline in the economy and the resulting de-industrialisation.113  The institutional 
framework that had been established in the colonial period and the immediate post-
colonial period were literally wiped out, as they were replaced by the rule by decrees of 
the military regime. 
 
The first policy measure of the military regime was to reverse the measures announced 
on May Day 1970, which had far reaching changes in the basic industrial policy. In 1970, 
the government had decided to acquire a controlling interest in a number of private 
companies and manufacturing establishments, and also to exclude private enterprise 
from external trade. This policy had only been partially put in effect when the military 
took power early in 1971. The new regime decided to reverse this strategy.114 Under 
decree 18/1971, it was no longer required that the government must take over 60% of 
the shares of any nationalised company. 115 It reduced state participation from 60 to 49% 
in 11 companies (including three in manufacturing), though 60% participation continued 
in seven other companies covered by the pronouncements.  
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The attempt to be selective as espoused in the Third Five Year Development Plan (June 
1971- June, 1976), which was referred to as the “Development Manifesto”, by defining 
the role of government and the private sector, never materialised in practice.116 It was 
envisaged that government would have control over, power generation, water supplies 
and exports of major cash crops. In addition to the private sector, there would be joint 
ventures in all enterprises engaged in a limited number of sub-sectors of strategic 
importance. These included: commercial banking and insurance, iron and steel 
production, sugar production and processing of petroleum products. These plans 
remained largely on paper.   
 
In less than a year, the reversal on nationalisation was as well invalidated as General Idi 
Amin expelled the Asian entrepreneurs, managers and technicians in 1972 in what he 
declared was an “economic war”.117  From this time Uganda entered a period of 
unpredictable policy regime, which inevitably resulted in de-industrialisation.   
 
The second policy measure by the military regime saw the expropriation of the non-
Ugandan businesses followed by an adhoc allocation of the businesses to the public 
sector and Ugandans who had no industrial culture in terms of technical know-how and 
organisation.118  The expropriation had two major effects: i) economic growth fell as 
investments dried up as manufacturing firms had less confidence in Uganda’s political 
and economic stability as skilled managers were replaced by largely unskilled people, 
often drawn from the military and with little education.119 ii) expanded public sector as 
expropriated industries were allocated to UDC. Thus, there was unplanned shift of 
ownership from private to public, causing a strain on the managerial and financial 
capacity of UDC. 
 
These two actions triggered a process of decline in economic growth resulting in de-
industrialisation due to a negative growth rate in the manufacturing sector. By 1979, at 
the end of the Amin regime, most of the manufacturing establishments had ground to a 
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halt. Despite the fact that there were 50 factories in the medium and large-scale sector 
operating in 1971, by 1981, 15 of these were completely closed down and the capacity 
utilisation of the remainder was only around 25%. In 1971, when the last full industrial 
survey was conducted, the whole industrial sector was reported to comprise about 970 
establishments employing ten or more people, and a much larger number of cottage 
industries compiled by the Ministry of Industry recorded only 464 establishment. Almost 
40% of the reported establishments had temporarily ceased operations while the 
remainder were operating on average with very low capacity utilisation of around 20% 
(compared to 70% in 1970).120   
 
The most critical effect of the “economic war” was the loss of the entrepreneurial talent 
of the Asian community as most skilled people who dominated the industrial and 
commercial activities and qualified Ugandans and aid-financed technical assistance 
personnel left the country.121 Where they remained, there was a great deal of political 
interference in administrative and financial matters, which resulted in inefficiency and 
general demoralisation.122 The loss of skilled personnel affected both private and public 
sectors. 
 
Second, the unplanned expansion of the public sector, led to further de-industrialisation. 
While the Nakivubo Pronouncements advocated a systematic step-by-step 60% 
acquisition of control of the private sector investments by government, the “economic 
war” was spontaneous with 100% control over the expropriated industries. This had 
devastating effect on the industrialisation process in general and industrial policy regime 
in particular. 
 
Within three years, the number of parastatal bodies increased by nearly 100 and in 1975 
more foreign businesses was expropriated. The public sector grew enormously and the 
strains this exerted on public sector financial and managerial resources had far-reaching 
ramifications.123 Uganda lacked the hundreds of managers, engineers, accountants and 
other professional personnel to replace those who were forced out. No objectives or 
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guidelines were provided for the new managers, except for periodic prohibitions on price 
increases.124 
 
The unplanned transfer of several expropriated enterprises to UDC and later, the 
creation of several new parastatals, dealt a further blow to the industrialisation process. 
By 1971, UDC, the premier agency for industrial development in Uganda, had 36 
subsidiaries and 22 associated companies. After 1972 with the expulsion of Asians, more 
than 100 companies were appendaged to UDC causing operational strain. The expulsion 
of Asian and British technicians and managers, created problems for UDC whose 
management, engineering, accounting and marketing capacities were now constrained.125   
 
In 1974, the government decided to “re-organise” UDC. Several industries were taken 
away from UDC. In addition, the government created several new parastatals. Both 
actions disrupted the industrialisation process. This heralded the destruction of UDC. 
Many of the viable subsidiaries of the UDC group, such as Nytil and Uganda Cement 
Industries, were allocated to new parastatals. Those transfers were never made legally and 
there were therefore no payments for the equity shares, which were arbitrarily taken away 
from UDC. By the second half of the 1970s, with all viable manufacturing units allocated 
to the new parastatals, UDC was reduced to a skeleton staff only in the headquarters.126   
 
The takeover of Asian and British enterprises by government without compensation 
inspite of the provision for it in the decree, further discouraged FDI. This was 
compounded by the political instability and uncertainty which plagued Uganda under the 
military dictatorship. The expropriated enterprises collapsed or operated at very low 
capacity. For instance, in 1971, industrial enterprises were operating at about 70% 
capacity but by 1976, the average production was 30% of the capacity or below.127 The 
attempt to attract foreign investment through the Foreign Investment Decree, of 1977,128 
was totally unsuccessful, though this was attributed to lack of an enabling investment 
law. The real reason for lack of foreign investment was not the absence of an enabling 
law. It was due to political uncertainty following the 1972-73 expropriations that had led 
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to capital flight and lack of new investments. The state had as well disrupted the process 
of mobilisation on internal savings for investment. 
 
The creation of new parastatals created an institutional and policy nightmare. Several 
parastatals created were given the responsibility to manage the expropriated industries. 
Among these were: National Textile Board (NTB), National Tobacco Corporation 
(NTC), Uganda Cement Corporation (UCC), Lint Marketing Board (LMB), Produce 
Marketing Board (PMB) and Uganda Steel Corporation (USC). This presented several 
policy-making problems leading to institutional difficulties. Some industries were simply 
extracted from UDC. Some were put directly under the Ministry of Industry and not 
under UDC.129 These parastatals came to be afflicted with a number of shortcomings. 
The managers of the new parastatals lacked both managerial competence and 
entrepreneurial skills, while the private individuals who acquired the smaller businesses 
had soon stripped them of most assets.130 The problems of management and public 
administration of parastatals, taken away from UDC and new ones created in 
government ministries, continued to bedevil economic policy making in Uganda. The 
new parastatals were largely used for state patronage. While earlier on they were sources 
of tax revenue, in form of corporate taxes, rents, licences and rates, they now depended 
on the government for survival.131 
 
The issue of markets further dented the industrialisation process. From its inception, 
Uganda’s ISI strategy was developed with an eye on the East African Common Market. 
The legacy of this ISI strategy caused the industrial sector of Uganda a lot of problems 
during the 1970s, especially when the East African Community collapsed in 1977. Trade 
restrictions were not only from outside East Africa but also within the East African 
region.132 The break-up of the East African Community, reduced competition as 
protection of local industries was enforced leading to inefficiency. The market also 
narrowed contributing to under utilisation of installed capacity as Kenya and Tanzania 
established their own industries, particularly the textile industries. In addition, the general 
political atmosphere was not conducive to investment.133 
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There were some attempts to revive the economy. First was an attempt to energise the 
Small Scale Industries. In 1974, Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) carried out a feasibility 
study as a prelude to launching a Small Scale Industry (SSI) scheme. By April 1977, 2% 
of UCB deposits was set aside for the scheme. The scheme did not pick up immediately 
despite intensive publicity in the mass media. The funds set aside for the SSI scheme 
were not fully utilised because a) lack of foreign exchange to import plant and machinery 
b) lack of adequate security for the required loans and c) lack of an institutional 
framework to develop and train SSI entrepreneurs at the grassroots level.134  
 
In summary, one could argue that a form of naïve economic nationalism – the desire to 
reduce dependence on private foreign capital, and ensure that the “commanding heights” 
of the economic activity were under domestic control,135 informed the above economic 
policies. The creation of public enterprises, which contributed to industrial growth in 
other countries,136 was based on systematic and gradual changes unlike the Uganda case 
where there was unplanned seizure of Asian properties. Since the expropriated industries 
were not planned for, none achieved the developmental reasons and objectives for 
nationalisation. Public enterprises failed to raise savings for re-investment in either the 
industrial or other sectors. They could not fill the entrepreneurial gaps left by departing 
Asians through state participation. Neither could they accelerate technical progress and 
technical change nor rapid diffusion of improved techniques, among others.137 The 
government, inspite of nationalising the enterprises, did not have the capacity to replace 
machinery. It could neither repair nor maintain the operational ones due to lack of 
expertise and financial resources.138 
 
The result was the decline and virtual collapse of the industrial sector in the 1970s. The 
decline started in the 1970s but in the 1980s, government worked to reverse the situation 
both through the return of selected parastatals bodies to the private sector, rehabilitation 
and the adoption of a more liberal industrial strategy. The Dudley Seers report139 offered 
three options for the revival of the industrial sector’s large state-owned units: i) to stay in 
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public hands by returning them to UDC, ii) to be passed to Uganda nationals and iii) to 
be returned to foreign control. These proposals were overtaken when Uganda adopted a 
Structural Adjustment Policy package under IMF/World Bank in June 1981.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to examine the institutional foundations of Uganda’s industrial 
policies. These were discussed around five themes. First, the “late” colonial industrial 
policies from 1945-62. We have observed that in order to realise its objectives, the 
“early” colonial state established institutions and mechanisms for expropriation of the 
surplus from domestic producers of mainly coffee and cotton, both for its maintenance 
and for the benefit of metropolitan interests. It was mainly after the World War II, in the 
“late” colonial period that the state, through its bureaucracy and UDC as the 
entrepreneurial coordination agency was tasked to oversee the colonial industrialisation 
project.  
 
Secondly, to finance the project, the colonial state created institutions through which 
funds were extracted, such as the coffee and cotton marketing boards. The colonial state 
as well controlled sources of finance through the banking and monetary policy sector. 
Thirdly, to facilitate the implementation of industrial policies, several business 
associations representing different interests in the colonial economy were allowed to 
operate. We note, however, that intermediate institutions in form of associations such as 
Uganda Chamber of Commerce (UCC) and the Indian Merchant Chamber acted more as 
a support system for colonialism than for business interests. These industrial policies, 
however, led to modest industrialisation by the time of independence. 
 
Fourthly, the inherited institutions presented both possibilities and obstacles to industrial 
transformation. We noted that at the centre of the post-colonial state were a small elite 
political class and bureaucracy with limited vision that could not transform the economy. 
I observed that the policy of recruiting Ugandan nationals into the bureaucracy and 
Ugandanising commerce in themselves could not transform the economy. We noted that 
while the state took two broad approaches to finance industry: first, through local 
resource mobilisation (proceeds from mainly coffee and cotton) and second, through 
FDI, the ultimate stress on FDI could not lead to autonomous industrialisation.  
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Fifthly, I observed that the unplanned expropriation of the Asian properties and the 
expansion of the public industrial sector had devastating impact on industry. I noted that 
the “economic war” resulted in the loss of entrepreneurial talent of the Asian 
community, the qualified Ugandans and aid financed technical assistance left the country. 
The unplanned transfer of the expropriated enterprises to UDC, the premier agency for 
industrial development, dealt a blow to Uganda’s industrialisation process.  
 
The combination of these distortions in the institutional and policy-making processes 
ensured that by the end of the Idi Amin regime in 1979, there had occurred serious 
decline and virtual collapse of the industrial sector. It is within this context that the 
Obote II regime that came to power in 1980 had to implement SAPs which is discussed 
in the next chapter. 
 
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5.  INDUSTRIAL POLICIES UNDER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
PROGRAMMES (SAPs) 1981-2006 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
This is the second data chapter of this thesis. It is mainly based on government 
documents (published and unpublished), material from archives and newspaper reports. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide evidence of actual government support for the 
industrial sector and the inadequacies in its implementation. The chapter sets out to 
discuss the nature of Uganda’s industrial policies under a liberalised policy framework of 
SAPs from June 1981 to 2006.  
 
Basically, since the early 1980s, industrial development in sub-Saharan Africa has 
occurred within the broad macroeconomic context dominated by short-term, market-
based structural adjustment programmes, with no or minor industry-specific policies 
proposed to encourage the expansion and diversification of the industrial sector.1 The 
central objective of this chapter is to examine the practice of industrial policy in context 
of SAPs. The problem is that SAPs have no specific industrial policy prescriptions and 
are premised on an ideology that is antithetical to strategic thinking about 
industrialisation.2 Its application in the Ugandan context has not been an exception to 
this premise.  
 
In the previous chapter it was noted that Uganda’s industrialisation process was 
dominated by state intervention through import substitution. Thus, SAPs as its starting 
point, viewed ISI as the central weakness of the nationalist project of industrialisation 
that unfolded in the 1960s and was built-on the late colonial industrialisation initiative of 
the 1950s. ISI in the 1950s and 1960s created a complex of import-dependent industries 
whose existence became predicated on the continuous transfer of resources from 
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agriculture, which had literally collapsed by 1979 at the end of the 1972 “economic war”.3 
Based on free market theory, SAPs proposition is to dismantle ISI as it is seen as an 
unmitigated disaster due to state-induced market distortions.4  
 
This chapter is divided into two sections representing the two phases of SAPs in Uganda. 
The first section discusses phase one, (1981-85), which was mainly concerned with: i) 
rehabilitation of the economy in general, ii) return of expropriated properties, iii) 
attraction of foreign investment and iv) continued stress on import substitution.  
 
The second section discusses phase two, (1987-2006) involved: i) several structural 
reforms ii) widespread liberalisation and privatisation of the economy, iii) stress on FDI, 
and iv) creation of several institutions to facilitate export-oriented industrialisation (EOI). 
Apart from specific policies and institutional framework, the focus shall be on three main 
themes: i) effects of liberalisation on industrial sector, ii) the impact of privatisation on 
industry iii) sources of financing of industry. The important role of technology policy is 
discussed in chapter six which deals with institutions in support of the industrial sector. 
This is because among others, these factors have profound implications for the 
industrialisation of Uganda. 
 
5.1 SAPs and Industrial Policies, Phase One – The Obote II Period (1981-85) 
The period of June 1981-85 constitutes the first phase of SAPs in Uganda. The Obote 
II regime stressed re-organisation and rehabilitation of the economy as a whole and 
not new investment, under Recovery Programme of 1982-84.5 Central to the 
programme was the return of the expropriated property to former owners, mainly 
Asians, closing or privatisation of some of the parastatals, re-organising the rest of the 
parastatal sector and hiring the parastatal sector managerial positions on the basis of 
technical qualifications and competence.6  The rehabilitation focused on a number of 
core elements: i) rationalisation of existing productive enterprises through a judicious 
policy of financial assistance to priority industries, ii) a comprehensive improvement 
                                                 
3 Mamdani, Mahmood, (1990), “Uganda: Contradictions of IMF Programme and Perspectives”, Development 
and Change, Vol.21, p.427 
4 Mkandawire, Thandika, (1988), “The Road to Crisis, Adjustment and De-Industrialisation: The African 
Case”, Africa Development, Vol.XIII, No.1, p.26  
5 Commonwealth Secretariat, (1982), Recovery Programme 1982-84, Government of Uganda, London  
6 Ibid, p.3. 
 148 
in the industrial and resource management by government and iii) judicious use of 
scarce foreign exchange to potentially export-oriented enterprises so as to enhance 
future foreign earnings as well as save on exports. It is these objectives that informed 
the rehabilitation efforts.  
 
5.1.1 Rehabilitation Efforts under SAPs 
 
Rehabilitation efforts aimed at broadening the economic base to minimise the existing 
excessive dependency on agricultural sector, raise the level of industrial and mineral 
production as a means of changing the structure of the economy. This was implemented 
by direction of resources to priority areas and encouraging private investment, both local 
and foreign. To achieve this, there were steps to revise the 1964 Foreign Investment 
(Protection) Act with a package of incentives.7 The recovery programmes were short-
term rehabilitation plans designed to channel financial resources into selected priority 
areas, which could produce quick returns with minimum investment. This short-term 
focus could not solve the distortion that had been inflicted on the industrial sector in the 
1970s.  With rehabilitation at the forefront of government economic policy, there was no 
specific focus on industry. The government, however, took some measures in support of 
industry. Even in the context of SAPs, the state implemented some supportive measures 
to prop up industry. The policy of rehabilitation ran into the early 1990s prior to the 
outright privatisation policy.  
 
First, given the distortion and poor performance of the industrial sector during the 1970s 
and changes in political and economic policies in 1980s, government did decide to return 
to UDC those manufacturing units which were under its management through parastals 
in anticipation that the industrial sector would again experience rapid growth.8  
 
Second, the Central Bank, Bank of Uganda, apart from working to maintain internal 
stability of the Uganda shilling, sometimes guaranteed foreign loans to the industrial 
sector on behalf of government. In the 1981/82 budget, for instance, provision was 
made to bail out parastatals that could not recover their expenses. These included Lake 
                                                 
7 Commonwealth Secretariat (1982), Recovery Programme, 1982-84, Vol. 111, Industry. 
8 Government of Uganda, (1983), Background to The Budget, 1983-1984, p.21. 
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Katwe Salt Project, Uganda Cement industry, (UCI), Kilembe Mines, among others.9 The 
industrial sector, being boosted by special allocations of foreign exchange from the 
Central Bank, gained some momentum, growing at an average of 6.1 per cent over 1981 
to 1983 period. Given the level to which production had dropped, this growth did not 
make much difference. By 1984, however, the sector was again back on a declining 
trend.10 
 
Third, the government as well allocated the “aid” finances from International 
Development Association (IDA), an arm of the World Bank, to several industries, 
through Uganda Development Bank (UDB) and Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) that 
were now mere conduits of the borrowed finances. It was on the basis of these finances 
that there was some industrial recovery in such manufacturing plants such as Uganda 
Breweries, Uganda Baati, manufacturers of galvanised corrugated iron sheets.11   
 
In the whole process, the manufacturing industries were allocated about 25% of the 
programme funds during this period as most of the funds were targeted at the 
agricultural sector on whose revival the industrial sector depended as it would provide 
the raw materials and earn foreign exchange to import the necessary capital and 
intermediate goods for industry.12  The key demand by the World Bank was the return of 
expropriated firms to their form Asian owners. This would restore confidence in private 
sector investments. To revive industry, therefore, the policy measure taken was the 
return and privatisation of the enterprises that had been expropriated in 1972 “economic 
war” to the former Asian owners. This was given institutional expression through the 
Expropriated Properties Act, 1983.13 Despite the adoption of SAPs, the state remained 
central in the industrial restructuring process. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Katumba, A.M (1988), “The State of the Industrial Sector, 1984”, Occasional Paper, No.6, Makerere 
Institute of Social Research, p.5 
10 Kasekende, L, Atingi-Ego and Sebudde, R (2002), The African Growth Experience: Uganda Country Study, 
mimeo, p.46 
11 Government of Uganda, (1983), Background to The Budget, 1983-1984, p.21. 
12 Commonwealth Secretariat, (1982), Recovery Programme and Projects, 1982-84: Industry, Vol.111, p.12.  
13 Government of Uganda, (1983), The Expropriated Properties Act, 1983, Entebbe. 
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5.1.2 The Expropriated Properties Act, (1983) 
 
This Act came into force on 23rd February 1983. It provided for the transfer of 
properties and businesses acquired or otherwise expropriated during the 1972-73 
“economic war”, to the Ministry of Finance and their return to former owners, taking 
into account the claims of former owners who might wish to be compensated. The Act 
was a move towards divestiture (privatisation) strategy, which was in line with the new 
government role of the provision of parametric policies a rather directive policy since the 
adoption of SAPs in 1981.  
 
This section proposes to evaluate the effects of the Act on industry and in terms of its 
resolution of the ownership problems, which had adversely affected the performance of 
the industrial sector. The Act partially resolved the ownership problems as some of the 
nationalised properties were returned to their former owners (mainly Asians). By the end 
of 1983, the ownership of 69 out of 172 enterprises that had been identified for return to 
former Asian owners had been repossessed.14 This went some way in creating confidence 
and improving performance of the sector. The implementation of the provisions of the 
Act thus resulted in a slight reduction of the uncertainties regarding the ownership of 
industries and helped increase in profitability of some industries.15 With the resolution of 
ownership, the new owners could access loans. The return of the Asian properties would 
also have two other effects. The divestiture aimed at reducing the burden of 
subsidisation on government as most of the enterprises were run on government 
subsidies. Second, it revived some confidence in private investment, as foreign investors 
were encouraged to return. Perhaps, the most far-reaching impact on industry, it was 
hoped, would be the privatisation of nationalised industries and liberalisation of the 
economy. 
 
5.1.3 Liberalisation and its Effect on Industry, 1981-85. 
 
In June 1981, the government introduced an integrated, liberalised package of monetary 
and fiscal policies designed to: i) increase prices and other incentives to producers, ii ) 
reduce smuggling, iii) removal of price controls and iv) reduce inflation by stimulating 
                                                 
14 Dhetemwa, Godfrey, (1992), Effects of Devaluation on a Selected Number of Industries in Uganda, MA 
(Economics), Economic Policy Planning and Management, Makerere University, p.28. 
15 Government of Uganda, (1985), Background to the Budget, 1985-1986, Entebbe: Government Printers, p.26. 
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investments and production.16 This did away with fixed exchange rate and replaced it 
with what was known as the “float”. Liberalisation had mixed effects. 
 
The floating of the Uganda shilling resulted in the increases in wages and the cost of 
public utilities. This sharply increased the costs to the Uganda industries and tended to 
weaken the competitive edge of Uganda products vis-à-vis imported goods. The effect of 
the float on the industrial sector was that it faced problems of working capital, marketing 
and under-capacity utilisation.17 This was due to the fact that the government left the 
industrial sector to compete side by side with other sectors for the foreign exchange 
funds from foreign “aid” which was auctioned at the Central Bank. In most cases, the 
manufacturing sector was usually out bid in foreign exchange market, mainly by the 
export/import traders, hence failing to raise the necessary capital to run their 
enterprises.18 The industries also found it increasingly difficult to compete in the market, 
for several reasons. First, due to the costs of production, and second, because of the 
increased contraband goods smuggled into the country without taxation 
 
The devaluation of the Uganda shilling, made it difficult for both the rehabilitation and 
the running of the repossessed industries. While the repossession of the expropriated 
properties took place, the most pressing problems that militated against even the mere 
rehabilitation of industry were: the devaluation of the Uganda shilling, which made it 
difficult for industries to purchase both machinery and inputs or repay loans, lack of 
managerial skills or exacerbation of mismanagement by political appointments, 
IMF/World Bank conditionality, particularly credit squeeze, suffocated some industries.19 
The increasing vulnerability of Uganda industries to external pressures can be evidenced 
by the sources of finances. With the acceptance of SAPs, the World Bank advanced loans 
on which Uganda’s industrialisation came to depend. For autonomous industrialisation 
to occur, the source of finance is important as it has implications on what priorities to 
fund. 
 
                                                 
16 Obote, A.Milton., (1981), Budget Speech: First Step to Recovery, Entebbe: Government Printers. 
17 Onyach-Olaa, Martin, (1989), Op Cit., p129. 
18 Mamdani, Mahmood. (1990), Uganda: Contradictions of the IMF Programme and Perspective, 
Development and Change, Vol.21, p.445. 
19 Barya, J, John, (1995), Industrialisation and Technology Acquisition in Uganda: An Analysis of the Policy, Legal and 
Institutional Framework with Three Case Studies, Research Report submitted to the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) Ontario, Canada, p.14. 
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5.1.4 Sources of Finance for Industry 
 
The Ugandan banks were no longer sources of finance but had become mere conduits of 
foreign “aid” funds allocated to industry. The investment funds for medium and large-
scale industrial sector, mainly from the World Bank, were channelled through the 
Uganda Development Bank (UDB). UDB was strengthened in three ways: i) expansion 
of its equity base (over $10.0m), ii) attraction of more than $50.0m in new funds to be 
lent to the industrial sector and iii) provision of technical assistance.20 By 1986, the major 
sources of external “assistance” for manufacturing sector were the “Industrial Sector 
Development Loans” which were administered through Uganda Development Bank 
(UDB) and Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB). The thirty three manufacturing 
establishments involved were accorded high priority with reasonable prospects for viable 
operation.21  
  
The major concern here is that the World Bank dictated to which sector of industries 
loans were lent. Loans went mainly to processing plants of cotton and coffee for export, 
the raw materials needed in Europe and USA, although some of the funds were directed 
at the importation of machinery and spare parts for industrial sector. 
 
During the period 1981-84, industrial development policy was controlled through Bank 
of Uganda, the liberalised foreign exchange operations and primarily through the flexible 
exchange rate policy, basically a monetarist policy regime. The working capital bottleneck 
that resulted from devaluations, the tight monetary policy and the high interest rates 
tended to choke industrial rehabilitation without any selective reprieve.22  With the 
realisation of the disastrous effects of liberalisation on industry, the Minister of Finance 
indicated that government would protect local industry and took the supporting 
measures necessary to maintain local production.23 
 
                                                 
20 Government of Uganda, (1984), The Background to the Budget, 1984-85, Entebbe: Uganda Government 
Printers, p.33. 
21 Government of Uganda (1986), The Background to the Budget, 1986-87, Entebbe, Uganda Government 
Printers, p.45.  
22 Banugire, Firimooni, (1987), “IMF Structural Adjustment Policy in Uganda, 1980-87”, Weekly Topic, 
Wednesday, October, p.7. 
23 Government of Uganda (1984), The Background to the Budget, 1984-85, p.9. 
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In general, the attempted SAPs, which were implemented between 1981-83, largely failed 
because of their inability to address the structural basis of the crisis. The programme was 
not fully implemented and was abandoned after June 1984. This was mainly for three 
reasons: i) SAPs depended for its success on continued flow of foreign finance and not 
enough of it was obtained on a continuous basis and ii) there were non-economic 
reasons, especially the civil war which was being waged by National Resistance Army, 
(NRA), the guerrilla army led by Yoweri Museveni, since February 1981, contributed to 
the failure of the programme.24  iii) Perhaps, the major cause of the failure of SAPs in this 
first phase was contextual. The effect of devaluation when combined with liberalisation, 
in the context where market incentives gave no preference to productive over speculative 
investments, was bound to end in failure. As Mahmood Mamdani observes on both the 
first and second phases of SAPs, the Open General Licence (OGL) for industries, which 
was taken as a major concession to industry over trade, was at the same time a major step 
backward, because an OGL for all industries implied the absence of any industrial 
priorities. 25  
 
Priority or non-priority industries cannot be distinguished simply by reference to the end 
product (mass consumer as opposed to luxury products). The real distinction requires 
looking at the production technology and the import requirements of each industry. This 
would require raising three issues: i) the agents of change in industry, ii) the nature of 
markets for expanded production and iii) the sources of finance for industrialisation. In 
other words, recognising the institutional context of industrialisation is critical. These 
questions were largely left out in both the first and second phases of SAPs. The second 
phase of SAPs saw extended liberalisation, privatisation and several institutional reforms 
with implications for the industrial sector. The institutional reforms are discussed in 
chapter Six. 
 
5.2 SAPs and Industrial Policies, Phase Two – 1987-2006 
 
This phase witnessed extended institution of both economic and structural reforms. 
After some hesitation and practice of a populist barter trade and administrative allocation 
                                                 
24 Ochieng, Erisa, (1996), “Stabilisation and Adjustment Programmes in Uganda, 1981-1995, International 
Development Consultants, Kampala, p.4 
25 Mamdani, M., (1990), Op Cit., p.446-51.  
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of “essential” commodities: sugar, salt, soap, from 1986 to 1987, the second phase of 
SAPs was launched in May 1987 by the NRM regime and still runs up to the present day, 
though in different forms. The reform was embodied in the Economic Recovery 
Programme (ERP).26 ERP were a bold economic reforms geared at stabilising the 
economy as a basis for rapid and sustained recovery of the productive sectors. This was 
revised and replaced by the ERP (1988-1992).  
 
Before we discuss the details of the implementation of SAPs in the second phase, it is 
important to underline its differences with the first phase. First, the Museveni regime by 
1987 faced both a desperate economic situation without even basic consumer 
commodities and increasing political opposition from elements of the regime that had 
been overthrown the previous year. Second, the NRM could carry out reforms without 
being beholden to a particular political class. Politically, the NRM had captured state 
power by relying on the rural support rather than the urban classes which would feel the 
immediate effects of the reforms. Apart from the reforms enabling it to consolidate 
political power, the reforms were bound to meet minimal resistance. It is within this 
social and political context that SAPs were launched in the second phase. This may be a 
major explanation of the class basis of government support to the various entrepreneurs 
in it drive to build a “middle class”. The reforms served the double objectives: economic 
revival and political consolidation. 
 
SAPs in this phase has had two central thrusts: a) macro-economic stabilisation through 
tight fiscal management – balance of payments stability, reducing inflation, lower interest 
rates, market-led market reforms, foreign exchange reforms and trade liberalisation and 
b) the growth strategy defined through the agricultural export-led growth initiative that 
would take advantage of the liberalised environment created by the removal of trade 
tariffs.27   
 
In the years between 1987 and 1999, the Government of Uganda, introduced several 
programmes destined to rehabilitate the industrial capacity (Emergence Relief and 
Rehabilitation of 1986) to stabilise the economy and restore its infrastructure and social 
                                                 
26 Government of Uganda, (1987), Economic Recovery Programme, Kampala. 
27 Rugasira, Andrew, (2004), “Sustainable Economic Growth and the Era of Structural Adjustment: 
Observations on Uganda”, a paper presented at a workshop on Agricultural-Led Industrialisation in Uganda, 
Centre for Basic Research (CBR), Kampala, p.8.  
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services,   the 1987/88 to 1991/92 reforms to re-orient the economy towards private 
sector-led growth and The Way Forward I and II, 1990-1995, through structural 
adjustment.28 
 
Prior to the implementation of these policies under SAPs phase II (1987-2006), the 
government carried out several structural/institutional reforms. Among these was the 
reform of the bureaucracy, which would be at the centre of the implementation of these 
policies.  The reform of the bureaucracy was expressed through the commissioning of 
Public Service Review of 1989.29 These institutional reforms are discussed in the next 
chapter 6. 
 
For this period, we examine the five major features of SAPs that had implications for the 
industrial sector. These include: i) liberalisation ii) privatisation of the public sector firms, 
iii) financing of industrialisation through FDI, iv) financing industry with foreign aid and 
loans and v) politics and patronage in the financing of industry. Both the SAPs and the 
accompanying structural reforms, particularly the reform of the bureaucracy, had 
implications for industrial policy practices and the distinctive nature of the industrial 
sector. 
 
5.2.1 Liberalisation and the Industrial Sector 
 
The first major element of liberalisation was that of foreign exchange which had been the 
perennial obstacle to industrial activity, by removing the bureaucracy of securing it from 
the Central Bank. This followed in the footsteps of the Berg Report30  that had identified 
the inability of most African countries to generate enough foreign exchange to cover 
their import requirements as the major obstacle to their development.31 The liberalisation 
of foreign exchange aimed at the elimination of this constraint, bureaucratic meddling 
and was accompanied by a determined effort by the government to reduce its own deficit 
                                                 
28 Siggel, E., and Ssemogerere, G, (2001), “Uganda’s Policy Reforms, Industry Competitiveness and 
Regional Integration: A Comparison with Kenya”, EAGER, Discussion Paper, p.3. 
29 Government of Uganda (1990), Public Service Review and Reorganisation Commission (1990). The details of 
bureaucratic reforms are discussed in Chapter six. 
30 World Bank, (1981), Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, Washington, DC. 
31 Sender, John and Smith Sheila, (1984), “What’s Right with the Berg Report and What is Left of Its 
Critics”, IDS Discussion Paper, 192, June, p.16. The major problem of the Berg argument about the shift 
towards export–oriented manufacturing is over timing. Berg over-estimates feasible rates of increase in 
SSAs manufactured exports, p.28. 
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and therefore monetary expansion, which reduced inflation substantially while increasing 
exports.32  
 
The trade and payments liberalisation and private sector-led strategy may not provoke 
the intended supply side response, as was the case in Uganda where there are market 
imperfections and weak markets. The manufacturing sector, as was the market, in 
Uganda was small and by 1995 was only 7% of the GDP, comprising small-scale 
enterprises, producing simple consumer goods, dependent on imported inputs and 
generating minimal value added. In this context, liberalisation may lead to de-
industrialisation, the transfer of resources to foreigners and the concentration of 
economic power in a few hands.33 Thus, liberalisation had mixed effects on industry. 
 
Liberalisation gave easy access to foreign exchange but it also made it easier to import 
cheap competing commodities. The massive devaluations that followed eroded the 
working capital bases and reduced capacity utilisation of most industries and led to 
closure of some. The liquidity squeeze aggravated the shortage of working capital. Trade 
liberalisation and the removal of import restrictions allowed for an inflow of cheap 
imported goods, based on the avoidance tax by smuggling into the market.  
 
The state launched anti-smuggling measures, which remained ineffective. What 
compromised government policy in the fight against smuggling and tax evasion was the 
participation of politically highly placed agents later in the programme, for example, 
DANZE Enterprises, a private company set up to make profits for the ruling party, 
NRM. In its heyday, DANZE Company routinely smuggled a wide variety of 
merchandise: sugar, cooking oil, shoes, jute bags, bed sheets, blankets, sweaters, hoes 
axes and matches.34  Several firms were subjected to competition from these smuggled 
goods, some of which were produced under subsidy abroad.35 This resulted in the closure 
                                                 
32 Harvey, Charles and Robinson, Mark, (1994), The Design of Economic Reforms in the Context of 
Political Liberalisation, Uganda Country Study, European Commission, p.10. 
33 Ochieng, Erisa, (1996), Op Cit, p13.  
34 The Daily Monitor, (1997), February 7th, p.9. 
35 Dhatemwa, Godfrey Arnold, (1992), Effects of Devaluation on  Selected Number of Industries in Uganda,   MA 
Dissertation (Economics), Makerere University, Kampala, P.27. 
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of some industries, for example, Lessian bags, hoes and textiles resulting in de-
industrialisation and unemployment.36  
 
The interest rate liberalisation and wanton pursuit of so-called positive interest rates37 
were the root cause of the non-performing loans in the commercial banks, resulting in 
the collapse of banks in the late 1990s.38 At the height of the high interest rates (up to 
50%) in the period of 1989-93, many industries were running at losses and some had to 
close. Price de-control allowed industries to adjust their prices but it also increased the 
price of inputs and utilities, a trend that intensified with further privatisation of power 
generation and supply.39  On the positive side, there was increased output as foreign trade 
was liberalised and imported inputs became more freely available.40 
 
Second, the focus of practically every aspect of SAPs is to create a competitive 
environment in a given local economy in which entrepreneurial decision-making would 
be conditioned mainly by market forces. Thus, the business environment in Uganda was 
progressively liberalised through the elimination of export and industrial licensing and 
price controls, the removal of most import prohibitions, the introduction of the 
Investment Code (1991) and the creation of the Uganda Investment Authority, (UIA) to 
expedite registrations and encourage foreign investment. The investment code replaced 
the Foreign Investment Act (1977) and Industrial Licensing Act (1969). The Industrial 
Licensing Act of 1969, which emphasised control and contradicted the Investment Code, 
was suspended and eventually repealed in October 1992. By 1992, there had been almost 
complete liberalisation of the imports and the licensing system.41  
 
The abolition of the Industrial Licensing Act and the assumption that with the free 
access to foreign technology entrepreneurs are said to be free to invest, expand and 
                                                 
36 Government of Uganda, (1995), National Strategy and Programme of Action for the Development of the Industrial 
Sector, mimeo, p.2. 
37 In late industrialisation context it may be prudent to get prices “wrong” as Amsden observes in South 
Korean case, see Amsden Alice, Asia’s Next Giant, (1989).  
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modernise in response to markets, was to prove less than optimal for Uganda’s industrial 
transformation. The dismantling of the structures such as the industrial licensing and 
marketing boards, that sustained much of the earlier industrial growth, particularly in the 
1950s and 1960s, leaves the country unprepared to capture benefits from the more 
technologically advance investors. The concern here is the effect of the liberalisation of 
marketing boards, particularly of coffee and cotton. 
 
The earlier process of industrialisation in the 1950s and 1960s had depended on 
surpluses extracted from coffee and cotton through the marketing board mechanisms. 
While it is the case that marketing board mechanisms had come to be abused, particularly 
from the 1970s, the situation called for their restructuring and not dismantling. Together 
with co-operatives, marketing boards acted as an important link with the agricultural 
sector as they processed the crops, provided marketing linkages as co-operatives 
provided vital inputs to producers, coffee and cotton. 
 
By drawing on the industrialisation experience in East Asia, for instance, suggests that 
individual decisions of entrepreneurs based on market considerations generally do not 
add up to strategy of industrial development and industrial restructuring unless 
government intervenes actively and directs the markets to achieve a transformation of 
their comparative advantage into competitive advantage. Thus, abolition of these 
institutions must be seen as a mistake. 
 
Third, the compounded impact of removing restrictions together with increased efforts 
to raise tax revenue by increasing taxation of the manufacturing sector made the negative 
effects doubly felt. High rates of taxation, VAT, excise duties, income tax made local 
manufactured goods further unable to compete with imported products and this instilled 
into the economic system an anti-local product bias in favour of imported products: 
textiles, soap, utensils and other mass consumption goods.42 The specific case of VAT 
was negative to industry. Many industrialists found VAT of 17% too high, especially 
when compared to Kenya’s 15% (and in light of Kenya’s lower production costs and 
easier access to the sea).43  The low capacity in many manufacturing establishments is due 
                                                 
42 Rugasira, Andrew, (2004), Op Cit, p.16. 
43 Bigsten Arne and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Steve (2001), Is Uganda an Emerging Economy? A Report for the 
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to low effective demand, high taxes, lack of working capital, unreliable utilities and the 
open door policy.44  
 
For developing countries that need to deepen their industrialisation process, opening up 
of the economy must be done as part of a coherent strategy, the existing base of learning 
be utilised and further developed under increasing international competition with 
appropriate selective and functional interactions, and the government retains a significant 
role in resource allocation in the liberalisation process.45 The rapid and sweeping 
opening-up of the economy to market forces with no underlying strategy is less than 
optimal to bring about industrial transformation. The industries that have been 
established have very little backward and forward linkages and remain import dependent. 
 
Liberalisation as well resulted in the growing of foreign debt.46 For instance in 1980, just 
before the first IMF programme began, Uganda’s debt/service ratio, the percentage of 
export earnings that must go to service foreign debt, was 18.9%. By 1985, it had climbed 
to 55%. When the second IMF programme began in 1987, this ratio was 59.6%, by 1992, 
it was 80%. These ratios have serious implications for economic policy as the resources 
that may have been used to import capital goods and various inputs that would enhance 
industrial production were used to service debts.47 
 
In general, liberalisation created an economy that was fundamentally import dependent, 
trade-biased and given little impetus to agricultural modernisation and industrial 
deepening. Official documents show no indication of a well-worked out industrial 
strategy that actually comes to terms with the heavy import dependence of the industries 
created in Uganda over the past five decades.48 Without industrialisation and the 
modernisation of agriculture – a shift from peasant subsistence farming to an 
economically more advanced farming, a policy framework that merely encourages the 
financing and engaging in speculative trading activities will not deliver the necessary 
                                                 
44 Ochieng, E, (1996), Op Cit., p.28. 
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 160 
social and economic transformation of the country. The speed and spread of 
liberalisation must take note of the level of the development of productive capabilities, 
particularly, technology.49 Liberalisation did not take the Ugandan context into serious 
consideration. This trend is further observed in the privatisation process.  
 
5.2.2 Privatisation of the Public Industrial Sector 
 
Privatisation refers to “the transfer of ownership from the state to the private sector by 
sale – full or partial – of on-going concerns or by sale of assets following liquidation”.50 
The privatisation of public sector industries was one of the features of SAPs 
implementation. The public sector in Uganda expanded very rapidly with the expulsion 
of the Asian business community in 1972 as several expropriated industrial firms were 
transferred to public sector management, UDC. The unplanned transfer only resulted in 
mismanagement and their collapse by the end of the 1970s. By 1979, the average capacity 
utilisation of industrial concerns was down to about 20%. Mismanagement took its toll 
on efficiency. Employment levels dropped, as did contribution by industry to foreign 
exchange earnings. From being an exporter of some industrial products, particularly in 
the East African region, Uganda became a net importer only ten years later.51   
 
The attempts at rehabilitation and the return of expropriated Asian properties to the 
former owners between 1981-85, as discussed above, could not revive the industrial 
sector. The efforts to return the various nationalised firms to UDC as a way of reviving 
the industrial sector were futile as UDC was no longer the entrepreneurial agency that it 
had been in the 1950s and 1960s. The “economic war” of the 1970s had essentially 
disoriented industrial sector to a point of no return, requiring wide-ranging reforms and 
renewed vision for industrialisation.  Little changed in terms of the revival of the 
industrial sector in the early 1980s. The depth of the reforms in the late 1980s underlines 
the  differences between the two phases. 
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51 Tiwaidha-Kyama, P. (1994), Privatisation Strategy in Development: Some Policy Options for Public Industrial Sector 
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In 1986, the NRM government inherited at least 146 state owned enterprises excluding 
banks. Government had majority holding in 138 and minority interest in 8 enterprises.52 
By the end of 1989, there were 116 public companies of which 60 were industrial. UDC 
in 1991 controlled 35 companies of which only 28 were operational. Separately from the 
UDC, many enterprises were owned directly by government ministries, in particular the 
Ministry of Industry and Technology, which was responsible for 45 parastatals.53  
 
Overall, the public enterprises were characterised by low capacity utilisation, large 
operation costs (low profitability), low productivity and increasing lack of liquidity and 
indebtedness. The entire sector was glutted with a non-productive and unmotivated 
labour force riddled with poor management.54 For instance, in 1988, the aggregate loss 
suffered by 31 of the manufacturing public enterprises amounted to US $ 8.3 million. 
The public enterprises were as well responsible for up to 45 to 65% of the country’s total 
external indebtedness.55 In an 1992 survey of parastatals on the eve of privatisation, 19 
out of 30 major parastatals were making loses.56  Thus, the parastatal sector had become 
a major burden on the government budget and consumed about 10% of government 
expenditure.57   
 
Following the launch of ERP as a SAPs strategy in 1987, the Uganda government 
published a policy statement on Public Enterprise Reform and Divestiture (PERD) in 
November 1991, which outlined the government’s privatisation strategy.  The 
privatisation of public enterprises was informed by the World Bank views on the 
economy, which argued that there should be non-interference in the workings of the 
markets accompanied with policy-making that reflects economic rationality and a 
fundamental concern for enhanced economic efficiency and productivity. 
 
Privatisation covers at least four separate components: charging, contracting out, 
denationalisation and liberalisation. These in turn can be categorised into three distinct 
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operational areas: i) total divestiture ii) fractional divestiture – part sell and joint venture 
and iii) Leasing and liberalisation.58  Operationally, Uganda’s privatisation process mainly 
took the form of divestiture. Institutionally, the divestiture was implemented through the 
World Bank-financed Privatisation Unit (PU), based on the PERD Act that was enacted 
in 1993.59  
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
The concern here is to examine the implications of the privatisation process and its 
assumptions on the organisation and promotion of the industrial sector. Uganda’s 
privatisation strategy had two basic objectives: first, to reduce the direct role of 
government in the economy and second, to develop the correspondingly greater role of 
the private sector.60 Overall, it was aimed at revitalising the private sector, increase 
economic efficiency and thereby generate economic growth and consequently, 
development. These objectives are assessed against the results of privatisation on the 
industrial sector. Since 1993, 105 public enterprises have been divested (including 31 
liquidations) as per PERD statute. By 2001, there were 34 enterprises remaining to be 
privatised. Again, as is the case with liberalisation, the results of privatisation have been 
mixed. The table below shows that after privatisation, there was a reduction in direct 
government subsidy to enterprises. But the expenditure and support shifted into various 
forms as equity support, financial terms and fiscal terms as can be noted in the table 
below. 
Table 5.1:  Uganda: Public Enterprises Subsidies from Government (billion in Uganda Shillings) 
Type of Subsidy 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Direct Subsidies 19.408 56.270 52.356 100.345 8.827 
Equity support 78.760 55.313 52.168 3.437 40.415 
Financial Terms 57.042 65.958 72.842 71.628 74.774 
Fiscal Terms 18.024 20.578 89.79 7.728 45.068 
Other 35.303 10.560 20.336 26.964 70.069 
Total 208.537 208.679 206.681 210.102 186.153 
      
Source: Background to the Budget, 1999/2000 
 
                                                 
58, Heald, David, (1984), “Privatisation: Analysing its Appeal and Limitations”, Fiscal Studies, No.5. 
59 Harvey, Charles and Robinson, Mark, (1994), Op Cit., p.52. 
60 Government of Uganda, (1991), “Policy Statement on Public Enterprise Reform and Divestiture”, 
(Ministry of Finance, September). 
 163 
First, the fiscal impact of the removal of subsidies is rather mixed. While the government 
has reduced expenditure due to the withdrawal of direct subsidies to parastals, the 
government expenditure has remained more or less the same or even increased as the 
government has shifted from direct to indirect subsidies to public enterprises for the 
period 1994 to 1997. There was a shift in the category contribution: The most 
remarkable being indirect subsidies or equity support which dropped between 1994 and 
1998 as a result of indirect subsidies being converted into direct subsidies. Overall, 
however, privatisation has reduced subsidies to public enterprises and has led to 
increases in government income especially when taxes paid by the privatised firms have 
exceeded the sums previously paid to public enterprises. For instance, the 39 companies 
surveyed paid an average of Uganda shillings 1.8 billion in 1997, Uganda shillings1.6 
billion in 1998 and Uganda shillings 2.1 billion in 1999.61 Therefore, the privatisation 
programme went some distance in reducing the fiscal burden of subsidies on the state. 
 
At the industry level, privatisation made a number of achievements. An impact 
assessment of the Uganda privatisation programme62 identified a number of 
improvements in Uganda’s industrial sector. First, of the 21 companies surveyed, 10 were 
in the manufacturing sector. For those companies, capacity utilisation increased from an 
average of 11% in 1993 to 51% in 1998. Notable increases in capacity utilisation were in 
the cases of: i) The Uganda Metal Products and Enamelling Company (TUMPECO) 
which increased its capacity from 8% at hand-over (1994) to 40% in 1999 and ii) Lake 
Victoria Bottling Company Ltd which increased capacity from 22% at hand-over in 1993 
to 45% in 1998.63  Second, there is evidence from the firms surveyed that there was 
increased productivity in terms of output in nearly all companies reviewed. Remarkable 
growth was realised with Nile Breweries Ltd increased its capacity from 0.6 million crates 
of beer to 7.8 million crates per annum (130%). This improvement in capacity coupled 
with investment in machinery and equipment by the privatised firms has been 
accompanied by a change in their product mix, gearing to meet consumer tastes and 
demand.64 But there are more fundamental issues against which privatisation, as a 
development policy, particularly in the promotion of industrialisation, must be judged.  
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One of the cardinal objectives of privatisation was the promotion of the private sector, 
particularly the local entrepreneurial class. Given the constraint of capital by the local 
entrepreneurs, the state would need to build their capacity by transferring resources to 
local firms or even financing the creation of new ones. What occurred was the reverse. 
The major problem is that the advocates of both privatisation and liberalisation have a 
naïve view of the state in countries like Uganda. They underestimate the centrality of 
politics and patronage in economic decision-making.65  
 
Rather than build an entrepreneurial class, privatisation introduced a new and more 
vicious round of corruption from which foreign nationals and state officials were the sole 
beneficiaries.66 Several examples abound. The government sold state enterprises to its 
own supporters and at give away prices. Among these companies was, Lake Victoria 
Bottling Company, Print Pak, Masindi Hotel, Soroti Meat Parkers, Uganda Meat Parkers 
and Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB), among others, all of them were sold to the 
political incumbents and supporters of the regime. The most significant of these was 
UCB, through which funds would be passed to the local entrepreneurs. This was sold at 
cut-rate price. UCB had been re-capitalised at a cost of US$72 but sold to a Malaysian 
company at US $ 11million.67  Top government officials used the money realised from 
the sale of state enterprises to extend their patronage network. Through presidential 
directives, funds were transferred to supporters of the regime. A case in point is that of 
regime functionaries like Mwebesa (for his dairy plant in Mbarara) and Sembule (for his 
steel mill in Kampala), who got proceeds from privatisation to inject in their private 
businesses.68 
 
The implication of the way privatisation was handled and proceeds spent, the process 
benefited individuals from “powerful” families. A Select Committee on Privatisation that 
was set up in 1998 presented its report in November, in which it decried ‘growing 
nepotism’ and how ‘some politically powerful families have been manipulating the 
process of privatisation”.69 Under pressure from politicians, the Privatisation Unit 
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encouraged assets stripping in some enterprises and created monopolies in others for the 
benefit of certain politically powerful purchasers. The purchase of public enterprises by a 
few ‘powerful’ families, politically connected, meant that resources increasingly came to 
be concentrated in a few hands. Thus, the objective of using the proceeds from 
privatisation to advance industrialisation was defeated at the altar of patronage and 
corruption.70  
 
The other objective of the privatisation policy in Uganda was to broaden the share of 
ownership by the locals thereby fulfilling the social goals. As the report on the PERD Bill 
put it: 
“A country where large players on the economic scene do not have an interest at 
heart is one with little influence on its economic issues. For that reason we 
strongly recommend that Ugandans should be encouraged to have a stake in 
Uganda’s industries. The local private sector therefore should be given priority to 
purchase the enterprises either in their individual capacity or in association. It is 
important to avoid the unfortunate politically unattainable situation where all 
divested enterprises are taken over by foreign entrepreneurs”.71 
 
Privatisation failed to address the fear by indigenous people of the transfer of resources 
to foreigners. In a survey to assess the socio-economic impact of privatisation, the 
majority of the respondents expressed the feeling that public enterprises were given away 
to foreigners at the cheap.72  According to this survey, locals bought 55 per cent of the 
public enterprises, while foreigners bought 37 percent. However, foreigners bought 
public enterprises with higher value constituting 75 percent of the total divestiture 
proceeds. The value of public enterprises bought by locals constituted 16 per cent of the 
total divestiture proceeds.73 Thus, the objective of broadening ownership among 
Ugandans as stipulated in the 1993 PERD statute, section 20 was not met. SAPs and the 
attendant privatisation ignored the institutional context in which the privatised resources 
could be transferred to the indigenous entrepreneurial class. 
 
While privatisation in the context of a crisis economy may be a necessary condition, it 
may not, on its own, be sufficient to generate the necessary momentum for renewed 
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growth and development. In privatising public enterprises, the possibility of “market 
failure” needs to be considered. The failure of public enterprises should not be taken as 
an automatic proof that private entrepreneurs would do better. In a country like Uganda 
where the stock market has just been initiated, with very limited local capital and a 
narrow internal market due to low incomes, the private sector if not supported by the 
state, may as well find it difficult to take root.74 This illustrates the critical importance of 
state finance or guarantees of loans to the private sector in economies like Uganda.  
 
5.2.3 Financing Industrialisation and Investment 
 
A detailed analysis of the financial structure of Uganda’s economy is beyond the scope of 
this study. However, no analysis of industrialisation can be meaningful without 
mentioning the key aspects of the financial system through which it is financed. Uganda’s 
financial system is relatively underdeveloped. By 2003, the formal sector encompassed 
the central bank, 13 licenced commercial banks, 9 credit institutions, 14 insurance 
companies, 3 development institutions, 3 building societies and the Postal Savings 
Bank.75 
 
There are three points discussed here. i) the sources and control over finance by the 
state,  ii) liberalisation of  the financial sector and iii) the shift from credit-based system 
with critical  prices administered by government to a market-based system in the financial 
sector. These reforms have had major implications for the financing and investment in 
the industrial sector. 
 
During the pre-adjustment period, government played a major role in determining credit 
flows through a system of subsidies, interest rate ceilings, credit allocation and direct 
intervention and ownership. The liberalisation and privatisation of financial institutions 
under SAPs has had tremendous implications for domestic financial system in general 
and the financing of the industrial sector, in particular.76 Historical experiences of 
industrialisation illustrate the centrality of finance in the process. Control over finance 
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gives the state power to influence and direct economic policy. To finance 
industrialisation, the state would deploy the following instruments: direct subsidies to 
companies, loans and loan guarantee, tax incentives, government procurements, research 
and development and worker training assistance.  Under SAPs and the general 
liberalisation policy these would be considered elements of distortion. 
 
The central question in industrial development is that of the sources of the finance for 
industrialisation and whether the sources are primarily local or foreign as this determines 
the priority and non-priority of industries to be financed. Without subsidies and credit 
allocation as stipulated under SAPs, there arose the question of what would be the source 
of finance for industrialisation and investment in Uganda? 
 
The immediate source of finance for industry under SAPs was envisaged to be the 
proceeds from the privatised public enterprises.  According to the divestiture statute,77 
the proceeds from the divested public enterprises were to be deposited in divestiture 
account in commercial and development banks and the Ugandan entrepreneurs would 
borrow the funds for investment to promote industrial development. In practice, this did 
not occur, due to a number of shortcomings in the statute and political practices as 
regards finances by the ruling elite. Second, there was no specific percentage of these 
funds earmarked for industrial investment.  
 
The Statute, (1993), had open-ended prescriptions on the use of divestiture proceeds. 
Section 23(C) of this law provided that the proceeds of sale in the divestiture account 
may be used “to do anything necessary to attain the most favourable conditions of 
divestiture”. It was not until the PERD Amendment Act, (2000),78 that a more objective 
criterion for the application of proceeds, to promote Ugandan entrepreneurs involved in 
agricultural and industrial development was introduced.79  Second, although these funds 
were supposed to provide investment capital for Ugandan entrepreneurs, no specific 
industrialisation programme was instituted to link up with the funds. A specific 
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 168 
industrialisation programme was necessary indicating priority industries and the 
requirements for entrepreneurs to acquire investment capital.80   
 
Moreover, under SAPs there was a shift in the bank lending policy, which was 
accompanied by a sharp credit squeeze to the state sector. The point of squeezing the 
flow of credits to the state sector was to increase its flow to the private sector. One 
major failing of policy throughout the two IMF programmes, from early 1980s to early 
1990s, was that the commercial banking policy did not reflect and thus reinforce any 
investment priorities. Little was directed to production as most of the bank credit went 
to crop finance, commerce and trade.81 Liquidity squeeze aggravated the shortage of 
working capital. The limited contribution of bank loans to expanded industrial 
production is blamed both on the scarcity and high cost of credit. The banking policy 
and the cost of credit had negative implications for Uganda’s industrial sector as it was 
rendered less competitive, given the fact that local firms have small retained earnings.   
 
Bank of Uganda administers six credit programmes aimed at promoting economic 
growth and development through medium and long-term finance. These include: EIB- 
Uganda Apex private sector Loan Scheme, Investment Term Credit Refinance Fund 
(ITCRF), the Development Finance Fund (DFF), the Bank of Uganda Export Refinance 
Scheme (ERS) and the Export Credit Guarantee Scheme (ECGS). Due to lack of 
collateral and failure to penetrate export markets, however, this has meant that the 
private sector firms have not made use of these funds, as they have remained unutilised 
such as EIB Apex Scheme and the ERS funds. The Uganda banking sector further 
frustrated export trade through demand for unrealistic collateral to guarantee export 
trade.82  Moreover, Uganda has a very high cost of borrowing which has further 
frustrated the private sector. 
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The liberalisation of the financial sector was made necessary by the fact that past policies 
had led to financial repression,83 which was seen as hindrance to the development of the 
institutional capacity of financial institutions in their development of the commercial 
viability of their operations. Credit and interest rate restrictions discouraged savings 
mobilisation and led to unsatisfactory lending arrangements. In general, the financial 
sector suffered from the low savings rate, deficiencies in the availability of credit, and 
general lack of confidence in the financial sector.84  
 
The May 1987 economic reform policies provided for the establishment of a revolving 
fund credit facility for lending to commercial banks for the provision of short-term credit 
to priority import. The ERP of 1987 introduced a number of reforms: an elaboration of 
regulatory institutions, the introduction of prudential guidelines, the privatisation of 
banks and insurance companies.  
 
The immediate response to liberalisation was an explosion in financial services, as the 
number of banks doubled, accompanied by a profusion of ancillary finance, mortgages, 
insurance and brokerage houses, the endpoint of deregulation. Lured by burgeoning 
opportunities and heady profits, investors, entrepreneurs and professionals flowed to the 
banking industry. Rather than mobilising savings, the banking system engendered 
speculation based on short-term borrowing, with little going to industry. Industrialisation 
demands a long-term, selective financing. The shift to a market-based system in the 
financial sector was based on the assumption that it would stimulate domestic resource 
mobilisation and increase the capacity of the banking system to support private sector 
participation in economic development.85 Paradoxically, financial savings, real value 
lending to the private sector and investment all declined in the wake of liberalisation.86  
 
Liberalisation of the financial system and move away from the directed-credit system 
misses the Gerschenkronian developmental perspective which would tell us that a credit 
                                                 
83 Wasike, David (1999), “Financial Institutions and Industrialisation in Uganda 1987-96: A critical Survey 
of the Credit Institutions” a paper presented at the Institutions and Industrial Development Workshop at 
Marienlyst Falster, Denmark 19-21 May , p.4.  Financial repression involves government restrictions to the 
free operation of the financial system through interventions in financial markets and public ownership of 
banks. 
84 Government of Uganda (1992), The Way Forward II: Medium Term Sectoral Strategy 1991-95, Ministry of 
Planning and Economic Development (MPED), Kampala, p.5. 
85 Kasekande, Louis and Atingi-Ego, M (2003), Op Cit., p.1. 
86 Wasike, David (1999), Op Cit., p.4.  
 170 
system based on equity and securities markets is an artefact of early industrialisation, and 
that the model of state or bank-influenced industrialisation is a consequence of 
“lateness” in world time and in the absence of abundant capital in the private sector.87 
Uganda being a “late” industrialiser needs a directed-credit system, albeit a reformed one. 
This is because the control of the financial system can be used to build up the social 
conditions needed to support the government objectives.  
 
In the wake of the liberalisation of the financial sector, coupled with internal weaknesses 
in the banking sector, there was a spate of the collapse of several commercial banks, 
which were supposed to act as sources of finance for industry.88 Thus, the institutions for 
mobilising domestic savings, which could be transformed into loans to industry, were in 
a crisis. The primary causes of the failures of these banks were mainly internal and less 
due to liberalisation. First, there exhibited incredibly bad corporate governance on the 
part of those entrusted with the stewardship of these banks. Second, there was persistent 
under-capitalisation of the banks throughout their operating lives. Third, there was 
imprudent credit, in particular, over-indulgence in the respect of insider loans, coupled 
with inadequate loan/loss provisioning and fourth, there was consistently weak 
supervision of these banks by Bank of Uganda.89  
 
It could be argued that the banking crisis was not a result of excessive government 
intervention, as SAPs advocates would have us believe. Instead it resulted from 
imprudent short-term debt made possible by weak supervision and regulation of the 
banking system. The institutional aspects of changing from a rationed to a free market in 
credit was neglected, especially the issue of bankers’ ability to judge and manage risk and 
the lack of information by the regulators. It is this asymmetry of information that created 
perverse incentives for risky lending that in turn provoked a financial crisis which had 
serious implications for credit to the industrial sector, and indeed the entire economy in 
the 1998-99 period.   
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While the fragility of the banking system – where there was widespread insecurity of 
holding long-term financial assets, imprudent lending and overwhelming insider lending 
in the banks90 called for reform, the importance of financial intermediation for 
industrialisation demanded corrective measures not the closure of the banks. A 
developmental state aiming at industrial transformation cannot afford to let temporary 
liquidity problems close major banks or firms. 
 
The only exception was Uganda Development Bank (UDB). Between 1980 and 1997, the 
largest percentage of its portfolio was in the support of the industrial sector. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case at present as the bank is under-capitalised with no 
plans to recapitalise it so as to perform its critical mandate of development financing. 
The table below indicates the industrial distribution of UDB portfolio over 17 year 
period. 
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Table 5.2: Industrial Distribution of UDB Portfolio, 1980-1997 
Sector Total Owing  Net Assets  
 Amount in 
(M.shs) 
% of Total Amount in 
(M.shs) 
% of Total 
(A)AGRICULTURE     
Crop 5291.43 10.47 2726.0 14.5 
Livestock 2344.76   4.64 1098.0   5.8 
Total Agriculture 7636.19 15.11 3824.0  20.3 
Export Trade 186.47   0.37    130.0    0.7 
B) INDUSTRY     
Chemical, fuel and 
energy. 
766.67   1.52    259.0   1.4 
Foods &Beverages 11478.19  22.72   5739.0  30.5 
Iron, Steel & Metal 
Fabrication 
1270.81    2.51   1040.0    5.5 
Leather, Footwear 
and Rubber 
3432.57   6.79     905.0    4.8 
Non-Metallic Minerals 
&Mining 
 3319.06  6.57  - - 
Paper & Printing  1216.61  2.41  410.0  2.2 
Wood & Timber  1660.87  3.29  400.0  2.2 
Other Industry 14528.32 28.75 5909.0 31.4 
Total Industry 37673.06 74.55 14662.0 78.0 
Tourism, Hotels and 
Services 
5035.39 9.96 183.0 1.0 
GRAND TOTAL 50531.11 100.00 18799.0 100.0 
Source: Uganda Development Bank (UDB). 
 
As can be seen in the table above, among the broad sectoral categorisations, industry 
took the largest share, at 75%. Agriculture comprised only 15% by comparison. The 
Bank had, between 1980 and 1994, invested up to US$120m in the industrial sector. The 
investments helped in the gradual revival of the country’s industrial sector. The failure to 
capitalise the Bank and emphasis development financing has resulted in it receding into 
insignificance as far as financing development in Uganda is concerned. What is needed is 
the revival of development banks to finance, cheaply, the medium and long-term projects 
rather than the current reliance on commercial banks in development financing. 
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The other possible source of finance for industry that the state and the entrepreneurs 
could have taken advantage of are Pension Funds from the National Social Security Fund 
(NSSF), Postal Office Bank savings,91 incentive rewarding taxation system and the 
manipulation of the cost of utilities, particularly power, in Alice Amsden’s words by 
getting the utilities “price wrong”. 
 
The point here, however, is that the Ugandan financial system is not geared towards the 
deliberate promotion of local industrial capacities. This can be illustrated by the emphasis 
that the government placed on FDI.  
 
5.2.4 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Industrial Sector 
 
FDI refers to a lasting interest by a resident enterprise/individual in one economy (direct 
investor) in an enterprise resident in another economy (the direct investment enterprise). 
It comprises of three components namely, equity investment, re-invested earnings and 
inter-company loans.92 FDI involves investment of foreign assets into domestic 
structures, equipment and organisations. It is thought to be more useful to a country 
than investment in equity in the case where the stock exchange is undeveloped. 
 
Under SAPs, FDI was seen as the major source of finance for industrialisation. The FDI 
is assumed to provide much needed capital, technology, and new opportunities for 
optimal utilisation of resources, employment and support to the export effort of the host 
country. Apart from the direct equity participation, foreign companies add to capital 
formation through their ability to raise additional finance from international banks and 
other financial institutions.93 Given the low level of domestic savings,94 financing 
industrialisation in Uganda came to rely on FDI.  
 
The institutional context for FDI is provided by UIA whose broad function is to 
promote, facilitate, supervise and market Uganda’s investment opportunities through a 
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coordinated national investment programme.95 Since its institution, UIA has provided the 
environment in which investments have surged. The supportive economic policies 
undertaken by government led to private sector confidence. This provided a strong 
thrust for the increased private sector investment. As at 1990, for instance, Uganda 
witnessed disinvestments to the order of $ 6 million. But since 1993, FDI inflows grew 
rapidly. The average net annual inflow during 1993-97 was around $112 million and in 
1997, FDI inflows reached $250 million, double that of 1996.96  
 
Between 1991 July and February 1997, the UIA had received 2,508 project proposals out 
of which 2,118 had been approved. By September 1997, 2,200 planned investments had 
been attracted in the country in various sectors of the economy worth US$3.6 billion. 
During this period, newly wholly foreign-owned investment increased from 2 percent to 
34 percent of the total private investment. Joint ventures increased from 16 per cent to 
32 percent. On the other hand, new wholly locally owned investment decreased from 82 
percent to 34 percent.97 Between 1993/94 and 1994/95, private investments increased 
from 5.6 per cent to 9.1 percent of the GDP.98 In general, private investments increased 
by an average of 13 percent per annum in the 1990s and its share of GDP by 1999 
averaged 10 percent.99  The market value of the stock of Foreign Direct Equity 
Investment (FDEI) increased by 21.8% from US$539.9 million in 2000 to US$657.5 
million in 2001. In book value terms, therefore, FDEI grew by 33.1%.100 
 
Given the history of FDI in Uganda and the changed view of FDI since the collapse of 
Soviet Union and its East European allies, Uganda has performed well in attracting FDI, 
as MNCs have tended to divert their investments to Eastern Europe. The concern here, 
however, is to evaluate the efficacy of FDI as a source of industrial finance for Uganda’s 
industrialisation process. The benefit of FDI to Uganda’s economy is evaluated at several 
levels: i) value addition, ii) new uses for local resources, iii) technology absorption, iv) 
support for ancillarisation, v) net foreign exchange accruals and vi) local capacity 
building, in terms of costs and benefits. We focus on the origins, actual accruals, 
                                                 
95 Nalwanga, M.V.B (2000), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Performance of the Manufacturing Sector in Uganda: 
1991-1999, MA Dissertation (Economics), Institute of Economics , Makerere University, Kampala, p.22. 
96 UNCTAD, (1999), Investment Policy Review of Uganda, Geneva, August, p.3. 
97 Uganda Investment Authority (1999), Analysis of Investment Performance 1991-1998, Vol.1, Media and 
Management Information Services Division, Kampala and (UIA) Investor Survey Report, (1997), Kampala.  
98 Obwona, Marios (1998), “Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments and their Impact on Economic 
Growth in Uganda”, Economic Policy Research Centre, Makerere University, Kampala, p.10.  
99 UNCTAD (1999), Op Cit., p.8. 
100 Bank of Uganda, UBOS and UIA (2004), Private Sector Investment and Investor Perception in Uganda: 2003 
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composition, technological transfer employment, local linkages and their implications for 
the development of the local industrial sector. 
 
First, according to the various surveys that have been conducted by UIA, the major 
sources of FDI are United Kingdom, Kenya, India, Canada and South Africa.101  Apart 
from South Africa, FDI coming from these countries may be misleading. It can be 
attributable largely to exiled Asians victims of the 1972 “economic war” who were forced 
to flee Uganda. Before their expulsion in 1972, there had been about 70,000 Asians in 
various sectors of business. They regained their properties and injected capital towards 
rehabilitating industries.   
 
The return of Asians and the repossession of their firms that had been expropriated in 
1972, however, underlines the importance of FDI to Uganda’s economy. The return of 
Asian properties to its former owners was a key demand by the World Bank at the start 
of SAPs in 1981. Second, because of the experience of the expropriations, the former 
major Asian investors like the Madhvani Group preferred to be identified as foreign 
investors. The Madhvani Group, the largest conglomerate in Uganda, has since the mid-
1980s been rehabilitating their sugar, beer brewing, soaps and oil businesses, as foreign 
investors and not as returned residents.102   
 
On their return in 1979, the Madhvanis entered an agreement with the government of 
Uganda but preferred to be categorised as foreign investors.103  The group came to be 
registered as a single resident foreign subsidiary. Section 5 of the Agreement, which 
elaborates on the notion of “single resident”,  spells out that the “single-resident foreign 
subsidiary  of the MADHVANI foreign trust” is Madhvani International, S.A, a 
corporation duly organised and existing under the laws of Panama, having offices at 
Trafalgar House, 11 Waterloo Place, London S.W.1, England (herein referred to as 
“MISA”). The Agreement then was really between the Uganda Government and a 
foreign company, Madhvani International S.A (MISA), incorporated in Panama and 
based in England.  
                                                 
101 UIA conducts annual survey reports on private investments. There have also been several surveys on 
FDI financed by the World Bank, USAID among others: Private Sector Investment and Investor Perceptions in 
Uganda, 2003 Report, (UIA), Investment Policy Review of Uganda, (UNCTAD), 1999 and Foreign Investor Perceptions 
on Uganda, (Consorzio Italiano Consulenti (CIC), Italy, 1999 and Investment Response to Structural Reforms: 
Firms Survey Evidence from Uganda, (World Bank), 1998.  
102 UNCTAD (1999), Op Cit., p.5. 
103 “Memorandum of Agreement by and between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the 
Heirs of Jayant Madhvani”, dated October, 1979. See Mamdani, M, (1980), “The Madhvani Agreement: A 
Critique”, Weekly Topic, Friday, 19, pp6-7. 
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Thus, the vast majority of FDI flowing into Uganda by mid-1990s came from those 
firms with previous experience in Uganda or East Africa. Their experience in Europe and 
elsewhere enabled them to add new value to their rehabilitated industries in Uganda. The 
most important attribute being considered as foreign investors. 
 
Second, there is a big discrepancy between the book value of the proposed FDI and 
actual investment figures. On the basis of various in-house UIA surveys taken in 1993, 
1994 and 1995, all had proposed/actual conversion rates between 38 % and 40%, which 
is low in comparison with other countries outside sub-Saharan Africa.104 During the 
period of 1991-1998, foreign investment plans amounted to US$ 2.4 billion, of which 
about 34 per cent were realised. Domestic investors had planned an additional US $1.4 
billion, of which about US $624 was actually invested. While the manufacturing sector 
has attracted the largest share of investment, according to UIA surveys, a substantial part 
of the investment was in the rehabilitation of old industries and not the creation of new 
productive capacity.105 In a survey based on 1457 projects, the projects that were wholly 
Ugandan owned had a higher rate of abandonment and a slower rate of implementation 
than projects with a foreign component. The majority of the abandoned projects (79%) 
were wholly Ugandan owned. 8.7% were wholly foreign owned, while 12.3% were joint 
ventures.106 The major reasons for not implementing or abandoning projects immediately 
after securing the investment license are financial constraints, low markets and 
competition, suggesting the need for targeted support to industry from the state in terms 
of financing and enhancement of technological capacity. 107  
 
Third, one of the claims of FDI is that it enhances export-orientation and linkages with 
local producers. Typically, FDI exploits the raw materials and cheap labour of developing 
countries and exports abroad. Investment flowing into Uganda with little exception 
targets the domestic market.108 While a dimension of FDI is focused on manufacturing, 
its impact has been in the domestic market–oriented, import-substituting (import 
reproduction) type of investment. FDI is concentrated mainly in beverages/soft drinks 
and breweries for the local market. The other industries, such as sugar, textiles, cement, 
footwear, packaging, plastics and food processing have also attracted some FDI. Overall, 
                                                 
104 Obwona, Marios (1998), Op Cit., p.11. 
105 UNCTAD (1999), Op Cit., p.6. 
106 UIA (2000), Final Report on The Investor Survey, 2000, Kampala, p.xii. 
107 Ibid, p.36. 
108 Obwona, Marios., (1998), Op Cit., p.12. 
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value added in manufacturing appears limited as processing, in several cases, involves 
only repackaging. The packaging industry, (for packaging, fish, flowers), where half of the 
firms are foreign, is important for the success of Uganda exporters.109  
 
There has been very limited export-orientation, although rising. In the UIA survey110 
sectors that reported the highest percentage of product export, based on 391 firms, were 
fish and fish farming 100%,111 floriculture, 72.2%, manufacture of soap, 75%, cotton and 
textiles 53%, metal products 51.9% and rubber and plastic products 50%. The main 
export destinations are the East African Countries where 134 companies export, 
followed by Europe with 77 companies and COMESA by 55 companies. North America, 
the largest economy and Asia with the fastest growing economies in the world are not 
being targeted as potential destinations. The general characteristic of these exports is that 
they are primary products that have very minimal value addition. 
 
Foreign investors in these industries co-exist with local firms, but in most cases they have 
not established linkages with the local economy. Thus, the upgrading of industries in the 
value chain is non-existent. FDI linkages with the local economy and the upgrading of 
industries in the value chain, globally, have never been automatic. There are have to exist 
institutional arrangements which facilitate learning in the value chain. The UIA is the 
institution that would encourage partnership-based investment which would enable the 
local Ugandan entrepreneurs to learn how to produce efficiently and competitively.   
 
The capital goods manufacturing industries and export-oriented industrial establishments 
are still minimal. Most industries depend on imported inputs for their production, for 
instance, steel 97%, paper 94% and plastics 94%.112 According to a UNCTAD survey, 
foreign firms have reduced their use of imported inputs. 113  In 1993, 76 per cent of the 
firms reported that they imported more than half of their intermediate inputs, whereas 
the figure was 60%. Among the firms that imported less inputs, 85% linked the decline 
in importation to the purchase of local inputs, while 15% to production of such inputs 
with the firm. Though they are reducing imported inputs, FDI manufacturing operations 
                                                 
109 UNCTAD (1999), Op Cit., p.6, and p.10. 
110 UIA (2000), Op Cit.,, p.44. 
111 Reflecting the fact that the fish fillet is destined for Europe and Asia as the locals resort to the bare fish 
bones left after filleting, locally referred to as Mugongowazi.  
112 Ddumba-Ssentamu, John  (2000), “Employment Creation and Poverty Reduction: Impacts of Industrial 
Investment in Uganda”, In Bachou, Salim (2000), (ed.), Investment for Poverty-Reducing Employment in Uganda, 
unpublished manuscript, Kampala, p.92.  
113 UNCTAD (1998), Survey of Foreign Firms in Uganda (Company’s Profile) , Geneva, June, p.11. 
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remain import-dependent. Their qualitative impact on the economy is therefore very 
limited.114 
 
Fourth, FDI’s other main contribution is supposed to be job creation and the increased 
output of manufactured goods. In all operations licensed by UIA between 1991 and 
1999, FDI employed more people in all years than local investments. The investment 
projects as licensed by 1999 when fully implemented were expected to generate around 
95,000 jobs. Half of these would be in the manufacturing sector, mainly in agro-based 
industries and production of simple consumer goods.115 This points to the fact that FDI 
to the country are involved in labour intensive as opposed to capital intensive 
investments.116 
 
One of the claims of FDI is the question of technology transfer. A mid 1998 survey by 
UNCTAD of foreign firms in Uganda, indicated that linkages with parent companies and 
other foreign firms have brought them technology, management, export markets, equity 
capital and training, though visits to some firms noted that manufacturing generally 
involved use of low technology.117  UIA’s other objective is stimulating local and foreign 
investment by providing information to industrial sector on appropriate technology. 
UIA’s survey of technologies and skills in Uganda industries indicated a limited level of 
technology transfer contrary to UNCTAD claims. Technology transfer occurred in terms 
of imported machinery and employment of expatriates, with maintaince of the machinery 
not properly mastered. Most foreign investors employed foreign skills and claimed this 
was due to lack of skilled local people.118 Second, there is claim that the Uganda Science 
and Technology system is poorly adapted to meeting local industry needs due mainly to 
lack of coordination between government and research institutions and the private 
sector. In the UIA study, however, it was observed that there are many technical 
personnel in Uganda who have basic technical knowledge. For FDI to transfer 
technology, the investors would hire local skills and train them as part of human 
resources development.  
 
                                                 
114 Obwona, Marios (1998), Op Cit., p.21. 
115 UNCTAD (1999), Op Cit., p.8. 
116 Nalwanga, M.V.B (2000), Foreign Direct Investment and the Performance of the Manufacturing Sector in Uganda: 
1991-1999, MA (Economics) Dissertation, Makerere University, Kampala, p.56. 
117 UNCTAD (1999), Op Cit., pp 8-9. 
118 UIA (1998), A Survey of Technologies and Skills in Uganda Industries, Kampala, June, p.35. 
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The problem of the limited technology transfer by FDI must be seen in the context of 
the form it takes. The transfer of technology, historically, has never been automatic. The 
institutional context is critical. Prior to FDI, institutions for negotiating the technology 
transfer, including maintenance and training, must be put instituted. There should be a 
provision requiring that every technology importation should incorporate training 
programmes in installation, operation and maintaince. There is a critical role of the state 
in this regard. Rather than leave the process to voluntary initiatives by FDI or market 
forces, active participation by government with industries in educating and training 
appropriate quantities of skilled workers is a prerequisite to the transfer of technology. In 
the context of SAPs, these necessary institutional arrangements if the Ugandan economy 
is to benefit from FDI shall further be negated with the establishment of old-style 
Economic Processing Zones (EPZ). 
 
5.2.5 Export Processing Zones (EPZs) 
 
EPZs are part of the “big push” strategy into export markets financed by FDI that 
Uganda is applying. Uganda has sought to introduce EPZs spearheaded by government 
through UIA for investors in order to make Uganda more competitive internationally. 
This follows the recommendation by the UNCTAD review that the country moves away 
from the concept of the traditional “Free Trade Zone” (FTZ) and Export Processing 
Zones (EPZ) as a model of development and set up a bold new concept for a “Multi-
Facility Economic Zone” (MFEZ).119 The MFEZ would provide facilities for all targeted 
industrial projects both export and local market oriented.120  This “new” concept retains 
all the elements of the “old” with its limitations as a spring board of industrialisation. 
This is because MFEZs are industrial zones where “unfavourable” laws and regulations 
are replaced by best practices in order to attract investors. They are areas for both 
export-oriented industries with all the necessary infrastructure and services such as 
utilities, customs and planning services, streamlined primary and secondary licensing and 
other approvals. Several projects for establishment of industrial parks have been set up in 
Luzira industrial site on a 26 acre plot located 5km from the city and Namanve a 938 
hectare park, near Kampala.121 
 
                                                 
119 UNCTAD (2000), Investment Policy Review of Uganda, Geneva, pp.50-51. 
120 UIA (2000), Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZ) Establishment in Uganda, Kampala, p.3-4. 
121 Songa Martha, (2000), “Uganda’s Industrial Future lies in Namanve Park”, The Monitor, Monday, August 
07, 2000. 
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Apart from the addition of support for local market focused manufacturers, under this 
“new” concept labour would still be organised under government and subjected to 
stringent rules after repealing the “unfavourable” laws. Second, the concept does not 
stress the enhancement of technological capacities of the local firms through linkages 
with FDI and the acquisition of skills for national firms. Third, given the objective of 
relying on low skilled labour for competitiveness, the quality of jobs created would be 
rather low.  
 
The return to the old-style Free Trade Zones (FTZs) as seen in the concession in Rakai 
district in Central Uganda, contradicts the so-called new concept of MFEZ.122 The 
government of Uganda granted permission to a cult-like Spiritual Foundation, through its 
Kagera Eco-Cities Ltd to operate an autonomous 200 square mile Lake Victoria Free 
Trade Zone, Sseesamirembe City State, within the boundaries of Uganda. This state will 
have the authority to enact its own laws, maintain its judiciary and immigration 
department, besides having a government headed by a Governor. Such FTZ is unlikely 
to lead to implantation of industrialisation process in the country. To note, these projects 
are being introduced at the time when there is a collapse of similar EPZs in neighbouring 
Kenya.123 With no coherent inward investment strategy, EPZs as means of financing 
Uganda’s industrialisation are bound to achieve little. 
 
5.2.6 Financing Industry with Foreign Aid and Loans 
 
The financing of industrialisation in Uganda has also relied on foreign aid and loans. 
Since the accent of the NRM administration, Uganda has been favoured with external 
assistance both in form of loans, grants and donations. Between 1986-1990, for instance, 
the country received US$ 1.3 billion in form of loans and credits.124  During the period 
1980 – 1998, the World Bank and IMF advanced to Uganda 20 different types of reform 
loans.125 Aid has provided a crucial cushion since reforms started, first for the repair of 
essential infrastructure, second, to enable the country to undertake reforms, thus 
                                                 
122 Sunday Vision, (2006), “Rakai Free Trade Zone Dangerous”, February, 19. 
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exhibiting high donor dependence.126 Politically, aid has been used for power 
consolidation by funding patronage networks on which the NRM regime is built.  
 
The concern here is how the funds were utilised. The Committee on the Economy 
observed that the largest bulk of the funds in the initial SAPs phase were allocated to 
defence, finance and planning which claimed close to 60%, agriculture and industry were 
together allocated less than 20% for the period 1986-90. The trend was maintained in the 
later period.127 These allocations reveal a particular priority hierarchy, which shows that 
productive sectors have been at the bottom of the national priorities. It would be more 
strategic to focus on agricultural and industrial sectors where improved and increased 
production could lead to the satisfaction of domestic demand and save on imports while 
the surplus products can be exported to earn the needed foreign exchange to improve 
the balance of payment situation. 
 
Despite the neo-liberal regime, however, the state continued to support the industrial 
sector and the economy as a whole on the basis of foreign aid and loans. Following 
reform measures in June 1981 and the approval of the First Reconstruction Credit by the 
IDA, foreign exchange was made available for imports of replacement of machinery, 
equipment, spare parts and raw materials for the industrial sector, which was allocated 
more than 50% of the total foreign exchange available.128 During 1987/88, the 
disbursement of loans from the World Bank totalled US $65 million. The industrial 
sector was given priority in the allocation of funds taking between 25-35% of the total. 
In addition, the government obtained a line of credit from the Netherlands and British 
Aid through Barclays and Standard Chartered Banks. Over 50 large, medium and small 
scale industries in key sub-sectors were funded with these credits.129 
 
The Open General License (OGL) system was introduced in January 1988, aimed at 
obtaining a positive response from key industries. The system, however, was limited to 
efficient public and private industries in 7 priority industries, namely textiles, blankets, 
soap, mattresses, beverages, tobacco and cement. In 1988/89 period the allocation of 
foreign exchange through this system amounted to US $ 2.7 million and contributed to 
positive developments in manufacturing by providing industries with foreign exchange to 
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import urgent spare parts and raw materials.130  In the same financial year, Uganda 
Development Bank (UDB), with the assistance of Bank of Uganda embarked on a Bulk 
Purchases Scheme to alleviate the Small Scale Industries, SSIs’ constraint of availability of 
machinery, tools and raw materials at reasonable prices. During this period about Uganda 
Shillings 100 million was spent on the scheme as UDB at the same time offered free 
feasibility studies to SSIs entrepreneurs. The major problem with this support is that it 
was not selective and focused in context of limited funds. 
 
5.2.7 Politics and Patronage in Financing of Industry 
 
The financing of industry, as was the case with privatisation, has not escaped the 
patronage politics and networks that have been constructed in Uganda’s “free market” 
economy. Rather than enhancing local industry through financial support, government 
on a number of occasions sunk massive resources in failing companies where the 
political leadership seem to have personal stakes. The major beneficiaries have been the 
Asian and local politically connected entrepreneurs. 
 
            In two cases, for instances, government picked the debts of several Asian businesses 
belonging to M.N Methta, Madhvani and Sekhar Mehta. State support for industry is a 
legitimate undertaking if the industry is critical to the country’s development. However, 
this was not the case. In August, 1998, government paid US$ 4 million of Mehta debts 
and planned to clear the Mehta group’s local debts amounting to Shs.3.4 billion owed to 
Stanbic and Bank of Baroda despite state refusal to bail out local investors such as Kato 
family, former owners of the International Commercial Bank (ICB). Government paid a 
total of US $95 million including US$68 million for Mehta Group and US$27 million for 
Madhvani family conglomerate. Earlier, parliament stopped Ministry of Finance from 
paying US$6.2 million to Mehta Group.131  
  
The same Groups (Mehta and Madhvani) are to benefit from the present crazy with land 
giveaways by government (President Museveni) to investors.  What explains the offer of 
these subsidies to these particular groups?  There are two possible explanations: one 
economic and the other political. First, with the return of Asian properties to the former 
                                                 
130 Uganda Government (1990), The Background to the Budget, 1989/90, Kampala, p.67. 
131 See various issues of Uganda Confidential, (1998), that is, “Government to lose US$20 million in dubious 
Payment for Madhvani Loans”, Number, 315, 20-26, November and “Stop Government Payment of 
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owners that had been expropriated in 1970s and the added investments since the early 
1990s, the Asian Groups of Companies remain representatives of foreign capital with 
increasing influence on the Uganda economy. Such subsidies are often approved of by 
the World Bank representatives in Uganda who are over-seeing the implementation of 
SAPs. The support for the Asian propertied class partly advances the interests of foreign 
capital in Uganda.   
 
The second explanation is that the Asian entrepreneurs lack local political power. The 
result is that they have to seek alliance with the local ruling elite for their mutual benefit 
and protection. With wide discretionary authority conferred on the governing elites in the 
implementation of reforms, public resources have been used in unaccountable and non-
transparent ways to help the government maintain its political dominance.132 The Asian 
entrepreneur class comes in handy in the manoeuvre by the ruling elite to consolidate its 
political power. In return for political protection of their investments, the Asian class is 
expected to contribute funds for the servicing of the numerous patronage networks of 
the rulers that have been established. It is said that the Asian entrepreneurs have had to 
contribute funds to political campaigns in the current electoral politics. In return, the 
government has had to allocate state resources to them, especially land.133  
 
The second instance, which is not supportive of local industrialisation efforts, is the 
BIDCO agreement.134 The government signed a loan with the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) on 26th May 1998 to support the development and 
production of vegetable oil in Uganda. The government signed a US$112 loan agreement 
to guarantee a private vegetable oil company, on 4th April 2003. Government undertook 
to give BIDCO 26,500 hectares of land on a 99-year lease to grow palm oil and process 
vegetable oil. BIDCO would pay rent Shs. 10,000 only, equivalent to $5, per year. 
Government would indemnify the company and its subsidiaries for any loses, damages, 
costs, claims, demands and expenses rising from any breach of the provisions. Under the 
                                                 
132 See Mwenda, Andrew & Roger, Tangri (2005), “Patronage Politics, Donor Reforms and Regime 
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134 Uganda Government (2003), Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and BIDCO Oil 
Refineries Ltd for the Development of Oil Palm Industry in Uganda, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development, (MoFPED), Kampala. 
 184 
agreement, government offered to construct and maintain roads leading to all sites in the 
country where the project will be and to connect Bugala Island, the centre of the project, 
onto the national grid as well as build weather stations. Government further commits to 
provide fertile land, water and process work permits for company staff.  
 
While these incentives may be necessary to attract FDI, the question of local industry 
development is left out. The agreement does not spell of any safeguards, neither the 
number of weather stations at $50,000 each nor the plant capacity for the vegetable oil 
plant. The whole question of technological transfer is not even mentioned. Without local 
linkages, BIDCO with its tax holiday and enormous incentives shall likely lead to the 
collapse of local vegetable oil industries such as Madhvani, Mukwano Industries, Mbale 
Soap Oil, Kengro, Unilever, Nile Agro and 45 oil millers in northern Uganda, under the 
Uganda Oil seeds Processors Association, (UOPSA).135  
 
Like the cases of banking policy or privatisation, the characteristic feature of this type of 
FDI is that decisions were not based on commercial assessment of risk against expected 
returns or beneficiation of local industry in terms technological acquisition and 
enhancement of competitiveness but on political favouritism and patronage.   
 
5.2.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the industrial policies under SAPs which can be divided into 
two phases, was based on government documents, survey reports, records from the 
archives, unpublished dissertations, newspaper reports and secondary literature. The 
analysis of the data revealed several findings: 1) Industrial policies in the first phase of 
SAPs (1981-85), were directed at correcting the disortions that had been inflicted on the 
industrial sector by the Idi Amin regime in the 1970s. Thus, SAPs from June 1981 put 
stress on the rehabilitation of the public industrial sector under UDC and the return of 
expropriated firms to the former Asian owners. In particular, the return of several 
industries to UDC which were under various Ministries did not correct the distortions.  
2) The introduction of the liberalised package of monetary and fiscal policies while 
leading to modest improvement in industry, did not resolve the problem of industry. 
This was mainly due to two reasons: i) the source of finance for industry and ii) the non-
prioritisation of industry in the policy process. We observe that for autonomous 
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industrialisation to occur, the source of finance is important as it has implications for 
what priorities to fund. I note that the World Bank dictated to which industrial sectors 
the loans went to. Secondly, there was no prioritisation of the industries that could be 
financed. The combination of these shortcomings and political instability led to the 
collapse of phase 1 of SAPs. 
 
The Second Phase of SAPs (1987-2006) saw extended liberalisation, privatisation and 
several institutional reforms with implications for industrial policy and practice. Several 
findings can be noted: first, in terms of the implementation of the prescribed SAPs, this 
phase was more successful, particularly in the creation a liberalised economy though with 
some shortcomings. Thus in terms of liberalisation, the reforms created an economy that 
is fundamentally import-dependent, trade-biased and has given little impetus to 
agricultural modernisation and industrial deepening. It is noted that the speed of 
liberalisation did not take note of the level of development of productive capabilities of 
industry, particularly of technology. Several industrial firms subjected to competition 
from smuggled goods had to close (see pp. 169-70). Secondly, privatisation resulted in a 
number of achievements. As noted on p.176, several firms increased their capacity 
utilisation and increased productivity in terms of output. The other major achievement is 
that privatisation led to s substantial expansion of the industrial class in Uganda. But it as 
well had shortcomings. Rather than build an entreprenueral class, privatisation 
introduced a new and more vicious round of corruption from which foreign nationals 
and state officials were the major beneficiaries. While privatisation in the context of a 
crisis economy may be a necessary condition, it may not, on its own, be sufficient to 
generate the necessary momentum for renewed growth and development. 
 
Thirdly, the policy makers did not adequately address the question of sources of 
industrial finance as these are critical in determining the pririoty and non-priority of 
industries to be financed. While the state intended to raise finances through the 
privitasation of public enterprises, this did not take place. In addition, there was no 
industrialisation programme indicating priority industries and the requirements of 
entrepreneurs to access investment capital. 
   
Finally, the financing of industry came to be influenced by the politics of patronage. 
Rather than enhancing local industry through financial support, government supported 
selected industries on the basis of patronage. Even where FDI was encouraged as a way 
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of financing industry, the decisions were not based on commercial assessment of risk 
against expected returns or beneficiation for the local industry in terms of technological 
transfer to enhance competitiveness but on political favouritism and patronage. 
 
In conclusion, it could be argued that successful industrial policies require selectivity, 
prioritisation and coherence of the institutions that formulate and implement policies. 
This was made more difficult by the conditionalities of SAPs. It is in light of this, that we 
examine the institutions and the institutional reforms that created several semi-state 
agencies in support of the economy in general and the industrial sector, in particular, in 
the next chapter.
 CHAPTER SIX 
 
6. INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND AGENCIES IN SUPPORT OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
This is the third data chapter of this thesis. It is based on primary data derived from in-
depth interviews with officials from the Ministries of Public Service, Ministry of 
Tourism, Trade and Industry (MTTI) and support agencies, particularly, the Uganda 
Investment Authority (UIA), Uganda National Council of Science and Technology 
(UNCST), Uganda Industrial Research Institute (UIRI) and the Uganda Manufacturers 
Association (UMA). The primary data is supplemented with documents (published and 
unpublished), newspaper reports and academic articles.  
 
There are several purposes of this chapter. First, is to differentiate the current institutions 
from those inherited from the colonial period. Second, to assess whether these newly 
created and reformed institutions work in coordination with each other in the process of 
formulation and implementation of industrial policy. Underlying the subsequent analysis 
is the assumption that policy making is an essentially political process. The institutional 
capabilities or limitations can best be understood within the social and political context. 
 
In the previous chapter, we examined the central elements of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs): liberalisation, privatisation and their impact on the industrialisation 
process. This chapter looks at the civil service (bureaucracy) reforms with a brief 
background, the creation of several agencies to support SAPs and their efficacy in the 
formulation and implementation of industrial policies in Uganda. The bureaucracy is a 
critical institution in the formulation and implementation of policies. Therefore, the 
reform process demanded the review and institution of relevant agencies for policy 
implementation in general and industrial policy in particular.  
 
This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section is a brief overview of the 
working of the bureaucracy prior to the reforms. Second is the reform agenda of the 
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bureaucracy as a whole. The third section outlines the various agencies revived or created 
to support the development process, among these include: the UIA, UEPB, the PSF and 
the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST).  The fourth section 
is a reflection on the efficacy of the industrial policy framework that was crafted as part 
of the reforms. The fifth section takes specific focus on the technology policy as 
expressed in the creation of UNCST due to the centrality of technological upgrading in 
the industrialisation process. Part six deals with the business peak association, Uganda 
Manufacturers Association, (UMA), related associations and their involvement in the 
formulation and implementation of industrial policy. State-business interaction is an 
important expression of embryonic operationalisation of embedded autonomy. The 
above institutional reforms and mechanisms are fundamental to the successful 
formulation and implementation of a robust industrial policy. 
 
6.1 Brief Background to the Civil Service Reforms 
 
This brief narrative on the background to the civil service reforms is based on an in-
depth interview with a former long serving Permanent Secretary (PS) of the Ministry of 
Public Service, Mr Peter Uchanda1  According to him, the policy environment in the 
immediate independence period in the 1960s was conducive to policy-making. “The 
elected government was easy to consult as it involved civil servants in policy-making 
through the Presidential Economic Commission which met regularly and made concrete 
proposals”. Any economic policy was discussed with the producers through co-
operatives and industrial associations. Until the 1970s,  when the Idi Amin military 
regime ruled by decree, the general political environment encouraged transparency and 
the policy-makers in collaboration with producers could collectively identify bottlenecks 
in policy implementation. For instance, in the 1960s when the government decided to 
establish the Meat Parkers Industry in Soroti town in Eastern Uganda, senior civil 
servants participated in policy-making particularly as they gave professional advice on the 
establishment of government ranches that would supply the meat raw material to the 
industry. 
 
According to Mr. Uchanda, the civil service during the 1960s period was characterised by 
a number of features: First, political interference was very minimal as the bureaucracy 
was relatively autonomous.  Second, the recruitment into civil service was based on merit 
                                                 
1 Interview with Mr. Peter Uchanda, former PS, March, 2004, (See Key Informants, appendix, 1). 
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and were followed with little interference in the work of the Public Service commission. 
The military rule in the1970s saw the gradual erosion of these feature as there arose the 
tendency of ministerial arrogance, growing recruitment of relatives without merit and the 
increasing problem of funding for civil service operations. 
 
The further decline of the civil service performance came during the return of Ugandan 
exiles after the collapse of the Idi Amin regime in 1979. The returnees (former exiles) 
failed to follow the civil service rules. The civil service was recruited and dismissed at 
will, purportedly fighting “Aminism”.2 Little was done to reverse this practice in the early 
1980s. According to Mr. Uchanda, what was needed was a selfless, patriotic bureaucracy 
imbued with a public spirit and hope in the future of the country. It is within this context 
that the reform of the bureaucracy was done in late 1980s.  
 
6.2 The Reform of the Bureaucracy 
 
The reform of the bureaucracy entailed a review of the civil service and creation of 
several institutions with the mandate covering trade or industry. These included the 
bureaucracy (civil service) and related state institutions such, the Ministry of Trade, 
Tourism and Industry (MTTI), Ministry of Finance and Planning and their related 
subsidiaries such as Uganda Investment Authority (UIA), The Uganda Export 
promotion Board (UEPB), The Private Sector Foundation (PSF), which are dealt with in 
the second section. 
 
The Ugandan bureaucracy, like those in most sub-Saharan African countries, had by the 
time of the reforms, become over-extended, ineffective with very little capacity to 
formulate and implement policy. Thus, in the context of the need to implement SAPs, 
the bureaucracy had to be reformed. The main objective of public service reform was to 
increase the efficiency, effectiveness and the capacity to promote economic and social 
development. The idea was to reduce the bureaucracy to a small, well-trained, well-
remunerated and motivated force. The first attempt to reform the bureaucracy was 
through the 1982 Civil Service Restructuring programme under Mr. Martin Orech, the 
then Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Public Service. This did not amount to 
much as it was not implemented.  
 
                                                 
2 Aminism refers to the legacy of the Idi Amin regime which was characterised by arbitrariness, 
absenteeism, corruption and nepotism among other ills. 
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The substantive reform of the public service was conducted under the Public Service 
Review and Reorganisation Commission, (PSRRC) (1989-1990), which noted that:  
 
“…Government has, over the years, over-extended itself, competing with its own 
citizens by straying into areas of economic, industrial and commercial activity 
(which are) otherwise not the domain of government …thereby fostering 
proliferation of activities, overlaps in jurisdictions, duplication of functions and 
poor coordination”.3 
 
Informed by the neo-liberal view of the state, the Review Commission recommended the 
government to shed off some of the existing activities that could be better performed by 
the private sector through liberalisation and simplification of the procedures for taxation 
and licensing so as to remove the frustrations that impeded the private sector (markets), 
both formal and informal in their operations.4  The reform aimed at the trimming or 
outright elimination of inefficient government bureaucracy and agencies.   
 
The Review Commission conducted its work in the context where the World Bank was 
less hostile to the role of the state. The report while still treating the state as a major part 
of the the problem of the economic decline, it at the same time saw the state as a major 
part of the solution but it had to be reformed first. 5 The reform agenda, as per World 
Bank, was focused on three major policy measures: a) advising governments on how to 
reduce the size of the civil service b) devise appropriate salaries policies and c) implant 
better financial management.  
 
The application of these reform measures in Uganda led to some economic recovery, 
averaging a GDP growth of 7.4 per cent from 1994/5 to 1998/9. By mid 1990s, the 
economic logic of adjustment was internalised within the state, especially the increasingly 
powerful Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFPED) whose bureaucrats 
have imbued the neo-liberal views on the state.6 
 
The concern here is not only to examine the extent to which the reformed bureaucracy is 
performing, or re-engineering economic recovery but also the examination of 
                                                 
3 Uganda Government (1990), Report of Public Service Review and Reorganisation Commission, 1989/1990, 
Kampala, Volume 1, p.ii 
4 Ibid, p.iv. 
5 By 1989 the World Bank had slightly retreated from its dogmatic view of the state as the problem and 
now saw it as part of the solution, particularly the need of developing its capability to formulate and 
implement policies. See World Bank (1989), Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 
Washington, D.C 
6 Harrison, Graham (2001), “Post-Conditionality Politics and Administrative Reform: Reflections on the 
Cases of Uganda and Tanzania”, Development and Change, Vol.32, p.663. 
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institutional structures and policy-making processes and their implications for 
implementation of industrial policy.  
 
In reviewing the experience of reforming African civil services, Olowu notes that their 
major preoccupation is purely with technical concerns of reducing the size but failed to 
tackle the more challenging task of building and sustaining the institutional capacities 
within the framework of political, cultural, economic and fiscal changes.7 In Uganda, this 
preoccupation with size was expressed through the retrenchment of civil servants and 
the organisational restructuring of Ministries. Uganda reduced the number of Ministries 
from thirty-eight to twenty-one as a prelude to its own civil service reforms.8   
 
In line with the notion of “roll-back” the state advocated by the World Bank, the PSRRC 
recommended the implementation of both the down-sizing (retrenchment) of the civil 
service and the freeze on recruitment into the civil service effective 1st July 1989.9   The 
objective was to make the bureaucracy more efficient and effective. However, as Primo 
Nyokatre notes: “while retrenchment resulted into reduction in the number of civil 
servants and had a demoralising effect of staff in the short-run due to the stigma 
attached to it, there is no clear-cut evidence to show that it has resulted into easily 
measurable and observable improvement in the productivity of the stayee public officers 
in the long-run”.10 Neither have civil service jobs been cut.  As indicated in the table 
below, the civil service has been expanding annually since the reforms were carried out. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Olowu, Bamidele (1999), “Redesigning African Civil Service Reforms”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 
Vol.37, No.1, (March), p.2. 
8 Ibid, p.2. But much of this reduction has been reversed to the extent that Uganda as at present boasts of 
71 Ministers. In line with the politics of patronage and clientelism, several ministers are attached to a single 
ministry hence maintaining high public administration expenditure.  
9 Public Service Review and Re-organisation Commission (PSRRC) (1989), Op, Cit, pp, ii and p.327. 
10 Nyokatre, Primo, (2002), The Effect of Retrenchment of Staff Performance: The Case of Ministry of Public Service, 
MA  Dissertation  in  Public Administration and Management, (MPAM), Department of Political Science, 
Makerere University, p.iv. 
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Table 6.1:  Civil Service Size after Reforms 
Year Size of civil service Percentage Change 
1999 166,460            - 
2000 178,080           7.0 
2001 191,120           7.3 
2002 204,182           6.8 
2003 223,895           9.7 
2004 240,119           7.2 
2005 243,338           1.3 
Source: Uganda Computer Services 
 
The reform of the bureaucracy was one of the key policy reform measures pursued by 
the government under SAPs. The idea was to reduce the civil service to a small, well-
trained, generously remunerated and motivated workforce. It was hoped that this would 
in turn form the backbone of effective promulgation and implementation of government 
policies. To understand the limits of Uganda’s much acclaimed one has to look at the 
implementation of the reforms.  
 
First, concurrent with the trimming of the civil service, government and “donors” 
embarked on the creation of new and specialised agencies to implement specific aspects 
of structural reforms. These included Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), Uganda 
Investment Authority (UIA), Uganda Coffee Development Authority (UCDA) and 
several others. Just like the retrenched civil service had been recruited on the basis of 
political affiliation, tribal and family considerations, government turned around and used 
the opportunity provided by the creation of these specialised agencies to reward its 
political and tribal clients with jobs. 
 
The recruitment into semi-autonomous agencies meant that the reduction in the civil 
service is far less than the above official figures represent. Recruitment into these 
agencies swelled the size of the state apparatus almost to its original size. Therefore, 
rather than reduction, the key change resulting from the civil service reform was a 
reconfiguration of the civil service from a monolithic institution suspicious of the NRM 
regime to a fragmented set of agencies at the mercy of the ruling elite. 
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Second, the post-reform ex periences indicate that the pre-occupation with numbers 
obstructed the need to address the core of the problem in the bureaucracy. The problem 
of bureaucratic capacity in Uganda goes deeper than the problem of numbers. First, as 
the PSRRC noted, there was and still there is, abysmally low salaries and wages operating 
in the public service as a whole.11 This has had the effect of the inability to attract and 
retain high quality professionals.  
 
Third, several years of political turbulence and upheavals left a legacy of patronage and 
evasion of controls which could not be corrected immediately by retrenchment. The now 
deep-rooted patronage networks have led to a breakdown of the merit recruitment 
system which is critical to the resuscitation of the Ugandan bureaucracy. Patronage 
networks are the key factor in the distortion of the policy framework. 
 
Fourth, the reform agenda for the bureaucracy in Uganda ignored the centrality of the 
politics of patronage. The control over resources through the bureaucracy is perceived as 
a vehicle of wealth accumulation. With the bureaucrats’ control rights over firms’ 
business operation, such as taxation, licensing, public utilities; they have solicited bribes 
to accumulate wealth.12  The preference of patronage networks has resulted in the 
creation of autonomous projects within different ministries destroying the coherence of 
the bureaucracy further.13 
 
Given the increasingly unclear career path in the civil service with insecurity of tenure 
due to the practice of retrenchment and favouritism, the occupation of a bureaucratic 
office has come to be seen as an opportunity to use the prerogatives of the office to 
maximise private interests and accumulate before exit.14   
 
Finally, in general, the reform of the bureaucracy has taken place in the context the 
strategies of liberalisation and privatisation intended to change the way in which the state 
interacts with the firms, shifting from command methods to market mechanism. Little 
attention was paid to possibility of the private (business) interests to penetrate the 
                                                 
11 Public Service Review and Re-organisation Commission, (PSRRC) (1989), Op Cit, p.ii. 
12 Svensson, Jakob (2000), “The Cost of Doing Business: Firms’ Experience with Corruption in Uganda, 
The World Bank: African Region Working Paper Series, No.6, p.11. 
13 Interview with, Mr. Okulo, CN, Assistant Commissioner of Industry and Technology, MTTI, 2 October, 
2007. 
14   Svensson, Jakob ( 2000), “Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much?: Evidence from a Cross-Section of 
Firms in Uganda”, The World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper, 2486, p.2. 
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bureaucracy and use it, especially to evade tax and engage in smuggling, activities which 
have negative implication for industrialisation.15  
 
The efforts, through retrenchment, appropriate salaries and implanting better financial 
management to create an efficient and effective bureaucracy within a state characterised 
by corruption and patronage, have achieved dismal results due to the fact that the efforts 
leave out fundamental institutional mechanisms that impinge on policy-making 
processes. Perhaps this is given a clearer expression in the reform process of the 
ministries concerned with the formulation and implementation of industrial policy.  
 
The second thrust in the reform of the bureaucracy was through ministerial re-
organisation. This followed the recommendation by the PSRRC that the whole 
ministerial line-up should be streamlined and re-organised to bring down the total to 20 
or 21 Ministries altogether as it was hoped this would increase their efficiency.16 The 
concern here is with the three Ministries whose re-organisation immediately impinged on 
the practice of industrial policy. Thus: The MoFPED, MTTI and Public Services 
ministries. 
 
First, administrative reforms at the ministry level led to shift of industrial policy from 
Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry (MTTI) in terms of policy formulation and 
implementation to Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
(MoFPED).  In 1992 government classified its ministries as “core” and “non-core” 
ministries where the “core” have the first call on budgetary resources.17 MTTI is a “non-
core” ministry.18 The Ministry of Planning and Economic Development were merged in 
1992, to create the ‘super ministry’, hence a “core” ministry, principally concerned with 
the tasks of financial management rather than planning and development. The Executive 
Secretary of UMA, and indeed the bureaucrats interviewed, argued that the MTTI must 
                                                 
15 Hellman, Joel et al (2000), “Seize the State, Seize the Day”: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in 
Transition”, The World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper, 2444, p.1 In Uganda’s instances of private 
interest penetration of the state was discussed in the previous chapter (The Politics of Patronage and 
Financing of Industry). 
16 Public Service Review and Re-organisation Commission (PSRRC) (1989), Op, Cit, p.ii. 
17 Kitakule Sarah, (1998), Report on Current Situation, Vision and Strategy for Trade and Industrial Policy Research in 
Uganda, Submitted to Uganda National Council of Science and Technology, December, p.8. 
18 With the Budget cuts in 2002 to finance war in the North of Uganda and patronage networks, MTTI 
neither qualified for increases in budget allocations within the short term expenditure framework nor be 
protected against mid year budget cuts, Mulumba Isaac, “Trade Ministry to lose Budget Allocations”, The 
Monitor, 27 November. 
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be given the necessary support as the core ministry concerned with the implementation 
of industrial policy.19 
 
Increasingly, there has been centralisation of power to MoFPED and to a lesser extent to 
the Ministry of Public Services.20 In particular, MoFPED is the ministry that serves as a 
conduit between the state and donor/creditors. All agreements for project and 
programme funding are signed by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance 
regardless of the target Ministry.21 These reforms have had serious implications for the 
formulation and practice of industrial policy and indeed, other development policies in 
the country.  
 
First, the shift of policy formulation to the MoFPED relates directly to the ascendance of 
monetarism within the state, that is, the overriding concern with budgetary expenditure 
and more effective rising of taxes.22 But another reason for the extended powers to 
MoFPED is that the Ministry is manned by the President Museveni’s bureaucratic allies 
who usually respond without question to the presidential demands for finance to fund 
his patronage networks.  
 
Second, “all donor funded projects – the only significant source of capital spending in 
the system – were managed centrally by the Ministry of Finance and Planning”.23 Rather 
than stress and fund MTTI, Ministry of Finance has received a disproportionate amount 
of training and ‘technical’ assistance, that is, externally funded posts to experts (almost 
always expatriates). Donors have funded research groups within MoFPED with a view to 
improving the technical competence of economic planning and policy making and the 
World Bank and UNDP have introduced incentive schemes into MoFPED to enhance 
the performance and motivation.24  As a result of the Ministry of Finance’s hegemony 
over the policy-making process, due to the control of the donor finances and its relative 
technical competence funded by the donors, it has become arrogant and acts without 
regard to other ministries programmes. For instance in 1999, the original budgets set by 
                                                 
19 Interview with Mr. Hilary Obonyo, UMA, 16 October, 2007. 
20 Harrison, Graham (2001), Op, Cit, pp 663-7.  
21 Ibid, p.664. 
22 Harrison, Graham (2001), “Post-Conditionality Politics and Administrative Reform: Reflections of the 
Cases of Uganda and Tanzania”, Development and Change, Vol.32, p.664-665. 
23 Brett, E A (1994), “Rebuilding Organisational Capacity in Uganda Under the National Resistance 
Movement, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.32 No.1, p.68. 
24 Lamont, Tim (1995), “Economic Planning and Policy Formation in Uganda” in P.Langseth et al (eds), 
Uganda: Landmarks in Building a Nation, Kampala: Fountain Press, p.16-19. 
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the Uganda Ministry of Finance for all ministries, departments and agencies were 
unilaterally reduced mid-term by MoFPED.25 
 
 
Third, the Ministry of Public Service itself, the heart of the bureaucracy, has acted in a 
similar manner. The funding by donors for the reform of the bureaucracy offered the 
ministry the opportunity to project its own agenda on the rest of the line ministries.  The 
training efforts of the Public Service have been compromised by donor prerogatives. 
With donor funding came a new set of regulations concerning the techniques of the 
policy processes. Donors look for and fund corporate plans within ministries, 
departments, and agencies, based on frameworks which set out specific policies, 
executing agencies, timeframes and funding requirements.26 The capacity-building 
mandate of the ministry is further undermined by the presence of expatriate personnel 
on donor-funded contracts which reinforces both the international orthodoxy of reform 
and the new methodologies of donors.  
 
Both the Ministry of Public Service and MoFPED are the focal points of the donor-
driven policy making framework in Uganda. Donors view the finance ministry and the 
public services ministry as the two central executing ministries with which they must deal 
– the former managing money and the latter the personnel 27  Both Ministries, and 
indeed the rest of the economy remain donor funded and driven. 
 
Relegated to the sidelines of economic policy-making and funding, MTTI is hampered in 
carrying out its mandate as far as industrial sector is concerned. The rise of monetarism 
under SAPs has led to the displacement of the needed strategic focus on industrial policy. 
The idea of focused industrial policy has further been scattered by the creation several 
specialised agencies dealing with matters related to industrialisation. Concurrent with the 
trimming of the bureaucracy and the re-organisation of ministries, the government and 
donors embarked on the creation of new and specialised agencies to implement specific 
aspects of SAPs. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Harrison, Graham (2001), Op Cit, p.666. 
26 Ibid, p.670. 
27 Ibid, p.666-7. 
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6.3 Specialised Agencies in Support of the Industrial Sector 
 
The data for this section of the chapter was derived from interviews with key informants 
and officials of specialised agencies UIA, UNCST, MTTI and UMA. The data is 
supplemented with secondary literature and newspaper reports. 
The revival and the creation of specialised agencies was guided by the contemporary pro-
market policy bias whose concern is how to enhance efficiency, productivity and growth 
by expanding the role of the private sector and market forces, mainly with a supportive 
mandate through various institutions.28 This supportive or facilitating bureaucratic role is 
to maintain market conditions, arrange business licences, coordinate contracts, supply 
information to consumers and investors, and arrange finance for investors, among other 
roles. The Uganda government with support of foreign loans and “donor” finance set up 
several agencies to support the process of economic development. These included the 
Uganda Investment Authority (UIA), Uganda Revenue Authority, (URA) and the 
Privatisation Unit (PU). 
 
Second, the other institutions in policy network confront similar obstacles to the 
performance of their mandates as MTTI. The Uganda Export Promotion Board (UEPB), 
established by statute in 1996, traces its history to the Uganda Export Promotion Council 
(UEPC) that was established in 1969. The political instability, especially the one that 
begun in the early 1970s and continued into the mid – 1980s saw the UEPC’s activities 
grind to a halt. UEPC was reactivated in 1986 and restructured in 1996 as UEPB. UEPB 
has mainly focused on understanding markets better, how to penetrate them and what 
their peculiarities are. Unlike its Kenyan counterpart, Uganda government has not 
instituted incentive programmes and created support institutions to encourage the 
development of exports.29  
 
The Private Sector Foundation (PSF) was established in August 1995 financed by 
USAID. The membership of the PSF is business associations and public sector 
organisations, which facilitate the private sector. The foundation advises government on 
                                                 
28 Haque, N., Shamsul, (1998), “The Paradox of Bureaucratic Accountability in Developing Nations under 
a Pro-market State”, International Political Science Review, Vol.49, No.4, p.362-3. 
29 Kenya has set up export development programmes such as : Manufacturing Under Bond (MUB), where 
bonded premises for manufacturing and export are operated under customs supervision, duty and VAT 
exemption on imported plant, machinery, equipment, raw materials, Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and 
the Export Promotions Programmes Office (EPPO), which administers Duty and VAT waiver on 
imported raw materials by manufacturers producing for export. 
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policy issues affecting private sector development. PSF promotes and seeks to 
institutionalise policy dialogue between government and the private sector in order to 
reduce policy uncertainty and build confidence with both domestic and foreign investors.  
 
The most important institution for our case is the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA). 
The in-depth interviews with two of its officials brought out the thinking behind its 
operations.30 The interviews were focused on five elements of its mandate: 1) capacity to 
handle investments, 2) investment incentives, 3) job creation, 4) technology transfer and 
5) re-investment. 
 
Both respondents were of the view that UIA has capacity to attract investment and has a 
competent bureaucracy. The administrative capacity is underpinned by the way the 
recruitment of staff is carried out. The positions are always advertised, based on merit 
and the recruited staffs are often sent for further training in the best investment 
practices. While this may be the case, there seems to be some biases in recruitment as the 
composition of the recruited staff seem to be regionally, tribally inclined contradicting 
the claim of being based on merit and competence. 
 
Second, asked about the basis on which investment incentives are given, Mr. K 
Kyoratungye argued that “World over incentives are given to reduce costs of start-up 
and encourage first time investors”. While this may be correct, there has been a tendency 
for foreign investors to demand for subsidies at the initial investment from government 
mainly through lobbying President Museveni as was the case in Tri-Star Apparels Ltd 
that we discuss in detail in chapter seven. 
 
Third, one of the claims of FDI is that of job creation in a given economy. Both 
respondents agreed that UIA has not been able to monitor and verify whether the 
investors created jobs as is usually claimed in their investment proposals.  Apart from not 
bothering to question the quality of jobs created, Mr. Kyoratungye was of the view that, 
“There is no need to flow-up whether the proposed job creation is implemented or not. 
Government or UIA cannot determine the schedule for investors. Companies find it 
difficult to maintain expatriates so in the end they employ locals”. This attitude by 
bureaucrats who are tasked with policy implementation defeats the objective of FDI. As 
policy implementers, the bureaucrats at UIA must ensure the implementation of the FDI 
                                                 
30 Interviews with Mr. Mukasa Issa, Director of Investment Promotion Division and Mr. Kyoratungye 
Karemente, Director, Strategic & Management Information System Division 15 October, 2007. 
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claims if they are to be beneficial and enhance capacity of industrial sector in particular 
and the national economy in general.   
 
Fourth, technology transfer is supposed to be one of the key benefits from FDI. Yet the 
respondents at UIA confirmed that ensuring technological transfer is not made a central 
demand on the investors at the time of application for the investment licence. According 
to Mr. Mukasa, “There is no need to demand for technology transfer agreements or 
registration as Uganda’s economy is fully liberalised”. This is perhaps the weakest part of 
UIA. Technology transfer is critical for industrialisation, particularly when it takes the 
form of licensing as opposed to mere importation of machinery. UIA should be at the 
forefront at implementing policy on technology transfer. Technology transfer, globally, 
has never been automatic. It has always been induced in those economies where it has 
been successful through prodding the FDI and instituting learning mechanisms. 
 
Fifth, to enhance industrial capacity, UIA would be expected to put stress on re-
investment of the proceeds from production and exports by the investors. Both officials  
at UIA noted that there are no conditions set on re-investment in Uganda’s economy. 
Mr. Kyoratungye argued that “re-investment is a question of demand and supply: What is 
required is establishment of a friendly environment where there is reliable power supply, 
road networks, serviced land” and re-investment shall occur. There are several concerns 
about the efficacy of such an institutional framework and attitudes to bring about 
sustained investment, particularly in industry. From the above, several issues can be 
noted. 
 
First, the proliferation of institutions has not necessarily led to efficient policy 
formulation and implementation. Both UEPB and PSF suffer from failure to have sector 
focus. While PSF is well funded, UEPB budget, which falls under MTTI, is low and its 
cash budget regime is often suddenly cut. This is a major handicap to implementation of 
its mandate.31  
 
Second, their creation of new agencies resulted in further bloating of the public service as 
indicated in table above (p.204). The down side of this expansion was that meritocracy in 
recruitment into these agencies, as has become of the central public service, was thrown 
to winds. These specialised agencies were turned into arenas for patronage by dispensing 
                                                 
31 Kitakule, S, (1998), Report on the Current Situation, Vision and Strategy…. pp11-20. 
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state jobs to the clients of the political class. The public servants were recruited on the 
basis of political affiliation, tribal, kinship and family considerations rather than on 
professional merit and competence. Yet competence is a critical element in the 
formulation and implementation of policy. Finally, while there have been lots of 
investments in terms of quantity, the issue of quality and systematic sectoral focus has 
been left out. 
 
6.4 Industrial Policy Institutional Framework 
 
The primary data for this section is derived from an official of MTTI32 and the Minister 
of State for Industry and Technology speech at the National Industrial Policy 
Stakeholders Forum.33 
 
Since 1994 there have been attempts to construct a coherent industrial policy through 
several documents.34 These documents outlined Uganda’s industrial policy. They were 
typical market-oriented policy statements that located Uganda’s industrialisation process 
within free markets and export orientation. These policy statements did not take into 
consideration the moment and the context within which Uganda had to industrialise. The 
policy framework remained general. There was no attempt to identify, selectively, 
strategic sectors that would create, in the words of Hirschman, a “multi-dimensional 
conspiracy” – the generation of dynamic economic activities in other sectors. Alexander 
Gerschenkron suggested that the moment of industrialisation determines which 
industries must serve as the country’s engine of growth and the nature of that growth in 
turn determines the social, technical, financial resources and institutional foundation 
structures that must be mobilised for industrialisation to be successful.35 
 
The basic motivation for current national industrial policy is the drive for it to become a 
strong agent in achieving the national vision and aspiration to sustained structural 
economic transformation.36  In an interview with the Assistant commissioner (MTTI),37 
                                                 
32 Mr. Okulo Cankwo, Assistant Commissioner, Department of Industry & Technology, (MTTI) 
33 Prof. Ephraim Kamuntu (2007) “Industrialisation: The Viable and Proven Route to Economic 
Transformation and Prosperity for all”, Imperial Hotel Kampala, 20th – 21st September.  
34 Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry (MTTI) and Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (1994), Uganda: 
Industrialisation Policy and Framework, 1994-1999, Kampala, November, MTTI (1999), Industrialisation 
Policy and Framework, 1998-2002, Kampala and MTTI (2003), Strategic Framework for Industrialisation 
in Uganda, Kampala, January. 
35 Gerschenkron, Alexander (1962), Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
36 Prof. E. Kamuntu (2007), Op cit. p.6. 
37 Mr. Okulo Cankwo, 2nd October, 2007. 
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he stated that the focus of the industrial policy shall aim at promoting export oriented 
industries as opposed to import substitution industries, the major reason being the 
“failure” of the ISI strategy. The change in industrial policy focus has been influenced by 
three (3) events overtime: i) globalisation ii) liberalisation and iii) politics.  
 
First, there is a realisation that for industries to be competitive, Uganda’s industry must 
be knowledge-based. The stress of the new industrial policy is on technological 
acquisition. The government is aware of the fact that for industrialisation to occur there 
must be stress on technological absorption capacity. Accordingly, the government has to 
organise an enabling environment within a deliberate policy framework to take into 
account of what is happening globally. 
 
Second, following the thinking of SAPs, for industries to be competitive, they have to be 
liberalised. Industrial policy initiative in its current form is caught between liberalisation 
and state intervention to support industry. The policy recognises the need for state 
involvement in certain sectors and instances. Liberalisation should not taken as an end in 
itself. 
 
Third, the national policy recognises the fact that industrialisation is a political process. 
Despite the policy of liberalisation, the thinking the Ministry of Industry is that private 
interests, both big and small industries, have to be supported particularly in the financing 
of industry. In this regard, the proposal during the Forum on industrial policy was that 
Uganda Development Bank (UDB) and UDC should be revived and linked to the 
industrial sector. Accordingly under the new policy regime, “There will be strong support 
for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as a primary vehicle for fostering 
entrepreneurial capabilities, innovation and competitiveness and for linkage and 
interaction with big industries as part of Uganda’s industrial sector”38  
 
Over the years, the weakness of the industrial policy regime has been due to a number of 
factors, particularly the way liberalisation was carried out. More specifically, the 
disbandment of UDC in 1993, which had deviated from its original objective, instead of 
an industrial promotion agency had been turned into a holding company, implied the 
removal of institutional mechanism that was an embodiment of entrepreneurial vision 
and responsible for the relatively organised implementation of Uganda’s industrial policy 
                                                 
38 Prof. Kamuntu, E, Op cit, p.13. 
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over the years. The result has been the emergency of fragmented bureaus in form of 
Ministry of Finance and Planning and Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) engaged in 
their own tuft wars with near eclipse of the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Industry 
without coherence and coordinated approach to industrialisation.  
 
The Investment Code (1991) and as amended in 1997, is too general to promote a 
competitive industrial sector. It has no inbuilt mechanisms or indicators to monitor 
trends in some key determinants of competitiveness, such as the introduction of 
advanced technology, or the upgrading of human skills. The investment code, even as 
amended, lacks focus on industrial development. As a result, there is no agency that can 
provide entrepreneurial vision and institutional mechanisms to act as agents of 
transformation and implantation of an industrial sector. The above agencies, could not 
implement the policies competently. This explains the shoddy implementation, 
inefficiency, incoherence and corruption that are seen in the coordination of investments, 
collecting of taxes and privatisation process. The implementation of the proposed 
industrial policy regime should be able to overcome the above past weaknesses. The next 
section examines the efforts to acquire technology for industrialisation under SAPs in the 
country. 
 
6.5 Institutions for Technology Policy (UIRI & UNCST) 
 
This section of the chapter is based on in-depth interviews with technocrats at the two 
institutions mandated with technology policy and research and development (R&D) 
namely: Uganda National Council and Science and Technology (UNCST) and Uganda 
Industrial Research Institute (UIRI). The interviews were based on specific questions 
regarding their operations, collaboration, challenges, interactions with private sector 
firms, interactions with UMA and the technocrats’ views on the impact of liberalisation 
on technology policy.39 
 
Broadly, technology policy may be defined as systematically stimulating technical 
progress, that is, enhancing the skills, (know-how and know-why), and procedures 
applied in the production of goods and services.40 The concept of technology includes 
technical knowledge (knowledge about machines and production processes) as well as 
                                                 
39 UNCST & UIRI  (See interview outline appendix  No.3). 
40 Ahrens, Joachim, (2002), “Governance and the Implementation of Technology Policy in Less Developed 
Countries”. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Vol.11 (4-5), p.445. 
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institutional arrangement and skills, which are necessary to efficiently transform inputs 
into outputs.41  The success of overall strategy of industrialisation of any country, to a 
greater extent, depends on the chosen technology strategy.  Technological capabilities are 
at the centre of industrialisation processes. The development of capabilities needs the 
entrepreneurial state to intervene and promote their deepening because market forces or 
FDI as we have seen above, do not always induce intensive technological changes that 
are warranted.42 The availability of technical and engineering skills are among the key 
requirements for industrial upgrading and the development of competitive enterprises. 
These skills are produced through the national innovation system.43 The late 
industrialisation paradigm presupposes that the development of technological capabilities 
in late industrialisers is through learning.44  Learning can best take place in particular 
institutional configuration, a national innovation system. The policy for the development 
of technology, therefore, is critical for the industrialisation process. The experience of 
countries that have industrialised, there have been two major components of technology 
policy: import of technology and promotion of in-house R&D. 
 
The major thrust of Uganda’s technology policy has been to entirely import the necessary 
technology from the developed countries since the inception of its industrialisation 
process. The tendency has been to import capital through FDI throughout the post-
colonial period.  This approach to technology acquisition continued under SAPs with its 
policy prescriptions of free market-orientation. The Washington consensus which informs 
SAPs, is silent on technology let alone industrial policy and postulates a non-
interventionist, minimal role of the state, limited to macro-economic stabilisation, 
liberalisation and getting prices right.45 For developing countries, technological transfer 
can only occur if they have acquired sufficient technological capabilities and institutional 
capacities to identify suitable technologies and to adapt, absorb, and improve the 
technologies imported from abroad.46   
                                                 
41 Ibid p.443. 
42 Lall, Sanjaya, (1992), “Technological Capability and Industrialisation” World Development, Vol.20, No.2, 
p.165. 
43 Nelson, Richard and Rosenberg, Nathan (1993), “Technical Innovation and National Systems” In 
Nelson Richard (ed) National Innovation System: A Comparative Analysis, New York & Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p.5. 
44 Amsden, Alice (1989), Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
45 Williamson, John (1990), “What Washington Means by Policy Reform”, in Latin American Adjustment, 
How Much has Happened? Williamson J., (ed), Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. 
46 Ahrens, Joachim (2002), “Governance and the Implementation of Technology Policy in Less Developed 
Countries” Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Vol.11 (4-5), P.442. 
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Technological acquisition and policy in Uganda is examined at three levels: 1) national 
science and technology policy efforts at endogenous technological change. 2) transfer of 
technology from developed countries and the forms it takes. 3) the linkages of both 
endogenous technological change and technology transfer with the local industrial sector. 
Before the late 1980s, Uganda did not have any clear policy in regard to technology 
transfer, adoption, acquisition or assimilation.47 As mentioned in all budgets of the 
period, “aid” was mainly utilised for the procurement of a wide range of equipment, 
spare parts and raw materials for the various projects. It was not until in 1986 that a 
Department of Industry and Technology in the Ministry of Industry was established and 
the pledge that the government would develop an indigenous scientific capability 
intended to adapt or develop appropriate technology for the development of industry 
and other sectors.48 The institutional expression of these efforts was the reform of the 
Uganda National Research Council (UNRC) and the creation of the Uganda National 
Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) (1990), Uganda Investment Authority 
(UIA), (1991) and Uganda Industrial Research Institute (UIRI).  
 
 
6.5.1 Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) 
 
The national science and technology system is coordinated by UNCST. In 1990, the 
government enacted a statute for the establishment of UNCST.49 Among the functions 
of UNCST is to advise government on and co-ordinate the formulation of an explicit 
national policy on all fields of science and technology and also assist in the promotion 
and development of indigenous technology. Several years later, there was no explicit 
national science and technology policy, and therefore no recognised guidelines on 
technology transfer, especially through FDI.50 This is because UNCST has not pursued it 
                                                 
47 Barya, J, John (1995), Industrialisation and Technology Acquisition in Uganda: An Analysis of the Policy, Legal and 
Institutional Framework with Three Cases Studies, A Report Submitted to the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) Ontario, Canada and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, USA.  
48 Government of Uganda (1986), The Background to the Budget, 1986-87, Entebbe: Government Printers, 
p.47. 
49 Government of Uganda (1990), Uganda National Council for Science and Technology, Statute No.1, Entebbe. 
50 Kabasa, Paul (2000), Private Investment and Technology Transfer in Uganda between 1991 and 1997, A 
dissertation submitted as partial fulfilment of a degree in MA (Economic Policy and Planning) of Makerere 
University, pp. 8-9. 
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mandate purposively. It has instead become a focal point of no less than eight 
International Projects about which the scientific community knows hardly anything.51   
   
In an interview with the Assistant Executive Secretary of UNCST,52  contrary to the 
above representations, UNCST has conducted several research projects to guide it in the 
formulation and implementation of Uganda’s technology policy. These include : i) Level 
of endogenous Technological Capability of Agro-based  industries in Uganda (1999), ii) 
Study on Management Requirements for the Integration of Science and Technology in 
the Private Sector (2000) and  Pilot Survey on Science and Technology Innovations for 
Products from Traditional Research Institutions and Industries (2004-5)53 among others. 
The bureaucrats contend that UNCST conducted the research with particular resource 
constraints which has supported policy formulation. “The problem is the low level of 
public understanding of the mandate of UNCST. The role of UNCST is not to carry out 
but to coordinate research”54. While this may be the case, technology innovation and 
policy dynamism demands more than the above kind of research. It entails putting into 
action a process of access to new technologies, mastering them and adapting them to 
local conditions, which the above studies are incapable of engineering. 
 
The Assistant Executive Secretary was  supportive of the current policy that emphasises 
importation of technology. This is seen as the most practical and faster route of acquiring 
technology as it is costly to develop technology internally. While this is the realistic 
approach, it may not enhance Uganda’s technological capacity in the long-run. For 
sustainable transfer of technology to Uganda’s industrial sector, there is need for 
dynamism in institutional arrangement for accessing, mastering, improving upon them 
and adapting to local conditions.   
 
The Assistant Executive Secretary pointed out one major weakness is lack of policy 
“networking”. The two institutions concerned with technology policy do not operate as 
one or as complementary to each other. This is identified as one of the shortcomings of 
technology policy as they operate as rivals rather than complementary bodies. UNCST is 
                                                 
51 Tindimubona, Alex (2000), National Policy Dialogue on Research and Technology Development in Uganda: An 
Assessment, A report submitted to the European Commission, DG Development, European Centre for 
Development Policy Management, (ECDPM), Maastricht, p.14. 
52  Interview with  Mr. I.N, Barugahara, 17.8.2007. 
53  UNCST (1999) Level of Endogenous Technological Capability of Agro-Based Industries in Uganda, Kampala  and 
UNCST (2000), A Report on the Study on Management Requirements for the Intergration of Science and Technology in 
the Private Sector, Kampala. 
54 Interview with Mr. I.N, Barugahara. 19.8.2007. 
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affiliated to the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development MFPD and 
UIRI is attached to the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MTTI). While UNCST 
formulates S&T and innovation policy and UIRI focuses on development of industrial 
research, the Innovation Fund which is important to both is under MTTI. These 
uncoordinated operations limit the effectiveness of both technology policy institutions.  
 
The inertia in technology policy is compounded by low levels of the funding of Science 
and Technology S&T by government. While “S&T as a percentage of government 
expenditure increased from 3.3% in 2004/05 to 3.7% in 2005/06”55, it remains minimal 
as the larger burden of funding national technological advance is left largely in the hands 
of “donors” as indicated in the table below.  
 
Table 6.2 : STI Sector Funding for FY 2005/2006 
 
Item  Recurrent Capital Total Donor 
Contribution 
To GOU 
Budget 
Breakdown 
of “Donor” 
Funding to 
S&T 
R&D56 5,423,710 29,107,342 34,531,052 
 (25%) 
19,630,248 
(56.8%) 
52.7% 
STET57 10,053,201 16,179,500 26,232,701 
(19%) 
11,497,500 
(43.8%) 
30.8% 
STS58 35,430,876 41,717,500 77,148,376 
(56%) 
6,132,000 
(7.9%) 
16.5% 
S&T 
TOTAL 
50,907,787 
                      
 87,004,342                   137, 912,129 
(100.0%) 
37,259,748 
(27%) 
100.0% 
 
R&D as % of GDP 0.3% 
R&D as % of Government 
Expenditure 
0.9% 
S&T as % of GDP 1.2% 
S&T as % of Government 
Expenditure 
3.7% 
 
Source: MFPED: Background to the Budget, 2005/06 and UNCST 200759 
 
The national technological capacity that would act as a catalyst in industrial 
transformation can not be sustained while depending on “donations”.  This is because 
                                                 
55 Government of Uganda (2007), National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy, May, Kampala, p.7. 
56 Research and Development. 
57 Scientific and Technical Education Training. 
58 Scientific and Technical Services. 
59 Government of Uganda, National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy, Draft,  May 2007. 
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the question of national priorities cannot be addressed by “donors”. Secondly; the 
linkage between UNCST and the firms is hardly stressed. 
 
Most profound is the technocrat’s views on the impact of liberalisation on technology 
policy. According to him, “when the economy is open the country benefits as the 
population gets access to better quality goods, prices reductions and knowledge 
transfer.”60 While this may be true, technology transfer is never automatic. There must be 
concrete institutional arrangement to facilitate that transfer. The concern with opening of 
the technology transfer market is that the private sector is selective based on profits with 
little concern for the national technological capacity. The private sector profit motive 
overshadows industrial development concerns. Liberalisation in the absence of focused 
institutional arrangement for technology acquisition implies that there is no home grown 
mechanisms and policy initiative to enable the acquisition of technological knowledge 
through learning from the more advanced nations. Under the influence of neo-liberal 
thinking, the bureaucrats at UNCST as those in UIA have not crafted mechanisms 
through which technology transfer could occur. Next we look at UIRI. 
 
 
 
6.5.2 Uganda Industrial Research Institute (UIRI) 
 
UIRI is the other organisation in technology transfer network. UIRI’s major objectives 
include developing appropriate technology so as to create an efficient and competitive 
industrial sector, to adapt foreign technologies that suit the local conditions and to create 
technological information centre for industrialists.61  
 
Started several years ago as part of the East African Industrial Research Organisation, 
(EAIRO), it has grown very slowly in the last 20 years. Operating under the Ministry 
Tourism, Trade and Industry (MTTI) and with the technical and financial support from 
the Chinese government, its initial mandate was to cover two specific sectors: food 
technology and ceramics. Its performance at the development of technology has been 
dismal. The most positive element is the attempt to build-up local analytical laboratory 
capacity instead of sending samples to European laboratories as has been the custom.62 
 
                                                 
60 Interview with Mr. I N, Barugahara. 
61 The New Vision (2001), “UIRI Seeks Appropriate Technology” Tuesday, 20 November, p.30. 
62 Tindimubona, Alex (2000), National Policy Dialogue, p.16. 
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In an interview, the new Executive Director of UIRI acknowledged the dismal 
performance of the organisation in its contribution to Uganda’s economy in general.63  
He rejected the impressive statistics and glossy reports about Uganda’s achievements and 
noted that “Uganda exports are mostly raw materials as opposed to finished or value 
added products” His solution to dependence on foreign expatriates is to develop internal 
capacities to ensure technological transfer.  There is a promise under the new leadership 
of moving beyond “cut and paste” experiences of other countries. He stressed that “the 
strategies that are formulated and implemented must be based on our circumstances” 
But first the management shall have to deal with organisational weaknesses and limited 
resources. 
 
As noted by one researcher earlier, both research bodies suffer from organisational 
weaknesses. UIRI leadership is weak and dominated by foreign experts from China, the 
UNIDO and FAO. UNCST on the other hand occupies a very low position in the 
powerful Ministry of Finance and Planning, as the Ministry appears not to view R&D as 
a priority.64 As a result both UNCST and UIRI have been ineffective in fostering R&D 
and hence technology transfer.  
 
The transfer of technology to Uganda remains outdated as it is through the mechanism 
of importation of technology or embedded in FDI. The technological dependence on 
FDI is a result of the mental subordination that arises from a strong sense of inferiority 
and incapacity towards science and technology. The central tendency amongst successful 
late industrialisers has shifted from the absorption of foreign technology through 
copying and self-teaching to the adoption of foreign technology through investing in 
foreign licences and technical assistance.65  Yet, the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) 
has made little efforts for deliberate, positive and conscious attempt to have the 
acquisition of technology as a major component of investments from abroad or by 
Ugandans. Since 1991 when licensing of investments under the Code commenced, by 
1994 there had been only one agreement registered for the transfer of technology.66  
 
                                                 
63 Interview with Dr.Charles Kwesiga, 18. August, 2007. 
64 Tindimubona, Alex (2000), “National Policy Dialogue”, p.25. 
65 Amsden, Alice, (1989), Asia’s Next Giant… p.20. 
66 Barya, John Jean, (1995), Industrialisation and Technology Acquisition in Uganda: Analysis of the Policy, Legal and 
Institutional Framework with Three Case Studies, Submitted to the International Development Research Centre 
(IDRC) Ontario, Canada  & the Carnegie Corporation of New York, pp29-31.    
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FDI as a means of technology transfer presents a number of limitations. The initial FDI 
transfer of technology to Uganda took the form of “packaged transfer or packaged 
licensing” where technology was acquired through a single transaction, mainly through 
the UDC. It is a form of tied purchase. This means an obligation either expressly or 
impliedly imposed upon Uganda to purchase the technology, know-how and other 
technological equipments from a specified monopoly.67  UDC until it abolition in early 
1990s, did not take the initiative to invest in light industries which would manufacture 
machines or machine parts in Uganda. This created an economy without forward and 
backward linkages due to failure to stimulate indigenous technical knowledge and 
consumption of local raw materials.68 An example of such technology transfer is the 
Mukwano Industries, Kampala. Established in the mid 1980s, the industries rely on 
imported, packaged technology, which gives responsibility regarding installation, 
provision of expertise, repairing, importing raw materials to technology supplier to the 
expatriates in the industry. By 1992, it had 42 expatriates, all Asians. The expatriates man 
all the key mechanical areas of the industry. They do the repairing, they compile and 
analyse data regarding performance, recommend what machines and spare parts to buy. 
Overall, the technology cannot be unpackaged due to technological lock-ins.69  
 
A more recent study notes that despite the steady inflow of foreign capital, (FDI), since 
the early 1990s, an extremely weak infrastructure has set limits on the depth of its 
participation in deepening technological capacities in Uganda.70 Hence, the persistence of 
this form of technology transfer based on importation is informed by the path dependent 
nature of technological processes that need to be “un-locked” to achieve technological 
progress in the country. The necessity of un-locking technological processes is 
compounded by the dearth of basic and high technology infrastructure that would 
enhance learning, innovation and efficiency of local industries. As a result of the stress 
on technology importation, there is little linkage of foreign acquired technologies to the 
local industry sector. This would best be built through a national innovation system. 
                                                 
67 Munulo, J (1987), A Critique of Imported Technology and Development in Uganda in Conjunction with Law and 
Development, A paper submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of 
Bachelor of Laws of Makerere University, p.62. 
68 Makeera, Salim (1992), Technology Transfer and its Impact in the Industrial Development of Uganda, A dissertation 
submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Bachelor of Laws of 
Makerere University, p.100. 
69 Makeera, Salim (1992), Technology Transfer…pp. 142-168. 
70 Rasiah, Rajah and Tamale, Henry (2004), “Productivity, Exports, Skills and Technological Capabilities: A 
study of Foreign and Local Manufacturing Firms in Uganda”, Institute for New Technologies (INTECH), 
Discussion Paper Series, p.29-30. 
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The Uganda science and technology system is comprised of the above institutions and 
several educational and research institutes. However, as UNCTAD report observes, the 
system is poorly adapted to meeting the needs of local industry. Most critical is lack of 
coordination between the government, technology support institutions and the private 
sector.71 During the period of 1991-1997, for instance, there were no reported cases by 
UNCST of collaboration of foreign investors in research and development (R&D) with 
indigenous R&D institutions, with the only research done being market surveys of 
consumption of products of manufacturing enterprises with the aim of improving the 
marketing of their products.72   
 
According to the bureaucrats who were interviewed at UNCST and UIRI, the causes of 
Uganda’s poor performance in science and technology include: i) inadequate financial 
support, ii) little appreciation of science and technology , iii) limit of technology transfer 
due to inappropriate imported technology and uncoordinated technology development 
and application.73 The major problem, however, is that research and development remain 
unprioritised in national strategies with minimum efforts to absorb, innovatively, the 
technology from foreign sources and adapt them to local conditions.    
 
Implementing technology policy does not only require clear objectives and credible 
commitment on part of the government but, equally important, a competent and 
meritocratic bureaucracy that is closely related to the business sector but yet can act 
sufficiently independently of particularistic pressures. Next we examine the 
manufacturers association and its contribution to industrial policy formulation and 
implementation. Secondly, we assess the extent to which the association moves beyond 
the alleged rent-seeking inclinations of business associations in their operations. 
 
6.6 Industrialists and the Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA)  
 
The primary data for this section of the chapter was derived from in-depth interview 
with the Executive Director, UMA, documents, published literature and newspaper 
reports. The focus of the interviews was on a number of themes: i) the policy 
environment. ii) national industrial policy, iii) operations of UMA, iv) views on financing 
                                                 
71 UNCTAD (2000), Invest Policy Review of Uganda, Geneva, p.10. 
72 Kabasa, Paul (2000), Private Investment and Technology Transfer in Uganda, p.83. 
73 Interviews with UNCST and UIRI officials above. 
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industry, v) private-public interactions, vi) technology policy, vii) preferential treatment 
of foreign investors, viii) relations between Uganda Asian industrialists and local 
industrialists and ix) way forward for Uganda’s industrialisation. (See interview schedules, 
appendices No.6 and 7).  
 
The most significant private sector institution in the industrial policy network is UMA, 
although there are theoretical misgivings of business associations that view them as rent-
seeking special interest groups. According to Olson, “interest groups, like business 
associations, always pursued distributive objectives, seeking unproductive rents rather 
than the common or public interest”. 74 More recently, his view of associations has grown 
dimmer arguing that interest groups such as business associations typically had “a very 
narrow, rather than encompassing interest. It therefore faces incentives that are much 
more detrimental to society than those facing the secure stationary bandit, often also 
worse than those that face the gang with a protection racket, and not much better for 
society than those facing the individual”.75  This view assumes the worst about business 
associations, which may not be accurate.  
 
On a positive note, Doner and Schneider, categorise the business association 
contributions in terms of positive responses to state failures and market failures.  Thus: 
“The “market-supporting” activities of associations are instances where associations push 
under-performing states to provide: property rights, incorrupt administration and 
infrastructure. The “market-complementing” activities of associations are functions that 
that overcome market failures of various sorts including imperfect and costly 
information, low investment in training, and lack of coordination in investment in 
upgrading”. 76 
  
It is within this framework that the contribution of UMA to the development of 
Uganda’s industrial sector is analysed. UMA represents the majority of firms in Uganda’s 
manufacturing sector. UMA has a membership of more than 700 firms categorised into 
small, medium and large scale industries. The Small Scale industries are considered for 
                                                 
74 Olson, Mancur, (1982), The Rise and Decline of Nations, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
75 Olson, Mancur, (1997), “The New Institutional Economics”, in Institutions and Economic Development, 
edited by Christopher Clague, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, p.46. 
76 Doner F, Richard and Schneider, Ben Ross (2000), “Business Associations and Economic Development: 
Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others”, Business and Politics, Vol.2, No.3, p.262. 
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employees 10-24, Medium scale, up to 50 employees and large scale for employees above 
50.77  
 
UMA was established in the early 1960s primarily as a forum to represent the dominant 
Asian manufacturing interests then but was defunct for much of the 1970s and 1980s 
because of mass expulsion of Asians in 1972 and the subsequent contraction and decline 
of the indigenous manufacturing sector as a result of political and economic turmoil that 
followed. It was revived in 1988.78 UMA is run by a small team of qualified staff headed 
by an Executive Secretary, who reports to Executive Director and by year 2000 had over 
700 member firms, both manufacturing and trading. Its objectives are to promote, 
protect and coordinate the interests of industrialists in Uganda, to act as a watchdog and 
effective mouthpiece for its members and advise government on key policies affecting 
industry.79 
 
In an interview, the Executive Director reiterated the motive of the revival of the 
association. Thus:  
“Given the collapse of the manufacturing sector as a result of the expulsion of 
Asian entrepreneurs in the 1970s, the sector had to be revived and had to survive. 
The constraints that the industrial sector confronted could not be overcome by 
individual firms. The problems of price, availability and quality could best be 
solved collectively, hence the formation of UMA”.80  
 
UMA has evolved into a key institution in representing the interest of the private sector, 
in general and the industrial class in particular. Prior to becoming a key institution, in its 
formative years UMA built its capacity with the support of the donor community, which 
include, UNIDO, USAID and Canadian Business Association81 that assisted in the 
development of data collection and policy analysis. The support/information given has 
helped UMA to prepare and argue for its positions and demands to government.82 By the 
year 2000, UMA had evolved into an association of over 700 member firms, not 
necessarily manufacturing firms. Through various market-supporting and market-
                                                 
77 UMA (2007), The Status and Performance of Uganda’s Manufacturing Sector in 2006, Final Report, UMA 
Business Unit, June,  p.113. 
78 Harvey, Charles and Robinson, Mark (1994), The Design of Economic Reforms in the Context of Political 
Liberalisation: Uganda a Country Study, p.20. 
79 Barya, J, John, (2001), “Foreign Political Aid, Democratisation and Civil Society in Uganda: A study of 
NOTU and UMA, 1990-2001”, Seminar, paper Centre for Basic Research, (CBR), 8 March, p.27. 
80 Interview with Executive Director, (UMA), Mr. Hilary Obonyo, 16 October 2007. 
81 The Monitor (1998), “UMA Ten Years of Success” 21 April, p.15. 
82 Barya, J.John, (2001), “Foreign Political Aid….”, p.37. 
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complementing activities, UMA has endeavoured to fulfil its mandate of advancing the 
Ugandan industrialists’ interests.  
 
Over the years, it has developed a strong partnership with government in policy 
designing through dialogue. It has forged partnership with government and donor 
community in which key economic issues affecting the manufacturing sector and the 
whole economy are discussed and policy measures agreed.83 In 1991, it spearheaded the 
setting up of the Presidential Forum, which includes all key stakeholders in policy-
making and the private sector. A focal point for the work of the Policy Unit was the 
October 1992 National Forum on Strategic Management which provided for formal 
opportunity for government officials to establish a working relationship with the private 
sector with a view to identifying and implementing actions to promote private 
investments and export growth. Since then, UMA routinely sends copies of its policy 
papers to the president, permanent secretary and senior officials of MFPED, which 
increases the credence of its interventions.84   
 
According to the Executive Director, the major success of UMA over the last 20 years is 
that it is now recognised, accepted and respected by government and “development 
partners” as the voice of the majority of Uganda’s manufacturing sector. No major 
economic policy is implemented without consulting UMA.85  
 
While the above reports and writings claim strong partnership and harmonious dialogue 
between UMA and the state, UMA confronts two major obstacles in its operations. First, 
there is a tendency for the government to involve UMA in policy-making “through 
invitation”. “If a policy is to be owned, the various interest groups must be involved 
from the initiation, not simply invited”.  
 
Second, there remains hostility towards the private sector by the civil servants. The  
UMA Executive Director further observed that: 
“The main challenge of UMA has been getting the public to appreciate that the 
private sector can make a contribution to development. There is need to change the 
mind-set of the civil service. The expanded role of the private sector in the 
development process involves loss of sovereignty and powers in areas which were 
                                                 
83 The Monitor (1998), “UMA Contribution to National Development”, 21 April, 17. 
84 Harvey, Charles and Robinson M., (1994), The Design of Economic Reforms… p.21. 
85
 Interview with Mr. Hilary Obonyo, 16 October, 2007. 
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controlled by the public sector. The civil service is not willing to change its 
attitude”86 
 
The tension between the bureaucracy and the private sector is bound to result in 
prolonged ineffectiveness in the implementation of industrial policy.  While not being 
submissive to the demands from the private sector, what is needed is a particular 
interaction between the state and entrepreneurs that enables the state to have genuine 
capacity to formulate long-term goals. 
 
UMA uses advocacy, consultation and lobbying in partnership with government through 
constant dialogue, representation on policy-making bodies and since 1992-97 through the 
National Forum to advance manufacturers interests.87 The private sector through UMA 
participates in the budget process, which has been well received by government. UMA 
has on a number of occasions participated in the speed and sequencing of trade reform 
programme through its representation on various government bodies as it makes 
proposals on issues of budget and taxation. Academic researchers, local consultants have 
in addition taken part in the policy reform process through UMA.88 For instance, UMA 
proposals to government to institute a transparent government procurement policy were 
granted. Government instituted a policy of 20% price advantage to local products, 
conforming also to COMESA rules of origin to be enforced for all government 
procurement contracts. This encouraged local manufacturers to compete relatively fairly 
with their overseas counterparts.89 This was seen as supporting local industry. 
 
In the interview, the Executive Director argued that UMA proposals are not aimed at 
blanket protectionism of the manufacturing sector. The Director noted that:  
“UMA is not an organisation that is waiting for the distribution of unproductive 
rents. For any manufacturer to be protected, one best protection is to be 
competitive in three areas: quality, price and quantity. To ensure competitiveness, 
UMA has a Standards Committee to assist members to produce quality products at 
competitive rates”.90 
 
This positive and competitive attitude by the leadership illustrates the attempt by UMA 
to transcend the alleged rent-seeking inclinations of business associations. 
 
                                                 
86 Interview with Mr. Obonyo, Hilary, 16 October, 2007. 
87 Barya, J.John (2001), Op Cit, p.28. 
88 Holmgren, T, Kasekende, Louis, Atingi-Ego and Damulira, D, (1999),“Aid and Reform in Uganda: 
Country Study,” Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC), Makerere University, Kampala, p.28. 
89 UMA (1998), UMA Proposals for the 1998/1999 Budget and Economic Policy, Kampala, May 13, p.29. 
90 Interview with Mr. Obonyo Hilary, 16, October, 2007. 
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In what may be referred to as a market complementing process, UMA has over time 
been able to demand and /or recommend reduction and changes in various tax 
categories such as excise duty, aspects of VAT administration, import duty, excise tariff, 
Pay As You Earn (PAYE) and certain changes have been made to reflect those demands 
over the years. Government has generally heeded UMA demands on reducing taxation 
on beverages and combating smuggling.91 
 
In January 1999, East African Heads of State met in Arusha and issued a communiqué 
indicating the intention of the three countries to eliminate internal tariffs by July 1999. 
UMA was at the forefront of the rejection of this proposal. UMA urged government not 
to endorse zero-tariff resolution until measures to boost competitiveness and export 
capacity for regional market are put in place in Uganda. The removal of tariffs when 
Uganda is still a high cost producer could force manufacturers to relocate to Kenya 
where production is cheaper and export trade is less bureaucratic. The removal of tariffs 
would lead to loss of revenue by government, which would result in increase of domestic 
taxes on consumption and income. This would create a “high tax” regime in Uganda and 
thereby further suppress domestic demand for local products and discourage investment 
in Uganda. 
 
UMA further observed that the Zero Tariff regime would be a set-back to Uganda’s 
industrial growth, which averaged 16 % for the period 1990-1997, and would delay the 
attainment of a critical mass of industrial activity for the sustainable industrialisation of 
Uganda.92 This was reinforced by the Minister of Finance who noted that the Zero tariff 
system without a common external tariff would not work and the commonality of 
customs coding was necessary if all the countries were to benefit.93 If the internal tariffs 
were to be eliminated, Uganda would eventually lose out because it is not yet at the same 
level with Kenya and Tanzania. To some, this would be seen as an argument for 
protectionism associated with ISI whose time had passed.94  In an earlier article, Erisa 
Ochieng argued against this type of thinking using the age-old argument that protecting 
an industry from the competition of imports involves imposing a cost on domestic 
                                                 
91 Barya, J.John (2001), “Foreign Political Aid…”, p.32. 
92 UMA (1999), Proposal on National Economic Policy, Submitted to His Excellency the President of Uganda, 
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, Kampala, April, pp3-5. 
93 Parliament of Uganda (1999), Report of Sessional Committee on Finance, Planning and Economic Development on 
the Finance Bill, 1999, Kampala, p.2. 
94 See Ochieng, Erisa (1992), “Protecting Home Industries: A Critique”, The New Vision, 20 March. 
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consumers to benefit the producer. Prior to the opening, Uganda must develop capacity 
to compete. 
 
The free market view that free trade is a strong force of economic change may be flawed. 
Before Ugandan industrialists can compete in the region, they must be competitive 
enough at home. This calls for a particular institutional context in which manufacturing 
and export trade takes place. To achieve that competitiveness, Uganda needs strategic 
protection of specific industries, effective taxation policy, targeted concession credit and 
dynamic export orientation, which does not see export-orientation and import 
substitution as mutually exclusive.   
 
The Executive Director of UMA was of the view that while the above policies were 
important, the defining element that is critical is the development of the infrastructure: 
roads, power, water, industrial land and skilled labour. There need to be addressed for 
sustained growth. In particular, the problem of persistent power shortage remains the 
major problem at present.95 In a study commissioned by UMA of 150 firms, 12 %, which 
is a total of 18 companies, were planning to close down due to the power shortage that 
has increased the cost of doing business.96  
 
Apart from power shortages, the other major problem is that of corruption. According 
to the current Chairman of UMA, Mr. James Kalibala, corruption in government is 
stifling the private sector’s efforts to do business with government – the largest buyer of 
goods and services in the country. He notes that: 
“Often, lucrative government tenders are offered to bidders who are not most 
competent but those with the deepest connection to the public office administering 
those tenders. Wrong evaluation and awarding of contracts and tenders in 
government affects the private sectors in doing business with government. This 
appears to be due to bias and favouritism”.97 
 
UMA has also attempted to address the problem of information and transaction costs for 
the industrial sector, popular in New Institutional Economics (NIE), at three levels. i) 
information services, ii) trade fair and exhibition and iii) consultancy services as supports 
for local industry.  
 
                                                 
95 Interview with Mr. Hilary Obonyo, 16 October, 2007. 
96 UMA (2007), The Status and Performance of Uganda’s Manufacturing Sector in 2006, Op Cit, p.80. 
97 Biryabarema, Elias (2007), “UMA boss decries kickbacks”, The Monitor, March 10-16. 
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First, UMA has an information centre that runs a business-matching service to facilitate 
the formation of joint ventures as well as inform members and the general public about 
the association’s activities with a comprehensive database. Related to this, UMA hosts 
the Technological Information Promotion System (TIPS), an information network on 
investment opportunities, trade and technology in developing countries. At a very small 
fee, the TIPS network enables one to obtain regularly (weekly) useful business 
information.  
 
Second, in addition to the above, UMA renders strategic support to members to improve 
their products through the various Sub-Committees and the Business Unit which assists 
members to get certification both local and international by running an ISO 
programme.98 
 
Third, UMA conducts Trade Fair and Exhibitions annually with two major objectives, 1) 
to promote products manufactured locally and 2) create an environment for the local and 
foreign members to interact and share business ideas.  
 
Fourth, in 1990 UMA established Consultancy and Information Services (UMACIS), 
which provides business and technical consultancy services and information for 
investors.99 The provision of information has contributed to awareness of local products 
and helped reduce transaction costs amongst local manufacturers.  
 
Finally, UMA has made contributions to the upgrading of local industry. Since August 
1993, the Association in conjunction with USAID has been operating a fund aimed at 
helping entrepreneurs prepare good business plans.100 In 1997, UMA was selected by the 
USAID – funded PRESTO Project to host the internationally renowned Enterprise 
Development Programme (EDP), an entrepreneurship programme of an intensive 80-
hour instruction programme taught in two-weeks on full-time basis.101  In 1998, UMA 
established a fully-fledged training centre at the Secretariat to provide practical training to 
member firms focusing on topical issues and has organised various seminars.102 
 
There are other business associations in the policy network but with limited significance 
for the local manufacturing sector. These include the Uganda National Chambers of 
                                                 
98 Interview with Mr. Obonyo, Hilary, 16 October 2007. 
99 The New Vision, African Industrialisation Day Supplement, Wednesday, 28 November (1996). 
100 Kitakule, Sarah (1995), “No Alternative to Good Planning”, The New Vision, 19 January. 
101 The Monitor, UMA to Train Experts, 13 August (1997). 
102.The Monitor, “UMA Ten Years of Success” 21 April, 1998. 
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Commerce and Industry (UNCCI), which was as well revived in 1988 and is the apex 
organisation representing the sectoral associations organised along district lines. Its main 
objectives are to promote the interests of Uganda business and to provide information to 
its members on government policies. It has not had much going for the industrial sector. 
UNCCI representatives are sometimes invited to attend sessions of select committees 
dealing with economy and industry, although this is not perceived to be especially 
effective as a channel for influencing policy.  The other association of significance is the 
Uganda Small Scale Association (USSIA). Founded in 1979, has thousands of members 
and several branches across the country. It has several programmes to support 
entrepreneurs but most prominent of them is The Master Craftsman Programme (MCP), 
funded by UNIDO for strengthening national capacities for the promotion of micro 
entrepreneurs called MCP advisers provided with technical and business skills to fellow 
entrepreneurs.103   While MCP overall thrust is supportive of economic reforms, its focus 
is on the problems of its members to access credit and affordable utilities.104 Both 
associations can be said to be focused on the “market-supporting” activities. 
 
The dialogue between the government and these institutions in the policy network 
amounts to what may be regarded as an embryonic notion of embedded autonomy. 
Embeddedness does not mean cosy relations between the state and individual private 
firms, but an overall government-business interface that is distinguished by transparent 
consultation, cooperation, and coordination mechanisms, in which public officials and 
representatives of a sector participate.105  While most of what is agreed on may not have 
been implemented, the above initiative indicates a process in the right direction of 
upgrading skills for industrialisation. The assumption by NIE proponents that interest 
groups’ major reason for existence is rent seeking and distribution of privilege may not 
be accurate. The problem, though, remains that of numerous patronage networks in 
Uganda’s public service. 
 
Behind this apparent harmonious interaction within the industrial class, there is intense 
struggle by sections of the industrial class, particularly the Uganda Asians, to influence 
the political leaders and get favours, particularly loans from government.  In an interview 
                                                 
103 The New Vision, “Uganda Small Scale Industries Association ensures that that the small sector develops” 
Tuesday, 20 November, 2001, p.29. 
104Harvey, Charles and Robinson, Mark (1994), The Design of Economic Reforms in the Context of Political 
Liberalisation: Uganda Country Study, European Commission, December, pp21-23.  
105 Ahrens, Joachim (2002), “Governance and the Implementation of Technology Policy in Less 
Developed Countries”, p 461. 
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with the Executive Director of UMA, he decried the continued preferential treatment of 
foreign investors and Ugandan Asians. He argued that “government policy should be 
based on principles and not individual favouritism. For instance, the focus of policy 
could be on agro-processing industry. If this is taken as a policy, it must be 
generalised”.106   
 
Finally, recent policy documents reflect the present philosophy of the Uganda 
government towards industrialisation and development in general. The Poverty 
Eradication Plan, covering the period up to the year 2016/17, sets the tone for future 
budget allocations: All public expenditure programmes are to have poverty eradication 
focus. The Medium-Term Budget Framework 1997/98 introduced sectoral hard budget 
ceilings to reflect the national expenditure priorities. The sectors with expenditure 
priority are primary education, primary health care, water and environmental sanitation, 
agricultural extension to smallholders, as well as roads construction and maintaince.107 
Clearly there is no specific focus industrialisation both as a programme or a national 
priority as if industrial transformation is not part and parcel of the process of poverty 
eradication.  
 
The Executive Director of UMA noted that one major weakness is that government has 
no clear policy in support of the small and medium enterprises which constitute the 
majority of UMA membership. A clear policy would enhance these enterprises and 
expand employment opportunities. He further argues that “There is need to establish a 
proper industrial policy framework and implement it accordingly because the future of 
industry lies in an organised approach”108 
 
There is recognition that a politico-institutional foundation of policy reform in general 
and technology or industrial policy in particular is an unalterable prerequisite for long-
term development. Regardless of whether a government decides to follow the policy 
prescriptions of Washington consensus or whether it opts for a more activist role to 
overcome co-ordination failures and other market imperfections, a complex politico-
institutional structure needs to be put in place in order to make government more 
effective in accomplishing whatever tasks it undertakes. The focus should be on specific 
                                                 
106 Interview with Mr. Obonyo Hilary, 16 October, 2007. 
107Siggel, E., Ssemogerere G. (2001), “Uganda’s Policy Reforms, Industry Competitiveness and Regional 
Integration: A Comparison With Kenya, EAGER, Discussion Paper, p.5. 
108 Interview with Mr. Obonyo Hilary, October, 2007. 
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characteristics of government machinery such as autonomy, rationality, efficiency and 
technocratic capability, which make public administration less dependent on the 
disruptions of politics.  
 
At the national level, the focus should be on sectors rather than on the entire economy. 
The practice of industrial policy can best be examined by a focus on sectors or sub-
sectors. Given the variant sectoral characteristics and features, the understanding of the 
specific sectoral needs is critical to avoid a generalised industrial policy practice. The 
country’s economy is composed sectors and sub-sectors that vary in terms of technology, 
market, levels of owner and institutions of their governance which demands varying 
industrial practices. Thus, the focus on sectors brings out similarities and differences 
which inform state policy towards them. The issue of focusing on sectors is illustrated in 
the next two chapters. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to examine the institutional reforms under SAPs, particularly the 
reform of the bureaucracy, the revival and creation of several agencies and their 
implications for industrial policy making. It was based on in-depth interviews with 
government bureaucrats and representatives of the industrial class through UMA, 
secondary literature and newspaper reports. The analysis revealed several findings. 1) 
While the major objective of the public service reform was to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of policy making by the bureaucracy, the post-reform experiences indicate 
that in practice the reforms were pre-occupied with reduction in numbers. Reducing 
numbers and imposing new sets of formal rules without simultaneously reshaping power 
within the bureaucracy was less than optimal to bring about effective policy making.      
2) The post-independence reform experiences indicate that the preoccupation with 
numbers obstructed the need to address the core problem in the bureaucracy, namely 
low levels of salaries and lack of competitive recruitment into the bureaucracy. These are 
important for several reseasons. First, the low salaries make it difficult to attract and 
retain high quality professionals, on merit, with the capacity to formulate robust policies. 
Second, several years of political turbulence and upheaval left a legacy of patronage and 
job insecurity which could not be corrected by retrenchment. Third, the reform agenda 
for the bureaucracy ignores the centrality of the politics of patronage. Finally it is noted 
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that little attention was paid to the possibility of the private sector interests to penetrate 
the bureaucracy and use it negatively. 
 
3) The creation of several new agencies such as UIA, UNCST and UIRI, while necessary, 
have not performed optimally. Several years after their creation, UNCST and other 
related agencies have not developed explicit national science and technology policy, and 
therefore no recognised guidelines on technology transfer, especially through FDI. 4) 
The intermediate agencies, particularly UMA, have made some contribution to the 
implementation of industrial policy. The relationship between UMA and government 
amounts to what could be regarded as embryonic embedded autonomy. However, 
behind the apparent harmonious interaction, there is intense struggle by sections of the 
industrial class to influence political leaders which results in the incoherence of industrial 
policy as government offers favours, without stress to priority sectors, to particular 
individuals as opposed to supporting the whole industrial class. 
 
Finally, it is noted that proliferation of institutions has not necessarily led to efficient 
policy formulation and implementation. Likewise, effective industrial policy can be 
done by having a sectoral focus rather than generalised practice of industrial policy 
for the whole economy. The illustration of the need for a differentiated industrial 
policy practice is done in the selected sector case studies in the next two chapters: 
chapters seven and eight. 
 CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
7. THE TEXTILE AND CLOTHING INDUSTRY 
 
7.0 Introduction  
 
This is the fourth data chapter of the thesis. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate, 
as a case study, the possibilities and limitations in the practice of industrial policy in the 
Ugandan context since 1945.  It is based on primary data from textile firms and 
secondary data. The primary data was collected through interviews based on interview 
schedules1 with government officials in the Ministry Tourism Trade and Industry (MTTI) 
and with the Chief Executive officers (CEOs) of three textile manufacturing firms 
namely: i) Southern Range (Nytil) Ltd, ii) Phenix Logistics (Ltd) and African Textile Mills 
(Ltd) (ATM). The secondary data was based on documents and newspaper reports. 
Secondary data is the source of information on the historical outline of the chapter and 
the fourth textile firm, Apparels Tri Star (Ltd), as it was not possible to interview the 
CEO or management which was embroiled in a failed government subsidy to the firm 
scandal. 
 
The selection of the textile industry as an illustration of industrial policy practice, is 
premised on several factors both internal and external to the country’s economy. First, at 
the time of fieldwork, 2004-2005, the textile industry was taunted as a strategic sector 
that had to be supported by government through subsidies to boost Uganda’s export 
earnings, particularly African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA). Second, the textile 
industry is the oldest manufacturing venture in the country introduced in the colonial 
period in the 1950s. Therefore, it is an industry in which substantial tacit knowledge has 
been accumulated over several decades which can easily be revived. Third, the industry is 
based on cotton as a raw material which can be widely grown in the country which has 
conducive climate for cotton production.  Fourth, the industry is usually labour intensive 
and therefore could absorb substantial labour force hence reducing on unemployment. 
Fifth, the industry requires a relatively modest amount of capital and has a short period 
of return on investment. Sixth, the industry possesses forward and backward linkages in 
that both the raw cotton and the textiles could be exported and the same time has a 
                                                 
1 Interview Schedule on Textile sector (See Appendix No.8). 
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home market for the manufactured products like textiles, oil, animal feeds. Finally, with a 
particular involvement of the state, the above comparative advantage could be 
reconstructed to create competitive advantage in both external and internal markets. 
 
This chapter is divided into three major parts. The first and second parts are based on 
secondary data. The first part examines the structure and the historical legacy of the 
textile industry from colonialism to the time of the expropriation of the Asian properties 
in 1972. The second part looks at the textile industry under the “economic war”, in the 
1970s. The third part is based on primary data collected from interviews and secondary 
sources mainly newspaper reports. It examines industrial policy practices in terms of 
government support to the above textile firms under SAPs. Thus in this chapter I 
examine the changing role of the state intervention, the policy instruments applied and 
their impact on the textile manufacturing sub-sector.  
 
The basic argument in this chapter is that the textile industry development experience in 
Uganda is informed by several factors, namely i) the historical legacy of state 
interventionist ISI policy through the 1950s and 1960s. ii) The expropriation of Asian 
entrepreneurs in 1972’s “economic war”, iii) the rise of the second-clothing usage and iv) 
the adoption of SAPs and its attendant policy prescriptions since the early 1980s.  
 
7.1 The Structure of Uganda’s Textile Industry 
 
The textile and clothing industry can be defined to include those firms that engage in 
spinning yarn, weaving, knitting clothes and finishing processes. The textile 
manufacturing sub-sector comprises of four major textile manufacturing industries and 
numerous small and medium firms: The major firms include: i) Southern Range (Ltd ) 
(formerly NYTIL), ii) African Textile Mills, (ATM), iii) Tri Star Apparel (Uganda) Ltd, iv) 
Phoenix Logistics (formerly UGIL).2  The small and medium garment manufacturers are 
numerous and are approximately 400 in Kampala city alone. They produce safari suits, 
army uniforms, police uniforms, shirts, dresses, blouses and trousers. These are not a 
subject of this study. 
 
                                                 
2 Tri Star Apparel (Uganda) Ltd has since collapsed and closed in October, 2006. African Textile Mills 
(ATM) and Simba Blankets are operating at very low capacity and may soon close (early 2006). 
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Table7.1: The Major Manufacturers of Clothing & Textiles 
Firm Current Capacity (bales) Installed Capacity (bales) 
Phenix Logistics (U) Ltd 
(UGIL) 
            1, 200 3,600 
Southern Range Nyanza 
(NYTIL) 
            9,000 23,000 
Goustar Lira Spinning 
Mill 
           7,000 (2006) 27,000 
Africa Textile Mill Mbale            2,000  9,000 
TOTAL           19,200 62,000 
SOURCE: CDO (2001). 
 
The Uganda textile industry is based on the cotton as the raw material. Cotton has 
traditionally been one of Uganda’s most important commodities and currently accounts 
for 3.4% of foreign exchange receipts. At its peak in 1969/1970 when the production 
was nearly 500,000 bales, cotton contributed as much as 40% of foreign exchange 
earnings. Touching on the lives estimated at more than nine million Ugandans (about 
30% of the population) living at the substance level, cotton and the associated textile 
manufacture is designated as a strategic export. 
 
The overall decline in production and export of raw cotton has been matched by a 
decline in the ginning and the textile manufacturing sector as well. As illustrated by the 
table below, in the year 2004, cotton accounted for only about 6.6% of the country’s 
foreign exchange earnings; it was number 4 export earner and contributed $ 43 million in 
the total export value.  
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Table7. 2:   Share of Cotton to GDP and National Exports 1998-2005   
Year GDP 
(US$ million) 
National Value of  
      Exports 
(US$ million) 
Cotton Export  
Earnings  
(US $ million) 
Share of GDP  
        (%) 
Cotton Share to 
National Value 
of Exports (%) 
1998 5, 746.4 536.8 7.69 0.13 1.43 
1999 6, 721.2 478.8 17.41 0.26 3.64 
2000 5, 260.2 401.7 22.09 0.42 5.5 
2001 5, 308.0 451.8 13.43 0.25 2.97 
2002 5, 509.7 467.6 9.52 0.17 2.04 
2003 5, 941.4 522.5 17.75 0.3 3.4 
2004 7, 152.7 653.3 42.80 0.6 6.6 
2005 7, 653.4 812.9 28.82 0.4 3.5 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2006) 
 
Inspite of years of rehabilitation efforts and privatisation, by 1998 immediately after 
privatisation, on average, the capacity utilisation of the textile industries was low at less 
than 30%. This was a result of the run-down state of the factories, lack of proper 
management, poor quality of products, poor marketing and more significantly the large 
importation of cheaper products, which included second-hand products. Most of the 
products are sold on the local market with a small percentage exported. The focus of this 
study is, however, on the four major textile industries. In the late colonial period, there 
existed only one major state-owned textile firm: Nyanza Textiles (Ltd), NYTIL which 
has since 1996 been privatised. 
 
To understand the challenges that the Uganda textile manufacturing sub-sector is 
confronted with at present, it is important to have a historical perspective that brings to 
the fore the institutional framework within which the industry has operated. Knowledge 
of the historical experience of the phenomena may help unravel the industry’s intricacies. 
Thus, below I examine the historical legacy of the textile manufacturing sector from its 
inception in the 1950s to 1981 with the adoption of Structural Adjustments Programmes 
(SAPs). 
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7.2 The Historical Legacy: Colonial and Independence Period, 1950-80 
  
The modern Uganda textile and clothing industry traces its origins in the colonial period, 
particularly with the establishment of Nyanza Textile Industries (NYTIL) Ltd in 1956, 
which dominated the market into the 1970s. The British Cotton Growing Association 
(BCGA) had introduced Cotton in Uganda in 1903, the raw material on which the textile 
industry is based. The production of cotton in Uganda was to replace the loss of the 
American market as a source of raw materials for the British textile Industry. With the 
industrialisation of USA, the pioneer British industry, the Lancashire textile industry, lost 
its most important guaranteed supply of raw cotton as the America industrialists needed 
the US cotton for their industries.3 Thus, cotton was introduced in Uganda by the British 
to secure the raw materials for its textile industry.  Prior to the establishment of NYTIL 
in 1950s, the textile industry took on the form of processing of raw cotton – ginning, 
mainly for export and limited clothing industry, which produced piece goods from 
imported yarn. In 1954, the company undertook the dyeing and the bleaching of 
imported grey cloth in Tanganyika. The two activities satisfied only a small proportion of 
total demand in East Africa, and all other products were imported.4  
 
NYTIL was formed in 1953 as one of the largest colonial government ventures 
undertaken with CALICO Printers Association (CPA) Ltd of UK, located at Jinja.5 This 
was influenced by the dominant ideology of public ownership which prevailed both in 
England and globally after World War II.  It started production in 1956 as a vertically 
integrated textile mill comprising of a spinning mill, weaving shed and Finishing 
Department. Nytil, therefore, marked the beginning of import substitution 
manufacturing of clothing. 
 
In this section, we look at the broad state policy framework that facilitated the growth of 
the industry. The factors include: ownership, role of the state-UDC, the raw material 
base, the technological base, local and regional markets and more broadly, the 
                                                 
3 Mamdani, Mahmood (1975), “Class Struggles in Uganda”, Review of African Political Economy, ROAPE, 
No.4 November, p.27. 
4 Stoutjesdijk, E. J (1967), Uganda Manufacturing Sector: A Contribution to the Analysis of Industrialisation in East 
Africa, Makerere Institute of Social Research, (MISR), Kampala: East African Publishing House, p.46. 
5 Uganda Development Bank (UDB) (1989), Report of Textile Sector Study for Uganda, Vol.1, P-E Inbucon: 
Werner International, p.2. 
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institutional framework: cotton research centres, the co-operative unions, Lint Marketing 
Board, (LMB), the finances and labour. 
 
7.3 The Textile Import Substitution under colonialism: 1950-62 
 
First, the ISI under colonialism was state-led. Initially NYTIL, the premier textiles 
manufacturing firm was a private venture owned by CALICO Printers. Faced with initial 
difficulties due to heavy competition from, especially East Asian producers, mainly 
China, Japan and Pakistan, the state took it over with the purchase of some shares by 
UDC and this action stopped its loss making trend. In 1957, CPA sold to the Uganda 
Government and in 1958 NYTIL became a wholly state-owned subsidiary of UDC by 
acquisition of the Uganda Government’s 58.5 per cent share and loan holding. The 
former owners, the CPA, were appointed as managing agents.6 Thus, through UDC, the 
state mobilised and interacted with private capital as expressed in the acquisition of 
shares in Nytil and prodded the private capitalists, particularly Asians, to invest in the 
manufacturing sector.  
 
It should be noted, however, that the success of NYTIL was not only due to the fact that 
it was state-led and owned. The state implemented several measures that established the 
viability and the competitiveness of the industry and led to its rapid growth. One of the 
major factors behind this fast growth was the local production of raw cotton in most 
parts of Uganda, especially in the eastern and northern Uganda.7 Uganda had a 
favourable source of raw materials – cotton, on which the textile industry was based. The 
textile industry does not demand highly skilled labour. In addition, there existed a ready 
market for cloth both local and regional. The other factor was the availability of cheap 
power. The Owen Falls Dam had been constructed to provide low cost electricity for 
industrial and commercial activities in Uganda and the region. NYTIL was built near the 
dam and along the railway line for easy transportation. 
 
We have above discussed ISI strategy in general terms. This section now proposes to 
look at how the ISI strategy was applied to the textile industry. At the centre of ISI 
                                                 
6 Stoutjesdijk, E, J (1967), Op Cit p.47. 
7 Kiganda, C, John  (1993), The Effects of Liberalisation of the Cotton Sector on the Performance of the Cotton 
Ginneries: A Case Study of the Eastern Region, MA (Economic Policy and Planning) Dissertation, Makerere 
University, p.1. 
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strategy in the textile industry was NYTIL. The establishment of NYTIL was strategic. 
The state objective was to substitute textile production, save and earn foreign exchange 
and regain control of the textile market in East Africa that had been threatened by 
Japanese goods in 1950s.8 As an infant industry, for it to prosper, protection was 
necessary. Shortly after CALICO Printers had sold out to the government, Kenya and 
Tanganyika agreed to raise the duty on imported cotton cloth to 30% ad Valorem, 
combined with some specific duties. As a result, NYTIL for the first time made profits in 
1959, employment grew and assets were accumulated.9 Thus, protectionism had positive 
results as it enabled local expansion of textile production in the expanded local and 
regional market. 
 
The period witnessed the emergence of products other than cloth based on local cotton: 
soap, edible oil and cattle feeds as import subsititutes. Thus, the colonial state policy 
provided the local and regional protected environment that natured the growth and 
competition of the textile industry in Uganda and the East African region.  What was 
paramount to state policy, however, was the extraction of surpluses from its colony to 
aid in the reconstruction of the British economy, which had been shattered by the war. 
This was realised within a particular institutional framework. 
 
Particular institutions mediated the state policy towards the textile industry. Critical 
among these were the cotton co-operative unions that ginned the cotton and the Lint 
Marketing Board (LMB), formed in 1948 that marketed it. Cotton research centres were 
geared to produce standard cotton. The state bureaucracy particularly that located in the 
Ministries of Agriculture and that of the Ministry Co-operatives and Marketing 
contributed to the consolidation of the textile industry through their extension services.  
While the co-operative unions ensured the production of quality cotton, the marketing 
boards were used to mobilise surpluses from peasant growers. At their inception in the 
1940s and 1950s, they were purportedly intended to: i) be agents of price stabilisation, ii) 
provision of government revenue, iii) prevention of inflation, iv) prevention of 
exploitation of farmers by middlemen and v) the maintenance of quality.  While it is true 
that the marketing boards were used to accumulate enormous surpluses, which were 
deposited with Bank of England and aided British war and reconstruction efforts, it is 
                                                 
8 Mamdani, Mahmood (1976), Op Cit., p.253. 
9 Stoutjesdijk, E. J (1967), Op Cit., p.46-7. 
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also the case that some of the funds were used to finance the above infrastructural 
projects particularly power generation, including the establishment of UDC, the 
coordination agency, which were supportive of the industrialisation process in the 
country, in general. 10 
 
In addition, in the support for textile marketing, the colonial state appointed Lebel (East 
Africa) Ltd as a distributing and marketing agent of NYTIL products. Lebel (EA), Ltd 
was incorporated in 1952 by M/s Calico Printers Association Ltd of UK, for the purpose 
of distributing NYTIL fabrics and products throughout East Africa. Later in the 1970s 
Lebel offices were opened in Nairobi and London. The company performed well, both 
locally and abroad, until 1974 after the declaration of the “economic war” when the 
export of fabrics was banned to meet the local demand.11 
 
It is this state support, protection and institutional arrangements, therefore, which played 
a critical role in fostering the emergence of the textile industry in the colonial period. In 
addition to the textile industry, a small manufacturing sector in Uganda that produced a 
significant range of goods emerged in 1950s and 1960s. An internal market was created 
as investments expanded and employment opportunities arose. It is this institutional 
framework that was inherited at the time of independence. 
 
7.4 Textile ISI from 1962 to the 1972 “Economic War” 
 
The first decade of independence was characterised by the expansion of the textile 
industry based on the continuation of the ISI policies initiated in the 1950s. There were, 
however, two important deviations during the period. i) There was the attempted 
nationalisation of industry in May 1970 and ii) The expropriation of mainly Asian 
industries during the “economic war” in 1972. State policy towards the textile sector 
during these phases is examined at three levels: i) the unplanned expansion of the sector. 
ii) the financing of the sector and iii) the 1972 expropriations.  
 
                                                 
10 Mamdani, Mahmood, (1975), Op Cit. p.37. 
11 The Republic of Uganda (1987), Report of the Ad Hoc Administrative Committee of Inquiry Into the Affairs of 
Textile Industries, Kampala, February, p.21. 
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The textile industry expanded in the aftermath of independence within the state led ISI 
paradigm. The first major institutional support for the textile industry came in form the 
establishment of a commercial bank with the major objective of availing finances to the 
cotton industry. To support the financing of the textile industry, the 1963 Co-operative 
Act created the Co-operative Bank, (CB) as the first indigenous commercial bank. The 
Co-operative Bank was tasked with the allocation of resources to ginneries and coffee 
hurriries, through their co-operative unions for processing cotton and coffee mainly for 
export. Second, the establishment of Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) in 1965, which as 
well provided crop finance, further helped the financing of the textile industry. In 
addition, there was the Uganda Development Bank (UDB) established in 1972 as 
develoment finance institution. This further augmented the state support for industry in 
general. 
  
Several import substitution firms were formed in addition to NYTIL. Notable was the 
establishment of United Garments Industries (UGIL) Ltd and Lira Spinning Mill. Both 
of them were under the control of UDC. In addition, there were private sector initiatives 
which established African Textile Mills and MULCO. In a critique of the nature of these 
investments, Mahmood Mamdani observes that such investments were last-stage 
assembly plants. Raw materials and quite often, semi-manufactured components, were 
imported from the parent monopolies overseas.12 Thus, the major shortcoming of such 
investments is that they were more of import reproduction rather than import 
substitution as they had little integral connection with the Ugandan economy. 
 
The textile industry was dealt a further blow with the declaration of “economic war” in 
1972 when the Asian owners of most of the textile industry were expelled resulting in the 
loss of entrepreneurial, technical and supervisory personnel in the industry. The 
nationalisation of the industries in general and the creation of the National Textiles 
Board, (NTB) in 1974, could not improve the textile industry. From the mid 1970s, the 
textile sector deteriorated, co-operative unions and hence ginneries under their control 
declined in terms of efficiency. The textile industry collapsed because the Asians had 
been the main buyers of raw cotton and owners of the ginneries as well as the managerial 
backbone of the textile industry.   
                                                 
12 Mamdani, Mahmood (1983), Op Cit., pp24-25.  
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The 1972 “economic war” had disastrous impact on the textile industry. First in line was 
the collapse of cotton ginneries, which were central to the textile industry. This was 
reflected in the obsolete machinery in the mills, irregular supply of spare parts and the 
raw material – cotton, as the farm production collapsed. Due to the destruction of the 
bureaucracy, extension services in agriculture as was in animal husbandry, collapsed.  
Second, at the textile manufacturing level, the quality of products deteriorated as firms 
failed to replace the equipment and the import of chemicals and dyes due to lack of 
working capital as foreign exchange was not readily available.  
 
Regionally, one other major development that affected the textile industry in Uganda was 
the collapse of the regional model that had been part and parcel of colonial plan when 
establishing NYTIL. With the collapse of the East African Community (EAC) in 1977, 
Kenya and Tanzania embarked on consolidation of their own textile industries to cater 
for the local demand which had been supplied by NYTIL. While most of the raw 
materials needs for Ugandan factories were supplied from the home-grown cotton, 
NYTIL and certain firms were exporting both yarn and finished cloths to the East 
African market by the time of the collapse of the East African community in 1977. The 
collapse of EAC led to the loss of the regional market. 
 
The result of the collapse of textile manufacturing was the rise of the phenomenon of 
second-hand clothing and smuggled cheap fabric leading to further destruction of the 
local textile industry. Being import-dependent, due to the lack of capacity to import the 
necessary machinery and intermediate goods that facilitated the textile manufacturing 
industry, the industry had virtually collapsed by the end of the military regime in 1979. 
Thus, the change in ownership, administration and management resulted in the decline 
of production and financial and material loses.13 It was in this context that efforts at 
rehabilitation and adoption of SAPs took place in the early 1980s. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Republic of Uganda (1987), Report of the Ad Hoc Administrative Committee of Inquiry into the Affairs of Textile 
Industries, Kampala, February, p.4. 
 232 
7.5 The Textile Industry under SAPs 
 
This constitutes the third part of the chapter. This part is based on primary data derived 
from in-depth interviews with the CEOs of the textile firms, other corporate officials and 
newspaper reports of the four major textile manufacturing and exporting firms in 
Uganda. The interviews were aimed at establishing the extent of state involvement in the 
firms’ operations, the impact of liberalisation policy on the firms’ operations, 
privatisation and its constraints on the textiles industry, the impact of second-hand 
clothing on the textile market, technological and managerial capabilities of the firms, the 
performance of the textile exporting firms and the overall question financing the textiles 
sub-sector. We examine the specific policy and support measures taken by government 
regarding the textile industry. For illustration, I outline the specific actions, particularly 
financing, that were taken at the firm level through examples from the four selected 
textiles firms: NYTIL, ATM, Phenix Logistics and Tri Star Apparels. 
 
In general, with the growing influence of neo-liberal economics in economic policy and 
development thinking in the 1980s, the role of the state interventionist policies came 
under heavy attack. Thus, state involvement in the textile industry had to change as SAPs 
were adopted. Several policy measures were taken towards state interventionism as far as 
the textile industry in Uganda is concerned, particularly after 1987 economic policy 
reforms. Thus: i) liberalisation ii) privatisation, and iii) stress on export orientation.  
 
First, despite the policy of liberalisation, given the importance of the textile industry in 
terms of employment and foreign exchange earnings, the state continued to support the 
textile sector and firms, particularly NYTIL Ltd, by guarantying loans. As the Assistant 
Commissioner of Industry noted:  
“Financing industrial firms is a cardinal responsibility of any state that intends to 
engineer industrial transformation in its economy. The Uganda government support 
of the textile firms is informed by the government policy in which the textile 
manufacturing sub-sector has been identified as one of the country’s strategic sectors 
that can engineer growth”14.  
 
                                                 
14 Interview with Assistant Commissioner, Department of Industry and Technology, Mr. Okulo Cankwo 2. 
October, 2007.   
 233 
Until its privatisation in mid 1990s, the textile sector in general and NYTIL in particular, 
received several loans as the sector was identified as a priority for rehabilitation.15 In 
1987/88 financial year, US $ 6.58 million was disbursed as projected in the rehabilitation 
plan of the textile industry. Out of this, US$ 6.34 million was to be utilised in NYTIL, 
Jinja made up of US $ 4.13 million out of the IDA Industrial Rehabilitation Credit, and 
US $ 2.1 million from an Islamic Development Bank Credit, both loans were disbursed 
through UDB.16 The following year, 1989, the firm was granted a loan of US$4.0 million 
by UDB towards partial rehabilitation of the textile mill. In addition, there was a partial 
commitment by the ODA (UK) to disburse 1.058 million pounds for capital items and 
0.172 million pounds for technical assistance through a grant from the British 
government to the Uganda government.17   
 
In the financial year 1992/93, an IDA loan of US$ 5.1 million, was utilised to convert oil-
fired boilers to electrical power driven. Two electric boilers were delivered, installed and 
commissioned in 1991. Another IDA loan was used to increase the capacity of the 
weaving and finishing sections so that they could handle wide cloth production. US $ 2.2 
million was used to procure machines and US $ 2.5 for the importation of yarn, 
chemicals and dyestuff.18  
 
Inspite of these subsidies, there was limited revival of the firm. This could be explained 
by two major factors: i) lack of demand in the local market for new textiles and ii) the 
ever increasing second-hand phenomenon, which could be afforded because they were 
cheaper and of better quality. This compelled the government to privatise it. But prior to 
the privatisation of public enterprises, there had occurred a generalised liberalisation of 
the economy. 
 
The officials at MTTI did not see any problem with the government financial support for 
the industrial firms. To them the privatisation and liberalisation of the economy is a 
welcome measure. Inspite of privatisation and liberalisation of the economy, the private 
                                                 
15 Government of Uganda (1987), Background to the Budget, 1987-1988, p.40. 
16 Government of Uganda (1988), Background to the Budget, 1988-1989, p.55. 
17 Government of Uganda (1989), Background to the Budget, 1989-1990, p.70. 
18 Government of Uganda (1992), Background to the Budget, 1992-1993, Entebbe: Government Printers, p.68. 
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firms in the textile sector deserve financial support as they are in a sector that has been 
identified as strategic and shall contribute to employment and export earnings. 19   
 
First, in an interview with the Assistant Commissioner, Department of Industry and 
Technology, his major concern is that: 
 “The intervention in the textile industry is done on ad hoc basis. The President 
(Museveni) has unduly encouraged distortions in the industrial sector. The CEOs of 
the firms that can lobby the President are offered subsidies in terms of loans from 
local banks and government guaranteed loans from international banks. Intervention 
should be done across the board”.20  
 
Due to the primacy of the politics of patronage in Uganda, state intervention “across the 
board” shall take long to be practiced. Given the need by the ruling elite to cultivate and 
build constituencies from which they can support their patronage networks that are 
critical to the current electoral politics, the preferential offer of loans to selected clients 
through the President’s office is bound to continue. The beneficiaries of state subsidies 
are always called upon to “contribute” to the electoral efforts of the ruling class.21 
 
Second, across the textile manufacturing sector, the overwhelming view is that the 
government should give financial support to the firms if they are to meet the current cut-
throat competition from textile importers in the now liberalised Ugandan market.  A 
representative view is that:  
“The main problem in the textile industry in Uganda is lack of cheap finance. In the 
absence of development banks and the commercial banks in Uganda are risk averse, 
substantial borrowing by firms is limited. The commercial banks are primarily 
speculative as they are more interested in accumulation of long-term government 
treasury bills”.22 
 
Third, the critical importance of state finance is reinforced by the import dependent 
nature of the textile industry which demands such support. Apart from cotton, the textile 
                                                 
19 Interview with  Mr. Okulo Cankwo, 2nd October, 2007. 
20 Interview with Asst. Commissioner, Industry and Technology, Mr. Okulo Cankwo, 2  October, 2007. 
21 There are unconfirmed reports that the entrepreneurs are always expected, and they usually do 
contribute to the electoral efforts of the ruling class. The current efforts to give Madhvani Industries up to 
40,000 hectares of land in Northern Uganda to establish a sugar plantation and Metha Industries up to 
7000 hectares from part of Mabira Forest, near Kampala is said to be payback for the contribution they 
made to President Museveni’s 2006 electoral bid. 
22 Interview with Managing Director, African Textiles Mill (Ltd), Mr. Praful Patel, 10 August, 2007 
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industry demands the importation of several items to be used by manufacturers as raw 
materials as indicated in the table below. 
 
Table7.3: Some Imported Raw Materials Used by the Textile Industry 
Raw Materials Imported % tage Taxes and Exemptions 
Calcium Carbide  0             
TM Propam 0 
Formaldehyde 0 
Additives 0 
Lutesit Albn Ester of Acylic acid 0 
Tolouene Di Iscocyanate 0 
Metacid-400 0 
Abcol SC-5 0 
Silicon oil  
Low Density Polyethene 0 
PVA BP 17 10 
Polyster spun sewing thread 25 
Polyol 10 
Blankent shoddy Yarn 10 
Other yarn of polyester staple fibres 10 
T G Grey Fabric  25 
Nylon twine  
Bale strapping Metal 10 
Clipping Clips for Garments 25 
Eyelets 10 
Buckles 10 
SOURCE: UMA (2007), pp 32-3 
 
Apart from the negative impact of second-hand clothing which is discussed later in the 
chapter, the textiles industry has been affected by lack of finance to import the above raw 
materials. The common demand by both the government officials and the private sector 
operators is that the government supports for industry must be equitable and the credit 
offered should be cheap enough to enable the firms compete fairly in the liberalised 
market. 
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Fourth, both the government officials and the private sector operators argue that the 
inequity in government support to industry and the paucity of cheap loans to the firms   
is due to the lack of a national textile policy. However, the institution of a national 
textiles policy in itself may not be a sufficient solution to the problem of industrial 
financing. The existence of a national textile policy, or even a general national industrial 
policy, shall not automatically lead to the birth of development banks that can provide 
cheap credit or to the death of patronage politics which is sustained on favouritism for 
those who “contribute” to electoral politics.  
 
Government is still reluctant to institute a national textiles policy despite several 
recommendations from the textile industry.  In an interview with Mr. Yuichi Kashiwada, 
the CEO of Phenix Logistics Uganda (Ltd) who is also the Chairman of Textile 
Manufacturers Association of Uganda (TEMAU), he noted that:     “although 
government recognises the importance of textile manufacturing sub-sector, our 
presentation of the case for a national textile policy has not been responded to”.23  
 
The lethargy in the government bureaucracy has made it difficult for the bureaucrats who 
have been tasked to work on the formulation of such policy. Next I discuss the effect of 
liberalisation on the operations of textile manufacturing firms. 
 
7.6 Market Reforms and the Textile Industry 
 
This section is concerned with the impact of liberalisation on the cotton and textile 
industries. Like the previous section it is based on both primary and secondary data.    
The primary data was derived from interviews with bureaucrats and the CEOs of firms 
in the sample. The secondary data comes from several documents and newspaper 
reports. The interviews were focused on two major issues: i) The implications of state 
withdraw from the cotton and textile industries. ii) The liberalisation of textile imports 
and their impact on local textile production. 
 
Liberalisation of the cotton and textile industries produced mixed impact on the local 
industry. Uganda’s cotton sector on which the textile industry is based had come under 
                                                 
23 In an interview with Mr. Yuichi Kashiwada, CEO, Phenix Logistics Ltd, 22 September, 2007 
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the monopoly of Lint Marketing Board (LMB), since the colonial period. Liberalisation 
meant that this monopoly had to be broken.  With liberalisation, the state moved from 
being a producer and marketer to a regulator. In the context of liberalisation, new 
mechanisms for the promotion of the cotton sector, on which Uganda’s textile 
manufacturing sector depended for raw materials, were created. This took the form of 
Cotton Development Organisation (CDO). Second, there was the removal of several 
protective measures for the textile sector. Here we examine the consequences of 
liberalisation on the local textile industry. 
 
Before the liberalisation of the cotton sector in 1994, cotton was strictly regulated by the 
Cotton Act and LMB Act of 1964. The two Acts imposed strict regulation and control 
over cotton growing, marketing and the movement of cotton to specified ginnery zones, 
the fixing of prices for seed cotton and cotton lint. Under the LMB Act, LMB was 
required to purchase all the lint cotton and its export.24 In 1994, these Acts were repealed 
and replaced with CDO and the cotton sector was liberalised. 
 
In general, the policy of liberalisation has been given a wrong interpretation in 
government, that is, everything should be left to operate without prodding and guidance 
to the extent that government has abandoned the role of setting and monitoring 
production targets.25 Even in a liberalised economy, there is need for regulation through 
particular institutional arrangement. This was a result of the realisation of the importance 
of institutional arrangements for development to occur. Market mechanisms operate well 
within particular institutional framework. This is provided by CDO. CDO was mandated 
to promote and oversee the cotton industry as a whole by developing research, 
controlling the quality of lint cotton and improving the marketing of cotton. The 2000 
Cotton Act empowers CDO to register and regulate dealers and operators in the cotton 
sector from pre-planting stage up to cotton ginning and lint export stages. CDO has 
registered up to 44 ginneries 19 of which were exporters for 2005/2006 Season.26 Thus, 
the state involvement is still critical to ensure increased production and effectiveness of 
the cotton policy along the value chain. 
                                                 
24 Kiganda, C, John (1993), The Effects of Liberalisation of the Cotton Sector on the Performance of Cotton Ginneries: A 
Case Study of the Eastern Region, A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment for the Award of the Degree 
of Masters of Arts in Economic Policy and Planning of Makerere University, Kampala, p.42. 
25 Parliament of Uganda, (2000), Report of the Sessional Committee on Tourism, Trade and Industry on Budget/Policy 
Statement for the Financial Year 2000/2001, Kampala, August, p.6. 
26 Cotton Development Organisation (CDO), (2007), Annual Report 2006, Kampala. 
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There are other institutions with linkage to the textile industry. The research function is 
carried out by National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) in liaison with CDO 
in identifying gaps and providing finance support for various research activities in Serere 
and Bukalasa research stations on new strains of cotton have been developed and are 
being multiplied in segregated areas with assistance from CDO. There are as well 15 lint 
exporting companies licensed and registered by CDO.27 Through parliament, in 1999, 
CDO sought the government to guarantee a loan to the Uganda Cotton Ginners and 
Exporters Association, (UCGEA) amounting to about $7 million for the production and 
purchase of cotton, which was granted.28  
 
There remains substantial state support for the development of cotton, particularly for 
the improved cotton production, the raw material that the textile sector depends on.  As 
indicated in the table below, though there are some fluctuations, the general trend has 
been increases in production and earnings in the cotton sector with the support from the 
state since liberalisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 UMA (1999), The Textile Subsector Study, prepared by UMA Consultancy and Information Services Ltd, 
Kampala, pp 12-20. 
28 Parliament of Uganda (1999), Report of the Committee on National Economy to the House on Authority to 
Guarantee Shs. 7.1 billion, (about $ 7 million), to the Uganda Cotton Ginners and Exporters Association, Kampala, 
December. 
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Table7.4:   Production in (bales), Trends and Earnings since Liberalisation  
 
  Earnings from 
Exports 
Earnings by farmers  
Year Cotton Lint 
Production 
(bales) @ 185 
kg) 
Ave. FOT 
price 
($/kg of 
lint) 
Value 
($ 
million) 
Indicative 
price 
announced 
by CDO 
(sh./kg of 
Seed 
cotton 
Ave. 
farmgate 
price 
received 
by 
farmers 
(sh/kg 
Value 
(Shs. 
Billion) 
% 
World 
Market 
price 
received 
by 
farmers 
Dollar 
Exchange 
Rate 
1994/95 33,000 2.1 12.82 270 400 7.39 57 1,000 
1995/96 56,416 1.98 20.67 300 350 11.06 50 1,058 
1996/97 110,700 1.86 38.09 300 320 19.84 48 1,070 
1997/98 32,000 1.79 10.6 350 390 6.99 50 1,180 
1998/99 82,000 1.68 25.49 300 400 18.37 39 1,370 
1999/00 117,000 1.34 29 230 300 19.66 34 1,530 
2000/01 100,000 1.5 27.75 330 420 23.09 36 1,850 
2001/02 120,000 0.8 17.76 255 270 17.255 58 1,650 
2002/03 110,000 1.2 24.42 350 500 28.99 48 1,810 
2003/04 160,000 1.5 44.4 600 650 54.825 61 2,000 
2004/05 254,000 0.8 37.59 350 350 46.321 64 1,730 
2005/06 102,600 1.1 20.75 450 450 25.7 64 1,810 
2006/07 134,000 1.1 27.269 450 450 33.76 64 1,788 
2007/08* 150,000 1.2 33.3 450 550 46.2 65 1,690 
TOTALS 1,561,716  369.91   359.45   
* Estimates. 
Source: Cotton Development Organisation (CDO), 2007 
 
The market reforms and the liberalisation of the cotton sector, particularly ginning, have 
had some positive outcomes. The ginneries which broke away from the monopoly of 
LMB, following liberalisation, improved their performance and efficiency of operations. 
The removal of controls and regulations regarding domestic marketing of cotton has led 
to better returns to cotton farmers as they could now dispose of their seed cotton to 
private buying agents who paid promptly unlike the co-operative union ginneries which 
had developed the practice of delayed payment, since the 1970s. Some ginneries 
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presently owned by the co-operative unions are allowed to sell lint directly to local users 
and export it overseas, with cotton exporters allowed to exchange their proceeds on the 
market exchange rate.29 This led to a substantial revival of the cotton industry.  
 
The neo-liberals may attribute this to the wisdom of “free” market reforms, but the 
evidence suggests that the revival of the cotton sector is underlined by two critical 
factors. First, the continued state financial support to the cotton sector. Second, the 
upgrading of the cotton value chain through CDO and NARO – its importance in 
Research & Development (R&D), in addition to the collaboration of the ginners 
association (UCGEA). The continued state involvement in the cotton sector is a bigger 
part of the explanations for the sustained revival which, would not have occurred in the 
context of total liberalisation and control by private sector usually driven by their narrow 
profit motives. 
 
There, however, remain some challenges in the cotton sector.  In an interview with, the 
CDO official30 it was observed that:  
“The level of value addition to both cotton lint and other products is quite limited. 
There is only 5% domestic value addition to cotton lint due to limited utilisation 
capacity as most of the available technology is obsolete which makes their resultant 
yarns and garments uncompetitive on the international market. In addition, spinning 
and textile mills require heavy capital investment of between US$ 15 – US$ 60 million 
to set up.” 
 
The problems faced by ginners shall not be solved by the ginners operating through the 
“free” market. The official was of the view that given the colossal amount of funding 
involved, the government shall have to render support to the ginners. Therefore, while 
liberalisation is seen as a largely positive measure, its sustainability requires continued 
state involvement of a strategic type. 
 
The second focus of the interview on the impact market reform was the implications of 
the rapid liberalisation of the textile manufacturing industry and imports to Uganda. In 
an interview with Mr. Yuichi Kashiwada, CEO of Phenix Logistics, Ltd, he argued that 
                                                 
29 Kiganda, C, John (1993),The Effects of Liberalisation of the Cotton Sector on the Performance of the Cotton Ginneries, 
P.21 
30 In an Interview with Mr. Hans Windsor Muzoora, Principal Market Information & Monitoring Officer, 
CDO, 15 September, 2007. 
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the liberalisation of textile imports has been too rapid and has resulted in unfair 
competition. As he put it : 
“While in principle liberalisation is necessary, it at the same time allows free-riders. 
Due to corruption in the bureaucracy, government fails to impose the law on taxation 
giving a free rein to smugglers and false declarations of imports. New imported 
textiles are often declared as second-hand”31 
 
The textile industry owners and managers argue that the pace of trade liberalisation has 
been too fast.  These views are supported by the findings of an earlier study conducted 
by UMA which found that not enough time had been given to the firms to allow them to 
increase their market shares and develop economies of scale and to adjust their costs, 
especially given the already high costs of business due to expensive infrastructure and 
high domestic taxes. Some of the textile fabrics are under-declared at the customs by 
importers with the intention of reducing their liability for import duty and value added 
tax.32  
 
More serious is that there is no protection against dumping of textile imports from the 
Far East and Asian countries, which have charged prices for export products which are 
well below those prevailing in their home markets. It has further been argued that the 
import prices at which these textiles are imported are unrealistic and much lower than 
even the raw materials cost of the fabric. Even in developed countries where the 
economies are almost fully liberalised, the protection of the local textile industry has been 
prevailing in form of anti-dumping duties and import quota system.33  
 
Both the bureaucrats and the private firms CEOs see these as the real threats brought 
about by uncontrolled liberalisation; although opinions differ as to whether these are the 
major causes of the Uganda textile manufacturing industries woes.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Interview with Mr Yuichi  Kashiwada, 22 September, 2007. 
32 UMA (1999), The Textile Sub-sector Study, p.56. 
33 Parliament of Uganda (1996), Report of Sessional Committee on Trade, Industry and Information on the   1996/97 
Budget, Kampala, p.30. 
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The officials at MTTI saw the problem in broader terms. It was noted that: 
“New cloths from East Asia are of a better quality and cheaper. Because the firms in 
East Asia have developed skills and capacity to take advantage of economies of scale 
(mass production), costs of production are lower. One of the factors for high costs of 
production is low skills. High skills and high wages can lead to low cost as the high 
skills enables one to work efficiently without repeating the tasks and as a result make 
products that are competitive in the market. Low wages are not the advantage 
anymore. What are needed are high skills.” 34 
 
Therefore, so long as the Ugandan textile manufacturers continue to depend on low 
skills and low wages,35 they shall always be out competed. High skills and high wages are 
complementary as they boost productivity. The solution to Ugandan textile manufactures 
is to develop capacity, particularly high skills in textile production.  
 
To the private operators, while they acknowledge the ruinous nature of the 
competitiveness of imports from East Asia, their demand is not for protection. The 
problem is principally identified at the level of government policy. It was noted that: 
“The government tax regime is unfair. The formal manufacturers are charged all 
duties and taxes amounting to about 48% as other textile market participants smuggle, 
evade taxes and import new cloths disguised as second-hand cloths hence attracting 
lower taxes”.36 
 
The problem of competitiveness of Ugandan textile manufactures are seen at two levels: 
i) low skills and technological capacity and ii) government taxation policy.  
Developmental states elsewhere confronted these issues and assisted their national textile 
firms to be competitive. There is need for a national textile policy. But perhaps the factor 
that has undermined the textile industry most is the phenomenon of second-hand 
clothing. 
 
7.7 Second-Hand Clothing and Textile Industry 
With the collapse of the textile industry in the 1970s and 1980s, there arose the twin 
question of second-hand clothing and smuggling of textile fabrics into Uganda. Across 
                                                 
34 Interview with Assistant Commissioner, Okulo Cankwo, 2 October, 2007. 
35 Ugandan workers are very poorly paid which results in very low productivity since workers have to 
engage in other income generating activities. Uganda is perhaps the only country without a minimum wage 
policy. 
36 Interview with Mr. Yuichi Kashiwada, 22 September, 2007. 
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the textile industry second-hand clothing and smuggling are identified as some of the 
major obstacles to the development and competitiveness of local textile industry.  
 
The CEOs interviewed attributed the continued dominance of second-hand cloth 
importation to the corruption within the bureaucracy.37 But the officials at MTTI saw it 
differently. It was noted that the bureaucracy is often hoodwinked by crafty importers 
with false declaration of new clothes as second hand. Secondly, most of the second hand 
clothes that compete unfavourably with local production are donations from charities 
which the government cannot outlaw. Third, bureaucrats see it as a problem of low levels 
of production of textiles locally. In general, local textile manufacturers produce little 
quantity, poor quality and expensive fabrics, which even in the East African regional 
context Uganda’s manufactures, cannot compete.38 
 
The CEO of ATM (Ltd),39 offers a differing view on second-hand clothing. He was of 
the opinion that:  
“Second-hand clothing is not the major contributor to the lack of competitiveness by 
the textile industry. There exists large enough market for quality textiles both in 
European and local markets. With good quality textile products there is a huge export 
market” 
 
Similarly, the CEO of Phenix Logistics Uganda (Ltd) is not opposed to importation of 
second-hand cloths per se. As he puts it:  
“No objection to importing second hand clothing because there are many people in 
Uganda who need them. But what is manufactured in Uganda, has to be protected by 
government intervention to curb the imports of second-hand cloth, fake and 
smuggled goods. It would be up to the consumer to use new cloths other than second 
hand or smuggled goods”. 40  
 
While this may be true, the question of second hand clothing remains serious to local 
textile industry competitiveness. Since the early 1970s, western countries have 
                                                 
37 Interviews with CEOs: Mr. Yuichi Kashiwada (Phenix Logistics), Praful R. Patel (African Textile Mills) 
and Mr. Mubiru Richard, Corporate Affairs Director, (Southern Range Nyanza Ltd). 
38 Interview with Assistant Commissioner, Industry and Technology, Mr. Okulo Cankwo, 2 October, 2007. 
39 Interview with Mr. Praful R.Patel, 10 August, 2007. 
40 Mr. Yuichi Kashiwada, Phenix Logistics, 22 September 2007. 
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increasingly recycled their second-hand clothes by exporting them to the Third World 
with dire consequences for their domestic textile industries.41  
 
There has been a phenomenonal growth of second-hand cloth trade in Uganda. It has 
been both good for local people who cannot afford new ones and at the same time 
ruinous to the local textile industry. It is estimated that there are about Fifty (50) “big” 
importers of used cloth, locally known as mivumba, into Uganda. The employment 
generated by selling used clothes in just one market in Kampala, St. Balikudembe 
(Owino) market in Central Kampala, is about 6000 people, which is about double the 
employment in the entire formal textile manufacturing industry in Uganda. Throughout 
Uganda, employment related to the sale of used clothes is probably close to 100,000.42 
This has presented government with a serious policy dilemma. While it is true that used 
clothes do harm to the emergence of significant domestic producers of textile and 
clothes, it is also the case that the welfare benefits to the people, thus employment, 
cheaper and better quality clothes, out weigh the disadvantages. Hence the continued 
importation of used clothing. 
 
The textile firms have as a result demanded protection from the state against this ruinous 
phenomenon. In response to demands by textile producers for protection of the textile 
industry from used clothes, the government imposed a 20% excise duty on second-hand 
cloths in 1998. First to protest this tax and calling for its scrapping were the traders 
under the Uganda Importers, Exporters and Traders Association (UGIETA), arguing 
that about 500,000 Ugandans would lose their livelihood if the government imposed the 
tariffs on used clothing.43 In 1999, the government rejected the call by UMA to ban the 
importation of used cloths. The then Minister of Finance, Mr Gerald Sendawula,  stated 
that the importation of used cloths and footwear would continue unhindered, pointing 
out that many in the population simply cannot afford new clothing.44  
 
Since then, the used cloth trade has continued to expand. This is mainly for three reasons 
identified by those involved in the textile industry. First, without mivumba, most Ugandan 
                                                 
41 Haggblade, Steven, (1990), “The Flip Side of Fashion: Used Clothing Exports and the Third World” 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol.26, p.505. 
42, Mahler, Walter (2003), “Our Love Affair with Mivumba, The New Vision  ,Monday, June 9. 
43 Tom, Malaba (1998), “Excise Duty on Mivumba Worries Traders”, The Monitor,  August 21. 
44 Mutumba-Lule, A (1999), “Uganda Won’t Ban Used Clothes”, The East African, September, 22 – 28. 
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would walk naked, especially in the countryside where the peasants have sunk into abject 
poverty to the extent that they would not afford new cloths. Second, the mivumba 
industry is controlled by people with “powerful” political connections who easily subvert 
any policy measures against used cloth trade.45 Third, the used cloth trade has destroyed 
the local textile industry. As a result, the local market is dominated by second hand 
traders and imported second hand products, most likely disguised as new clothing. 
 
The extent of the destruction of the textile industry is illustrated by the overwhelming 
demand for used cloth in Uganda. In 2000, according to Bank of Uganda and Uganda 
Revenue Authority (URA) records, the total demand for all types of fabrics in Uganda 
was about 210 million metres per year. Of this, 170 million metres or 81 per cent of the 
total demand was met by importation of mivumba, 12 per cent or 25 million square metres 
constituted imported new fabric and only a dismal 7 per cent of the total demand was 
met by locally produced textile. Uganda’s export of cotton lint continues to grow as 
poverty pushes more Ugandans into wearing mivumba.46  As the table below indicates, 
Uganda’s textile market was satisfied by imports and not internally manufactured 
products most of which, were second hand clothing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Editorial (2002), “To Tax or not to Tax Mivumba”, The Monitor, Thursday, June 06. 
46 Weekly Observer (2005), Textile Firms Fight Mivumba to Survive April 26 – May 2. 
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Table 7.5: Uganda Textile and Garment Trade by Value (1995-1999) US$, 000.  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Imports      
Textiles fabrics not manufactured 23, 421 25,788 21,392 23,024 22,477 
Textile Yarn, fabrics made up 
articles 
37,599 28,378 25,692 23,121 23,539 
Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories 
14,754 14,125 11,490 17,335 17,587 
Total (a) 75,774 68,291 58,574 63,480 63,603 
Exports      
Textiles fabrics not manufactured 11,478 14,963 29,197 8,447 18,965 
Textile Yarn, fabrics made up 
articles 
2,073 3,192 11,609 1,393 1,465 
Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories 
290 92 76 - 81 
Total (b) 13,841 18,247 40,882 9,840 20,511 
(a-b) 16,933 50,044 17,692 53,640 43,092 
B as % of a 18 27 70 15 32 
Source: Statistical Abstract, June 2000 
 
UMA, the manufacturers’ peak association, through its Executive Director, insists that 
there should be encouragement of the consumption of new clothes by the local people.  
“We realise that our people are poor and may not be able to afford a $ 5 shirt. We 
should encourage the production of clothes by local industries and compare on a 
continuous basis as to whether production is picking up so that we can phase out 
second-hand clothes. Our people should be a proud people who can walk into a shop 
and buy a new dress. The question not only that they are poor, the critical problem is  
that there is little local production”. 47     
 
The solution to the second-hand cloth dilemma, in this view, is increased production 
with support from the state.  In the context of lack of a national textile policy to support 
the growth of the textile industry in the country, the increasing demand for used cloths, 
coupled with smuggling, has led to the destruction of the local textile industry. Several 
garment factories such as the Uganda Garment Industries, Breven, Betex industries, Pop-
in Industries, Eladam, christex, Mulco, Rayon Textile mills and ATM are just ruins of the 
once elegant firms or waiting for the hammer. Tales of the government bailing out firms 
                                                 
47 Mr. Hilary Obonyo (2003), in an interview with The Monitor, September 12.. 
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are rampant but the textile sector believes the unexplained silence by the government 
over the death of local textile firms defines the position taken by the government. 48   
 
There are four underlying issues as far as the problem of second hand clothing is 
concerned. i) the incapacity of local textile manufacturer in terms of lack of high skill and 
technology. ii) the cost of second-hand cloths which are cheaper and of better quality, iii) 
the abuse of state power as bureaucrats protect smugglers who easily subvert 
government policy. iv) lack of a national textile policy which would prioritise the textile 
industry given its potential to contribute to the country’s development. Selective bailouts 
of some industries cannot be a substitute to a prioritised national textile policy. These are 
some of the issues that would be addressed if Uganda’s textile industry is to compete. 
Privatisation, which we discuss in the next section, has not corrected the situation. 
 
7.8 Privatisation and Constraints on the Textile Industry 
 
The data for this section was derived from three sources: Primary data through in-depth 
interviews with the CEOs of the selected firms, secondary data from documents and 
newspaper reports. Apart from liberalisation, the other policy under SAPs, which has had 
tremendous impact on the Uganda’s textile industry, is privatisation.  
 
Since the mid 1990s, the textile industry was privatised. While privatisation has created 
some dynamism and competition within the sector, the firms are still confronted with 
several constraints. Here, we look at the constraints faced by each of the major textile 
firms. Across the sector, the following constraints have been identified: i) availability and 
cost of finance, ii) the high cost of utilities, iii) low labour productivity, and iv) 
government procurement policy. We use the cases studies of NYTIL, (Picfare), now 
Southern Range Nyanza (Ltd), Phenix Logistics and ATM to illustrate the various 
dimensions of these constraints. 
 
First is the constraint of the availability and the cost of finance. Finance is a critical 
element in the implementation of industrial policy. Since the liberalisation of the financial 
sector, the level of interest rates on commercial loans in Uganda has been about 24 per 
                                                 
48 The most notable bailouts that have cost the government over $ 25 million include: trader Hassan 
Basajjabalaba receiving $ 11million, Apparel Tri Star, $7 million, GBK Dairy, $ 1.2 million and Sembule 
Steel Mills bailed out of $ 6.6 million debt, Weekly Observer, April 26 – May 2. 
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cent per year on average, which is far higher than the expected rates of return on 
investments in the textile sector. In addition, banks are unwilling to accept collateral 
outside Kampala and this makes it difficult for companies outside Kampala to borrow.  
 
In an interview with the CEO of ATM (Ltd), which is located outside Kampala, the 
problem of finance was stressed.  According to the official, the firm could not borrow 
nor could it use the option that most firms use: lobby President Museveni, who through 
presidential directive gives loans to private firms.  The problem is that financial matters 
are considered business “secrets” by the firms and therefore difficult to get the exact 
picture. It was found that government had advanced loans and loan guarantees to all 
firms in the sample. The failure of ATM Ltd to access further loans is not due to its 
location nor inability to lobby. ATM failed to honour its loans obligations. According to 
officials in MTTI, the major reason for inability to access loans is that ATM failed to 
produce audited accounts of the firm which would prove whether the firm was operating 
or not.49 
 
The CEO of ATM Ltd justifies this failure to account loan given to the firm on 
“Government taxation policy which makes business unprofitable hence inability to pay 
taxes and honour loan obligations”50 
 
All the three firms in the sample defaulted on the loans that had been advanced to them 
with the support of government.  The privatised firms defaulted on the loans for a 
period ranging from one to four years and demanded for partnership with government 
(NYTIL, Phenix and ATM).51 
  
Let us begin with experience of ATM.  First, at the time of privatisation, the buyers of 
ATM were supposed to pay 10 per cent of US$1.4 as down payment for the 
government’s 51 per cent shares, in 1994. The rest was to be paid within twenty-four 
months after possession failure of which the assets would be sold on open tender system 
and the losses shared on a proprata basis but this has not been done to date. ATM 
                                                 
49 Interview with Assistant Commissioner, Industry and Technology, Mr. Okulo Cankwo, 2 October 2007. 
50 Interview with Mr. Praful R. Patel, 10 August 2007. 
51 The New Vision, Tuesday, May 23, 2000. 
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acquired several loans aimed at boosting production after refurbishing the plant. 52 By 
2005, ATM had failed to pay the loans given for the purchase of the machinery and to 
service the loans.53 After the failure to pay the loans, the firm suggested that the 
government swaps the debt for equity in the company and then government divests itself 
later in case it gets disinterested in the business. Government rejected the offer. ATM is 
likely to collapse unless government supports it. 
 
Second, NYTIL was privatised in 1996. With fanfare, it was announced that NYTIL Ltd, 
Uganda’s and East Africa’s biggest integrated textile mill had been sold to Picfare 
Industries Ltd for US $ 10 million. Picfare would pay US $ 10 million over a four-year 
period. It was also announced that a sum of US $7 million would go to the government, 
as payment for its assets while US $3 million would be paid for shareholders.54 There was 
a brief appearance of a successful turn around of the firm. Picfare secured a long-term 
loan, guaranteed by government, from the Commonwealth Development Corporation 
(CDC) to the tune of US $7 million, for rehabilitation and modernisation of the mill.55 
The firm negotiated a number of contracts to produce textiles. Having started a garments 
department with 100 new industrial sewing machines imported from Japan, it had the 
capacity to supply the entire Uganda Army and police with uniforms.56 This was seen as a 
government policy to promote local investment. Within three years of its privatisation in 
1996, by 1999 the firm was limping as smuggled fabrics and second-hand clothing 
encroached on its local market.  
 
According to a report by British Executives Services Overseas (BESO), the audit firm 
that Picfare commissioned in 1999 to evaluate the performance of the firm, estimated 
that about 3.7 million square metres of textiles were being smuggled into Uganda 
monthly. In this review of Picfare’s three-year operation, BESO warned that if smuggling 
is not checked, Picfare would be forced to close.57 By the following year, the firm had 
failed to repay the loan and as government refused to bail it out, it collapsed and was sold 
                                                 
52 Wamakesi, Adams (1997), “ATM in $10 million Face-Lift”, The Monitor June 26. 
53 Biryabarema, Erias, (2005), “ATM Requests Government to Intervene in Woes”, The Monitor, March 28, 
p.19. 
54 Musoke, David (1996), NYTIL Sold to Picfare, The New Vision,  March 21.  
55 The Monitor (1997), NYTIL Lands $ 7 million Loan, November 06. 
56 Olwor-Atiya, Tolit, (1997), NYTIL Picfare Cuts Army Uniform Deal, The Monitor  
57 The Monitor, (1999), NYTIL Picfare Limps, Faced with Closure, Thursday, July 15 
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to a new firm, Nyanza Southern Range Ltd, though it retains NYTIL as a longstanding 
brand name. 
 
In an interview with the Corporate Affairs Director,58 a contrary explanation was offered 
as to why the firm failed to honour its loan obligations. According to him: 
“Government accepted to write-off the debt of US$ 4.9 provided that the 
restructured company would show commitment to invest not less than US $10 million 
in a delay of 5 years from 1st November, 2000, to enable the company gain regional 
and international competitiveness. This was to get rid of lack of foreign exchange due 
to over-reliance on local markets. The firm’s actual investment value is now US $ 30 
million”  
 
A rosy picture is painted of the operations of the firm but there is evidence that it 
defaulted on the CDC loan. Due to financial secrecy, it was hard to establish that the 
firm has actual investment of up to US $ 30 million. 
 
Third, the United Garments Industries Ltd (UGIL) now renamed Phenix Logistics (U) 
Limited, was established as a Joint Venture limited company in October 1965, in 
partnership between UDC and two Japanese firms, Yamato shirts and Marubeni, Lida.59 
It was among those firms nationalised during the 1972 “economic war”. In the era of 
privatisation, it was returned to its former partners with government divesting itself from 
ownership. Like ATM and NYTIL, it acquired loans, which it failed to pay. As in the 
case of ATM, Phenix Logistics has suggested that government re-acquires shares in the 
company on the basis of US$ 2.5 million it owes to UDB, which was guaranteed by the 
government, so that it becomes a public-private partnership. In addition, government 
would guarantee a US$5.5 million loan from Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
(JBIC) to UDB to finance Phenix Logistics. This has not happened because the Finance 
Act does not allow the government to buy shares in a private company.60  
 
In a recent directive, it was reported that “President Yoweri Museveni has directed that 
US $5 million (Ug Shs 8 billion) of taxpayer’s money be given to Phenix Logistics Ltd, a 
                                                 
58 Interview with Mr. Richard Mubiru, Corporate Director, Southern Range, 6 October 2007. 
59 The Republic of Uganda (1987,) Report of the Ad Hoc Administrative Committee of Inquiry into the Affairs of 
Textile Industries, Kampala, February, p.41 
60 The Monitor, (2005), Phenix Asks to Swap UDB debt with Shares, Friday, 9th September 
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private firm”61  This is contrary to the law that under the Public Finance and 
Accountability Act (2003) and the Local Authorities Act (1997), the Auditor General 
(AG) cannot audit companies where the government has no majority shares such as 
Phenix Logistics Ltd.  
 
While government guaranteed loans to these firms, in the context of low productivity 
and narrow markets, the firms failed to service the loans. This recent case is likely to 
follow the same trend. The productivity of skilled and semi-skilled labour in Uganda is 
much lower than that in established textile producing countries in the Far East and 
elsewhere, and yet average wages are higher than in those countries. For that reason, 
Uganda has not been able to use the cheap labour for competitive advantage.  
 
Further, the cost of utilities has implications for the competitiveness of firms. Uganda’s 
utility costs are above average, particularly with the privatisation of the Uganda 
Electricity Board (UEB) to ESKOM, South Africa. 
 
Several textile-producing countries have used government procurement policy to 
promote local industry.  In interviews with all the CEOs of the firms in the sample, it 
was reported that the partnership between government and the private sector is not 
sufficiently reflected in government procurement policy. As one of the CEOs 
commented: “There seems to be no systematic procurement government policy. All 
fabrics are imported from China while ignoring local producers who have the capacity to 
satisfy such procurement needs”62. Government departments and international agencies 
continue to buy imported products rather than support the local manufacturers. Without 
support from government, the textile firms have found it increasingly difficult to 
compete. In addition to the predominance of smuggled and used-cloths in the economy, 
privatisation has made little difference as government has continued to guarantee loans 
to all the above textile firms. As an indicator of failed privatisation, the firms have not 
honoured the payment of loans and defaulted.  Instead the firms have demanded to enter 
into partnership with government on the basis of these loans as equity.  
                                                 
61 Mugerwa Yasiin (2007), “Phenix to get Shs 8 b from taxpayers”, Saturday, September 29. 
62 Interview with Mr. Yuichi Kashiwada, Phenix Logistics, 22 September 2007. 
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It can be noted that privatisation of the textile firms has had contradictory outcomes. 
Uganda remains a very expensive business environment. Liberalisation and privatisation 
though necessary are not sufficient to enhance productivity and competitiveness in 
industry. Industry in its early stages of development needs to be propped up. The 
shortcomings in the privatised textile sector can be illustrated by it experience in export 
orientation drive. There are three major firms with aspirations to export textiles i) 
Apparel Tri Star (Uganda Ltd), ii) Phenix Logistics and iii) Nyanza Southern Range, 
(NYTIL). 
 
7.9 The Textile Industry and Export Orientation 
 
The data in this section is derived from interviews with CEOs, documents and 
newspaper reports. The data on Apparel Tri Star is mainly from newspaper reports and 
documents. This is because the firm closed in October 2006 and the former managers of 
the firm were not willing to be interviewed. Data on Phenix Logistics and Southern 
Range Nyanza is derived from interviews with CEOs, documents and Newspaper 
reports. 
 
The period of the 1980s to the 1990s witnessed a move away from ISI, in terms of 
rhetoric, to export orientation as policy prescription for industrialisation under SAPs. 
Export orientation means more than exports of manufactured products. The issues of 
internal integration (backward linkages), innovation capacity, technological interactions 
and the financing of industry must have an internal basis if there have to occur sustained 
export development. This is because ISI and EOI are not mutually exclusive. Yet, what is 
taking place in Uganda does not seem to take the internal basis of EOI seriously. 
 
The textile industry was identified as one of the strategic industries that would create 
multiplier effects in the economy, partly to address the unemployment problem and 
improve the country’s earnings both local and foreign.63 One particular firm that has 
been put at the forefront of the export of textile and clothing from Uganda, through the 
AGOA initiative, is Apparels Tri-Star (Uganda) Ltd.  
 
                                                 
63 Parliament of Uganda (2000), Report of Sessional Committee on Tourism, Trade and Industry on the Budget/Policy 
Statement for the Financial Year 2000/2001, (Kampala, August), p.15. 
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On the whole, to attract FDI, the government has had to offer generous incentives as 
indicated below. Apparel Tri-Star was one of the firms that benefited from this generous 
offer of incentives. As we note below, Tri-Star got over and above these incentives 
including government loans.  
 
Table 7.6: Incentives for Foreign Investment Capital allowances 
• Initial allowances on plant and machinery located in Kampala, 
Entebbe, Namanve, Jinja and 
Njeru…………………………..... 
•  
• 50% 
• Initial allowances on plant and machinery located outside 
Kampala, Entebbe, Namanve, Jinja and 
Njeru…………………... 
•  
• 75% 
• Start up costs spread over the first 4 
years………………………. 
• 25% 
• Scientific research 
expenditure…………………………………... 
• 100% 
• Training 
expenditure……………………………………………... 
• 100% 
• Mineral exploration 
expenditure…………………………………. 
• 100% 
Source: Uganda Investment Authority, 2001 
 
Apparels Tri-Star (Uganda) Limited was incorporated on April 22, 2002, “to produce, 
operate and manage factories of quality textiles, garments and related accessories for 
export for the local market and to exploit concessions and benefits granted to Uganda by 
United States and Europe for export of Apparels”. The firm entered a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Government of Uganda and “agreed to collaborate with each other 
and set up apparel and garment factories in Uganda for the export of ready-made 
apparels and garments”. 64 An examination of the details of the memoranda brings out 
the predatory character of the so-called FDI. Tri-Star turns out to be a private venture 
totally financed by Uganda government resources and directed from State House, 
(President’s office).  
 
Under the memorandum of understanding, the firm was heavily subsidised. The 
government had to fulfil a whole range of obligations, which make the firm look more 
like a public enterprise rather than an FDI venture. Among the obligations, which the 
government fulfilled, included: i) refurbishing the building identified to house a training 
centre, (former coffee processing plant), ii) recruit labour for the firm, iii) arrange 
                                                 
64 Government of Uganda (2002), Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Uganda and Apparels 
Tri-Star (Uganda) Limited, Kampala, pp 1-6. 
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conducive financial package and tax regime for the procurement of machinery, 
equipment, office and factory furniture, fabric, accessories and working capital by 
guaranteeing a loan on US $2.5 from Africa Development Bank (ADB), iv) government 
responsibility for payment of taxes and duties on machinery, equipment, furniture, 
vehicles v) secure work permits for Directors, Management staff and personnel, vi) avail 
Tri Star a full range of incentives, vii) secure local orders for government institutions, 
such as army, police and prisons, viii) government undertakes to pay 71.5 per cent of the 
railway transport charges of each container of raw materials and finished goods to and 
from Mombasa-Kampala during the first year of operation. On the other hand, Tri-Star 
would be obliged to run the factory.  
 
In 2002 it was announced with pomp and ceremony that a Sri Linkan investor, Kumar 
Dewapura, was bringing US $1.5 million to set up a garment factory in which he would 
train, then employ 1,000 rural women under his firm Tri-star as it championed Uganda’s 
export-led growth campaign.  
 
First, due to lack of local supplies of raw materials, cotton, had to be imported from 
China and has tried to import from South Africa and Nigeria because Uganda’s cotton 
was twice as expensive due to subsidised production elsewhere. Neither are imports from 
the above sources any cheaper given the transport costs involved. In general, the global 
apparel industry relies on cheap labour, cheap raw materials and cheap transportation 
costs to the market. Given Uganda’s landlocked location, the importation and 
transportation of raw materials was bound to make Uganda’s manufactures less 
competitive in export markets.65   
 
Second, with the intention of depending on cheap labour, Tri-Star instituted an appalling 
labour regime at the plant. The firm came under spotlight after 298 of its female 
employees, locally known as “AGOA girls”, were sacked because of going on strike. The 
parliamentary Committee on Finance was mandated by the parliament to look into the 
performance of the firm. The probe found out that the cause of the strike was poor 
working conditions such as poor remuneration, inadequate sanitation facilities, long 
working hours and other general working conditions.66  In disregard of the poor working 
                                                 
65 Milner, C, Morrissey O., and Rudaheranwa, Nicodemus (1998), “Protection, Trade Policy and Transport 
Costs: Effective Taxation of Uganda’s Exporters”, Centre for Research in Economic Development and International 
Trade (CREDIT), No.98/13. 
66 Parliament of Uganda (2004), Report of the Committee on Finance, Planning and Economic Development on 
Apparels Tri Star (U) Ltd, Kampala. 
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conditions as reason enough for strike, President Museveni justified the action saying 
that: “ I sacked those girls because of indiscipline and their actions would have scared off 
investors who had plans of setting up businesses here. They would have thought that the 
labour in Uganda is undisciplined”.67  By 2005, the working conditions for the employees 
had not improved and the firm does not recognise the right of union organisation by 
employees. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (CFTU) have pointed out that the management of Apparels Tri-Star and 
other firms in the country that are beneficiaries of AGOA programme have refused to 
recognise trade unions. Despite the repeated criticism, the government of Uganda has 
refused to bring its labour laws into compliance with the international standards of 
freedom of association, the right to organise and bargain collectively.68 Given the low-
end factory jobs that are being created, the process is not going to enhance local labour 
productivity. More depressing is the performance of Tri-Star in its export mandate.    
 
In the case of export drive, the firm’s performance in exports has been dismal given the 
amount of resources that have been put at its disposal. Although, Uganda qualified for 
the apparel provision in October 2001, by the end of 2002, it had not exported any 
goods under this rule. It was not until 2003 that President Museveni flagged off the first 
consignment of cotton shorts made by the Tri Star Apparel to the US worth US $ 156, 
000.69 Tri-Star’s exports by 2005 stood at about US $ 6 million a year.  AGOA reports 
indicate that, Lesotho, a country of only 2 million people, in 2004 exported goods worth 
US $ 320 million in apparels production to the US, over 99 per cent of it under AGOA.70  
 
The problem of exports is compounded by transport costs to the market. Delivery times 
are an issue in Tri-Star’s competitiveness. It takes about 120 days to deliver goods to 
USA from Uganda. From Asia it is between 78-90 days. Yet, it takes 2-4 weeks to ship 
out of Mombasa.71 Uganda as a land-locked country, confronts cost disadvantage as 
delays are incurred in having to ship overland. Rail and road transport are slow, whether 
via Mombasa or Dar es Salaam and consequently it is more difficult to ensure the on-
                                                 
67 Kakaire A. Kirunda, (2004), “I Sacked AGOA Girls – President”, The Monitor, March 22. 
68 The Monitor (2005), Discuss AGOA with US Leaders – ILO Boss, Tuesday, 13. 
69 Kasozi , Robert Adam (2003), “Tale of Rosy Figures and a Sick Economy”,  The Monitor, August 10. 
70 Lall, Sanjaya (2005),”FDI, AGOA and Manufactured Exports by a Landlocked, Least Developed 
African Economy: Lesotho”, The Journal of Development Studies, Vol.41, No.6. 
71 Uganda and AGOA: A Focus on Value Added Textile Exports, Planning Trip Report to Uganda, April 17-23, 
2005. 
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time delivery to buyer destinations.72 The dismal performance of textile exports can 
partly be explained by these constraints. 
 
As a result of the above memorandum of understanding, the firm was greatly subsidised 
by government, which provided capital in form of unsecured loans and all the above 
obligations. Far from being a source of finance, textile FDI has become a burden to 
government. During the start-up in mid-2002, the government provided a US $ 2.5 
million subsidy to cover renovations of the former coffee-processing factory.  By 2003, 
Tri-Star had received at least US $5.5 in financial support from government.73 
 
After operating for two years, (2004), Tri Stars auditors, Pannell Kerr Forster, came out 
with a damming review of its performance. Tri-Star had made losses to the tune of about 
US $ 4 million and according to the auditors it was technically bankrupt. According to 
the Auditors, Tri-Star received a loan of US $ 3.06 million from the government through 
UDB, repayable in six years and, although the loans are without a fixed repayment 
period, Tri-Star could not pay.  
 
The Senior Advisor on AGOA and Trade programme in Uganda, Mr. Onegi-Obel, 
argued for the government to have a greater role in the management of not only Tri-Star 
but also Phenix Logistics Industries, another AGOA-focused company.  In a letter to the 
Minister of Finance, Obel asked the Minister to “expedite the conversion of the 
exposure in Tri-Star Apparel Company and Phenix Logistics (UDB and BOU of Apex 
Funds) into government held equity so that the resulting entity can better be able to 
attract more and better financing. “The Minister should proceed to reconstitute new 
boards as necessary in consultation with the subject companies (Tri-Star and Phenix 
Logistics), so that they become a public-private partnership, which in essence, they were 
already” Obel urged.74 Tri Star Ltd collapsed in October 2006 due to the inability to 
produce profitably among other factors. 
 
Southern Range Nyanza (former NYTIL Picfare) has plans to participate more actively in 
the textile export programme, but focused at the regional level. The firm has made 
substantial investments and have a modern, fully integrated plant with spinning, weaving, 
                                                 
72 FIAS (2003), Uganda: Administrative Barriers to Investment: Update to the 1996 Road Map Study, Foreign 
Investment Advisory Service: A Joint Service of the International Finance Corporation and World Bank, 
Commissioned by Government of Uganda, P.114. 
73 Kanyegirire, Andrew (2003), “Will Tri-Star Sparkle?”, The New Vision, Thursday, July, 2003.  
74 Weekly Observer  (2004), “AGOA Firm Tri-Star, in Shs. 7bn (US $4m) Loss”, June 10. 
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finishing and garment manufacturing. The firm’s programme is more regional-focused. 
In 2002, the firm exported to Sportif in the US, but subsequently discovered that exports 
would not be profitable under the price structure subsequently offered by the company 
and stopped taking orders.  The policy at the firm is to consolidate regional capacity in 
East Africa. In an interview with the Corporate Director,75 Southern Range wishes to be 
a strong manufacturer and supplier of fabrics (particularly organic cotton) to the region 
after 2007 when AGOA rules stipulate that the fabric has to originate in the sub-Saharan 
countries in order for the apparel to carry a zero duty rate into the US. The firm has the 
capacity to participate in the regional market although it shall still confront the problem 
of transportation costs, which would impact on its competitiveness.76 
 
Phenix Logistics Uganda (Ltd) is currently the leading textile exporting firm after Apparel 
Tri Star closed in October 2006.  According to the CEO, the firm has positioned itself as 
an exporter of textiles based on organic cotton. Due to the limited internal market in 
Uganda, the firm policy exports up to 80% of its production. The exports have been 
mainly of T-shirts and pants to the United States market. Between February and 
September 2007, the firm exported T-shirts at the rate of 100,000 units per month 
earning on average US $ 135,000 monthly. The major challenge to the firm is the need 
for expanded capacity.77  
 
This study comes to the conclusion that Uganda cannot fully reap the benefits from 
AGOA unless domestic textile production is part and parcel of its own textile supply. 
Domestic sales would guarantee continued market availability in the case the AGOA 
market expires. Local textile manufacturers believe Uganda should pitch its war at home 
against mivumba by supporting local production. One of the constraints to be confronted 
is the lack of skills capacity. Given that Uganda does not have a textile college nor 
technical institutes to train employs in the various dimensions of the textile industry, the 
textile and apparel firms must provide their own training for the employees. An 
investment in education would certainly help the sector improve its performance and 
enhance its competitiveness. 
 
                                                 
75 Interview with Mr.Richard Mubiru, Corporate Director, Southern Range, Ltd, 6 October 2007. 
76 Uganda and AGOA: A Focus on Value Added Textile Exports, p.7. 
77 Interview  with Mr. Yuichi Kashiwada, 22 September, 2007. 
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Despite these shortcomings, the textile industry has witnessed the emergence of a 
number of intermediate institutions, which may be deployed constructively in the 
implementation of the industrial policy. Critical in this case are three business 
associations that impact on the textile industry: Uganda Manufacturers Association, 
(UMA), Textile Manufacturers Association of Uganda (TEMAU), Uganda Importers, 
Exporters and Traders Association (UGIETA) and The Uganda Ginners and Cotton 
Exporters Association, (UGCEA). Technical and market information is available to 
ginners from the UGCEA, buyers and international parent companies.78 Under SAPs, in 
terms of industrial governance, in 1988 the leading Ugandan entrepreneurs revived the 
Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA) to articulate their interests as discussed in 
chapter six, as well as to facilitate cooperation with the government. TEMU is currently 
the leading advocate for the national textile policy. 
 
The experience of the development of the textile industry elsewhere, especially East Asia, 
points to a different logic from that applied in the Ugandan context. In South Korea and 
Taiwan, cotton textile industry started with domestic discrimination first, and proceeded 
to the export market, based mainly on domestic firms. Foreign firms were obliged to 
enter partnerships with local firms and facilitate learning. In Uganda the practice is the 
opposite. 
 
To succeed in textiles exports there would be need for massive support of the textile 
sector by the state. This would include: duty-free access to imported materials (fabrics, 
dyes, machinery) at world prices, reliable power and telecommunication, efficient 
shipping line out of Uganda, access to cheap working and investment capital, 
modernisation and capacity expansion, incentives: tax holidays, reduced tax rates among 
other requirements.79  This is attributed to the lack of a textile policy. 
 
                                                 
78 RATES, (Regional, Agricultural Trade Expansion Support Programme), (2003), Cotton Textile Apparel 
Value Chain Report for Uganda, The RATES Centre, April, 
http://www.cottonafrica.com/downloads/Uganda_Cotton_VCA.pdf 
  
79 USAID/Uganda (2001), AGOA Textile and Garments – What Future for Uganda’s Exports, Technical 
Report: Uganda Private Sector Trade Policy Capacity Building Project, Submitted by Nathan-MSI Group, 
p.23. 
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Both the officials of MTTI and the CEOs of the textile firms interviewed see the textile 
industry as viable and not as a sunset industry.80  The CEOs interviewed were optimistic 
about the future of the textile industry. The optimism is based on a number of perceived 
advantages that Uganda possesses in the manufacture of cotton based textile. According 
to the CEO of ATM Ltd, “Uganda’s cotton is of good quality and competitive enough. 
With the concentration organic cotton, there is a very big future for textiles especially as 
there is a huge European market.”81  
 
The MTTI official was of a similar view arguing that:  
“In Ugandan situation, the textile industry should not be taken as a sun-set industry. 
Textiles are still strategic and have a very big potential. The problem is that there is 
little investment in the textile industry. … there still exist huge markets for textiles in 
Europe”82 
 
Externally, there exists opportunities for the growth of the textile industry. First, the 
industry can draw on the experience of earlier industrialisers. If you look at the 
industrialised countries be they in Europe, East Asia or US, the textile industry was one 
of the initial industries to be developed. But more important, while there is evidence that 
the “old” and labour-intensive textile industry turned into a high-tech and capital 
intensive industry since the 1960s, this did not stop the decline of the industry in the old 
industrial countries.83 The decline of the industry in developed countries offers 
opportunity for countries like Uganda based on cheap labour and cheap raw materials to 
fill the gap.  
 
Second, the textile industry is one of the largest industries globally. For instance, in 2003 
the European Union (EU) textile and fashion industry employed 2.5 million and 
generated a turnover of Euros 187 million, making it one of the largest industries in 
Europe.  Textiles have also become increasingly important in technical applications in 
fields such as construction, automotive industry, soil protection, plant protection, filters 
and applications.84 This in addition to the cultural expression by textiles, by the way 
                                                 
80 In a sunrise industry, output and demand are expanding while in a sunset industry; output, employment 
and demand are falling over time. 
81 Interview with Mr. Praful R. Patel. CEO, ATM Ltd, 10 August, 2007. 
82 Interview with Mr. Okulo Cankwo, Assistant Commssioner, MTTI, 2 October, 2007. 
83 Linder, H, Stephan, (2002), “Technology and Textiles Globalization”, History and Technology, Vol.18 (1), 
p.1. 
84 “Textile as concept, material and industry”, http://www.hb.se/ths/english/tic_english.pdf- 
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people dress, could extend Uganda’s opportunities for export and internal market. Third, 
the industry could take advantage of the United States opening of its markets for African 
manufactures under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).85 
 
While, both internally and externally, there are opportunities for expanded participation 
in the textile industry there occur several threats to Third World participants. First, there 
is the problem of production capacity, where local textile firms lack up to date 
technology, breakdown in production infrastructure and overwhelming poverty. The 
inability to purchase locally produced textiles, induces the importation of second-hand 
textiles which undermine local production. Second, while countries like Uganda could 
overcome the obstacle of rules of origin by improving production in the home market, 
there still remains the question of who captures the tariff rent.86  Third, there still remains 
the problem of the corporate control of the textile industry. In the context of lack of 
local capital, those who control the textile industry are not necessarily at the point of 
production.87 
 
7.10 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the practices of industrial policies in the textile 
manufacturing industry. The experience of the industry from the late colonial period to 
the adoption SAPs since the early 1980s, reveals several findings. 1) The textile import 
substitution over this period underlines the importance of state intervention in the 
initiation of the industrialisation process in economies such as Uganda. Through various 
institutions, state intervention resulted in a relatively successful textile industry. First, 
through UDC, the premier industrial development agency, the state mobilised resources 
and interacted with the private capitalists as expressed in the acquisition of NYTIL and 
prodded the entrepreneurs, particularly Asians, to invest in the manufacturing sector. 2) 
The experience of the textile industry also underlines the importance of particular 
institutions that mediated the state policy towards the textile industry – among these 
were: cotton research institutes, the co-operative unions and the marketing boards. This 
                                                 
85 AGOA refers to the Act signed into US law as Title 1 of the US Trade and Development Act on 18 
May, 2000. As a policy to induce Africa to embrace globalisation and policy changes, it offers increased 
preferential access for African exports to the United States. 
86 Olarreaga, Marcelo and Ozdenm Caglar, (2004), “AGOA and Apparel: Who Captures the Tariff Rent in 
the Presence of Preferential Market Access”, at http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/focus/gta/agoa.pdf-  
87 Hale Angela, (2002), “Trade Liberalisation in the Garment Industry: who is really benefiting?” 
Development and Practice, Volume 12, No.1 (February). 
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experience contradicts the generalised hostility advanced by neo-liberal theory towards 
state intervention. The state can play a positive role in the development process, 
particularly in the absence of an entrepreneurial class. The importance of state 
intervention was stressed by both bureaucrats and CEOs of the textile firms interviewed 
for this study. 
Third, the source and control over financial resources is a critical institutional mechanism 
for ensuring success of a given industrial policy. In this regard, the textile industry was 
relatively successful due to access to financial resources. The industry was supported, 
particularly in the first decade of the post-colonial period, by the creation of the first 
commercial bank in Uganda, the Co-operative Bank, (1963) and UCB, (1965), which 
financed the cotton sector on which the textile industry is based. The textile sector, like 
other sectors of the economy, was dealt a blow with the declaration of the “economic 
war” in 1972. The resulting collapse of ginneries and the deterioration of the quality of 
textiles, led to the shrinking of the textile industry. The political and economic turmoil 
during the 1970s and 1980s disrupted local processing and textile manufacturing 
capacities and led to a reduction of domestic cotton consumption, particularly ginning 
capacities.  
 
Fourth, since the early 1980s under SAPs there have been efforts to rehabilitate the 
textile industry and make it productive again. Despite the privatisation and liberalisation 
under SAPs, the state has continued to be involved in the textile industry, both at the 
financing and institutional level, by the institutional arrangements expressed by the 
creation of Cotton Development Organisation (CDO) to facilitate the cotton industry. In 
addition, other sector-specific institutions like the Uganda Cotton Ginners and Exporters 
Association (UCGEA) have been formed by private investors and interact with CDO to 
promote the textile industry. On the whole, however, the reforms and the policy shift 
from ISI paradigm to EOI by stressing export orientation of textiles have not been very 
successful, both due to policy inadequancy and structural constraints. ISI and EOI are 
not mutually exclusive. Instititutions and particular sets of connections that link the state 
to producers, and not just markets, are critical in eliciting entrepreneurship for industrial 
expansion. It is such institutions that can produce and coordinate the necessary skills to 
enhance capacity and competitiveness of the firms. 
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Finally, it could be argued that the efforts expended in reviving the textile industry in 
Uganda may be misdirected, given the limited returns on investment. The time for textile 
industry’s historical role as the initiator of the industrialisation process in LDCs may have 
passed. Clearly, the textile industry is now a sunset industry in the Ugandan context, 
contrary to the views of the CEOs of the textile firms and bureaucrats at MTTI 
interviewed. Given the incoherence of industrial policy which is exacerbated by the 
politics of patronage, there is need for a more focused industrial strategy which takes into 
account domestic and global factors. In the final analysis, the focus should shift to the 
identification of sunrise industries within particular sectors to promote which are 
commensurate with the country’s resources.   
 
The sectoral focus is important in that it brings out the particularity of given sectors 
whose activities is unified by related product groups and shared characteristics. Thus 
different sectors would require specific industrial policies. To illustrate the similarities 
and differences between sectors and why there must be a differentiated industrial policy, 
we examine the experience of the fish processing industry in the next chapter. 
 CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
8. THE FISH PROCESSING INDUSTRY 
 
8.0 Introduction 
 
This is the fifth and last data chapter of the study. It is based on primary data derived 
from in-depth interviews1 with officials at the Department of Fisheries Resources (DFR), 
and the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of the 3 selected fish processing firms as key 
informers and on secondary sources primarily documents and newspaper reports. The 
interviews were based on several issues: i) the natural resource base of the industry, ii) the 
problem of over-fishing, iii) export orientation of the industry, iv) the ownership of 
firms, v) financing of the firms, vi) creation of employment, vii) impact on local fisher 
people, viii) public-private interactions in the industry and ix) dependence on foreign 
markets and their implications for industrial policy practice. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the nature of past industrial policies towards 
the fish processing industry and the limitations of the current industrialisation based on a 
fragile natural resource in the context of a liberalised market. In terms of industrial 
policy, this sector is selected because of its nature, ownership structure and dependence 
on external markets, which would need some form of state involvement and regulation 
to ensure its sustainability. The natural resource base, which is fragile, may result in 
unsustainable exploitation of the resource if not checked by some forms of state 
intervention through embeddedness with the major private firms in the fishing industry. 
In this case, industrial policy with regard to fish processing can draw lessons from other 
fisheries to avoid making similar mistakes which may result in unsustainable harvest of 
the fish resource. The need for some forms of state involvement is to prod the fish 
processors to move beyond the export of raw fish in form of fish fillet to fish canning 
factories which would bring in more earnings and provide expanded employment. The 
fish processors are unlikely to move into the canning niche unless prodded through some 
form of industrial policy. 
 
                                                 
1 See interview schedules on fisheries policy-makers outline and that for fish processing firms (See 
appendices 10 and 11). 
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The fish processing sector is now the second largest export earner to coffee. It has 
experienced a dramatic boom since the early 1990s in the context SAPs and export-
oriented policy inducements. It stands out as an export oriented industrialisation (EOI) 
where market forces determine the type of production for export that takes place, 
producing within a country’s comparative advantage.  
 
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section is based mainly on documents 
and newspaper reports. It outlines the evolution of the fish processing industry from 
1950s when it was under state ownership and control to the present, when it is under the 
control of the private sector and FDI. The data for the rest of the sections is derived 
from primary data from in-depth interviews with selected firm owners and secondary 
sources mainly documents and newspaper reports. The second section examines the 
implications of relying on a natural resource and its sustainability for industrial drive. The 
third section discusses the export orientation, the strategies of securing the fish raw 
material and the control over markets by FDI. The fourth section discusses the 
implications of overwhelming dependence on export markets for the industry. Finally, 
we look at the notion of public-private partnership and its relevancy to the experience of 
the fish industry. The intention is to establish the institutional policy framework within 
which the industry has operated overtime and may be enhanced.  
 
8.1 The Structure of the Fishing Industry 
 
The fisheries sector is Uganda’s second largest export sector. The total value of fish 
exported from Uganda was US $100 million in 2004 up from an export of US $90 
million in 2004.2 The 10 active fish plants in 2003 represented a total investment of US $ 
38 million and employed about 2,650 people of which 34 per cent were women. 
Uganda’s greatest resource of exportable fish is Lake Victoria. The lake is shared with 
Kenya and Tanzania: Uganda, 43 per cent, Kenya, 6 per cent and Tanzania 51 percent. In 
addition, other productive waters bodies include: lakes Kyoga, Albert, Edward and 
George, Albert Nile, some of the 160 minor lakes, rivers, dams, ponds and wetlands, all 
estimated to cover an area of about 44,000 square kilometres.3  But for the purpose of 
this study, the focus shall be on Lake Victoria fisheries and its fish processing firms.  
                                                 
2 The Monitor (2005), “Huge Export Demand Depletes Fish Stocks”, February 22. 
3 Uganda Government (1999), Final Report: Uganda Fisheries Master Plan Study, Entebbe, July, p.15-16 
 265 
 
At 2003, the average production of fish from the main bodies in Uganda appears to have 
stabilised at around 220,000 to 230,000 tonnes, with the major species being Nile Perch, 
Tilapia and Mukene.4 By February 2005, reports from the fisheries department indicated 
that earnings from fish export had reached US $105 million, up from US $ 89 million in 
2003 being the highest rise in five years. This is attributed to the expanded processing 
capacity with the rise from 9 to 14 fish factories.5  Below is a table indicating when the 
processors were registered and where they are located. 
Table 8.1   List of Established Fish Processing Plants in Uganda. 
Date 
approved 
Name of the Fish Processor Location/City/Region 
U02/1994 Greenfields (U) Ltd Kampala 
U03/1994 Gomba Fishing Industries Ltd Jinja 
U04/1995 Ngege Limited Kampala 
U05/1996 Hwan Sung Ltd Kampala 
U05/96 Uganda Fish Parkers Ltd  Kampala 
U07/96 M/S Marine &Agro Export Processing  Jinja 
U08/96 Byansi Fisheries Co.Ltd Kalisizo 
U09/96 M/S Uganda Marine Products Ltd Kampala 
U10/2004 Intercontinental Fish and Foods Entebbe 
U12/2000 Entebbe Handling Services Ltd (ENHAS) Entebbe 
U14/2001 M/S   Masese Fish Parkers Ltd Jinja 
U15/2003 Tropical Fish Industries Ltd Kampala 
U16/2004 Igloo Food Industries Ltd Kampala 
U17/2004 Roka Bonds Ltd Kampala 
U18/2004 Oakwood Investments Ltd Kampala 
U19/2004 Fresh Water Fish Exporters Ltd Rakai 
U20/2004 M/S Unifoods Ltd Jinja 
U21/2004 M/S Pearl Fish Processors (U) Ltd Entebbe 
Source: Fisheries Department, Entebbe. 
                                                 
4 FIAS (2003), Uganda: Administrative Barriers to Investment: Update to the 1996 Road Map Study, Foreign 
Advisory Services, (FIAS) in Joint Service of International Finance Corporation and the World Bank 
commissioned by the Uganda Government, p.129.     
5 The Monitor (2005), “Fish Export Earnings Hit $105 million Mark”, February 8. 
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 The vast majority of Uganda’s exports go to the European Union, (EU), with lesser 
amounts going to the USA and Japan. The Uganda government’s role is mainly policy-
making, regulatory and administrative and not production. Fish processing and export 
has evolved over a period of time. 
Table 8.2:  Export of Fish and Fish Products from Uganda 1991-2006 
YEAR QUANTITY (tonnes) VALUE (‘000 US$) 
1991    4,751.00            5,308.70 
1992    4,831.00            6,450.50 
1993    6,037.00            8,806.90 
1994    6,563.00          14,768.90 
1995  12,970.00          25,902.80 
1996  16,396.40          39,780.90  
1997    9,839.00          28,800.00 
1998  13,805.25          34,920.79  
1999  13,379.98          36,608.30 
2000  15,876.38          34,363.14 
2001  28,672.17          80,398.47 
2002  25,169.14          87,574.36 
2003  25,110.60          86,343.28 
2004  30,057.46        102,917.25 
2005  36,614.80        143,618.24 
2006  32,855.47        136,850.87 
Source: Department of Fisheries Resources (DFR), 2006 
 
As the table above shows, there were increased exports of fish and fish products from 
the mid 1990s as the fish processing plants that had been established became fully 
functional. In 2003 there was a slight decrease in the quantity in tonnes (25,080) and 
value in ‘000 USD to 86,088. In 2004 the tonnage increased to 30,000 and the value to 
105,000 USD. By the end 2005, there was further expansion in quantity exported to 
36,000 tonnes and value of USD 143,618,000.  Thus despite complaints by fish 
processors about the reduction in fish raw material supply, tonnage of fish exported is on 
the increase.6 The fish processing industry has evolved over time. 
 
                                                 
6 Data from theUganda Fish Processors & Exporters Association, (UFPEA), 2006 and DFR, 2006. 
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8.1.1 The Evolution of the Fish Processing Industry 
 
The earliest establishment of the modern fish processing industry in Uganda can be 
located in the late colonial period with the construction of a fish processing plant by the 
colonial state in 1950, The Uganda Fish Marketing Corporation (TUFMAC) located in 
Western Uganda at Lake George. The plant received supplies of fresh fish from Lake 
George, Kazinga Channel and lake Edward fisheries. Like most of the industrial sector, 
the firm was owned by the state and operated under UDC, the premier agency for 
industrialisation. The plant produced frozen fillets of tilapia and carried out substantial 
trade in whole frozen fish and salted, smoked products. These products were distributed 
throughout East Africa and beyond. Agents in Zaire, (Democratic Republic of Congo) 
(DRC), Zambia and Aden received consignments of TUFMAC fish.7 
 
Several fish processing plants were established in the western region. These included: a) 
Ankole Fisheries, 1960, owned by Mr. Browser a former Manager of TUFMAC, at 
Katungura on the Bushenyi side of Kazinga channel and handled frozen whole fish and 
fillets. b) Uganda Fresh Fish, established in 1967, at Kabatoro near lake Katwe and dealt 
in frozen whole fish and fillets. Both firms marketed their products throughout East 
Africa, with Ankole fisheries exporting some of its products to USA, (Chicago).  
 
The on set of “economic war” under the Amin regime, made it difficult for these firms 
to operate. By the end of 1972, both Ankole Fisheries and Uganda Fresh Fish had ceased 
to operate. TUFMAC, by 1974, following the removal of its long-term selling and 
managing agents, Baumanns, was near collapse. Attempts to revive TUFMAC through 
UDC failed. The plant closed for good in 1977. There were three private fish processing 
firms that emerged in the 1970s:  i) Frozen Foods Ltd, (1973-74), fish processing plant, 
which operated with equipment transferred from the old Ankole Fisheries plant, with 
tilapia supplied from lake Victoria. Tilapia frozen fillets were produced for local 
supermarkets and hotels and to a limited extent, export to Nairobi. ii) Afro-Fish Ltd, 
which produced frozen fillets of tilapia for local supermarket trade but obtained tilapia 
                                                 
7 Reynolds J.E and Ssali, W.M, (1990) “Lake Victoria Fisheries Industrialisation: Recent Developments in 
Uganda”, http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/AD136E/AD136E00.htm.  The history of the processing 
industry is drawn from this document. 
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from lake Wamala. iii) FishCo Ltd, which was also engaged in the frozen tilapia fillet 
trade on a small scale.  
 
None of these Kampala-based concerns were able to continue in business for long given 
the worsening situation of misrule and economic disarray in the 1970s. All operations by 
these firms had ceased by 1976. The ensuring period of strife and insecurity, which lasted 
up until the mid-1980s, was characterised by a virtual collapse of the national economy 
and activity in terms of fisheries industrialisation (packaging) was almost nil. Attempt was 
made to revive the processing of fish in early 1980s by the construction of Kampala Ice 
Plant (1981) with the original plan being for the plant to function both as ice production 
facility and a central fish market for city residents. 
 
This brief outline of the evolution of the fish processing industry in Uganda points out a 
number of things. First, apart from TUFMAC, a parastatal, the firms involved in the fish 
processing were privately owned. Second, the principal raw material for processing was 
tilapia. Third, like the current situation, most of the fillet and frozen fish products were 
for exports, though there was a substantial internal market. Thus, the difference between 
this early period and the present can be seen in volumes of exports and their dependence 
on European Union market, the principal raw material being the Nile perch instead of 
tilapia both being natural resources, minimal state involvement in the fish production, 
distribution or processing but being only a regulator and nearly all fish processing firms 
being foreign owned (FDI).  
 
Yet the success of TUFMAC brings out the underlying factor of the centrality of the 
state in the initiation of the fish processing industry in Uganda. In the absence of local 
capital and the dominant influence of state-led development paradigm, the state became 
central in the formation and operation of the fish processing industry. 
 
The fish processing industry being natural resource-based, and at present owned mainly 
by FDI and dependent almost totally on export markets, has consequences for industrial 
policy and the industrialisation process in the country. What follows is a detailed 
examination of the implications of natural resource-based exploitation as a basis of 
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industrialisation and the dependence on export trade for industrial policy. The interviews 
were focused on the issues outlined in the introduction of this chapter. 
 
8.1.2 The Natural Resource Base of Fish Processing 
 
The fish processing industry in Uganda is based on the exploitation of naturally grown 
fish, particularly Nile perch, for export. During the late 1950s and 1960s, the Nile perch 
was introduced into the lake Victoria from its natural habitant of lake Albert in Uganda. 
Until 1979, the perch constituted only an insignificant part of the total catch of about 
100,000 tonnes to about 500,000 tonnes in 1989. Nile perch being a predator, feeds on 
most of the species of fish in the lake. From being multi-species fishery, the fisheries of 
lake Victoria is today basically a “three species fisheries”: one third being a sardine-like 
fish, R.argentea, locally known as mukene, ten per cent tilapia and the rest Nile perch.8 
Table 8:3 :  Fisheries Production Estimates for Uganda 1999-2003 in ‘000 tonnes 
Species 
English Name 
Local Name 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
African 
Lungfishes 
Mamba   9,192    5,755   5,796   5,000  4,566 
Characins nei Sliver slides 13,165   10,331 10,331   7,100   9,491 
Cyprinids nei Mukene,  17,600   12,181 12,182 12,000   8,261 
Freshwater nei  -            2          2   1,800       58 
Freshwater 
Siluroids nei 
Semutundu   1,000 - - -         1 
Naked catfishes Male   8,564      4,375    4,375   4,800   5,723 
Nile Crocodile Gonya -         508      900 -         2 
Nile Perch Mputa 89,203     87,257 88,881 90,698 112,804 
Tilapias nei Tilapia 84,540     96,468 96,172 98,000  97,330 
Torpedo-shaped 
catfishes nei 
   2,833        2,987   2,987   2,500    1,697 
TOTAL  226,097 219,356 220,726 221,898 239,931 
Source FAO Fish Stat (Name Source: www.fishbase.org) 
(Source Uganda Exporters Promotion Board (UEPB), July 2006). 
 
                                                 
8 Jansen, Eirik (1997), “Rich Fisheries – Poor Fisherfolk: Some Preliminary Observations about the Effects 
of Trade and Aid in the Lake Victoria Fisheries”, Socio-Economics of the Nile Perch Fishery on Lake Victoria, 
Nairobi, pp 3-4.  
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As seen from the table, the major species harvested in 2003 were the Nile perch, local 
name Mputa, accounting for 42% of production, the tilapia, local name Ngege and 
Mukene. 
 
The first major problem for the fish processing industry, the continued export and 
expansion of the Nile perch is the unsustainable regional over-exploitation of the 
fisheries.9 Being a natural resource with open access, the effect of the fishers on lake 
Victoria fishery is akin to the notion of “tragedy of the commons”.10 Typically, with ease 
of entry by fisher folk, the fisheries of the lake are exploited by increasing numbers of 
fishermen with little regard to the sustainability of the fish resource. This free-for-all 
situation in the lake can only lead to the depletion of the fish stock. Though there have 
been the penetration of bigger capital in the fisheries and there are limits to participation 
by various fisher people, this has not decreased the threat of depletion of the fisheries.11 
Second, the increasing profits in the sector have attracted new entrants and most often 
with more efficient gears increasing the possibility of resource depletion.12  
 
During the interviews with the CEOs of fish firms and Fisheries officials, several views 
were expressed on the problem of relying on the fisheries natural resource base. 
According to Dick Nyeko13, the concern with the depletion of the fisheries is simply 
alarmist as the harvesting of fish is sustainable due to thousands of tonnes of fish that 
can be harvested and the possibility of fish farming.  He argued that: 
“Uganda is blessed with sustainable fish raw materials averaging between 300-400 
thousands of tonnes annually. The country has also the capacity to increase 
output through fish farming which the government is actively promoting at the 
                                                 
9 Kaelin, J., Andrew and Cowx, G., Ian (2002), “Outline of the Path Forward in Uganda’s Fisheries 
Sector”, prepared for the Presidential Conference on Export Competitiveness, February. 
10 The notion of the  “Tragedy of the Commons” popularised by Garrett Hardin, (1968) article in Science, 
No.162, pp 1243-48, whereby as rational beings there is a tendency of individuals to maximise their gain, 
applies to the fisheries. The commons as seen as an open-access, essentially unregulated or anarchic fishing 
regime. In case of lake Victoria, over-fishing has taken place because there are too many people after a 
limited fishery resource, without adequate signals of trouble and incentives to stop.  The idea that fishery 
problems in Lake Victoria might be “tragedy of the commons” has also been widely reflected in writing of 
critical observers, for example, Gibbons, Peter, (1997),  “ Of Saviours and Punks: the Political Economy of 
Nile Perch Marketing Chain in Tanzania”, CDR Working Paper, 97. No.3, Copenhagen, Centre for 
Development Research, June.  
11 Asowa-Okwe, Charles (1996), “Modern Fisheries and its Impact on Access to and Common Property 
Management: A Case Study of Lake Victoria Fisheries – Uganda, A paper at a symposium on Common 
Property Mangement, Uganda International Conference Centre, Kampala, 26-28 March, P.20. 
12 Kabege, Juliet (2001) Industrial Fish Processing and Sustainability of Uganda’s Nile Perch Fishery, MSC in 
International Fisheries Management, Norwegian College of Fishery Science, University of Tromso, p.5. 
13 Interview with the Commissioner of Fisheries, Entebbe, Mr. Dick Nyeko, 4 October, 2007. 
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moment. Fish is a renewable resource as it can be farmed and reproduced unlike 
gold or copper which are exhaustible resources. ”  
 
Given the increasing importance the fish processing industry in national income and 
employment, the Fisheries Department’s major focus has been on increased regulation 
through the application of the Fish Act to make sure that the fish resource is sustainably 
harvested. As he observed: “in natural resource management, a resource that is 
undervalued shall be mismanaged” The Fisheries Department ensures that the 
beneficiaries of the resource such as fish firms avoid buying immature fish. This is done 
at three levels: i) collectively through the firms’ association, the Uganda Fish Processors 
and Exporters Association (UFPEA). ii) through regulation/inspection at the factories, 
and iii) through community management by establishing Beach Management Units 
(BMUs) at the fish landing sites.  
 
This optimistic official view on the sustainability fish harvesting  is in contrast to the 
reality on the ground. The reality is that increasingly, some firms have failed to raise 
enough fish raw materials for sustainable processing. In an interview with the CEO14 of 
two firms (Gomba Fish Industries and Unifoods (U) Ltd), it was observed that: 
“Liberalisation of the industry has resulted in very high competition for the fish 
raw material. The industry has been liberalised without being certain of fish 
stocks in the lake. The result has been almost total extinction of certain fish 
species like the tilapia. The problem is over-fishing. The whole fish industry is in 
a mess”   
 
He pointed to the drop in the tonnage of collected from the fishermen. For instance, 
where a fish trader previously collected 300kgs of fish, the average had dropped to 80kgs.  
 
Secondly, recent research points to the progressive extinction of the various fish species 
to the extent that there remains only the Nile perch providing perhaps 90 percent of the 
processed product. Paul Namisi observes that, “with over-fishing and increased 
economic activities threatening the depletion of the fish stock in the lake Victoria, there 
is increasing need than before for the attention to be focused onto the underlying forces 
                                                 
14 Interview with the Managing Director, Mr. Yusuf Karmali,  3rd December, 2007. 
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behind the threat”.15 Among these forces is the intense competition for the supply of fish 
to the fish processing plants.  
 
The introduction of Nile perch in the lake spawned a whole new industry related to 
capture, processing and subsequent export of the perch fillet. The urge to earn the scarce 
foreign exchange had led the government to licence about 20 factories with the capacity 
to process 20 tonnes each, on average of fresh fish per day, 14 of which are operational. 
Though each fish processing plant has been allocated an amount of fish, which they are 
permitted to process per day through the quota system, most of these factories have an 
installed capacity, which is twice the permitted quota.16 Given the inability of the state 
bureaucrats to monitor the compliance to these quota restrictions, fish processing plants 
have strived to go beyond the quotas and satisfy their firms’ over-capacities. This has led 
to intense competition for the raw material hence putting added pressure on the fisheries 
with consequences for both production and the traditional small-scale traders and 
artisanal processors.  
 
The competition for the fish raw materials has been occasioned by the excess industrial 
capacity due to the demand by processors for the unprocessed resource. This has 
resulted in the rise of Nile perch prices, the dwindling of local demand with the local fish 
chain participants – fishmongers and traditional processors, squeezed out of the chain. 
Competition has provoked vertical integration as factories strive to establish greater 
control over chain resources. The factories by capturing over 90 per cent of the Nile 
perch landings have provoked the demise of many local fishmongers and traditional 
processors and hastened concentration at harvesting level via the propagation of tied 
contracts.17  
 
                                                 
15 Namisi, Paul (2001), Socio-Economic Implications of the Fish Export Trade on the Fishers and the Fisheries of Lake 
Victoria in Uganda, Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project Phase II, Fisheries Resource Research Institute, 
(FRRI), p.11.  
16 Bahiigwa, Godfrey and Muramira, Eugene (eds) (1999), Capacity-Building for Integrating Environmental 
Considerations in Development Planning and Decision-Making with Reference to the Fishing Industry in Uganda, 
Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC), Makerere University, Kampala, p.35. 
17 Thorpe, Andy and Bennett, Elizabeth (2004), “Market-Driven International Fish Supply Chains: The 
Case of Nile Perch from Africa’s Lake Victoria”, International Food and Agri-busness Management Review, Vol.7, 
Issue 4, pp 46-47. I deal with the issue of contracts in details in how they are applied in the competitive 
strategy of the fish firms., in chapter in the sub-section on competitive strategies. 
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The Commissioner of Fisheries18 observed that the excessive demand for the Nile perch 
was positive for the fisher people. He argued that: 
“The existence of several fish processors is good for competition. The market 
rewards everyone. The efficient firms shall continue operating as others close. 
The liberalisation of the fish trade has led to prices rise 7 fold between 1999-
2007. Rather that complain about increased fish prices, the solution is to increase 
farmed fish as opposed to caught fish. Why? Price for fish is now good. While 
liberalisation has pushed people, there has also occurred an adjustment. People 
can now eat fish frames19 since most of the fillet is exported”. 
This view does not take into consideration the ruinous impact of over-fishing in the 
effort to earn the “good” prices in the context of incompetent regulatory regime. 
The rise in prices for the Nile perch has enticed many people into fishing. But due to the 
inability to afford the relevant gear and take advantage of the rising fish prices, the poor 
fisher people have engaged in illegal, unrecorded and unreported fishing based on the 
widespread use of illegal fishing methods, which can only lead to over-fishing and 
possible depletion of fish stocks. Unregulated fishing has contributed almost entirely to 
the decline of the native fisheries of Lake Victoria.  
 
The pressure on the natural resource has been compounded by the inadequate and 
incompetent regulatory authorities and management institutes contrary to the officials of 
the Fisheries Department. Sustainable fisheries trade is not possible if there is no 
sustainable fisheries management. With the urge to earn export revenue, the state has 
concentrated on ensuring that fish trade is not interrupted without realising that the basis 
for fish trade is a well-managed fishery. Through vessel licensing and issuing of permits, 
the state aims at controlling access to the fishery. To the bureaucrats and the enforcers, 
these have turned out to be a bonanza and the regulations are used for generating local 
revenues for fisheries management in local government.20   
 
Contrary to the official view of the fish processing industry, the reliance on a natural 
resource such as fish to industrialise has several drawbacks. In the context where 
measures to ensure its sustainability are absent, intense competition for the resources is 
                                                 
18 Interview with Mr.Dick Nyeko, Commissioner of Fisheries, 4th October, 2007. 
19 Locally known as mugongowasi meaning bare bones (fish skeletons) 
20 Keizire, B, Blackie (2004), Policy Research – Implications of Liberalisation of Fish Trade for Developing Countries: A 
Case Study for Uganda, Report to Food and Agricultural Organisation, (FAO) of the UN, Rome, pp 15-16. 
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prevalent, incompetent regulation and management of the resources points to a dead-end 
of sustained industrialisation. The situation in Lake Victoria is not sustainable. 
 
The over-exploitation of the fisheries resources in Lake Victoria is real and may lead to 
the depletion of the fish on which the processing industry mainly depends. There is 
strong evidence that the Nile perch that forms the main fishery (over 70%) is being over-
fished. The average landed fish had declined from over 50 kg weight in 1980, to less than 
10 kg weight in 1996. Catch rate has been in decline. In Ugandan part of Lake Victoria, 
between 1993 and 1998 the commercial fish catch fell by over 20 per cent.21 
 
The optimistic Commissioner of Fisheries was of the view that this decline in the catch 
rate should not be seen as the end of the road. Basing on global projection, he argues 
that the demand for fish is ever on the increase. According to him:  
“Fish is one of the commodities whose demand is ever increasing given the 
health concerns against red meat in the developed countries. Fish trade is now in 
excess of US $50 billion. The global demand shall continue to increase” 
 
According to the Commissioner, the solution to the depletion of fish stocks is three-fold: 
i) strict management of capture fish, ii) commercialisation of fish farming and iii) 
expansion of domestic demand. For the expansion of domestic demand, he pointed to 
the rapid expansion of fish farming by the Ugandan middle class which in the last 10 
years has expanded at the average of 300 per cent per annum.22  
 
In line with the commissioner’s thinking, the CEO of Greenfield Ltd, who is also the 
current Chairman of the fish processors association, The Uganda Fish Processors and 
Exporters’ Association (UFPEA), while concerned with depletion of fish raw material 
resource, made two suggestions in order to enhance the fish trade: one for increased 
production and the other technical. “To sustain fish export trade, what is needed is re-
investment in improving processing set-up of machinery to minimise wastage and firm 
expansion into fish farming”23 According to CEO of Gomba Fish Industries, the major 
                                                 
21 Namisi, Paul (2001), Socio-Economic Implications of Fish Export Trade…. p.11. 
22 Interview with Mr. Dick Nyeko, Commissioner of Fisheries, 4 October, 2007. 
23 Interview with Mr. Philip Borel, the CEO of Greenfield Ltd, 24 September, 2007. 
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problem can be identified as that of over-licensing of fish processing plants. There has to 
be a way of reducing the number of firms in fish processing.24  
 
While this may be the case, any country basing its industrialisation on the harvesting of a 
natural resource must take note of its fragility. Lessons could be drawn from the 
experience of Canadian fishing industry. The once abundant North Atlantic cod may be 
commercially extinct. Canada has closed its cod fishery to allow the fish to repopulate 
and practically putting 30,000 people out of work. Western Atlantic blue fin tuna are 
down to only 10 per cent of their former abundance. Now each blue fin commands US 
$270 per kilogram in Japan – a bounty that only adds to the desire to hunt it down.25  
The continued hunt and reliance on Nile perch can only lead to its depletion with 
attendant result that the fish processing industries shall have to close down. The 
uncontrolled exploitation of the natural resource has seriously reduced the fish stocks. 
The accurate stock assessment on size, structure, growth and mortality is hardly 
available.26  
 
The export oriented nature of the fish processing industry raises another set of questions 
for industrial policy. The almost total lack of internal market for the filleted fish in the 
country implies absence of backward linkages. One sure market is the local market. One 
has very limited control over foreign markets. This is discussed in the next section. 
 
8.2 Export Orientation of the Fish Processing Industry  
 
The fish processing industry in Uganda is basically export-oriented and is driven by three 
factors: i) the health concerns against red meat in Europe, ii) the depletion of European 
fish stocks and iii) the rising prices which encourage fishermen to hunt-down the fish.27 
 
Prior to the 1980s at the onset of SAPs, there was limited state involvement in the 
production, marketing or processing of fish. The limited participation was through 
TUFMAC, a parastatal organisation under UDC. Due to lack of direction, effective 
                                                 
24 Interview with Mr.Yusuf Karmali, the CEO of Gomba Fish Industries,  3 December 2007. 
25 Namisi, Paul (2001), Socio-Economic Implications of Fish Export Trade…p.11. 
26  Mitullah, Winnie, (no date), “Lake Victoria’s Nile Perch Fish Cluster: Institutions, Politics and Joint 
Action”, IDS Working Paper, p.18.  
27 Interview with Mr. Dick Nyeko, Commissioner of Fisheries, 4th October, 2007. 
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control and faced with stiff competition on the local and export markets, UDC had to 
underwrite the losses of the subsidiary. TUFMAC, however, was inspirational to local 
market participants through its efforts to improve the quality of its own salted fish, 
which forced its competitors to adopt the same methods, thus strengthening the Congo 
market. It pioneered the filleting, packaging and freezing process in Uganda and although 
its own sales efforts were ineffective, it paved way for the gradual shift to frozen fish in 
the local market.28  Thus, the fishing industry was mainly internally market focused. The 
state was mainly involved in licensing of fishing units. Most of the processors collapsed 
following the “economic war” of 1972. While there existed a parastatal for 
manufacturing the fishing gear, the Uganda Fishnet Manufacturers Ltd, with its collapse 
in the 1970s, the supply of fish gear was licensed to the private importers.29  
 
Two major factors account for the increased export orientation of the Uganda fish 
processing industry. First is the existence of massive market for fish in Europe, the 
Middle East, the Far East, USA and other developed countries as there has been a shift 
in consumer preference from red to white meat as argued by the Commissioner of 
Fisheries above. Second, fish trade liberalisation that has attracted investors in industrial 
fish processing firms to satisfy the expanding fish market.30 
 
The boom in Nile perch fishery has sparked-off large-scale investments in industrial 
processing for exports since the early 1990s. The global trade driven by market forces is 
intensifying and shifting to small-scale fisheries of Ngege (tilapia) and Mukene (sardine-like 
fish), although the later are mainly for the internal market.31  Apart from the virtually 
untapped supply of the large-sized Nile perch, the development and expansion of export-
oriented production and marketing of the Nile perch has been driven by the demand for 
quality fish by consumers in industrialised countries which continued to grow as fish 
supplies in northern waters dwindled.32 The optimism of the continued availability of the 
European market is that fishing is sent for even bigger expansion because of rising health 
                                                 
28 Government of Uganda (1969), Report of the Committee on the Marketing of Livestock, Meat, Fish and their 
Products in Uganda, Kampala, p.95. 
29 Biribonwoha, Alex (1991), “A Review of Fisheries Inputs in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania”, a paper 
presented at the UNDP/FAO workshop, Bujumbura, April, pp24-25. 
30 Keizire, Boaz, (2004), Policy Research – Implications of Liberalisation of Fish Trade… p.55.  
31 Namisi, Paul, (2002) “Socio-Economic Implications of Fish Trade and Exports in Uganda”, a paper 
presented at Colline Hotel, Mukono – LVEMP and NARO, National Scientific Conference, p.1 
32 Kabege, Juliet (2001), Op Cit., pp10-11. 
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awareness with many consumers, especially in the West, now preferring white to red 
meat.33  
     
The second factor in the expansion on fish exports markets is the SAPs policy of 
liberalisation aimed at encouraging private investment through tariff reduction and 
provision of tax incentives. The government also relaxed restrictions on profit 
repatriation for foreign investors and offered assurances of the security of their assets 
against any form of expropriation. The industrial fish processors were thus induced by 
profit maximisation which was secured and was further motivated by the enabling 
environment provided by government, including tax exemption on imported machinery 
and tax holidays and the availability of cheap human resources.34  According to CEOs of 
the selected fish firms, the liberalisation of the fish industry and the over-licensing of fish 
firms vis-à-vis the limited fish stocks in Lake Victoria has resulted in the depletion of the 
fisheries.35 
 
Internally, liberalisation resulted in increased supply of required gear; of types and sizes 
meeting regulations, on the market as import restrictions were lifted. Hitherto, gill net 
supply was a monopoly of the Uganda Fishnet Manufacturers Ltd, which could only 
meet 30% of the overall demand of nets. With liberalisation, the demand for fishing gear 
could easily be satisfied by the expanded importation by the private sector.  This policy is 
one of the stimulants for the growth of the fish-processing sub-sector.36 While there has 
been expanded importation of fishing gear, the implication is that Uganda Fishnet 
Manufacturers Ltd collapsed and closed shop resulting in loss of jobs and the possibility 
of locally produced fishing gear. 
 
Perhaps it was the state policy on the export of unprocessed whole fish that prompted 
the establishment of several processing plants in Uganda. According to Nsibe-Bulega, et 
al in 1991, Uganda government announced a ban of exports of unprocessed whole fish 
                                                 
33 Interview with Mr.Dick Nyeko, Commissioner of Fisheries, 4 October, 2007. 
34 NARO (1997), Fish Commodity Systems Economics (Uganda) Project, FIRI Socio-Economics Sub-Programme, 
Fisheries Research Institute, Jinja, October, p.24. 
35 Interviews with Mr.Philip Borel and Mr. Yusuf Karmali as above. 
36 Odongkara, 0, Konstantine (2001), Poverty in the Fisheries: A Framework for Analysis and Intervention for Lake 
Victoria, Uganda, PhD Thesis submitted to the University of Hull, United Kingdom, p.315-316. 
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to Kenya aimed at curbing the sale of unprocessed fish to foreign markets. 37  This 
marked the beginning of the era of fish export ban in Uganda. The Uganda  government 
pronouncement and the ban of sale of unprocessed whole fish to Kenya in early 1990s, 
prompted fish processing firms in Kenya to shift and start up industrial processing firms 
in Uganda.38  
 
Internally, however, there remains lack of internal markets coupled with a rudimentary 
cold storage and marketing network which makes fresh and frozen fish distribution to 
the inland population in the country, with a very low effective demand, very difficult.39 
The local communities prefer whole fish as opposed to fillet that all fish processing fish 
are producing. The TUFMAC model which produced the whole salted fish would be 
preferred for local markets.  
 
What follows is an examination of the implications of these factors for Uganda’s 
industrial policy in the context of export orientation. The first concern is the question of 
ownership and thus by extension, the financing of the fish processing firms. The almost 
total dependence on FDI in the fish processing industry has implications for industrial 
policy towards the fisheries and the development of local industrial capacities and 
markets.  
 
The ownership of the fish processing industry in Uganda is mainly by foreign 
entrepreneurs. These include: Asians from East Africa and Multinationals from Europe.  
According to Paul Namisi the fish factories are owned on partnership (75%) or sole  
(25%) basis by different nationalities, which include Ugandans, (38%), Kenyans, 
Koreans, Saudi Arabians, Indians and Dutch. 40 Most factory owners (56%) indicated that 
they had extensive professional experience in the fish processing business and only a few 
have only some relevant training (11%) in the fish business. On the other hand, 33% had 
no previous experience in the fishing industry prior to the establishment of the fish 
                                                 
37 Nsibe-Bulega, and Akankwasa, A (2002), “The Status of the Nile Perch Fishery and the Potential for 
Production and Marketing of Nile Perch Value Added Products in Uganda”, A paper prepared for 
CFC/FAO/COMESA. 
38 Keizire, Boaz (2004), Policy Research – Implications of Liberalisation of Fish Trade for Developing Countries…. 
p.17. 
39 Namisi, Paul (2002), “Socio-Economic Implications of Fish and Exports in Uganda”, A Paper presented 
at Colline Hotel, Mukono – LVEMP & NARO, National Scientific Conference, p11. 
40 Namisi, Paul (2001), Op Cit., p.50. 
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processing factory business. Common to almost all owners of the factories is that they 
have no past connection with the lake Victoria fisheries It seems to a rule that the 
factories have employed influential Africans as directors, who do not necessarily 
represent any effort to build Ugandan capacity in running the fish firms.41  
 
Secondly, many of the factories have been financed by international development banks 
and received support from government development and agencies of the industrialised 
countries. This form FDI shall have limited contribution to building local industrial 
capabilities in fish processing. This is because FDI which is driven by profit motive and 
dependent on foreign capital, therefore, is least concerned about local capacity building. 
The Commissioner of Fisheries does not see any problem with the fish industry being 
controlled by FDI for a number of reasons. First, the external markets for fish are 
insatiable yet it is FDI that can marshal substantial capital and technology to facilitate fish 
exports. Secondly, local firms do not have the capacity to handle international logistics. 
Thirdly, FDI is beneficial to all. He estimated that for every 1 kilogramme of fish, 40% 
of the income goes to the fishermen, 30% to the middlemen and 20-30% to the fish 
processors42. What he does not say is that with the contract system both the fishermen 
and middlemen are financed and therefore controlled by the fish processors. 
 
One of the claims of FDI is that creates employment opportunities. But the quality of 
the jobs created by FDI in the fish industry raises several concerns. First, the working 
conditions are less than charitable. The first thing one notice when one walks into a fish 
processing plant other than the smell of the fish, is the temperature of the air inside cold 
rooms. Secondly, often the workers have no permanent working contracts. Thirdly the 
training for the job can at best be described as rudimentary. Finally, as indicated in the 
table below, the number of people employed in the factories is very small compared to 
the number of those who lost their jobs in the traditional processing industry.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 Jansen, Eirik (1997), Op Cit., p.12. 
42 Interview with Mr. Dick Nyeko, Commissioner of Fisheries, 4th October, 2007. 
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Table 8.4:  Levels of Employment in the Fish Processing Firms 
Name of Establishment Estimated No. of Workers 
I. Igloo Food Industries Ltd 200 
2. Masese Fish Packers Ltd 100 
3. Marine and Agro Ltd 150 
4. Gomba Fishing Industries Ltd 100 
5. Unifoods Ltd  80 
6. Uganda Fish Packers Ltd 300 
7. Hwan Sung Ltd 250 
8. Uganda Marine Products Ltd Closed (October 2007) 
9. Tropical Fish Industries Ltd 230 
10. Greenfield (U) Ltd 180 
11. Tampa Fisheries Ltd 230 
12. Fishways (U) Ltd 180 
13. Oakwood Investments Ltd 150 
14. Freshwater Fish Exporters Ltd 150 
15. Wild Catch Fisheries Ltd 150 
16. Superfish Ltd   50 
17. Ngege Ltd    50 
TOTAL 2550 
Source: Department of Fisheries Resources (DFR), Entebbe, (2007). 
 
In interviews with the CEOs of the selected firms, it was claimed that several jobs had 
been created. The CEO of Gomba Fish Industries estimated43 that the firm had created 
between 400 – 500 jobs, which according to the above table are exaggerated. According 
to the CEO at establishment of the firm in 1982, there was nobody with experience in 
filleting. Due the civil war in the 1980s, the firm did not embark on exports until 1988-
89. It is during this period that several workers were trained to fillet. The CEO also 
boasted of managerial and technological capabilities. There are 3 fish technologists, 3 
                                                 
43 The CEOs of the firms were secretive on both matters relating to labour and finance. Requests to 
interview workers were flatly rejected. 
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refrigeration engineers and production managers. For the processing of fish skin the firm 
employs 10 technicians.44  
 
The CEO of Greenfield Ltd made similar claims. According to him, they carried out in-
house training and all staff have been trained in quality management system. This has 
included training in administration, understanding fish system, software packages and 
processing and quality assurance.45 While this may be correct, the nature of jobs created 
and their impact on local fisher people remain of concern as noted by some researchers 
on the Lake Victoria fisheries.  
 
Eirik Jansen observes that thousands of traditional, small-scale fishmongers have lost 
their jobs as the processing factories have expanded their operations.46 The quality of 
jobs created is of lower skills. This contrasts with the top jobs of the processors. The top 
management of most of the processing plants are foreigners, which implies that a 
substantial amount of the total salaries paid leaves the country.47   
 
These concerns by researchers are brushed aside by the Commissioner of Fisheries who 
argues that the establishment of fish processing firms around Lake Victoria has been a 
blessing. The firms have resulted in increase of fish price 7 fold since 1999. To ensure 
exports, the government has invested more than US $30 million in improving landing 
sites and rehabilitating fish markets. On the other hand, the private investors have 
injected in excess of US $180million in firms in terms of processing facilities, cold chains, 
refrigerated  vehicles  in addition to support for the laboratories which ensure the health 
and quality of fish exported.48 While these improvements cannot be denied, the concern 
here is the impact they have had on the local fishermen and the re-organised fishing 
arrangements which exclude a substantial section of local fishermen. 
 
Second, although FDI has had some advantages for many foreign and local 
entrepreneurs, it has become important new source of vulnerability. At the same time, 
                                                 
44 Interview with Mr.Yusuf Karmali, 3 December 2007.  
45 Interview with Mr. Philip Borel, 24 September 2007. 
46 Jansen E. (1997) Op Cit, p.9. 
47 Bokea, C and Ikiara, M., (2000), “The Macroeconomy of Export Fishing Industry in Lake Victoria 
(Kenya)”, IUCN Eastern Africa Programme, Socio-Economics of Lake Victoria Fisheries, p.13. 
48 Interview with Mr. Dick Nyeko, 4 October 2007. 
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the international consumer demand, particularly in demanding improved quality 
standards, has had profound local organisational ramifications for the organisation of the 
post-harvest Nile Perch supply chain.49 
 
The massive investment in the limited fish resource has led to the displacement of the 
local fishmongers and the traditional processors.  The excess industrial capacity spawned 
competition between processors for the underlying unprocessed resource by the late 
1980s. Competition provoked vertical integration as factories strove to establish greater 
control over chain resources. The emerging structure is extremely exclusionary – the 
factories by capturing 90% + of Nile perch landings, provoked the ruin of many local 
fishmongers and traditional processors and hastened the control over the chain at the 
harvesting level via the propagation of the tied contracts50  
 
The vertical integration of the fishing industry has resulted in losers and winners at all the 
three levels of fish supply chain: production, processing and marketing. The expanded 
FDI investment in the fishing industry has resulted in increased financing and upgrading 
of the lake Victoria fisheries and improved the fish catches and the reduction of post-
harvest losses.  At the production level, expanded investment in fisheries has stimulated 
fishermen and canoe owners to emulate new techniques and acquired bigger boats and 
moving gear. Such investment has included: gill nets, outboard engines and refrigerated 
boats.51 The high levels of investment in boat, gear and outboard engine required, while 
enhancing the technological capacity of fisher people, it has at the same time led to the 
exclusion of greater majority of fisher people from participating in fishing.52  
 
With the entry of processing factories into the production chain, there has been a trend 
strengthening the transfer of the ownership of the canoes and vessels away from the 
                                                 
49 Thorpe A and Bennett Elizabeth (2004), “Market-Driven International Fish Supply Chains: The Case of 
Nile Perch from Africa’s Lake Victoria”, International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, Vol.7, Issue 4, 
p.40. 
50 Ibid, p.46-47. The centrality of contracts is discussed in more details below under competitive strategies, 
especially its impact on competition and the resulting concentration of income in fewer hands.   
51 Mayende, S. Nabangi, (1992), Fish Production, Processing and Marketing at Masese and the Impact of Integrated 
Fisheries Development Project, MA (Economic Policy and Management), Institute of Economics, Makerere 
University, Kampala p.20. 
52 Asowa-Okwe, Charles (1996), “Modern Fisheries and its Impact on Access to and Common Property 
Management: A Case Study of Lake Victoria Fisheries – Uganda, p.20. 
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local fishing communities to fish processing firms and its agents.53 Together with total 
ownership of factories, the fish commodity chain has become exclusionary under the 
control of bigger capital. At the level of processing, local entrepreneurs have been 
relegated to the feeds processing sub-sector. 
 
The locally owned processing plants are for chicken feeds processing based on the 
sardine-like small fish, mukene. The chicken feed sub-industry is organised internally with 
the essential infrastructure lacking and little government support for the sector. Most 
processors are small-scale entrepreneurs who produce quantities that are consumed 
locally in the country. There are a few large scale processing plants which are known 
throughout the country like NUVITA, Ugandachic Poultry Breeders and Bulemezi Farm 
Enterprises Ltd owned by local entreprenuers. Mukene is the only source of fish meal for 
all processors today in Uganda with the exception of Gomba Fishing Industries where 
they process Nile perch skeleton and carcasses into fish meal which they sell to other 
processors.54 
 
The emerging fishmeal processing industry, threatens the sub-industry processing 
skeletons and other fish waste discarded by the factories that have evolved with a 
domestic market focus. Thorpe and Bennett note that a newly emergent secondary fish 
chains are now squeezing the skeleton sub-industry out as such discarded by-products 
are either being diverted into newly constructed fish meal plants, or disappearing 
altogether due to improved processing techniques which leave no meat on the 
skeletons.55 
 
All factories generate by-products: the skin, swim bladders, fish frames and maws, which 
with the exception of maws are exported to the Far East (Asia) market while all other by-
products are sold locally.56 The major firm that is owned by local Ugandans, Tropical 
Fish Industries Ltd (see table above), operates in this niche of by-products. The firm 
exports fish maws, fish bladder and air sacks as fish by-products. While the firm 
considers itself successful having broken into overseas markets in China, Hong Kong, 
                                                 
53 Jansen, Eirik (1997), Op Cit. p.8. 
54 NARO (1997), Op Cit., p.82-83. 
55 Thorpe and Bennett, (2004), Op Cit., p.47. 
56 SEWADOG (1999), Marketing Study: Socio-Economic Data Working Group, Jinja, p 84. 
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Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and United Kingdom, it operates on the fringes of the fish 
processing industry.57 
But even where efforts are made to manufactures products out of the by-products, the 
final product would only be done out of the country. For instance, when Gomba Fishing 
Industry Ltd embarked on producing of fish leather for export on a large scale, the 
finishing would be done in South Africa. The fleshed Nile perch skins from Gomba 
Industries would be semi-processed by Uganda Lather Tanning Industry (ULATI) before 
being taken to South Africa for specialised finishing, with very little effort to learn or 
carry it out in the country. 58 The processing of fish leather in South Africa should have 
been taken as learning process. 
 
The industrial fishing-processing sub-sector has based its operations on the main 
objective of exporting the products. Thus, one of its contributions to the economy is the 
earning foreign exchange. It is the case that fish exports earnings have been on the rise. 
There are, however, a number of issues that arise in the context of the utility of these 
earnings to the national economy. Apart from its contribution to the tax base of the state 
and the provision of employment, however rudimentary, foreign exchange earned by fish 
exporters has limited utility to enhancing national industrial capacity. The inability to 
enhance capacity in the fish sector may be explained by number factors.  
 
First, the fish processors are, at the same time, the highest users of foreign exchange 
through high imports demanded for their firms’ operations. The fishing industry 
demands massive importation of a range of items to facilitates the fishing operations and 
the fish processing, for both industrial processors and fishers. The demand by fishers 
includes: nylon twines, hooks, boat construction materials, nails, outboard engines, 
spares and fuel among others. The industrial processors need machinery and other 
processing equipment, packaging materials, building materials, finishing touches, among 
others. With no local production, most of the above items have to be imported thus 
spending most of the foreign exchange earned from fish exports. 
  
                                                 
57 http://www.intracen.org/bsrt/casestudies/csugandafish.pdf 
58 The New Vision (1994), “UNIDO Aids Fish Farm”, September, 15. 
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Second, since the plants are mostly foreign-owned, much of the foreign exchange earned 
is repatriated. Third, there is little evidence of the processing firms’ re-investment either 
in the fishing or other sectors of the Ugandan economy.  In general, very little of the 
profits are being re-invested around the lake or as incentives to fishers to fish 
sustainably.59   
 
In addition, the industrial processing industry for export under the grip of FDI 
ownership has resulted in the loss of livelihood opportunities of traditional artisanal 
processors and traders with very limited creation of alternative incomes.60 But perhaps 
the most destructive impact on fisheries is the threat to its sustainability as the fish firms 
pursue profits through the fish export trade. The urge to secure the fish raw material has 
led to rise of what could be referred to as “contract” markets.61  
 
8.3 Competitive Strategies for Export Markets in the Fish Industry  
 
The data for this section was derived from interviews with the CEOs of the selected fish 
firms, officials of Fisheries Department, secondary literature and newspaper reports. It is 
focused on a number of themes: i) the competition for the fish raw material, ii) the 
contract system, iii) the quota system and iv) limits on competitiveness of the fish 
resource.  
Prior to exports, the fish processors must secure the supplies of raw fish. The 
competition for the raw material begins at this level. There has occurred increased 
competition amongst the processing plants to secure sufficient supplies of fish. Just as in 
neighbouring Kenya, the main constraint limiting maximum production by Uganda 
processors is the difficulty in obtaining enough fish to process.62  
 
One of the critical strategies for securing supplies for their plants is the entering of 
contracts with the fishers. The processors enter contracts with agents to supply given 
                                                 
59 NARO (1997), Op Cit,  p.36-40. 
60 Odongkara, Constatine (2001), Op Cit., p.320. 
61  Contract markets basically refer to agreements between firm owners and agents for the supply of fish.  
They involve firm owners providing capital for the purchase of fish, fuel for outboard engines and 
provision of ice ‘refrigerate’ the fish to secure its freshness. This is to guarantee the supply of fresh fish to 
the firms.  
62 Abila, Richard and Jansen, Eirik (1997), “From Local to Global Markets: The Fish Exporting and 
Fishmeal Industries of lake Victoria – Structure, Strategies and Socio-Economic Impacts in Kenya”, Socio-
Economics of the Nile Perch Fishery on Lake Victoria, Nairobi, p.10 
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quantities of fish per week and they facilitate those agents through credit, insulated trucks 
and refrigerated boats.63 The result has been to upgrade the technological capacity of 
fisher-people. This gives the fish processors two critical elements of competitive 
advantage. 
 
First, the contract system ensures a sustained supply of the raw fish. Second, it reduces 
the fish processors’ losses that may occur as a result of the supply of poor quality (rotten) 
fish, as the cost of the rejected fish can be transferred to the agent. With insulated trucks 
and refrigerated boats, there is less rejected fish. Despite these arrangements, factories 
still encounter supply problems due to the dwindling catches and the intensified 
competition as more fish factories are licensed.64    
 
The contract system contradicts the neo-classical fundamentalism and its idealised “free 
markets”. Markets operate within particular institutional framework. While the contract 
system has ensured the supply of raw fish to the fish processors and upgraded the 
technology, the major outcome of the contract system is that it has resulted in the 
concentration of wealth amongst the agents, loss of livelihoods by the traditional 
fishmongers and traditional artisanal processors and the obliteration of “free markets” in 
the production and marketing of fish.  
 
The contract system in Uganda is rather loose due to the complications associated with 
them. This is because the system implies a rent, which the traders/agents would pay in a 
tied contract.  This rent would not be paid when a vessel is not tied through loan as a 
way of supplying particular firms. Thus, most Ugandan traders are aware of the benefit 
of not contracting and as a result they avoid tied contract sales with fish factories.65 
Nevertheless, the contract system is gradually being adopted by the fish operators. In an 
interview with one of the major operators,66 the firms in Uganda have gradually adopted 
the contract system. Initially the contracts were unlimited. At present, contracts with this 
particular firm are entered for a period of up to 2 years. The CEO argued that the 
                                                 
63 NARO (1997), Op Cit., p.33 
64 SEWADOG (1999), Marketing Study: Socio-Economic Data Working Group, Jinja, p.82. and Jansen, 
Eirik (1997), Op Cit.,p.12 
65 Namisi, Paul (2001) Socio-Economic Implications of the Fish Export Trade on the Fishers and Fisheries of Lake 
Victoria in Uganda, Jinja, p.65. 
66 Interview with Mr. Philip Borel, 24 September, 2007.  
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limiting of the period of contracts is better as their continuation depends on re-
evaluation and renewal depends on performance.  
  
Fish processors should buy directly from the fisher people, which would result in more 
competitive and better prices for the fish raw material. While the contract system is 
strategic and ensures supplies to the factories, they distort the market, with market power 
being concentrated in a few agents and processors. Secondly, the contract system serves 
as a transfer of wealth from one group in general to certain favoured individuals, groups 
or firms.67 
 
Third, to control the exploitation of the fish resource, government has instituted a quota 
system which limits the level of tonnage of fish a firm may process. The quota system 
has come to be  applied as a competitive strategy. The quota system has a dual role in the 
fishing industry. While the central aim is to prevent the depletion of the fish resources 
through over-fishing, it also limits competition as the state sets the quantities of fish each 
firm is authorised to process per year.68  The problem, however, remains that the quotas 
are not determined by any kind of scientific basis making as it is difficult to predict future 
changes or possibilities of expansion. This has been compounded by the reality that the 
state bureaucracy has very limited capacity to monitor compliance by the fish processors.  
 
Fourth, the Nile perch remains a very competitive substitute in the European markets. It 
has all the nutritional characteristics found attractive by consumers and dieticians. A 3.5-
ounce raw portion has just 93 calories and 1.8 grams of fat. Thus supermarkets operators 
who are interested in creating a niche with healthy orientation, the big news is Omega-3. 
The Nile perch, with 710 grams per serving, has one of the highest levels of omega-3 
fatty acids of any fish. The fillets are white, succulent, and virtually boneless and offer full 
flavour. The fish is an excellent substitute for sea bass, cod and grouper fillets.69 In 
Europe and Asian countries, the consumption of red meat has gone down because of the 
health problems attributed to it and this has paved the way for the rise of demand of 
white meat. This ensures expanded market for fish especially, Nile perch and Nile tilapia.  
 
                                                 
67  Kabege, Juliet (2001), Op Cit., p.38. 
68 Ibid, p.70. 
69 Barota, Michael (2003), “From Lake Victoria to Your Fish Counter”, Progressive Grocer, Vol.82, Issue 2. 
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There are, however, several factors that put limits on competitiveness fish exports. These 
include the land- locked nature of Uganda and the extra costs it incurs on comparison to 
its East African neighbours, the failure to be innovative and differentiate their products 
and failure to move to a higher level of value addition to fish products by canning the 
fish. 
 
First, the most expensive fillets comes from Uganda, where combined average comes to 
US$ 3.35 per kilogram of fillet, while Kenyan and Tanzania prices were for more similar 
at US$ 2.95 and $ 2.97 per kilogram of fillet respectively. In Uganda, all factories sold 
chilled (fresh) fillets, and about 6 sold frozen fillets.70 Second there is a failure to 
differentiate products. There is evidence that there is a possibility of differentiation as 
was the case with pioneer fish-processor in Uganda, TUFMAC, before its collapse in 
1977. Thus, prior to the Nile perch boom, the bulk of exports by TUFMAC were in the 
form of smoked fish, salt, dried and fillets.71  
 
The attempt at product differentiation, however, has been undertaken at Gomba Fishing 
Industries Limited and Greenfield Ltd where the owners/managers take an innovative 
approach to processing seriously and several different techniques of processing fish and 
fish products have been put on trial or planned: Nile perch swim bladder are dried for 
export sale, fish meal is produced from offal and fish frames – skeletons. Their products 
are more differentiated and go beyond chilled and frozen fillet of tilapia and Nile perch. 
They include: cold and hot smoked fillets of Tilapia and Nile perch, smoked split whole 
tilapia, salted/dried split tilapia and fresh whole gutted fish.72 But like the other 
processors, the firms are primarily oriented to the overseas export market and are 
actively seeking further supply contracts overseas.73 
  
At Greenfield Ltd there are efforts at general value addition. The fillet is usually semi-
finished and there are efforts at full transformation to products with high value. The 
CEO explained that value depends on the level of transformation and the market in 
                                                 
70  SEWADOG (1999), Marketing Study,  Socio-Economic Data Working Group, Jinja, p.83. 
71 Uganda Government (1969), Report of the Committee on Marketing of Livestock, Meat, Fish and their Products in 
Uganda, p.92. 
72 Interview with Mr. Yusuf Karmali. 24 September 2007. 
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terms of quality, health concerns and sophisticated target markets. Investment in 
technology takes these into account.74  
 
Finally, there are no efforts by the fish processors to extend value-addition to fish 
canning which would bring high returns and export earnings. Little of the export 
proceeds are re-invested in the industries or used to enter production niche such as fish 
canning.  
 
To enhance and to advance of their interests, the fish processors have constituted 
themselves into a business association, the Uganda Fish Processors and Exporters 
Association (UFPEA). It is through this association that the fish processors interact with 
the public power responsible for the formulation of policy towards the industry. 
 
8.4 The Public-Private Interactions in the Fish Industry 
 
The data for this section of the chapter is derived from the interviews with the CEO of 
the association, the CEOs of the selected firms, documents and newspaper reports. The 
focus of the interviews was on several themes: i) UFPEA interactions with government 
policy-makers, ii) collaboration to maintain fish quality, iii) the association as a lobby 
group. 
One of the key conditions for the development of successful EOI strategy is a strong 
institutional state linked to the business community with a certain level of embeddedness 
and ability to adopt and fully implement the necessary policy reforms.75 One major 
example of the public-private interaction in the fishing industry was in the case of fish 
quality concerns in European Union countries, which resulted in the ban on fish imports 
from Lake Victoria. This section examines the interaction between the state and the 
Uganda Fish Processors and Exporters Association (UFPEA) on one hand, and the 
interactions amongst members, on the other hand, in the promotion of the fish industry.  
 
In light of the declaration by EU that no local company would be permitted to export to 
any European Union countries without government guarantee that its plants meet all the 
                                                 
74 Interview with Mr. Philip Borel, 24 September, 2007. 
75 Stubbs, R ichard (1999), Op Cit., p.340. 
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required standards on hygiene and sanitation and its products are not contaminated, the 
processors had to comply with these health conditions.76  
 
To operationise the public-private interactions, the processors collaborated with relevant 
health authorities and lobbied government, designed strategies of supporting and 
working with actors located within the beaches to ensure that sourcing of the fish was 
appropriate and that the quality was maintained once the fish was caught. Thus, 
following the fish ban by EU, the factories strove to meet the new requirements. Well 
equipped laboratories, expanded and updated their filleting plants and in some cases 
engaged foreign technical assistance or sent their personnel abroad for training and 
consultation.77  
 
On the other hand, government responded to the EU and other international food safety 
and quality requirements by developing and construction of a number of modern fish 
landing sites in all strategic selected areas of major water bodies in Uganda. Uganda being 
dependent on “donor” funding, the government sought financial support from the 
African Development Bank (ADB) and Chinese and Japanese governments and a 
number of landing sites were earmarked for the development to boost the private fish 
processing industry.78   
 
The government, following the EU fish ban, through the Uganda National Bureau of 
Standards, (UNBS) has been striving to upgrade Uganda’s EU export status from “List 
2” to “List 1”, like Tanzania. “List 1” exports have total free access to the EU markets, 
and arrangement referred to as “Full Harmonisation”. The fish enters the EU market 
free of further checks and counter-controls and trade with individual countries unlimited. 
Uganda is on “List 2” Most factories have been concentrating on upgrading quality and 
capacity to meet the EU quality regulations since 1997.79 
 
The Ugandan processors obtain advice on the import regulations of export markets from 
UNBS. Because quality assurance mechanisms are imperative in fisheries given the latent 
                                                 
76 Merere, Ahmed and Joseph, Mwamunyange, (1997), “Governments to Vouch for Quality of Fish 
Exports”, The East African, July 21-27. 
77 Mitullah, Winnie (1997), Op Cit.,, pp 21-22. 
78 Keizire, Boaz, (2004), Op Cit., p.33. 
79 Namisi, Paul (2001), Op Cit., p.64. 
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perishability of the product, the fish processors have had to collaborate through their 
organisation, the UFPEA, to instil confidence in the importers. Through UFPEA, the 
Uganda fishing industry attained the International Standards Award – the ISO 9001:2000 
quality award. UFPEA firms were supported by USAID funded SPEED project and the 
consultative assistance from Total Quality Management Ltd, in the training for the 
award. In addition, SPEED supported the formation of an aggressive, internet-based 
marketing programme for UFPEA, for both the processors and their association by 
launching websites in June 2002. The Websites have been a resounding success, receiving 
more than 20,000 “hits” since launching. Website contacts bring in regular orders, 
including a recent US $ 300,000 per month order from a Middle East purchaser, alone.  
 
Since the fish ban by the European Union in 1990s, Uganda fisheries industry has made 
considerable strides in its ability to comply with EU standards. The state has supported 
for the fish industry by deploying several institutions.  The Department of Fisheries 
Resources, the Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) and partnership with the 
private sector together with the major “donors”, have supported efforts that have 
resulted in, for example, the establishment of private, EU-recognised testing laboratory.80 
All of the Uganda fish processors have implemented HAC-CAP (Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Points) and Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP). 81 As part of the 
marketing and competitive strategy, the processors are sensitive to quality standards of 
their products. They contribute towards research and advertising their products through 
magazines, trade shows posters and stickers.82 
 
Therefore, self-interest encouraged the emergence of endogenous policing/governance 
mechanisms, so as to ensure the product meets accepted strategic quality norms as it 
transits its way down the supply chain.83 The actions by both the processor’s association 
and the government are informed by the imperative of maintaining competitiveness in 
the export market. Despite the competition over the scarce supplies of fish, owners of 
the factories also have joint interests and co-operrate closely. The owners of the factories 
meet once a month to discuss matters of mutual concern to the fish industry 
                                                 
80 Interview with Mr. Philip Borel, 24 September, 2007. 
81 The New Vision (2003), “UFPEA Positions the Fisheries Industry on the Course for Competitive Market 
Place”, March 6. 
82 NARO (1997), Op Cit., p.33. 
83 Thorpe and Bennett (2004)  Op Cit., p.48. 
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competitiveness. These include: the firms’ relationship with government institutions, the 
conditions of imported equipment and the export of fish. Together the factories owners 
constitute a forceful and articulate lobby group vis-à-vis the government with substantial 
resources at their disposal to influence decisions, which affect them.84 
 
Externally, the fish processors strengthened the links with international agents. In the 
case of Greenfield Ltd, although there were no elaborate contracts, contact was made 
with several distributors and different mainly European countries. These included: 
Annova Food in Netherlands, East Coast in Spain, Lobbel in Luxembourg and Pitman in 
Belgium85.  
 
Finally, one major limitation in this public-private linkage is that there is little indication 
that the processors interact with Uganda’s scientific community in the national 
innovation system in their quest to improve quality of their fish processing. Perhaps 
another major problem confronting the fish processing industry is the dependence on 
exports markets. 
 
8.5 Dependence on Exports Markets 
 
The data for this section is derived from interview with the CEOs of the selected fish 
firms, the officials of the Fisheries Department, documents and news paper reports. 
 
Export markets are perceived as more attractive because they tend to offer more 
favourable terms of payment. The lack of internal markets in Uganda or the East African 
region is the other factor that drives the dependence on external markets.  In general, the 
export-oriented fishing industry of Lake Victoria shall continue to be very dependent on 
the international markets. Many of the processing factories have entered long-term 
agreements with supermarket – chains in Europe and USA.86 There are several concerns 
of total dependence on export trade, where LDCs have no control.  
 
Despite the high earnings associated with the export trade, it is highly risky because of 
the frequent fish ban on the EU market, due to the concern for food safety and other 
                                                 
84 Jansen, Eirik (1997), Op Cit. p.12. 
85 Interview with Mr. Philip Borel, 24 September, 2007. 
86 Jansen, Eirik (1997), Op Cit.,p.13. 
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factors such as prejudice over which the countries in the region have little control.87 The 
effect of the EU fish ban on imports from Lake Victoria in 1999 is instructive. The ban 
had repercussions that reverberated back down the chain to devastate the livelihoods of 
both fisherfolks and ancillary workers in the local lakeside communities.88 The danger 
associated with dependence on  external markets, especially European Markets came to 
the fore when the was a ban on fish exports to Europe over health concerns about fish 
originating from East Africa. Below are estimates of the economic losses suffered by the 
various participant and beneficiaries of the fishing industry in Uganda. 
Table 8.5: Estimates of the Economic Losses during the ban 1998-2000 
Areas of Loss Estimated Loss 
Export Earnings US$ 36,900,000 
Income of fishermen community (US$ 850,000 per month) due to 
the reduced prices and fishing activities 
US$ 4,250,000 
Factories that closed down 3 out of 11 
Factories that reduced their labour force by (2/3) 8 out of 11 
Jobs lost in fish factories (1/3)  2,000 
Jobs lost in fishing activities (1/3) 32,000 
Persons that lost 2/3 of their income 68,000 
Affected family members and relatives living on the same income 300,000 
Source: UNIDO (2003). 
 
At the same time, there is prevalent negative perception about exports from LDCs. For 
instance, fishery product importers in EU have an unfavourable perception of ACP, 
including Uganda, fishery products with regard to quality of the product and consistency 
of supply. This general perception leads to lower prices than would be offered for 
products with a reputation of good quality. This may be due to the inability of the 
processors get a clear understanding of how to penetrate the direct markets and 
supermarkets chains.  
 
                                                 
87 Odongkara, O, Kostatine (2002), “Commercialisation of the Fisheries of Lake Victoria and its 
Implications for Local Livelihoods”, A Paper Presented at the Meeting for the Network of Environmental 
Journalists for Lake Victoria, Nairobi, February, 7-8, p.4. It should be noted that the concern for food 
security does not only come from Europe as it noted that the market for fish collapsed at the height of the 
Rwanda genocide in 1994 when bodies of victims floated down river Kagera into Lake Victoria and the 
consumers refused to eat fish. Secondly, in 1999 consumers again refused to eat fish due to the widespread 
use of poison fishing on the lake. 
88 Thorpe and Bennett (2004), Op Cit., p.51. 
 294 
Aquaculture presents itself both as a solution and a problem to the question the 
depletion of fish stocks in Lake Victoria. As solution, it would relief pressure from the 
over-fished Lake Victoria natural resource. The problem is that aquaculture may face stiff 
competition from the low cost producers of East Asia, particularly Viet Nam, where 
there is massive production of genetically improved Nile tilapia89  
 
Although there increasing practice of aquaculture practice in Uganda and it would act as 
a source of extra production of fish for export, it is unlikely to fill the gap in production. 
 
Table 8.6:  Acquaculture Production between 2000 and 2003 in Uganda in kgs 
Species 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Carps, barbells and other 
cyprinids 
    100     270   230  300 
Miscellaneous freshwater fishes     120     540 2,728 3,000 
Tilapias and other cichlids      600   1,550 1,957 2,200 
Freshwater fishes.      820   2,360 4,915 5,500 
Total Uganda      820   2,360 4,915 5,500 
Grand Total      820   2,360 4,915 5,500 
Source: FAO Fisheries Global Information System 
 
Aquaculture production is relatively small, although rapidly growing, in comparison to 
the total capture fisheries as seen in table 8.1. Production technology typically employs 
extensive small-scale poly culture (mixed tilapia and catfish). This sub-sector is 
characterised by small farmers involved in pond culture. It would require extensive 
support from government to make them viable as significant sources of raw fish for 
processing. 
 
Finally, the fish export trade has not escaped the possible threat of the Genetically 
Modified Organisms (GMOs).90  According to a report titled: Future Fish: Issues in Science 
and Regulation of Transgenic Fish, new species have been genetically modified to grow as 
much as 11 times faster than the normal ones. Countries like Uganda, where fish is now 
                                                 
89 See Dey, Madan (2000), “The Impact of Genetically Improved farmed Nile Tilapia in Asia” Aquaculture 
Economics and Management, 4(1/2) and  Bimbao, Gasper et al (2000), “Socioeconomics and Production 
Efficiency of Tilapia Hatchery operations in the Philippines”, same volume. 
90 Izama Angelo, “Bio-Tech Fish to Hit Market”, The Monitor,  June 12. 
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the leading foreign exchange earner, but are yet to develop adequate regulatory control – 
might fear marketing and environmental repercussions. There is therefore fear that these 
new species could disrupt the fish industry and contaminate other species.  
 
While future fish may be a threat to Uganda’s export trade, the Commissioner of Fisheries 
remained optimistic at the introduction of GMO fish in Uganda. He argued that:  
“If Uganda must increase production, the bio-manipulation of fish to create a faster 
yielding species is necessary. It is good to have a fish which can grow up to 4 
kilogrammes in 4 months. The idea is the selection of better genes. Before selection, it 
has to go through a process of evaluation”91 
 
The Commissioner of Fisheries does not seem to see the repercussions this would have 
on fish export particularly in Europe. In case of GMO contamination, fish exports to 
Europe could suffer because of the EU’s reluctance to permit GMO products in their 
market.  
 
Given the practices of the processors, their almost total control of the fishery supply 
chain, and the above threats to the viability of fish exports as a long-term foreign 
exchange earner, its is erroneous to claim that “while the Nile perch chain is undoubtedly 
international market-driven, industrial processing activities remain under national elite 
control and the rise of tied contracts and artisanal matajiri92 who are strongly linked to 
these locally based elite”.93 Research on Uganda indicate that the fish processors are the 
main link between the artisanal fisher-folk and the overseas export markets, which have 
had the effect of changes in the distribution of wealth resulting from Nile perch fishery, 
different from that of the original artisanal fishery.94 At the same time, processors remain 
the only substantially organised group amongst the participants in the fishing industry.  
 
Despite the above challenges in the export market, both the state officials and private 
operators in the industry remain optimistic. First, competition has resulted in the 
building of an industry that can compete internationally. Second, the industry has been 
made to upgrade technologically throughout the value chain enhancing its 
competitiveness globally.  
                                                 
91 Interview with Commissioner of Fisheries, Mr. Dick Nyeko, 4th October, 2007. 
92 Matajiri Swahili word meaning the rich, in this case, boat /fishnet owners. 
93 Thorpe and Bennett, (2004), Op Cit., p.51. 
94 Namisi, (2002), Op Cit., p15-16 
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8.6 Conclusion 
 
This is the second illustrative chapter that underlines the importance a differentiated 
sectoral focus in the practice of industrial policy. In this chapter, the fish processing 
industry is analysed in terms of the contention between state intervention and liberalised 
market operations. Our findings indicate that: 1) the initiation of the fish processing 
industry relied on state intervention as illustrated by the construction of the first fish 
processing plant, The Uganda Fish Marketing Corporation (TUFMAC), by the colonial 
state in 1950. This was informed by the state-led development ideology for industry 
which prevailed until the 1990s with the privatisation and encouragement of foreign 
direct investment in the industry. 2) The political disruption and the unplanned explusion 
of the Asian entrepreneur class who were the manufacturers of instruments of 
production like fish nets and hooks, suppliers of out-board engines and were also a 
major internal market through their chain of hotels, led to a virtual collapse of the fish 
industry in the 1970s. 
 
Third, the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s and its 
emphasis on export orientation, led to the re-emergence of the fish processing industry. 
The findings of this study indicate that, while this has been positive in terms access to 
external markets and foreign exchange earnings, there are several drawbacks as far as 
enhancing fish processing capacity and the emergence of a sustained fish processing 
industry in the country. The question of the ownership and the financing of the industry 
have implications for the practice of industrial policy. The almost total dependence on 
FDI, may, in the long-run hinder the development of local industrial capacities and 
markets. Secondly, the competitive strategy of firms that rely on contracts with agents for 
procuring fish raw material tied to particular firms hinder the operation of free markets. 
 
Fourth, in the face of adversity in the industry, the imperative of private-public 
partnership emerged. The importance of this partnership is illustrated by the case of the 
fish ban in the late 1990s on the exports to European Union markets over health 
concerns. The state collaborated with processing firms through their processors’ 
association, UFPEA, in ensuring hygienic fish processing aimed at maintaining 
competitiveness in the export markets. This public-private interaction signified the rise of 
embryonic embedded autonomy, which may ensure effectiveness of industrial policy 
implementation. 
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Fifth, the study reveals several draw backs on the prospects of the fish processing 
industry in the country. 1) The reliance on a natural resource base such as fish harvesting 
to industrialise, may not be sustainable. In the context where measures to ensure its 
sustainability are absent, intense competition for the resource is prevalent coupled with 
incompetent regulation and management of the resource, points to a dead end of 
sustained industrialisation. 2) While the entry of modern fish processing firms has 
resulted in the introduction of technical capacities particularly refrigeration and improved 
handling at landing sites, their vertically integrated, exclusionary nature has led to the ruin 
of many local fish-mongers and traditional processors as they have lost their jobs. At the 
same time the jobs created by these firms are of low skill and low pay. 3) The 
dependence on external markets where exporters have no control and the lack of internal 
market in Uganda or the East African region is a major source of vulnerability of the fish 
processing industry. 
 
This case study illustrates the impotance of instituting a differentiated industrial policy 
practice. Different sectors demand policies specific to their characteristics. State 
intervention in the fish processing industry should logically differ from that in the textile 
industry. This brings to the fore the importance of sector specific approaches in 
industrial policy practices. 
 
One of the major challenges of the Ugandan state is to develop a framework of industrial 
policy that provides a coherent policy for both economic and political objectives. In case 
of the fish industry, the state should ensure that the fish resources are harvested in a 
sustainable manner and enforceable limits are set to the amount of fish which is 
exported. Fish marketing for both domestic and export markets requires guaranteed 
quality and safety standards especially if the exports markets are to be sustained. The 
more sustainable option is the development of fish farming - aquaculture. In the final 
analysis, industrialisation focused on foreign trade, controlled by foreign capital and 
dependent on foreign technology is not sustainable in the long-run. 
 CHAPTER NINE 
 
9. CONCLUSION: SUMMARY, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
 
9.0 Introduction 
 
This study set out to examine the ideas and assumptions that have informed industrial 
policy practices in Uganda between 1950 and 2006. The aim was to explain the 
problematic of Uganda’s industrial policy practices with the view of deepening our 
understanding of their contextual determinants and to suggest priority areas and explore 
the possibility of articulate practice of industrial policy as a guide to Uganda’s 
industrialisation process. This is because the study recognises the point that industrial 
policy and industrialisation are often products of numerous historical, social, economic 
and political considerations. Industrialisation and indeed any form of social change never 
proceeds independently of the concrete institutional and historical context. An 
underlying assumption of this study is that the lack of a coherent industrial policy may be 
a major contributing factor in the explanation of Uganda’s stunted industrialisation 
process. 
 
In this concluding chapter, we summarise our findings and then we discuss the strengths 
– empirical and theoretical contributions, weakness of this study and potential areas for 
further research. First, it offers a summary of the central arguments of the thesis. 
Secondly, it sums-up the major findings on industrial policy practices, their limitations 
and policy implications. Finally, the study identifies potential areas of future research and 
possible innovative policy alternatives. 
 
9.1 Summary and Central Arguments 
 
 
This study is based on the conceptualisation of industrial policy as a form state 
intervention to promote the industrialisation process in the context of a liberalised 
economy. As briefly reviewed in the introductory chapter, existing studies do little to 
advance knowledge on industrial policy and its importance in the enhancement of the 
industrialisation process in Uganda. 
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In chapters two and three, the study reviewed the literature on industrialisation and 
elaborated on the debates on industrial policy with the purpose of delineanating the 
possible relevancy of its practice in the current global context. I conceptualised the 
notion of industrial policy – selective and targeted state intervention in the economy, 
both as a problem and as a solution. The theoretical foundation is primarily drawn from 
the experience of East Asian NICs. The conviction in this study is that the ideas and 
notions of industrial policy presented here, while drawn from East Asian experience, are 
deemed to be relevant and applicable in other Third World settings as long as one gets 
their social and political basis right. It stressed the primacy of underling institutional and 
political arrangements for its successful practice as advanced in institutional political 
economy. The study, therefore, has sought to bring forward the possibility of industrial 
policy practice “back-in”. 
 
Chapter two delineated the assumptions and practice of industrial policy in Post-World 
War II in the Third World literature. In particular, the notion of developmentalism and 
its policy practices were examined. The strategies of developmentalism, broadly, were 
centred on the idea of rapid industrialisation, “big push”, to “catch-up” with the 
developed countries. The industrial practice followed was ISI that aimed at creating local 
industries in a two step process: first, by limiting imports through protectionism and 
second, by heavy subsidisation of local firms. The problem with ISI, we argue, was the 
form it took. It was more of import-reproduction type that took the “product” as their 
point of departure rather than purpose. It was as well unselective. The subsidisation of 
the public corporations and the loss-making, protected private sector firms led to 
expanded fiscal burden on the state. Faced with crises, most Third World states 
succumbed to the new policies backed by neo-classical economic theory which argued 
that to restore growth, there was need to remove state power from the economic realm 
and prescribed the policies of EOI, which have been dominant since the 1980s. 
 
Chapter three presented the analytical framework. It entailed a reflection on the efficacy 
of institutions and whether they matter in the development process. It is considered 
important to move away from the traditional notion of institutions as constraints. 
Turning to institutions brings new considerations in development. Institutions are 
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constituted and ultimately instituted. There are no blue prints to be copied. We have 
suggested that to understand industrial policy as an institutional practice, there is need for 
a multi-dimensional perspective and multiple logic. The central objective on the analytical 
framework was to capture the relationships between the state and markets. This is 
because for industrial policy to be effective, it must take these relationships into serious 
consideration. As the contrast between the experience of the “late” colonial period and 
the immediate post-colonial phase indicate, particularly after the 1972 expropriations, 
successful  industrial development requires markets to be underpinned by solid public 
institutions, in this case, UDC. Thus, the problem of industrialisation and its resolution 
necessitates the support of both private and public order institutions. 
 
Chapter four provided an account of the building of institutional foundations in Uganda 
by the colonial state that enabled a modest industrialisation process. These institutions 
included: the bureaucracy, industrial co-ordination agency, (UDC), the control over 
financial resources, establishment of local banks, business associations, among others, 
which became the bedrock for consequent industrialisation. This institutional framework 
presented both possibilities and obstacles to the post-colonial state, were inherited, built-
on but not transformed. Their attempted modification through the “Move to the Left” – 
a form of state building, during the late 1960s, was literally wiped out as policy-making 
was replaced by the rule by decree after the 1971 coup, and the consequent expropriation 
of the Asian industrialists. The result was de-industrialisation. These points to the 
importance of institutional capacity for development to occur. It is therefore the 
contention of this study that industrial policy requires a certain level of institutional 
capacity to back-up the policy apparatus. This may explain the modest success of 
industrial policy in the 1950s and 1960s. The institutional distortion that occurred in the 
1970s had serious implications for industrial policy, particularly made more difficult with 
the introduction of SAPs in June 1981. 
 
Chapter five examined Uganda’s industrial policies under a liberalised policy framework 
of SAPs. As noted in chapter four, Uganda’s previous industrialisation process was 
dominated by state intervention through ISI. The starting point of SAPs is that state 
intervention in markets is the central problem. Thus, SAPs presents difficulties for the 
practice of industrial policy. The findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows: 
under SAPs phase I, (1981-85), due to the distortion of the 1970s, the first priority was 
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the rehabilitation of the existing industries. This meant continued state and donor 
financial support of industry. It is observed that the attempted SAPs in this period, 
largely failed because of its inability to address the structural basis of the crisis. This can 
be accounted for by three factors: i) SAPs depended for its success on a continued flow 
of foreign finance and not much of it was available, ii) there were non-economic factors 
as the country was consumed by a civil war and iii) the effect of liberalisation and 
devaluation of the currency in the context where market incentives gave no preference to 
productive over speculation was bound to lead to failure. It is noted that SAPs Phase II, 
(1987-2006) has been more successful. Apart from liberalisation which gave easy access 
to foreign exchange for the importation of critical intermediate goods and raw materials 
for industry, there has been massive encouragement of FDI. It is observed that the 
privatisation of the public industrial sector, though with mixed results, led to the revival 
of the economy in general and industry in particular. The major concern, however, is that 
the economic reforms did not tackle adequately the critical problem of financing industry 
and the systematic transfer of technology. As a result, the industrial sector has no 
developed productive capabilities, particularly technology. Thus, we have argued that an 
incoherent industrial policy and the difficulty of financing industry, has resulted in little 
advance of the industrial sector.   
 
Chapter six looked at the reform of the bureaucracy and the creation support agencies to 
support the implementation of SAPs. Given the over-extended, ineffective and little 
capacity to formulate and implement policy, it was imperative that the bureaucracy and 
associated institutions had to be reformed. The reform of the bureaucracy involved 
restructuring the civil service and ministries. Secondly, there was the creation of 
specialised agencies such as URA, UIA, UEPB, UNCST and PU among others. Thirdly, 
there was the revival of UMA to enhance public-private interactions. While the reforms 
were necessary, they suffered from a number of limitations. First, the reform of the 
bureaucracy was obsessed with reducing numbers. Yet the problem of bureaucratic 
capacity goes deeper than the problem of numbers. The bureaucracy suffered from low 
remuneration, legacy of political turbulence, evasion of controls and prevalence of the 
politics of patronage. Second, while it was necessary to create specialised agencies to 
facilitate and maintain market conditions, arrange licences, supply information to 
consumers and investors, their proliferation did not necessarily lead to efficient policy 
implementation. Thirdly, the specialised agencies were turned into arenas of patronage by 
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dispensing jobs to the clients of the political class. Fourthly, while technology policy is 
important, as the availability of technical and engineering skills are among the key 
requirements for industrial upgrading and development of competitive enterprises, this 
objective was hardly achieved. Several years after its establishment, UNCST, the premier 
agency for national science and technology system, has no explicit national science and 
technology policy and therefore no recognised guidelines on technology transfer, 
especially through FDI. Finally, the revival of public-private partnership through UMA is 
commendable. UMA has evolved into a key institution in representing the interests of 
the private sector. Over the years, it has developed a strong partnership with government 
in policy designing through dialogue. UMA has forged partnerships with government and 
the donor community in which key economic issues affecting the manufacturing sector 
and the whole economy are discussed and policy measures are agreed upon, though the 
real power and decisions remains in the hands the World Bank and IMF. 
          
Chapter seven dealt with the textile industry. The chapter illustrated the practice of 
industrial policy to promote textile manufacturing. We discussed the colonial and the 
immediate post-colonial import substitution in the textile industry. It was noted that the 
success of the industry was underpinned by the institutional framework that was 
established. Principal amongst these institutions was the UDC through which the state 
mobilised resources and at the same time prodded the private sector to invest in industry.  
The experience of the textile industry underlines importance institutions that mediated 
the state policy towards the textile industry – among these were: cotton research 
institutes, the co-operative unions, the marketing boards and banks created to finance 
them. Most important were the Co-operative Bank and UCB. We observe that the above 
institutions were destroyed by the unplanned declaration of of “economic war” in 1972, 
expropriation of Asian entrepreneurs, and deterioration of bureaucratic capacity resulting 
in the virtual collapse of the textile industry. Since the adoption of SAPs in the early 
1980s there have been attempts at the rehabilitation of the industry, but has never 
recovered to the levels it was in the early 1970s. The SAPs period has seen the creation 
of several institutions, the prominent one being the CDO to support the industry. It is 
noted that there has been efforts to turn it into an export oriented industry. It was 
observed that the reforms and policy shift from ISI to EOI in textiles has not been 
successful. We argue that the efforts being expended to reviving the textile industry may 
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be misdirected as the historical role of the textile industry as initiator of industrialisation 
process may have passed.     
 
Chapter eight is the second sectoral study which is aimed at illustrating the importance of 
underlining the similarities and differences of sectoral approaches in the practice of 
industrial policy. First, we argued that the reliance on a natural resource such as fish to 
industrialise may not be sustainable, particularly in the context of over-exploitation and 
incompetent regulatory authorities. Secondly, it was observed that the industry is too 
dependent on FDI. This, we argue, may not be sustainable and it has the implication of 
hindering the development of local industrial capacities and markets. Thirdly, the rise of 
collaboration between the public and private sector is appreciated as it symbolises a form 
of embryonic embedded autonomy that could ensure effective implementation of 
industrial policy. In conclusion, we observed that in the fish processing industry, there is 
a case for more state involvement to ensure that fish resources are harvested in a 
sustainable manner and enforceable limits be set to the amount of fish to be exported. 
Finally, the policy-makers should prod the fish processors to extend value addition to 
fish canning which would bring higher returns and spill-overs to the economy.    
 
The two illustrative sectoral case studies point to the importance of a differentiated 
industrial policy towards various sectors. Given the variant sectoral characteristics and 
features of sectors, the understanding of the specific sectoral needs is critical to avoid a 
generalised industrial policy practice. The next section outlines the theoretical 
contributions of the study. 
 
 
  9.2 Theoretical Contribution  
 
As can be noted from the above summary, perhaps the most important result of the 
study is the evidence that the state and nature of the political arrangements have been the 
main determinants of the industrial policies practiced. The holders of state power, be it in 
the colonial, post-colonial or under SAPs, have had influence on which policy was 
implemented. Our findings on Uganda’s industrialisation process – summarised as 
stunted and incoherent, contribute to a reconsideration of their attribution to state 
intervention per se. The broader political economy and instutitional arrangements are 
critical in the success or failure of the industrialisation process. In certain circumstances, 
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and more particularly in developing like Uganda, there remains an important role of state 
intervention, first to creat markets since markets are largely absent and second, to 
enhance the competitiveness of particular industries through state support. 
 
Secondly, our findings do not fit in with the neo-liberal view of development in 
developing countries like Uganda. While state intervention has been problematic due to 
rent-seeking and incompetent bureaucratic machinery, among other shortcomings, the 
unbridled market reforms cannot in themselves result in sustained industrial 
development. The thesis looked at the relationship between privatisation and 
liberalisation and their impact on industrial policy practices. The empirical data and 
evidence in chapters 7 and 8 supports the view that the processes of libealisation and 
privatisation may not be optimal if not implemented in sequence and selectively. There is 
need for a mix of the state and markets with a critical regard to the complex institutional, 
historical and current global context. 
 
Third, our findings do not fit in with those of the opponents of industrial policy. The 
problem is not the practices of industrial policy per se, several shortcomings not 
withstanding, but incoherence of policy and the underlying socio-political factors. In 
practice, industrial policy must be selective and focused to specific sectors. What works 
in the textile industry, for instance, may not necessarily work in the fish processing 
industry. Theoretically, this suggests the need to re-think the question of   industrial 
policy practice in countries like Uganda as well as have a differentiated sectoral approach 
to its formulation and implementation. 
 
Fourth, the thesis constitutes a pioneer effort to systematically document industrial 
policy practices, their possibilities and limitations in the developing context of Uganda.  
  
Finally, the major weakness of this thesis is that it does make the analysis of the 
involvement and the reaction of the subordinate classes, particularly the working class, to 
industrial policy practices. Next we examine the policy implications of the study. 
 
9.3 Policy Implications 
 
Since June 1981, Uganda has been implementing neo-liberal reforms premised on non-
state interventionism. Therefore, the practice of industrial policy which means the 
initiation and coordination of governmental activities to enhance productivity and 
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competitiveness of the economy has been problematic. Yet it has been observed that no 
country, historically, has entered into modern economic growth without the state’s 
intervention or collaboration with large scale private sector entities.  This thesis has 
shown that the various industrial policies practiced in Uganda since 1945 points to the 
critical importance of the state and institutions to advance the industrialisation process. 
The findings in this study point to the need to understand these factors in order to 
successfully formulate a viable industrial policy.  What are the policy implications?  
 
First, the most critical function of the state is to facilitate economic development and 
enhance social welfare. Therefore to bring about development, it requires the institution 
of special, selective policy practices of which industrial policy is but one. While most 
Third World countries have selected successful firms for support, thus, pick winners, 
new policy direction should be for the state to create winners as there are no ready-made 
entrepreneurs to bring about industrial transformation. 
 
Second, there is need for coordination. Industrial policy can and should play an 
important role in resolving the coordination problems that cannot be easily dealt with by 
the market mechanisms. The evidence in the thesis indicates that liberalisation and 
privatisation do not necessarily lead to better performance. The optimal interaction 
between the state and private sector is necessary to realise development. The point is to 
carry out the coordination function competently.   
  
Third, to enhance competitiveness in industry, a certain level of technological mastery is 
necessary. This cannot be left to the market forces. In developing countries like Uganda, 
local industry cannot start from scratch without access to foreign technology. There must 
be state policy to leverage the local firms for acquiring foreign technology cheaply and 
pressurising foreign companies to make joint ventures with local entrepreneurs for them 
to learn. This is due to the fact that the requirements for the acquisition of technology 
are usually beyond individual firms or sectors. It is the state, in the Ugandan context that 
can raise colossal amounts of capital for investment.   
 
Fourth, opponents of industrial policy raise the problem of rent-seeking in case of 
selective industrial policies. It is true that industrial policies can be captured by special 
interest groups as evidence in the privatisation process in this thesis indicates where  it 
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turned out to be a boon for state insiders or government cronies. But the problem of 
rent seeking should not be seen in zero-sum terms. Many problems and costs associated 
with state-created rents may be reduced through appropriate institutional arrangements. 
Rent-seeking should not be regarded as endemic to state intervention per se, but rather 
resulting from specific political conditions. The solution, therefore, lies in more 
fundamental reforms of the socio-political formations.  
 
Fifth, the “new interventionism” as reflected in the practice of industrial policy would 
seek to guide the market not to replace the market. State involvement in economic 
governance is a given. The appropriate question is not “how much” but “what kind” of 
state involvement. The stress, in this case, is to institute public-private interactions. The 
interaction between the private sector and public power is critical. 
 
Sixth, the success of industrial policy depends on the availability of finance targeted to 
the industrial sector.  The sources of finances should be under relative control of the 
national state as the source of finance determines the priority and non-priority of 
industries to be financed. 
 
9.4 Potential Areas for Further Research 
 
By way of conclusion, I would like to point out three potential directions and areas for 
further research: i) changed role of the state, ii) sectoral focus, iii) the notion of 
embedded autonomy. One institution which is critical to creating conditions of industrial 
transformation and yet has been treated ambiguously in the literature and policy practices 
is the state. What this thesis suggests is that we must have another look at the state, 
particularly in its relationship with all social actors in the economy, not just private 
domestic and international capitalists. The state relationship with labour, not in terms of 
living and working conditions but most important in the imparting of skill, is critical for 
competitiveness in the current global context. The acquisition of knowledge and 
development of the state’s bureaucratic capacity are critical in industrial transformation.  
Second, is the issue of sectoral focus at national level in the research on industrial policy.  
A sector as a set of activities unified by some related product groups, share some basic 
knowledge and characteristics. Thus, policy research would be guided by the specific 
conditions, resources and capabilities within particular economic sectors. This could 
enable the drawing of more useful and practical policy alternatives. Third, is the notion 
of embedded autonomy – concrete set of connections that link the state intimately and 
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aggressively to particular social groups with whom the state shares a joint project of 
transformation, is the other important area for further research. Research would look at 
the local context of a given country, examine the expression of the interactive process of 
strategic cooperation between private and public sectors and how policy-makers could 
elicit concrete information on business opportunities and constraints and generate 
innovative policy initiatives. 
 
Finally, inspite of data deficiencies, we appropriately underlined the multi-dimensional 
nature of industrial policy practices, particularly its analytical elaboration. The findings of 
this thesis contribute to understanding the uniqueness and complexity of industrial policy 
practice in countries like Uganda. While we have argued that industrial policy and the 
industrialisation processes are often products of numerous historical, social, economic 
and political considerations, we contend that it has been the predominance of the 
political regime (whether colonial or post-colonial) which, have shaped the character of 
industrial policies over the past 50 or so years of Uganda’s development. 
 
APPENDIX 1: Definitions of Key Concepts 
 
The key concepts applied in the study were defined as a perquisite for crafting an 
analytical framework. 
 
The study of industrial policy and industrialisation in developing countries raises multiple 
theoretical and conceptual issues that have to be defined at the outset as a prerequisite to 
engaging in an analytical framework. The critical concepts include: institutions, 
industrialisation, development, developmentalism, state, developmental state, 
bureaucracy, embedded autonomy, market, late industrialisation, technological learning, 
value chains and upgrading, and industrial policy. 
 
Institutions 
 
Institutions are defined as systematic patterns of shared expectations, taken-for-granted 
assumptions, accepted norms and routines of interactions that have robust effects of 
shaping the motivations and behaviour of sets of interconnected social ties. In modern 
societies, institutions are usually embodied in authoritatively coordinated organisations 
with formal rules and the capacity to impose coercive sanctions, such as the government 
or the firms.1   
 
Development 
 
Development is a process of qualitative change or improvement from conditions of 
deprivation, poverty, hunger, illiteracy, unemployment, inequality and powerlessness to a 
position of autonomous existence and dignity. It implies sustainable increases in per 
capita incomes such that there is generalised social and economic restructuring and 
upgrading.2 In the context of this study, development is purposeful intervention, and that 
is why we are approaching the analysis of industrialisation from a policy perspective, 
especially state policy.  
 
 
Developmentalism 
 
Developmentalism connotes an economic system where a government intervenes in 
markets from the long-run viewpoint in order to promote industrialisation when 
                                                 
1 Chang H-J and Evans P., (2000), “The Role of Institutions in Economic Change” paper prepared for the 
meeting of the “Other Canon” Group, Venice Italy, January 13-14, p.1 
2 Seers, Dudley, (1984), “What are we Trying to Measure?” In Nancy Baster, (ed.), Measuring Development: 
The Role and Adequacy of Development Indicators, London: Frank Cass. 
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necessary, in contrast with the classical system of laissez-faire capitalism where 
government interventions are generally avoided. Industrial policy to prevent excess 
competition in cost-decreasing situation plays the key role in the developmentalist 
regime. It is the existence of a dominant developmental discourse on the priority and 
necessity of industrialisation and of state intervention to promote it.3  
  
The State 
 
The practice of industrial policy connotes state intervention. In state-centric literature, 
the state is defined as “the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive 
system that is capable of restructuring its relation to social groups as well as relations 
among groups”.4  The strength of the state depends on how effectively the state alters 
these structures. To the neo-Weberians, the state is seen as an arena, condensation and 
the crystallisation of social relations within its territories.5  To the neo-Marxists, “the state 
is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities which the ruling class not only 
justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active consent of those 
over whom it rules”.6 
  
Developmental State 
 
A developmental state is defined in political, ideological and institutional terms as “a 
state, which can create and regulate the economic and political relationships that can 
support sustained industrialization” and which “takes the goals of long-term growth and 
structural change seriously, ‘politically’ manages the economy to ease the conflicts 
inevitable during the process of such change (but with a firm eye on the long-term goals), 
and engages in institutional adaptation and innovation to achieve those goals”.7  
 
Bureaucracy 
 
Bureaucracy is a hierarchically organised authority with a specialised administrative staff. 
It is based on a legal-rationality in which legitimacy rests on “a belief in the ‘legality’ of 
                                                 
3 Schneider, Ben., (1999), “The Desarrollista State in Brazil and Mexico, in Woo-Cummings (ed.), The 
Developmental State, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
4 The varying definitions of the state: Stepan, Alfred, (1988), Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern 
Cone, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.4, Mann, M 1989:132 and Gramsci, A 1971:244). 
5 Mann, Michael, (1989), “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results” in 
Hall, John, (ed.) States in History, Oxford: Blackwell, p.132. 
6 Gramsci, Antonio, (1971), Selections from the Prison Notebooks, London: Lawrence and Wishart (translated by 
Q.Hoare), p. 244. 
7 Chang H-J (1999), “The Economic Theory of the Developmental State” in Woo-Cummings, M., (ed.), 
The Developmental State, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p.183 
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patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules 
to issue commands… obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order over 
a given territory”.8 For Weber, these public structures are not of extraneous interest but 
instead, are the key to all of the institutional structures of rational capitalism.9 
 
Embedded Autonomy 
 
Embedded autonomy refers to “a concrete set of connections that link the state 
intimately and aggressively to particular social groups with whom the state shares a joint 
project of transformation”.10  These social ties bind the state to society and provide 
institutionalised channels for continued negotiation and re-negotiation of goals.  
 
The Market 
 
A market “is a mechanism which allows people to trade, normally governed by the 
theory of supply and demand, so allocating resources through a price mechanism”.11 
 
Market failure 
 
Market failure occurs when free markets, operating without any government 
intervention, fail to deliver an efficient allocation of resources. Thus “market failure” 
refers to a situation when the market does not work as is expected of the ideal market.12 
 
 
Late Industrialisation 
 
Late industrialisation is a process of industrial change whose central tendency among 
leading firms is learning rather than invention or innovation of significantly novel 
technology. The general properties of an industrialisation based purely on learning appear 
to be distinct from those of an industrialisation based on pioneering technology.13 In late 
industrialisation, the state plays a strategic role in taming domestic and international 
market forces and harnessing them to national ends. 
                                                 
8 Weber, Max, (1968), Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Guenter Roth and Claus Wittich, 
(eds.), New York: Bedminister Press, p 328. 
9 Evans, P., (1995), Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press), p.29. 
10 Ibid, p.59. 
11  http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/market 
12 Chang, Ha-Joon, (2002), “Breaking the Mould: An Institutionalist Political Economy Alternative to the 
Neo-liberal Theory of the Market and State”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, No.26, p.544. 
13 Amsden Alice, (1989), Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation, New York, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p.4. 
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Technological Learning 
 
Technological learning is “a process by which firms acquire technology. Learning refers 
to mechanisms and processes by which technological progress is brought about. In 
contrast to economic ideas of learning-by-doing, technological learning is dynamic, costly 
process”.14 It means developing industries, which are dynamic, yet do not accord with 
given comparative advantage. 
 
Value Chains and upgrading 
 
Value chain refers to “the productive activities that lead to and support the end use of a 
set of related products or services, including lead firms”.15 A firm’s upgrading involves 
insertion into local and global value chains in such a way as to maximise value creation 
and learning.16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Hobday, Michael, (1995), Innovation in East Asia: The Challenge to Japan, (Aldershot: Edward Elger 
Publishing Limited, p.33 
15 Sturgeon, J. Timothy, (2001), “How do we define value chains and production networks”, IDS Bulletin, 
Vol.32, No.3, p.9. 
16 Gereffi, Gray et al (2001), “Introduction: Globalisation, Value Chains and Development” IDS Bulletin, 
Vol.32 No.3, p.5. 
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APPENDIX 3: TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
 
UGANDA COUNCIL OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (UNCST/UIRI) 
 
1) Major objectives (advise and coordinate the formulation of an explicit national 
technology policy 
 
2) What trade and industrial research that has been carried out by UNCST/UIRI? 
 
3) Which of these was initiated by UNCST/UIRI? 
 
4) What formalized interaction between UNCST/UIRI and the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry exist? (Policy network) 
 
5) How autonomous is UNCST/UIRI? 
 
6) What activist technology policy (promotion of local capacity) has the 
organization engaged in? 
 
7) Does the bureaucracy consult UNCST/UIRI before making decisions on 
technology policy? 
 
8) Technology policy is more than handing out R&D subsidies and tariff protection. 
Does UNCST/UIRI provide an “entrepreneurial vision” which identifies the 
“focal points” around which private sector investment decisions  can be 
coordinated? 
 
9) How is UNCST/UIRI expertise channeled to enterprises/firms? 
 
10) What is the relationship between UNCST/UIRI and Business Associations? 
 
11) What is your view of technology policy in the context of liberalization? 
 
12) What can you say about: 
a) design of technology policy in Uganda 
b) government disciplining of non-performers 
c) changed international context 
 
13) Basic issues: current UNCST/UIRI targets, role and relations with local firms 
particularly as far as R&D is concerned? 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4: PERD – PRIVATISATION INTERVIEW OUTLINE 
 
1) Overview of the privatization process 
 
2) Sales of PE: Who bought and Why? 
 
3) Enterprises returned to former Asian owners 
 
4) Privatization and the promotion of local entrepreneurs  
 
5) Application of the proceeds of privatized enterprises 
 
6) Performance of industries before and after privatization  
 
7) What do you consider to have been successes and failures of the privatization 
process? 
 
8) Specific cases of political interference in the privatization process.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 5: UGANDA INVESTMENT AUTHORITY (UIA) POLICY 
 
1) General investment strategy 
 
2) Processing investment (bureaucratic capacity) 
 
3) Efficacy/effectiveness of the legal system 
 
4) Investment incentives 
 
5) Land law and arbitration  
 
6) Labour/employment conditions (Job Creation) 
 
7) Transfer of technology. 
 
8) Corruption (Costs of doing business in Uganda). 
 
9) Export processing zones (EPZs).  
 
10) Policy on FDI re-investments in Uganda economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 6: INDUSTRIALISTS IN UGANDA – INTERVIEW OUTLINE 
 
1) Overview of Uganda’s Industrial Sector/ Industrial policy environment. 
a) Liberalization policy 
b) Privatization policy  
 
2) Organization of industrialists – Politics in UMA. Relations among firms 
(members) and between UMA and Government. (Issues of trust and 
collaboration). Was UMA industrialists’ initiative or government inspired? 
 
3) Comment on government investment policy with regard to industrialization 
(restrictions on entry and control) 
a) Local industrialists 
b) Foreign investors 
c) Semi-public enterprises 
 
4) Comment government policy towards small and medium firms. 
 
5) Policies that affect industrialization in Uganda: Taxation, Tariffs,  Interest rates, 
Import/export restrictions and utilities (power, water and telegraph) 
 
6) Industrial financing 
a) Government policy to finance industry 
b) Firms financial mobilization 
c) Finance for Research and Development (R&D) 
d) Finance for Skills training in firms 
 
7) Sources of Finance 
a) Original source of finance for the firms 
b) Retained earnings 
c) Borrowed from local banks 
d) International borrowing 
e) Government guaranteed loans 
f) Government Loan Programmes (Bank of Uganda) 
 
8) Problem of industrial competitiveness in both local and foreign markets.   
 
9) Comment on Technology policies of industrial firms in Uganda 
 
10) Comment on government categorization of MTTI as non-core ministry 
 
11)  What do you consider to be the major successes and challenges to Uganda’s 
industrialization at present? 
 
12) Comment on the relations between local and big Asian and foreign industrialists. 
 
13) What could be the way forward for Uganda’s industrialization? 
 
APPENDIX 7: UGANDA MANUFACURERS ASSOCIATION (UMA) 
 
A) Background. 
i) When and why was UMA formed? 
ii) When did you become involved in UMA? 
iii) Total investment manufacturing sector in Uganda. 
B) Policy Environment 
i) What is your view of the general liberalized market environment and its 
impact on the manufacturing sector? 
ii) What is your view of government policy towards industry? 
iii) How is UMA involved in policy making? 
iv) Which other organizations to you collaborate with in your work? 
v) Give an overview of Uganda’s manufacturing industry 
C) Operations of the UMA 
i) What do you consider to be the contribution UMA to manufacturing?  
ii) What services does UMA offer to members?  
iii) What do you consider to be the major obstacles to UMA 
operations/opportunities and challenges? 
iv) Outline your success and failures as an association. 
D) Private-Public Interactions 
i) What forms does your interaction with the state, other private associations 
and the general public take? 
ii) Do you have any relations with research institutions such as Uganda 
Industrial Research Institute (UIRI) and  in fisheries? 
iii) What is the nature of your interaction with Uganda National Bureau od 
Standards (UNBS) or Uganda National Council of Science and Technology 
(UNCST)? 
iv) UMA’s interaction with other associations. 
E) Current Issues  
i) What are the current pressing issues for UMA and the manufacturing 
industry? 
ii) What plans does the UMA have to enhance manufacturing, expoerts and 
expanded investment in industry? 
iii) Have you carried out any evaluations of UMA Operations? Any evaluation 
reports, any relevant association documents. 
F) General Issues 
i) Organizational resources 
ii) Autonomy from government 
iii) Financial autonomy 
iv) Participation in policy formulation and Implementation 
v) Influence on state policy 
vi) Assistance to member firms in terms of  Upgrading (competitiveness, 
technology, marketing and management enhancement) 
vii) Comment on government economic policy – tax, tariffs, interest rates, 
exports, local production, concessions (power, water and telegraph) 
viii) Overall relation between your association and government. 
ix) What are your plans to strengthen your participation in policy making?  
 
 
APPENDIX 8: TEXTILE INDUSTRY POLICY 
 
1) Government policy towards the textile industry 
 
2) Institutions  for textile industry policy-making and implementation 
 
3) Institutions that the MITI collaborates with in the implementation of policy 
 
4) Technology (government/Ministry) support for technology upgrading in textile 
industry 
 
5) What do you consider to be the major impact of the liberalization on the textile 
industry 
 
6) The MITI capacity to implement textile policy 
 
7) Financial mobilization from the textile manufacturers and traders 
 
8) Levels of investment in the textile industry 
 
9) Wage policy towards Textile industry. 
 
 
 
GENERAL ISSUES 
 
a) Textile industry as a sunset industry 
 
b) Politics and the textile industry 
 
c) Liberalization of co-operatives and Lint Marketing Board 
 
d) Technological Dependence 
 
e) Export Orientation (subsidies, local suppliers, labour regime, and performance vs 
support from government).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 9: COTTON DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION 
 
1) What is CDO? 
 
2) CDO and re-organization of the cotton industry (membership) 
 
3) Implications of liberalization of textile industry (LMB and Co-operatives) 
 
4) Organization of cotton production 
 
5) Impact of government policy on taxation on the cotton industry 
 
6) CDO view of Government guarantee of loans (UCGEA 1999) and government 
financial support to the textile industry 
 
7) Views on dumping, smuggling and Second-Hand textiles 
 
8) Views on textile/cotton export policy 
 
9) Textiles and sun-set industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 10: FISHERIES POLICY IN UGANDA INTERVIEW OUTLINE 
 
1) Institutions for fisheries policy-making  and implementation 
 
2) Institutions that fisheries department collaborates with in policy implementation 
and the form of that collaboration 
 
3) Technology: Technical support for fish processing firms from fisheries 
department: institutions and technological upgrading. 
 
4) Government investment in technology capability 
 
5) Impact of liberalization on fishing industry 
 
6) Policy instruments for implementation of fisheries policy 
 
7) Fisheries Department capacity to implement policy 
 
8) Fisheries Department interactions with business associations 
 
9) Policies on sustainability of fisheries production 
 
10) Fisheries Department’s industrial research and development 
 
11) Fisheries quality and standards policy 
 
12) Training and motivation of the management of extension fisheries workers 
 
13) Levels of the investment in fisheries development 
 
14) Fisheries Department interactions with Fish Exporters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 11: Interview schedule for the fish firms 
 
1) Ownership of the firms 
2) Financing of the firms 
3) Creation Employment 
4) Technological and managerial capabilities 
5) Liberalisation of the fish industry  
6) Natural resource base 
7) The problem of over-fishing 
8) Impact on local fisher people/ processors 
9) Public – private interactions 
10) The export orientation of the industry 
11) Dependence on foreign markets 
12) Major successes and problems 
13) The future of the fish processing industry 
14) Views on national fisheries policy 
 
APPENDIX 12: Newspapers and Magazines 
Progressive Groccer 
The Daily Monitor 
The East African 
The New Vision 
The Sunday Monitor  
The Sunday Vision 
The Uganda Herald 
The Weekly Topic 
Uganda Argus  
Uganda Confidential 
The Weekly Observer 
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